Sitrep for Jan. 10-13, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On Jan. 11, the Ukrainian project DeepState acknowledged that the town of Kurakhove had been fully captured. Currently, fighting is underway in two settlements in this area: the village of Dachne, located west of Kurakhove along the N-15 highway connecting the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and the village of Yantarne, situated south of Dachne in the Sukhi Yaly River valley. In Yantarne, Russian forces have raised their flag, with video footage showing them moving freely within the village. The Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed full control over Yantarne. DeepState has reported advances by the Russian Armed Forces in Yantarne but has not confirmed its complete capture.

Although the capture of Kurakhove is no longer in doubt, Viktor Trehubov, spokesman for the Khortytsia operational-strategic group, stated on the Suspilne television channel on Jan. 11 that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the town. In our previous sitrep, we noted that while the withdrawal from Kurakhove had not been officially acknowledged, unofficial statements from Ukrainian soldiers suggested otherwise. Many controversies surrounding the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are rooted in the remnants of the Soviet-era military management system, characterized by falsified reports and embellishments of the actual situation. Ukrainian generals responsible for operational-tactical and operational-strategic management are often criticized for errors at the brigade level, poor coordination and an inadequate understanding of the actual resources available to specific groups of troops. In some cases, inaccurate reports have led to subordinate commanders attempting to align on-the-ground realities with these reports, resulting in soldiers being sent on futile as a result.

Russian sources released a video showing 16 captured Ukrainian soldiers stating that they were sent on Jan. 2 to hold positions in the Kurakhove industrial zone. They claimed to have resisted enemy assaults until Jan. 6, at which point, lacking orders to retreat, they decided to surrender in order to save their lives. While the prisoners spoke of being treated well, it is important to consider that such statements may have been made under duress. Additionally, numerous documented cases of the execution and torture of surrendered Ukrainian soldiers cast doubt on the credibility of these claims.

Fighting continues for the remaining portion of the larger salient, which was previously anchored by the fortified Kurakhove area and the Sukhi Yaly River valley. Russian forces are advancing westward from the village of Shevchenko toward Andriivka and northward from Zelenivka toward Ulakly. Fighting for the aforementioned Dachne is also expected to persist in the near term.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have advanced near the villages of Uspenivka and Solone, moving toward the village of Kotlyne, which lies along one of the supply routes for Pokrovsk. Additionally, the RuAF made progress near the village of Pishchane and straightened the frontline around the villages of Zelene and Dachenske, the latter of which was captured by Jan. 3.

Commander-in-Chief of the AFU General Oleksandr Syrskyi has published a video showing strikes on Russian units. The geolocation of a video fragment indicates that Russian forces on the eastern flank of the Pokrovsk direction have reached an interchange northwest of the village of Vozdvyzhenka, located on the highway connecting Pokrovsk to Kostiantynivka. Therefore, this part of the highway can now be considered contested.

Numerous videos from the Toretsk direction show Ukrainian forces targeting Russian soldiers throughout the town of Toretsk. Another video shows Russian soldiers raising a flag in the northern part of Toretsk, moving relatively freely, suggesting their control over that area. Toretsk appears to be on the verge of being captured. It is worth noting that the fighting for the town began in late July 2024.

In addition, Russian advances have been noted in the town of Chasiv Yar, where fighting has been ongoing since last spring. Over the past 24 hours, the RuAF have advanced almost a kilometer [0.62 mi] in the Pivnichnyi neighborhood. However, a significant part of the town remains under the AFU control.

At the moment, in the Donetsk region, Russian forces are trying to capture two major towns, Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, both of which are key hubs for roads and railways. They are currently trying to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and east. To advance toward Kostiantynivka, the RuAF must first secure control over the towns of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. We believe that achieving these objectives will take a long time.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy shared photos of two North Korean soldiers captured by the AFU’s Special Operations Forces and Air Assault Forces in the Kursk region. The footage shows fighting in a tree line, hidden behind trees. It is presumed that the North Korean soldiers were hiding in the forest lines when they were struck by Ukrainian forces.

One of the captives was found carrying a Russian military ID without a photo, issued in the name of a resident of Tuva [Russia's constituent republic]. According to the Agentstvo [Agency] independent media outlet, the data of a real Russian citizen was used to create this cover identity, though the place of birth had been changed. We believe that the cover identities of North Korean soldiers are based on the data of real residents from Russia's constituent Republics of Tuva, Buryatia or Sakha (Yakutia) with certain modifications. Similar documents had previously been found by Ukrainian forces on the bodies of killed North Korean soldiers.

Reports indicate that one of the captives has a jaw injury, while the other has injuries to his arms and legs. Neither of them speaks English, Ukrainian or Russian. Communication is reportedly being facilitated by representatives of South Korean intelligence. The captives, aged 20 and 26, claim they were unaware they were being sent to war, believing instead they were going for military training. This claim, however, cannot be verified. They underwent one week of operational coordination with Russian soldiers, but what they were doing in Russia prior to that remains unclear. The captive with the military ID stated that the document was issued in the fall upon his arrival in Russia. It is likely that the Russian side issued these documents to conceal the participation of North Korean soldiers in the war.

One of the captives stated that he first engaged in combat on Jan. 3 and was captured on Jan. 5. The man with the jaw injury expressed a willingness to return to North Korea, while the other said he would return if instructed, but would prefer to stay in Ukraine.

The Yonhap news agency, citing South Korean intelligence, confirmed the capture of North Korean soldiers and reported that they serve in the Reconnaissance General Bureau of North Korea. However, we believe the prisoners are not intelligence operatives but rather special forces personnel. Earlier reports indicated North Korea had sent special forces to Russia, which, by analogy with the Soviet Army, could fall under the umbrella of military intelligence, similar to the former GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation].

This does not necessarily mean that the captured soldiers are privy to any classified intelligence regarding North Korea. Most likely, they are regular special forces operatives familiar only with their unit's specific missions. Thus, the primary value of their capture for Ukraine lies in the potential to present them at a press conference. However, leveraging their capture for anti-war propaganda against North Korea appears unlikely, given the country's isolation and lack of Internet access for its population.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also proposed exchanging the North Korean POWs for Ukrainian prisoners held in Russia.

Yonhap further reported that South Korea’s National Intelligence Service estimated the total number of North Korean military casualties in the Kursk region at 3,000: approximately 300 killed and 2,700 wounded. These figures seem highly implausible. A wounded-to-killed ratio of 9:1 would imply that the North Korean military provides the best frontline medical care in the world. It is worth noting that similarly unrealistic estimates were published in December. In the current war, the wounded-to-killed ratio for Ukrainian forces is 4:1 to 5:1, while for Russian forces, it is 3:1 to 4:1.

Pro-Russian Telegram channels have published footage of a purported strike by a Russian drone on what was claimed to be "Western-made ground surveillance radars." However, researchers identified the equipment as a North Korean medium-range surface-to-air missile system, first unveiled during a 2020 parade. The Oryx Spioenkop website lists it as an "Unknown SAM System (1)." Based on established naming conventions for North Korean weapons, it is likely to be named M2020, as it was first revealed in 2020. The number of these systems delivered and their operators remain unknown. The destruction of this system by a Russian UAV highlights poor coordination between RuAF units and North Korean soldiers, exacerbated by the language barrier. If the system is operated by North Korean personnel, they are more likely than Russian air defense operators to mistakenly target Russian aircraft.

US Congressman Mike Waltz, whom Donald Trump intends to appoint as his national security adviser, told ABC News in an interview that stabilizing the frontline is crucial to achieving any agreement to end the war in Ukraine. We were linking the renewed Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region in early January to the need to shift the narrative and demonstrate that the Ukrainian army retains offensive capabilities, as the operation itself has not significantly improved their ability to hold the bridgehead in the region. Waltz's remarks suggest that this tactic has not impressed American officials. Instead, reports of Russian forces capturing Kurakhove and advancing in the areas of the towns of Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Chasiv Yar, have had a greater impact.

Ukrainian officials suggest that the AFU’s withdrawal from the Kursk region would allow approximately 60,000 Russian troops to be redeployed into Ukraine, enabling further territorial gains by Russia. While this concern may hold some truth, it is argued that if Ukrainian forces had been allocated to Kurakhove instead of the Kursk region, part of the city might still be under Ukrainian control.

Additionally, Waltz noted that lowering the draft age in Ukraine to recruit "hundreds of thousands of new soldiers" is essential for stabilizing the situation. However, as previously discussed, this approach is flawed. The personnel challenges in the AFU are complex and linked to the issues of supplying the army. The lack of adequate weapons is a major demotivating factor. Addressing the root causes of draft evasion and desertion would likely yield better results than lowering the draft age to 18, as suggested by American officials.

Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation announced that more than 7,000 servicemen who had previously gone AWOL have returned to duty. This is a positive indicator that confirms the effectiveness of measures taken to combat desertion.

The governor of Russia’s Saratov region, Roman Busargin, reported that through "controlled fuel burnout," the open fire at the oil depot in Engels was extinguished after five days, although "work is ongoing." It is worth noting that the fire broke out following a strike by Ukrainian drones in the early hours of Jan. 8. According to the Ukrainian military and the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, this depot services a military airfield housing Russian strategic aviation, which is regularly deployed to conduct strikes on Ukrainian territory.

Western Assistance

Canada has announced that it allocates additional C$200 million for the Czech initiative to purchase ammunition for Ukraine outside the EU. Another C$50 million will be used to procure ammunition for Ukraine from Canadian manufacturers, while 100 million will support the so-called Danish model, i.e. to finance ammunition and equipment production inside Ukraine.

Overall, as a result of the 25th Ramstein format meeting, Ukraine has been promised aid amounting to $2 billion.

In our previous sitrep, we cited Spiegel, which claimed that due to budget constraints, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was blocking an additional €3 billion aid package to Ukraine. However, on Jan. 12, in his interview to Tagesspiegel, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius denied the allegation saying that the new package of military aid for Ukraine was awaiting approval. The package includes three IRIS-T air defense batteries, Patriot air defense missiles, artillery ammunition and other weaponry.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

The human rights organization Shkola Prizyvnika [Conscript School] reports that authorities may have finally launched the Unified Military Register [digital system to identify citizens subject to military service and serve draft notices]. They cite a 30-year-old man from the Moscow region as the first documented example of restrictions imposed by a draft office. When he tried to obtain registration plates for his car from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, officials declined his application because he could not provide a military ID or a military registration certificate. The man believed he was not listed on the military rolls. In the written refusal, a traffic police inspector referred to "a decision listed in the Unified Register [...] that applies temporary measures to ensure compliance with a draft notice." The document did not specify which draft office had imposed the restrictions or when they were enacted. By law, the draft office should have notified the man through the Gosuslugi public services portal about the measures if he failed to appear after receiving a draft notice. However, he claims he never received any summons, notifications or warnings. According to Shkola Prizyvnika, this could be the first official document indicating that the Unified Military Register is operational. However, they stress they cannot confirm this without additional public records or official statements. They also note that, even before the register’s rollout, existing legislation allowed authorities to impose temporary measures without using the system. Another concern is that the refusal was issued on a non-working day, Jan. 3.

The Mozhem Ob'yasnit [We Can Explain] Telegram channel highlighted a government resolution that extended financing for the launch of the Unified Military Register by one year. The cabinet of ministers published the document on Dec. 24, 2024, revising the final deadline for concluding contracts related to the register's development from Dec. 31, 2024, to Dec. 31, 2025. This indirectly suggests that the register is most likely not yet operational.