Sitrep for Dec. 4-6, 2024 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
On the Vremivka salient, after the Russian Armed Forces partially encircled the village of Velyka Novosilka, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched a counterattack and reclaimed the village of Novyi Komar. A recent video shows Russian soldiers retreating across fields, while another shows a flag-raising photo op by the AFU's 48th Separate Assault Battalion, which successfully mopped-up Novyi Komar.
At the same time, Russian forces captured the village of Blahodatne, located south of Velyka Novosilka. Further south, the village of Makarivka is now partially encircled, but the Mokri Yaly River is slowing its capture.
In the Kurakhove direction, Ukrainian forces remain in a dangerous position in the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River, frequently highlighted in our recent reports. However, Russian forces have not yet succeeded in completely encircling them. The RuAF continue to gradually push Ukrainian forces out, having taken Yelyzavetivka and advanced toward Romanivka and Uspenivka. Ukrainian forces are now likely withdrawing from the remaining villages.
Russian forces are also advancing in the villages of Sukhi Yaly and Kostiantynopilske, though further progress will be impeded by water. A similar situation exists in the village of Stari Terny, where a crossing has been destroyed. However, the RuAF can now fire on targets along the N-15 highway. Russian forces are steadily occupying the eastern parts of Kurakhove. Meanwhile, the previously rapid advance toward the N-15 highway near the villages of Kostiantynopil and Andriivka has significantly slowed in recent days.
A funny video from the frontline has emerged, showing a cyclist riding ahead of a Russian infantry fighting vehicle across a field. Pro-Russian military blogger Kirill Fyodorov suggested the cyclist might be acting as a guide to spot anti-tank mines. Such cases highlight the lack of anti-mine trawls and specialized demining equipment.
War in Syria
In our sitreps, we plan to focus exclusively on events in the Syrian war that directly affect Russia’s military capabilities and, consequently, its war against Ukraine. For broader coverage of the Syrian conflict, we recommend following Ruslan Leviev's Telegram channel.
Anti-Assad forces have captured a modern Russian radar system, the Podlet-K1, which operates in conjunction with the S-400 and S-300 SAM systems and helps them target fast, low-flying objects such as Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles or R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles. While we do not believe that this equipment will be used by militants against Russian aircraft, for instance, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham may hand it over—or trade it— with Turkey or the United States. Previously, the US was able to acquire a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system captured in Libya, gaining insight into how to devise countermeasures against it. It is worth noting that another Pantsir-S1 was seized by militants in Syria just a few days ago.
Another issue indirectly linked to Syria and Russia concerns the Bosporus Strait, which Turkey could reopen to Russian military ships traveling from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean (e.g., to Syria’s shores) if the Russia-Ukraine war is frozen. Article 21 of the Montreux Convention states that Turkey may close the strait if its leadership considers the country to be under immediate military threat. As we understand it, this decision ultimately is at President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discretion.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In early October, we reported on the widespread use of drones against civilians in the city of Kherson and its suburbs, though the available data at the time did not fully capture the scale of the attacks. Since then, this topic has attracted the attention of many media outlets, including major global publications. For example, according to the Financial Times, there have been 9,500 drone attacks targeting this area over the past four months (since early August). As a result, at least 37 people have been killed and 494 more have been injured, including 7 children. September saw the highest toll, with 155 civilians injured, 12 killed and 2,748 strikes recorded—the most in any single month. As the Financial Times based its analysis on data collected from open sources, the actual number of victims may be even higher.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Journalists from Meduza [international Russian-language online media outlet] have discovered that, according to the Russian national budget expenditure report, the number of volunteer fighters signing contracts with the MoD significantly decreased in the third quarter of 2024. While more than 90,000 individuals signed contracts in the second quarter, only 50,000–60,000 did so in the third. This decrease occurred despite the fact that, starting in August, the payment for signing contracts was at least doubled—from 195,000 rubles [$1,916] to 400,000 rubles [$3,930] from the national government, not including increases in regional payments. On average, the MoD recruited about 600–700 individuals per day in the third quarter, which, according to the article's headline, may be fewer than current losses. However, in our opinion, this conclusion does not fully correspond to the level of irreversible losses observed in recent months. Nevertheless, Meduza's broader conclusion—that the rate of recruitment now barely compensates for losses, does not allow the RuAF to accumulate significant reserves, but is also unlikely to lead to a sharp "collapse"—closely matches our assessment.
In the Saratov region, payments of 500,000 rubles [$4,910] for signing a contract with the MoD will continue in 2025. Governor Roman Busargin described next year’s budget as "one of the most challenging in recent years," highlighting that 60% of all expenditures are allocated to the social sector. It is worth noting that payments to war participants and families of those killed in action make up, on average, nearly a quarter of all social payments in the regions, and in some regions, this share reaches 83%.
About a year ago, the Russian military began cracking down on the use of civilian vehicles donated by volunteers that were not officially registered with military units. Officials cited numerous traffic accidents involving these vehicles, some of them fatal, as the rationale for the policy. In recent weeks, the issue has escalated, sparking widespread debate on pro-Russian Telegram channels. Some bloggers report that not only are civilian vehicles being confiscated, but their owners are being reassigned to assault units—an apparent strategy to replenish troop numbers. We concur that this approach risks undermining operational effectiveness, as the number of military-registered vehicles and trained drivers remains insufficient to meet the military’s logistical needs.
In Ukraine, the public discourse around the issue of desertion in the AFU continues to rage, a topic highlighted in a previous sitrep. The recent signing of a law decriminalizing the first instance of abandonment of duty has encouraged large numbers of soldiers who had gone AWOL to return to service. Viacheslav Smirnov, the head of recruitment for the AFU’s 47th Brigade, noted that within two weeks of the announcement, applications surged to such an extent that staff could not process them all. Two military units told Reuters that they were only accepting soldiers who deserted from bases rather than combat positions, as the latter is considered a more serious offense. Deputy Chief of the Main Department of the Military Law and Order Service of the AFU, Colonel Oleksandr Grynchuk, stated that 6,000 deserters had returned over the past month, with 3,000 reporting back within 72 hours of the law’s adoption. Mykhailo Perets, an officer in the K-2 Battalion of the 54th Brigade, revealed that his battalion had accepted more than 30 soldiers who had deserted from other units.
We believe that addressing the root causes of service avoidance and desertion from the frontline would be more effective than the Biden administration's proposal to lower the draft age in the AFU to 18 years old.
Yurii Butusov, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian publication Censor.net, stated that, according to Ukraine's General Staff, the AFU has lost 70,000 soldiers killed and 35,000 missing in action over the past three years. Considering that most of the missing are likely deceased, the total death toll exceeds 100,000, which aligns with our rough estimate.
Notably, the UALosses project currently lists slightly more than 60,000 confirmed KIAs by name.
Ukrainian sources have reported the death of Yevhen Matveyev, the 63-year-old mayor of Dniprorudne in the Zaporizhzhia region, who was abducted in March 2022 and had been in detention since then. His body was recently returned to Ukraine as part of an exchange in which Russia handed over 502 bodies of deceased Ukrainians. The conditions under which Russia detains prisoners of war and abducted civilians can be described as torture. Therefore, it is plausible that Matveyev either succumbed to torture or to a combination of harsh conditions and lack of adequate medical care. This is not the first instance of abducted Ukrainian civilians dying in Russian captivity. In October, reports emerged of the death of Ukrainian journalist Viktoria Roshchyna under similar circumstances.
Western Assistance
At the end of November, President Joe Biden requested Congress to allocate an additional $24 billion in funding for Ukraine in 2025. In response, Speaker of the House Mike Johnson stated that he does not plan to bring the issue to a vote. According to Johnson, lawmakers intend to wait until Donald Trump takes office and then adopt his strategy for Ukraine.
Andrii Yermak, head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, met in Washington with Keith Kellogg, Trump's nominee for a negotiating role in the Russia-Ukraine war, and Michael Waltz, Trump's future National Security Advisor. According to sources cited by The Wall Street Journal, Kellogg supported the Biden administration's decision to expedite weapons deliveries to Ukraine, arguing that this would provide Trump with additional leverage in negotiations with Russia. However, Trump's team reportedly does not plan to offer Ukraine NATO membership.
On Dec. 3, ahead of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring that any security guarantees alternative to NATO membership are unacceptable.
Meanwhile, Pete Hegseth, in an effort to secure his nomination as US Secretary of Defense, has promised Republican senators that he would quit drinking if they confirm his candidacy.
In Finland, the Prosecutor's Office has requested a life sentence for Yan Petrovsky, founder of the Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group Rusich [an openly neo-Nazi Russian volunteer unit], which has been fighting on Russia's side since 2014. Petrovsky was detained in July 2023 and faces five counts of war crimes, all of which he denies. The charges relate to events in the Luhansk region in September 2014. Investigators determined that Petrovsky, serving as the group's deputy commander, ordered the execution of 22 soldiers from Ukraine's Aidar unit and personally executed some of them. Evidence includes photos and videos recorded by Rusich mercenaries themselves, as well as testimonies from survivors of the incident. One survivor stated that Petrovsky executed wounded Ukrainians lying on the ground who were begging for mercy. Two other witnesses confirmed that the executed soldiers pleaded for their lives before being killed.
