Sitrep for Nov. 11-13, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces are advancing northwest from the town of Selydove along the Solona River, moving from the village of Vyshneve toward the villages of Hryhorivka, Petrivka and Pustynka.
Fighting continues in the Kursk region, with minimal shifts along the frontline in recent days. However, Russian forces have made slight advances near the village of Darino, south of the village of Lyubimovka. Recent footage often shows Russian armored personnel carriers transporting infantry to Ukrainian-held positions, frequently hitting mines or coming under attack from ATGMs or UAVs. Earlier counterattack waves often featured airborne troop vehicles, such as BMD infantry fighting vehicles; however, APCs now appear to be the primary vehicles in these operations. This change likely reflects a shift from primarily airborne troops to marine units, particularly the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, which is now frequently mentioned in reports.
There are still no verified visual confirmations of North Korean soldiers participating in combat in the Kursk region. Given the quality of available drone footage, identifying the ethnicity of individual soldiers in videos is challenging, and any association with North Korean forces can typically only be confirmed through personal IDs.
This counteroffensive appears to be achieving less initial success than previous ones, where significant areas were recaptured in the first few days. This may be due to the Armed Forces of Ukraine now occupying more fortified positions, enabling them to mount stronger defenses.
Among the Ukrainian units opposing the Russian onslaught is the 47th Mechanized Brigade of the AFU, equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2A2 Bradley IFVs in its service. While the Abrams tanks do not stand out much in terms of combat effectiveness compared to other types of tanks in the current war, the M2A2 Bradley has proven to be the best infantry fighting vehicle in the field. After their deliveries were announced, we assumed that their larger size, particularly their greater height compared to other IFVs used in the war, would make them easier targets for anti-tank missiles. However, most armored vehicles losses in this war are not caused by anti-tank missiles, but by drones, where the height of the target is irrelevant.
Rumors continue to circulate about an allegedly planned RuAF offensive on the Zaporizhzhia axis. We do not see evidence of a troop buildup on this axis. However, recently Russian forces have advanced in the South Donetsk direction, on the Vremevsky ledge, near the villages of Staromaiorske, Rivnopil and Novodarivka, where the AFU conducted their offensive in the summer of 2023. It is worth noting that only Novodarivka is located in the Zaporizhzhia region. We believe that the RuAF will try to retake the territory liberated by Ukrainian forces last year.
In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian troops have advanced near ​​the villages of Kruhliakivka and Kolisnykivka. This has been the most significant advance in recent days in this direction. We now expect the RuAF to continue their attempts to dislodge the AFU from the bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River.
In the Kurakhove direction, the RuAF aim to cut off the N-15 highway connecting the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, with the objective of depriving the AFU of their supply lines sustaining fortified positions around the town of Kurakhove. To achieve this, Russian units are advancing from the village of Maksymivka to the north and the village of Novodmytrivka to the south. South of Kurakhove, Russian forces are pushing toward Dalnie, where fighting has already reached the village itself. Additionally, Russian troops are attempting to secure a foothold in the eastern part of Kurakhove, transporting infantry units with the aid of armored vehicles.
One of the most significant developments in this sector of the front has been the destruction of the Ternivska Dam at the Kurakhove Reservoir, in the village of Stari Terny. It should be emphasized that this structure is a dam, and not a dike, as it artificially restricts the outflow of water necessary for the operation of the Kurakhove Thermal Power Station. Recently published drone footage of the explosion has led us to conclude that the dam was destroyed in a deliberate detonation carried out by Ukrainian forces. By destroying the road that runs over the dam, and connects both banks of the Vovcha River, the AFU are attempting to hinder the advance of Russian forces from Sontsivka toward the village of Dachne. However, even with the crossing gone, Russian troops may still be able to fire on targets located in the area.
The Wall Street Journal has published an article on the Ukrainian operation to dismantle the Kurakhove Thermal Power Station. In the spring of 2024, after weeks of continuous shelling, Russian forces damaged the power station and destroyed the bridge used to transport coal to the facility. As a result, a decision was made to "cannibalize" the plant—removing all valuable components that could be repurposed to repair other power generating plants located farther from the frontline. Although Western nations have been helping with the restoration of damaged power plants, the process has been notably slow. The dismantling effort posed numerous challenges due to the significant weight of many of the components slated for removal, requiring heavy-duty cranes and high-capacity trucks, as well as additional work to reinforce bridges leading to the site. Nevertheless, by the end of the summer, the operation was completed, and the salvaged parts were successfully used to restore other energy infrastructure.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
For about two months now, Russia’s Aerospace Forces have not used Kh-101 cruise missiles with Tu-95MS strategic bombers over Ukraine. This has raised concerns among many that Russia might be stockpiling these missiles in preparation for massive attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the winter, and to strengthen its negotiating position.
On the morning of Nov. 13, Russia carried out a large-scale combined attack, mainly targeting Kyiv and its surrounding area. Reports indicate that two Kh-101 missiles were successfully intercepted over Ukraine during the strike.
On Nov. 11, Russian forces launched a missile attack on a residential area in the city of Kryvyi Rih. The bodies of Olena Kulik and her three children, aged two months, two years and ten years, were pulled from the rubble of a destroyed building. The only family member who survived was Olena’s husband, Maksym Kulik. Another 14 people were injured in the attack.
Belgorod-based Pepel [Ashes] Telegram channel obtained CCTV footage of a UAV striking a five-story building in Belgorod on Nov. 5, which injured two people, damaged 40 apartments and affected 24 vehicles. Still frames from the video show that the UAV was not Ukrainian but Russian, identifiable by the distinct shape and large size of the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, which cannot be mistaken for any Ukrainian drone. The reason for the UAV’s crash on Russian territory remains unknown.
Pro-Russian milblogger Kirill Fyodorov claims that the Russian Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter, downed on Nov. 7, was targeted by a Ukrainian FPV drone lying in wait. Considering the helicopter’s relatively high speed compared to the drone and the significant air turbulence it generates, it seems plausible that an ambush targeting the helicopter at a known takeoff/landing site or in a hover zone would be more likely to succeed than trying to intercept it in full flight.
Western Assistance
France now plans to deliver six Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets to Ukraine at the beginning of 2025, doubling its original commitment of three jets.
Denmark and Ukraine have signed an agreement for the purchase and transfer of Ukrainian 22S2 Bohdana 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers, along with drones, anti-tank and anti-ship weapons for the AFU. To fund the agreement, Denmark will allocate €174 million [$184 million], Sweden will contribute €20 million [$21 million] and an additional €389 million [$411 million] will be covered by income from frozen Russian assets within the EU.
The names of potential nominees for various positions in Donald Trump’s administration are starting to emerge. Senator Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida, is reportedly in the running for the role of secretary of state. Rubio has previously been a vocal advocate for supporting Ukraine and supplying it with arms. However, in recent months, he has shifted his stance, calling for an end to the conflict and asserting that the US is "funding a stalemate war" and that the conflict could setback Ukraine a "100 years."
Mike Waltz is reportedly a candidate for national security advisor. In a recent interview, Waltz stated that Trump’s commitment to initiate negotiations between Ukraine and Russia to end the war is "perfectly reasonable." He also mentioned that if Putin refuses to cooperate, the US has "leverage, like taking the handcuffs off of the long-range weapons we provided Ukraine as well."
In a similar vein, German Chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz has pledged to give Putin an ultimatum to end the war within 24 hours, warning that failure to comply would lead to Germany supplying Ukraine with Taurus KEPD 350 long-range missiles and allowing strikes on Russian territory. However, these declarations are unlikely to be perceived as a serious threat: potential strikes on storage facilities or command centers do not pose a direct threat to Putin, and the loss of a few soldiers and military equipment is unlikely to compel him to end the war.
It is anticipated that Trump will nominate US National Guard veteran and Fox News host Pete Hegseth as the US secretary of defense. He is known for making notably hawkish statements on foreign policy. However, bringing such "hawks" into the president's administration does not necessarily mean that additional weapons will be supplied to Ukraine in support of a full victory. Trump reportedly wants to stop spending resources on the war in Ukraine and focus on confronting Iran and China. It is worth noting, however, that Trump's first term was marked by frequent personnel changes, and nominees could still change before the inauguration.
Poland seeks to forge an alliance to secure continued support for Ukraine during Trump’s presidency to prevent any possibility of Ukraine’s capitulation. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk plans to hold meetings with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Scandinavian and Baltic countries are also expected to be invited to join the alliance.
Photos from the funeral of Major General Pavel Klimenko, who died in a motorcycle crash in the Donetsk region on Nov. 6, have been published. They confirm that he was posthumously awarded the Hero of Russia title.
Journalists from Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] have published a large investigation into regional budgets. In the third year of the full-scale war with Ukraine, Russian regions are spending an average of 13% of their social spendings on sign-up bonuses for new contract soldiers. If payments for injuries and regional death gratuities for families of killed soldiers are taken into account, almost a quarter (23%) of all social payments in the regions is now directed to war participants. In some regions, this share is even higher—every other "social" ruble goes to war participants and families of those killed in action, and in some cases, they receive more than half of the corresponding regional budget. In peacetime, this money would have been spent on helping orphans, large families, veterans, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. The largest share of social support paid to war participants and families of KiAs is in the Stavropol region, where 83% of all social payment funds are allocated to military personnel. Specifically, 2 billion rubles [$20.40 million], or 21% of all social spendings in the region, went to new contract soldiers, which is 12 times more than what was allocated to orphans. In Karachay-Cherkessia [Russia’s constituent republic], war participants and families of KiAs received 75% of all social payments, and in the Kaluga region, 52%.
In Kursk, the Leninsky District Court fined Andrey Gerasimenko, a resident of a village captured by the AFU, 20,000 rubles [$200] for organizing an "unauthorized" protest of refugees from the Sudzha district.
In today’s livestream, we will be raffling off a signed copy of Evgeny Feldman’s Dreamers Against Cosmonauts among our subscribers.