Sitrep for Nov. 29-Dec. 2, 2024 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In recent days, the Russian Armed Forces have continued their advance on the Vremivka salient, gradually encircling the village of Velyka Novosilka. While the situation on the western flank remains unchanged, the RuAF have made notable progress on the eastern flank, moving southward near the village of Blahodatne. They have also managed to break through from Rozdolne toward the village of Novyi Komar, located north of Velyka Novosilka.
In the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces have nearly reached the village of Stari Terny on the northern shore of the Kurakhove Reservoir. It is worth noting that in early November, Ukrainian forces destroyed the dam in Terny eliminating a crossing over the Vovcha River. The RuAF will now need to establish a new crossing to reach the N-15 highway. No significant progress has been observed from Rozdolne toward Kostiantynopil in the south, leaving it unclear where exactly Russian forces plan to cut the highway. However, they are already close enough to exert fire control over it.
In the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River, south of the town Kurakhove, there have been no notable changes, but Russian forces continue their advance within the town itself.
In the Kupiansk direction, in northern Kharkiv region, Russian forces established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil River near the village of Novomlynsk last week. More recently, they managed to cross the river further downstream near the village of Masiutivka, south of the urban-type settlement of Dvorichna. This advance is intended to support future attacks on Kupiansk, a town divided by the river into two parts.
A video has emerged showing a Russian FPV kamikaze drone striking an M2A2 Bradley IFV stuck in mud (misidentified in the source as a Marder 1A3 IFV) geolocated north of the village of Novoivanovka in the Kursk region. The infantry fighting vehicle apparently had driven off into a ravine and got stuck. The drones targeted the side of the vehicle protected with BRAT [Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles], and were consequently unable to cause significant damage, despite claiming to have destroyed the armored vehicle. It is this explosive reactive armor that allows the Bradley IFV to remain one of the most protected vehicles used in this war.
A K2 Battalion serviceman from the 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has published a video showing attempts to dig out a T-72B tank out of frozen mud in the Siversk direction in the Luhansk region. Temperature fluctuations—above zero degrees Celsius [32ºF] during the day and light frost at night—lead to the mud freezing around the tracks of armored vehicles that remain static overnight. This significantly complicates their movement in the morning.
The 3rd Assault Brigade of the AFU claimed the destruction of a North Korean Bulsae-type self-propelled ATGM launcher as a result of combat operations "on the borders of the Kharkiv region." However, the quality of the video does not allow us to identify the targeted vehicle.
The Brigade's Telegram channel called it a Bulsae-4 ATGM system, but some sources indicate that the name refers to a portable anti-tank missile system, while the launcher shown in the video is called "Bulsae-6," and the entire system is presumably called Chunma-1. The launcher is based on the Soviet BTR-80 APC, and features a three-axle chassis. In July of this year, a similar self-propelled ATGM launcher was spotted in the Belgorod region bordering the Kharkiv region, therefore, the newly destroyed vehicle was likely also operating in that area.
South Korean intelligence reported on the supply of Bulsae-4 M-2018 NLOS ATGM to Russia at the end of October.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the early hours of Dec. 1, a Ukrainian drone struck a residential building in the Bryansk region. According to Governor Alexander Bogomaz, a child was killed in the incident. While he claimed it was a deliberate strike, we believe the UAV either accidentally hit the building or was driven off course by air defense systems or electronic warfare measures.
In the early hours of Dec. 2, during another UAV raid over Ukrainian territory, a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition hit a residential building in Ternopil, killing one person and injuring three others.
In a previous sitrep, we discussed how missile fragments can indicate whether a missile was intercepted by air defenses, using the example of the ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles functioning as intended in the Kursk region. An example of an intercepted missile can be seen in the images of a 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missile debris shot down over Ukraine on Nov. 28. The missile fragments are riddled with small holes caused by the prefabricated fragments of a surface-to-air missile.
The Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel reported another HIMARS MLRS strike on a ceremonial assembly marking the anniversary of the 83rd Separate Airborne Assault Brigade of the RuAF in the Kursk region. It is possible that Ukrainian forces learned about the event in advance, perhaps through radio intercepts. The strike, reportedly using cluster munitions (we believe GMLRS was more likely used than ATACMS tactical ballistic missile), resulted in 12 soldiers killed and 25 wounded.
Western Assistance
Although South Korea does not provide military aid to Ukraine, Ukraine receives $100 million in concessional financing from the Republic of Korea to support social services.
In the course of his unannounced visit to Kyiv, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has revealed that Germany will supply €650 million [$681 million] worth of weapons to Ukraine.
Typically, German military aid packages are much smaller in volume, therefore the aid will likely be spread over a number of packages. What exactly is included is not known, but we will certainly not see long-range Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missiles among the items delivered. At a joint press-conference Scholz and Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with a sixth IRIS-T system and Sea King helicopters. Also, before the end of the year, Ukraine will receive more Patriot launchers and Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.
The Associated Press, citing Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office, reported that over 100,000 servicemen of the AFU have been accused of desertion, with 60,000 of these cases occurring in the past year. The article also includes statements from an official noting that, in some cases, entire units abandoned combat positions, allowing the enemy to flank the AFU—actions that have sometimes resulted in execution of prisoners of war.
In a Financial Times article examining the reasons for abandoning positions, key factors mentioned include a severe lack of equipment and ammunition, as well as the absence of rotation. Deserting soldiers in the Mykolaiv region even started a public protest demanding additional training and more weapons. According to the soldiers, they were sent to Vuhledar armed only with assault rifles.
In an interview with Sky News, President Zelenskyy stated that, as of now, Western partners have fully equipped only 2.5 brigades out of the promised 10. In one of his recent podcasts, analyst Michael Kofman mentioned that the weapons already delivered and those contracted for delivery would suffice for 4–6 brigades.
Vadym Ivchenko, a member of Ukraine's parliamentary defense committee, stated in the aforementioned FT article that about 20% of deserters return. According to one brigade, the introduction of a chatbot designed to assist deserters in returning to service yielded several hundred responses. The Ukrainian government is implementing various measures to bring deserters back. For example, those who fled for the first time and voluntarily returned are not punished. Returning soldiers are initially assigned to reserve brigades for better preparation for combat operations.
The suggestion by officials in the Biden administration to lower the mobilization age in the AFU to 18 seems absurd to us, as reducing the age to 25 in May this year has not resulted in a noticeable influx of young men aged 25-30 to the frontline.
Janne Jaakkola, Finland’s Defense Forces Commander, has stated that his country is considering a withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines. In the war in Ukraine, mines, including anti-personnel ones, have proven to be an effective means of containing enemy advances, especially if there is a shortage of equipment and munitions. Therefore, considering the threat of Russia’s invasion and an absence of guaranteed US aid after Trump’s inauguration, Finland’s decision seems to be reasonable. It cannot be ruled out that some countries might also decide to withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions which have likewise proven to be a good means to contain the enemy.
VGTRK [state-owned Russian television and radio broadcasting company] correspondent Olga Kurlaeva has published a report on the BARS (Special Combat Army Reserve) volunteer unit in the Belgorod region. During filming, they spotted a UAV in the air, claimed it was a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone, and shot it down using rifles. In reality, it turned out to be a Russian drone belonging to the Sever [North] military group, valued at over 10 million rubles [$93,600]. This incident highlights both the lack of effective communication between nearby Russian military units and their inability to correctly identify UAVs.
War in Syria
We have been monitoring Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war and publishing investigations since mid-2015, therefore, we have decided to also devote some attention to current developments. Last week, anti-Assad forces launched attacks from Idlib province towards Aleppo.
One of the main offensive groups, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is designated as a terrorist organization in the United States and many European countries. HTS was formed from the merger of Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda), which aimed to overthrow the Assad government and establish a caliphate in Syria, and other Islamist factions. HTS is led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani, a former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra. He declared a break with al-Qaeda, stating his intent to establish an Islamist order based on Sharia law not globally, but only within Syria. In recent years, HTS has governed the Idlib province and gained some local support due to its relative moderation: unlike the Assad regime, it has not carried out mass repressions, has undertaken administrative functions, and has cooperated with humanitarian organizations.
Although Turkey also designates HTS as a terrorist organization, the group has occasionally formed tactical alliances, such as with the Syrian National Army, which serves Turkish interests and controls part of northern Syria. This area provides a buffer zone between Kurdish-controlled territories and Turkey.
Mid-last week, a video surfaced showing a deceased Russian soldier. Based on a Toyota Hilux pickup purchased from a dealer near Moscow and specific gear, the soldier was identified as a member of Russia’s Special Operations Forces. Next to the body was a crate of FPV drones, suggesting the soldier was likely assisting government forces with UAV operations.
The rapid advance of anti-Assad forces culminated on Nov. 30, when they reportedly captured most, if not all, of Aleppo with little resistance. On Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian Air Force conducted airstrikes against targets in the city. Footage from the ground reveals the strikes targeted armed individuals, likely affiliated with militant groups, but also hit busy roads with civilian vehicles—evidence of indiscriminate attacks. This may partially stem from poor-quality intelligence available to Russian forces. However, it is worth noting that indiscriminate airstrikes have been a hallmark of Russian operations in Syria over the years, irrespective of intelligence accuracy.
Over the past few days, anti-Assad groups have made significant advances and now hold near-total control of Idlib province, including the cities of Maarat al-Nu’man and Khan Shaykun, with further incursions into northern Hama province. The fighting has led to the capture of four airfields, some of which contained Russian equipment. Images have surfaced of militants posing near a Pantsir-S1 SAM system and a BM-27 Uragan MLRS, although it is unlikely that significant quantities of munitions were left behind.
Experts question whether the militants possess the expertise to operate the Pantsir-S1 system effectively, though they might repurpose its 30mm autocannons, which are compatible with ammunition used by BMP-2 IFVs.
The advances seem to have been primarily achieved through surprise tactics, similar to the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region on Aug. 6. In that instance, the unexpected start of operations allowed Ukrainian forces to quickly capture a significant area, but they subsequently stalled and could not make further progress. Some commentators suggest that opposition forces in the Daraa province might join the conflict, as certain groups have retained weapons despite the province being nominally under Assad regime control. It is worth noting that in 2013, the key events of the Syrian civil war began in this very province. However, there are currently no indications of such developments.
The primary factors contributing to the current escalation of the conflict include significant vulnerabilities faced by Assad's two main allies. Russia has become deeply engaged in the war in Ukraine, withdrawing nearly all of its forces from Syria. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has been weakened by Israel's operations in Lebanon and airstrikes targeting the group's assets in Syria.
We believe that aside from airstrikes, Russia currently has limited means to assist Assad's regime. Military equipment and ground forces are in short supply, with Ukraine remaining the top priority for the Russian army. It is possible that a small number of troops from the so-called "African Corps" (a legacy of the Wagner Group) may be deployed to Syria, but given its small size, such a move is unlikely to have a significant impact on the situation.
Assad's opponents generally lack substantial air defense capabilities, relying primarily on trucks equipped with anti-aircraft guns, as well as Chinese or North Korean man-portable air defense systems. As a result, they are unable to effectively counter aircraft operating at high altitudes.Russian aviation in Syria typically avoids flying at dangerously low altitudes, and we do not anticipate militants being able to shoot it down.
For Iran, preserving the "Shia Crescent" [a corridor of Shia groups through Iraq and Syria used to supply weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon] is critical. Therefore, it is likely that Iran will urgently deploy forces to assist Assad in order to prevent Sunni forces from achieving significant advances. Previously, Iran has recruited militants from Shia minorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan for this purpose.