Sitrep for Oct. 4-7, 2024 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces have occupied most of Tsukuryne; fighting over the remainder of the village continues.

In the southern part of the Donetsk region, Russian Forces are trying to advance along a line of settlements located near the Sukhi Yaly River. Recent footage shows fighting near the village of Kostiantynivka, northeast of Vuhledar, where the attack was successfully repelled. According to Ukrainian sources, two Russian tanks and six armored vehicles were destroyed.

There have also been minor developments in the Kursk region, where the Russian counteroffensive that began on Sept. 11 quickly stalled after a small advance along the western edge of the Ukrainian bridgehead. However, in the past few days, Russian forces, after liberating the village of Obukhovka on Oct. 2, managed to advance northeast towards the village of Lyubimovka.

A video has emerged confirming that the RuAF have reduced the size of their assault groups from 10-20 soldiers to just four. This was initially reported in an article by the Washington Post. In the footage, a likely shell-shocked Russian soldier, who arrived in a trench occupied by fellow servicemen, mentioned that four groups of four soldiers each participated in the assault, and only he survived. The involvement of several small assault groups in attacks forces Ukrainian artillery to expend more ammunition than would be needed to confront a single compact assault group of 20 soldiers.

The independent researcher Naalsio published an analysis of equipment losses in the Pokrovsk direction from Sept. 6 to Oct. 4. Notably, Russian losses are predictably much higher than Ukrainian ones: over the past month, the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost six tanks, while the RuAF lost 25. Ukraine lost 15 infantry fighting vehicles, while Russia lost 59. It is worth noting that it is normal for the attacking side to suffer significantly higher losses compared to the defending side. However, when looking at the statistics over the past year, Russia has lost more than 500 tanks and over 1,000 IFVs in this direction alone—and these are just visually confirmed losses. According to our estimates, around 1,200 to 1,500 new and refurbished tanks are being delivered to the front annually. The shortage of modern tanks became evident about a year ago, when T-54/55 tanks started appearing on the frontline.

In addition, The Times reported that North Korea is now supplying Russia with roughly half of the 3 million shells that the RuAF use annually, amounting to about 1.5 million. Based on available data, we are unable to independently assess the rate of supply from North Korea.

We also do not rule out the possibility that, if active combat operations continue, Russia may begin purchasing armored vehicles from its allies.

The General Staff of the AFU reported strikes using Storm Shadow cruise missiles and HIMARS MLRS against the command posts of the 35th and 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the RuAF, as well as the command post of the 2nd Combined Arms Army. The only geolocated proof available is footage from the town of Avdiivka, showing strikes on industrial buildings near a railroad. While it is plausible that these buildings were used for military purposes, there is no direct evidence yet confirming that a command post was located there. Moreover, judging by reports in specialized groups about the search for missing soldiers from the 27th Brigade in the first half of September in the Kupiansk direction, it seems unlikely that the brigade was in Avdiivka at the time. However, it is possible that the General Staff of the AFU has not released all available footage of the strikes.

On Oct. 5, a newly developed Russian S-70 Okhotnik-B heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) was shot down over Kostiantynivka in the Donetsk region, west of the town of Chasiv Yar. Footage from the scene shows two aerial vehicles flying at high altitude when one fires an air-to-air missile at the other, followed by a crank maneuver. The Russian side claims that a Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft shot down the malfunctioning UCAV—a statement many expected, as the interception of such an advanced UCAV by a Ukrainian aircraft would be a significant blow to Russia’s military prestige.

Footage of the falling aircraft confirms that the object was indeed an S-70 UCAV, debunking earlier speculations that a Russian Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft had been shot down. Additional geolocated images from the crash site in Kostiantynivka reveal a pixelated camouflage pattern on the fuselage, matching reference photos of the S-70. This marks the first confirmed appearance of the Okhotnik UCAV on the frontline. Previously, the RuAF had only released test footage of the aircraft, including video of an FAB-500 bomb drop at a training range in the Astrakhan region. Images from the crash site also reveal a cone-shaped fragment resembling the warhead of a Universal Inter-Branch Gliding Munition (UMPB).

Although pre-invasion reports indicated that the S-70 was close to being operational, it likely never officially entered service with the RuAF due to shifting military budgetary priorities caused by the war in Ukraine.

The aircraft that shot down the UCAV was flying at a high altitude dangerously close to the frontline. The pro-Russian Fighterbomber Telegram channel, linked to the Russian Aerospace Forces, claimed that the interceptor plane was a 5th-generation Su-57 multirole fighter jet, which features a reduced radar signature compared to earlier models. Su-57s have previously been reported by the Ukrainian side operating near the frontline.

A video has emerged showing a Russian UAV dropping a munition on a civilian vehicle in Kherson. Unfortunately, this has become a common practice, leading us to conclude that the terrorization of civilians is being carried out deliberately. Telegram channels led by Russian drone operators have published numerous posts demonstrating that they are specifically targeting civilian vehicles and individuals. Some channels have even published posts blackmailing civilians with threats of such strikes and demanding that they reveal the location of Ukrainian military personnel. Even if the Russian command did not issue such orders and was unaware of such actions by its subordinates, it can be at the very least accused of negligence. All participants in war crimes must bear full responsibility.

Additionally, photos of the aftermath of a Russian strike with a drone-dropped munition on a civilian bus in the Sumy region have been published.

The 12th Operational Brigade of Ukraine's National Guard, Azov, published a video showing the interrogation of Russian POW Vyacheslav Delyagin, member of the Storm unit. Delyagin claims that he did not want to fight but, after receiving a draft notice for mobilization, felt he had no other choice. He described the harsh conditions in his unit, stating that soldiers sent on assault missions were shown no pity. Many of the wounded were left without medical assistance and died from sepsis, while the evacuation of wounded and killed soldiers was neglected. As a result, according to Delyagin, the entire frontline was strewn with the bodies of those killed.

According to Delyagin, during fighting for the village of Niu-York in the Donetsk region, commanding officers ordered soldiers not to take prisoners and to execute captured Ukrainian soldiers—a practice that became common. He also mentioned that this approach was used on Russian soldiers as well: when a group of soldiers refused to storm enemy positions, they would be given a "red card," and if the next group moving to their position found them there, they would be ordered to execute them. We consider this story relatively plausible, as we have repeatedly seen evidence of Russian soldiers being executed for refusing to obey orders, as well as for other offenses.

Previously, when asked by journalists, we typically responded that there was no clear evidence that the execution of prisoners of war was a systemic strategy of the RuAF, assuming these were isolated incidents. Now, the evidence suggests that the practice is widespread. The fact that commanders do not stop such behavior makes them accomplices in war crimes. One of the tasks of our team in the coming years will be to assist in their investigation and ensure all those involved are brought to justice.

Additionally, the 12th Brigade released a drone video taken near Niu-York, showing Russian soldiers leading Ukrainian soldiers out of a cellar and executing them.

RIA Novosti [Russian state-owned news agency] published a report from Vuhledar in which Lieutenant General Roman Grekov made a slip, referring to the "capture" of the city rather than its "liberation," as is customary in Russian propaganda. The report also omitted any mention of the cost or losses incurred during the capture of Ukrainian cities.

Ildar Dadin, a Russian opposition activist who fought for Ukraine, has been reported killed in combat in the Kharkiv region. Since 2011, Dadin had been detained more than 50 times at rallies and pickets, and in 2015, he became the first person convicted under the article on repeated violations of rally regulations, receiving a 3-year sentence in a penal colony. His term was later reduced to two and a half years. For additional details on what is currently known, see our mobilization summary.

Western Assistance

In late May 2024, it was reported that Sweden was going to transfer its entire fleet of decommissioned Pbv 302 infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine. On Oct. 6, a video emerged from the Czech Republic showing a train carrying such IFVs, likely heading towards Ukraine.

The Netherlands’ Minister of Defense Ruben Brekelmans has announced that his country has allocated €400 million [$439 million] for the purchase of drones for Ukraine. According to Brekelmans, at least half of these drones will be manufactured in the Netherlands. If this is really the case, far fewer drones will likely be delivered to Ukraine than if they were produced in other countries, as military production in Europe is usually much more expensive.

Brekelmans also mentioned the delivery of the first batch of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. It is worth noting that he was referring to the aircraft that were actually delivered to Ukraine in midsummer. At that time, only certain sources provided the information about the country of origin of the batch, but it has now been officially confirmed. The Netherlands is planning to deliver 24 F-16 fighters to Ukraine by the end of the year.

In 2015, scientists from Columbia University published the results of a multi-year study on indoctrination, which involved children and adolescents in Germany who were raised during the Third Reich. The study revealed that those who were subjected to Nazi indoctrination in childhood remained under its influence throughout their lives and, as adults, demonstrated a strong commitment to Nazi ideology. In contrast, the indoctrination had less impact on adolescents. According to psychologists, younger schoolchildren absorbed information uncritically, while adolescents often rejected much of what was conveyed by adults due to their age-related nihilism.

We believe that the indoctrination of Russian children is a serious problem that must be addressed, including by the anti-war movement. Previously, "Talking About Important Things" [a compulsory lesson held every Monday in schools across the country] was conducted only in schools; however, there are now plans to hold them in kindergartens as well.