Sitrep for Nov. 13-15, 2024 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the southern part of the Donetsk region, as combat continues to intensify in this direction over the past few days, the Russian Armed Forces have captured the village of Rivnopil and are advancing near the Vremivka salient, close to the villages of Staromaiorske and Makarivka.

In the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces are progressing along the northern shore of the Kurakhove Reservoir, having captured the village of Illinka and are now advancing toward the village of Berestky. Additionally, attempts to encircle Ukrainian forces near the Sukhi Yaly River continue, with advances from the north near the village of Dalnie, where the RuAF has gained a foothold, and from the south near the village of Maksymivka. Sources within the Ukrainian military report that despite the apparent necessity of withdrawing from this pocket, no such orders have been issued yet. Meanwhile, north of the captured village of Bohoiavlenka, several units of the 37th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are reportedly engaged in combat with Russian forces. They have likely been deployed there to slow the Russian advance and stabilize the situation on this part of the frontline.

In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces unexpectedly broke through to the eastern outskirts of Kupiansk, approximately 4 to 5 kilometers [2.5-3 mi] from the nearest RuAF positions, using two columns of armored vehicles.

They have entered residential areas and deployed infantry, though some were destroyed. Reports indicate that Russian soldiers were eventually pushed out of the town, but the very fact that such a breakthrough took place highlights weaknesses in the AFU defense in this area. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that some Russian soldiers had disguised themselves in Ukrainian uniforms, which was considered as perfidy. It is worth noting that Russia introduced new MultiCam-patterned military uniforms this year, which are also standard in the AFU; however, these uniforms have not been widely distributed among the RuAF. Since it is quite possible that some Russian soldiers looked similar to Ukrainian soldiers because of this uniform, we are skeptical about the statement of the AFU General Staff.

According to statements from the US Department of State and South Korean intelligence, North Korean soldiers are allegedly participating in combat in the Kursk direction, though no visual evidence of their involvement has yet been presented. Russian forces have made minor gains in the southeastern part of the Kursk bridgehead, partially recapturing the village of Plekhovo. Fighting continues in the northern part of the bridgehead near the village of Pogrebki, where the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade of the RuAF is engaged.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

A video has been published showing a captured Buryat contract soldier from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade. He told Ukrainian forces that he had signed a contract in Moscow on Oct. 15 while under the influence of alcohol. He was then sent to Voronezh for training, which lasted only 4 to 5 days, and then to Kursk. By Oct. 27–28, he was deployed to the frontline, and less than a month later, he was taken prisoner. The total duration of his training did not exceed two weeks (if training continued in Kursk), which indirectly indicates a shortage of reserves in the Russian army.

A riot broke out in the 57849 military unit in Novosibirsk among Russian soldiers, many of whom had been wounded in the war and were stationed deep inside as a result. The reason for the unrest was the arrival of military police, who apparently attempted to send them back to the frontline without a medical examination. The soldiers smashed windows and mirrors, broke furniture, and vandalized the honor board. At least 10 soldiers then fled the unit. As detailed in our mobilization sitrep, it appears that all or nearly all of the escapees have since been apprehended.

On Nov. 13, the Russian government, in coordination with President Vladimir Putin, changed the compensation structure for servicemen wounded in action in roughly 2.5 hours. Details can again be found in our mobilization sitrep, but in brief: the maximum payment (then set at 3 million rubles, or $30,200) will now only be granted to those with severe injuries. Those with moderate injuries will receive 1 million rubles [$10,100], and those with minor injuries will receive just 100,000 rubles [$1,010].

Some analysts, using data on fatalities, are attempting to estimate the budgetary cost of compensating for injuries sustained in the "special military operation" zone. Even approximate figures could total to about 1 trillion rubles [$10 billion], leading to speculation that the decision to revise the payment structure was motivated by a desire to reduce budgetary costs.

However, it should not be forgotten that military personnel constantly complain about the lack of injury compensation and difficulties in obtaining necessary documents. It cannot be ruled out that, to reduce costs, there was an informal recommendation or a secret decree instructing medical personnel to complicate the process of recognizing injuries and obtaining payments as much as possible. The new procedure may be a response to such complaints—by differentiating payments, the authorities avoid paying everyone 3 million rubles [$30,200]. However, if payments are allocated fairly, the budgetary load could actually increase. Nevertheless, the new scheme creates opportunities for abuse related to the underreporting of injury severity.

Following backlash from pro-Russian channels, Putin signed a decree the very next day increasing compensation for injuries leading to a disability from 3 to 4 million rubles [$40,300].

On Nov. 13, the State Duma [lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia] also passed a law making members of volunteer formations financially responsible for damage to military property—the cost of the damaged property will now be deducted from the salaries of volunteer fighters. This law also creates significant opportunities for corruption and extortion. More details are available in our mobilization summary.

In Sevastopol, according to sources cited by the UNIAN Ukrainian news portal, the car belonging to Captain 1st Rank Valery Trankovsky, commander of the 41st Brigade of Missile Ships and Boats of the Black Sea Fleet, was blown up as a result of a special forces operation by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). Trankovsky's rank was equivalent to that of a colonel in the ground forces. Reports indicate that the officer was killed in the explosion. According to Ukrainian intelligence services, he was responsible for issuing orders to launch cruise missiles from the Black Sea against civilian targets in Ukraine. Specifically, he is considered responsible for the 2022 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missile strike on the city of Vinnytsia, which killed 29 people, as well as attacks on the city of Odesa and other locations.

Western Assistance

European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has stated in an interview with the European Pravda media outlet that the EU has already supplied Ukraine with more than 980,000 artillery shells. Including those provided as part of the Czech initiative, the EU plans to deliver over 1.5 million shells to Ukraine by the end of the year. Analysts, including Michael Kofman, who recently visited Ukraine, have noted that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have received a significant number of shells, and their shortage is no longer as critical an issue.

Josep Borrell also underscored the need for the EU to devise a strategy to fully utilize frozen Russian assets, rather than solely relying on the revenue they generate. To date, mechanisms for macro-financial assistance have been agreed upon through 2027, enabling G7 nations to provide Ukraine with approximately $50 billion in loans backed by the proceeds from Russian frozen assets.

As we previously reported, President-elect Donald Trump has nominated Pete Hegseth, Fox News weekend morning show host and former US National Guard soldier, as Secretary of Defense. Hegseth led a company at Guantanamo Bay and served tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2016, he attained the rank of major before transferring to the reserves and getting involved with veteran’s organizations. In 2020, Hegseth volunteered to join the 25,000-troops-strong National Guard force tasked with securing President Joe Biden’s inauguration but, along with 11 other candidates, failed the FBI screening process over alleged ties to far-right Christian groups and extremist views.

Tulsi Gabbard, known for her controversial stances and affinities for authoritarian figures, has been nominated as Director of National Intelligence. In 2017, in her capacity as a congresswoman, she made an unannounced visit to Syria, where she met with President Bashar al-Assad, drawing widespread criticism. In early 2022, in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Gabbard accused the US and NATO of "provoking" the attack and alleged the existence of American biolabs in Ukraine. By July 2022, Ukrainian authorities included her on a list of individuals disseminating pro-Russian propaganda. In April 2022, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation accused her of being "Kremlin-funded" and linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, on Nov. 14, 2024, the center retracted the publication from its Telegram channel. Some analysts suggest that Gabbard’s chances of Senate confirmation are slim, as she faces opposition from both Democrats and many Republicans. However, others posit that her nomination could still go through depending on her performance during Senate hearings.

It is worth noting that if the Senate rejects Trump’s nominees, he could invoke his authority to make "recess appointments," allowing officials to serve in their roles for up to two years without Senate confirmation. This tactic has historically been used by past presidents to bypass contentious confirmation battles. The practice faced scrutiny after President Barack Obama’s attempt to appoint four members to the National Labor Relations Board, leading to a 2014 Supreme Court ruling that prohibited presidents from making appointments during Senate recesses lasting fewer than 10 days, enabling Congress to hold pro forma sessions to block contentious appointments.

The Trump transition team is considering a draft executive order that establishes a "warrior board" of retired senior military personnel with the power to review three and four-star officers and to recommend removals of any deemed unfit for leadership. In this way, Trump will purportedly be able to remove those in the Pentagon who are not loyal to him.

On Nov. 13, during his meeting with Putin, Mosfilm Director General Karen Shakhnazarov informed the President that in 2023 his film studio had donated 28 T-55 and 8 PT-76 tanks, 6 infantry fighting vehicles and 8 tractors to the military. Most likely, the equipment in Mosfilm’s possession had been deactivated and could not be immediately deployed on the frontline although it could still be used as a source of spare parts.

Also, during the meeting Shakhnazarov criticized the blocking of YouTube, since those willing to access content banned in Russia find ways to bypass restrictions while for many others blocking results in limited access to Mosfilm’s productions. According to Shakhnazarov, Russian platforms, such as Rutube and VK, are no match to YouTube in reach. In response, Putin promised "to look into the problem." As a result, on the evening of Nov. 14, some users reported that their YouTube access was restored. Nevertheless, we are going to continue publishing our sitreps not only on YouTube, but also on our Telegram channel.

On Nov. 14, pro-Russian Telegram channels published photographs of a trainload with DPRK-made Koksan M1989 170mm self-propelled howitzers in the town of Krasnoyarsk. The German army used Kanone 18 in Mörserlafette heavy field guns of this unusual caliber during World War II, while the first North Korean 170mm SPHs were produced in the 1970s to counter the long-range US-made artillery that appeared in South Korea. They are known under the Western designation M1978 after the year of their first public appearance. During the Iran-Iraq War, the DPRK supplied them to Iran, at which time the SPHs were modified into the M1989 variant. The SPH uses a chassis closely related to T-54/55/62 tanks, its firing distance ranges from up to 40 km [25 mi] with conventional high-explosive rounds, and up to 60 km [38 mi] with rocket-assisted projectiles. However, at such a distance, the artillery systems have very poor accuracy, and we doubt that the DPRK has 170mm high-precision projectiles.

There is still no clear information why these SPH were delivered to Russia. Perhaps those are the standard artillery systems of the North Korean expeditionary corps of 12 thousand people sent to the Kursk region, which for some reason arrived late. Normally, military equipment is first transported to the near rear, and only then personnel arrive. At the same time, Russian forces have no need for such long-range artillery in the Kursk region, where the maximum depth of the frontline is 20km [12 mi]. An alternative explanation could be that Russia has run out of ammunition for their Soviet-made 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled cannons and decided to buy its tactical analogue with corresponding shells from the DPRK. According to our observations of Russian troop movements in 2021–2022, the journey of a trainload with military equipment from the Far East to the Voronezh region takes 3–4 weeks. Thus, the train currently in Krasnoyarsk will arrive in border regions in 2–3 weeks, and it will probably still have time to be photographed along the way. It is worth noting that those trainloads might well be carrying other DPRK-made military equipment.

In August 2023, two residents of Kamensk-Uralsky, Sverdlovsk region, Ruslan Shishigin and Mikhail Kolmogortsev, attacked an 18-year-old girl on the street because they did not like the color of her hair. Ruslan Shishigin hit her in the face and tried to drown her in a fountain, shouting that he had returned from the war in Ukraine (which turned out to be a lie) and that he would kill her if he saw her again. Shishigin was sentenced to three years in a penal colony for violent hooliganism. In the spring of 2024, while in the penal colony, he signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense and went to the frontline, where he was killed in August.