Sitrep for Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 2024 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Vuhledar direction in the south of the Donetsk region, the Russian Armed Forces have advanced between the villages of Novoukrainka and Bohoiavlenka, as well as west of the village of Pobieda. The Russian Ministry of Defense officially confirmed the capture of the villages of Shakhtarske, Novoukrainka, and Yasna Poliana.
In the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces are continuing to progress in the pocket near ​​the villages of Kurakhivka and Zoriane, and have advanced west of Tsukuryne.
The Ukrainian DeepState project has already marked the town of Selydove and the village of Vyshneve located to its west as fully captured.
Thus, when looking at this part of the map, one can see a giant "bulge" with the villages of Shakhtarske and Bohoiavlenka on its southern part, and the town of Selydove on the northern. The town of Kurakhove in its center is the main target of the Russian offensive in this part of the Donetsk region.
There has been no noticeable progress in the Kursk region lately, and there has been no combat operations involving North Korean soldiers. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, Ukraine's Permanent Representative Sergiy Kyslytsya claimed the arrival in the Russian Federation of three high-ranking DPRK generals close to Kim Jong-un: the commander of the special forces, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate and the head of the Main Operational Directorate. Their arrival makes the assumption that North Korean military personnel may take part in the war as part of a separate corps, the size of which corresponds to a motorized rifle division of the RuAF, under the command of North Korean generals somewhat more probable. Should that be the case, coordination between Russian and DPRK troops will likely be carried out in field headquarters.
US Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Robert Wood, reported that the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia’s Kursk region has reached 8,000. However, no additional military vehicles have been transferred to the area, and the first combat engagements are expected to occur in the coming days. Should that happen, it would confirm that DPRK soldiers will be used as assault infantry.
Recently published footage from the Kursk direction, near the village of Kremyanoye, appears to show Russian servicemen from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade arriving at a forest line in three armored personnel carriers and disembarking. As the APCs maneuver to return to their positions, they nearly run over the soldiers they had just transported. Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled this assault, and there are no indications that the RuAF progressed in this area of the front.
The RuAF has made no significant gains in the Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar or Toretsk directions. The Russian MoD confirmed the capture of Selydove and claimed, without evidence, to have taken the village of Leonidivka in the Toretsk direction. In a prior sitrep, we discussed Russia’s new tactic of targeting whenever possible the least defended sections of the frontline. In the Kursk region, however, we have observed a pattern of counter offensives in successive waves, with Russian forces making significant progress for three to five days, followed by a calming of the front for up to two weeks as Ukrainian forces mount a response. We are currently observing a similar lull in hostilities in the Kursk, Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions, while active combat continues in the Pokrovsk direction near Selydove, as well as in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions.
After a broad discussion of the shortage of personnel in the AFU, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Litvinenko, said that 1,050,000 people had been mobilized in Ukraine so far, and over 160 thousand more are planned to be drafted in the next three months. It is unclear how the Ukrainian authorities intend to achieve a rapid increase in recruitment to more than 50,000 people per month, given that in October this figure dropped to 20,000.
On Oct. 30, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated in a video address that Ukraine is now producing up to 20 22S2 Bohdana 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers per month.
Previously, on Oct. 1, he had already announced a production rate of 15-20 such SPHs monthly. According to Oryx data, a total of 11 Bohdana howitzers have been lost: seven Mark 3 howitzers and four Mark 4 (more details on the different versions of these systems can be found in this explanatory note). Even if the actual losses are several times higher, with a stated production rate of 240 units per year, the AFU would still have enough domestically produced SPHs. The main concern remains ensuring a sufficient supply of 155mm ammunition, which continues to be an issue.
In one of our previous sitreps, we summarized the news about the construction of four plants by German automotive and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall in Ukraine, where it was reported that the first plant had already been launched and would produce the first batch of 10 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles by the end of the year. Unfortunately, the words of Rheinmetall’s director, Armin Papperger, were mistranslated; in reality, he stated he would like to produce Lynx IFVs in Ukraine, but for now, the plant will be engaged in repairing and servicing various German armored vehicles, while Lynx IFV assembly will take place in another country. In another interview, Papperger mentioned that the first such vehicle would arrive in Ukraine by the end of the year, with the total batch consisting of 10 IFVs. Such inaccuracies complicate our understanding of the AFU’s future capabilities and, consequently, the analysis of the situation on the frontline.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the evening of Oct. 31, the RuAF carried out strikes on the cities of Odesa and Poltava. In Odesa, cluster munition warheads were undoubtedly used—detonations of submunitions are clearly visible and audible in a video from the scene. While it is not possible to geolocate the exact location of this strike, it is worth noting that the use of indiscriminate weapons in residential areas is prohibited, even if military facilities are located there.
On Oct. 30, a Russian munition hit a multi-story residential building in the Saltivskyi district of the city of Kharkiv. This district, located in the north of the city, has been regularly attacked since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Photos and videos of the aftermath show that people continue to stay in buildings that were previously damaged, as evidenced by the plywood covered windows of the affected building.
As a result of this latest strike, three people, including two children, were killed, and another 36 people were injured. The main damage is concentrated on the 3rd or 4th floors, indicating that the building sustained a direct hit. Ukrainian media reported that the munition was a FAB-500 air-dropped bomb equipped with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK). However, we believe the damage pattern is consistent with a smaller munition, such as one of the 250-kg class.
At this time, there is insufficient data to conclude that the strike on this residential building was intentional. However, based on our observations of systematic strikes on regional centers this year, it appears that Russia aims to create as many social problems as possible through terror against the civilian population, with the goal of increasing the pressure of Ukrainian society on its authorities.
A fire broke out at the BAE Systems nuclear submarine plant in the UK. It is currently unknown what caused the fire and whether it was an act of sabotage by Russia.
It is worth noting that when Western countries talk about preventing escalation, they are not primarily talking about the use of nuclear weapons, but about sabotage in Europe. In May 2024 a similar large-scale fire broke out in the Berlin factory of Diehl BGT Defence, which produces GMLRS rockets and missiles for IRIS-T air defense systems. The Western press now believes that Russian intelligence was involved in the fire.
Despite rumors that Qatar-brokered talks between Russia and Ukraine to halt attacks on energy infrastructure have begun, such attacks have not stopped this week. For example, on the night of Nov. 1, a Ukrainian UAV struck an oil depot in Svetlograd, Stavropol region. According to Governor Vladimir Vladimirov, there were no casualties.
Additionally, in the early hours of Nov. 1, drones attacked fuel and energy facilities in Ufa; according to Bashkortostan [Russia’s constituent republic] Governor Radiy Khabirov, there were no casualties or damage.