Sitrep for Dec. 25-27, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
The next sitrep will be in two weeks, on Jan. 10.
Frontline Situation Update—Year-End SummaryÂ
In 2024, the frontline in the Kherson region has remained unchanged. The Dnipro River continues to be a formidable obstacle to large-scale offensives, as establishing reliable supply lines for advancing forces across such a major waterway remains unfeasible. Following the destruction of the Antonivskyi Bridge and the bridge over the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam, both sides have been limited to conducting raids or attempting to establish localized bridgeheads, as seen in the case of the village of Krynky. Recent reports suggested a Russian raid took place on the right bank of the Dnipro near the Antonivskyi Bridge; however, no visual evidence has been published to corroborate this.
Throughout the year, the Russian Armed Forces have gradually narrowed the Ukrainian salient near the village of Robotyne. However, we do not anticipate an imminent large-scale Russian offensive in the area, as there are no visible preparations for such an operation. Meanwhile, the city of Zaporizhzhia continues to endure regular missile and air-bomb attacks.
The most significant Russian gains have occurred in the southern part of the Donetsk region. By the end of 2024, Russian forces had nearly encircled the village of Velyka Novosilka, and in late September, they captured the town of Vuhledar. It is worth noting that fighting in the Vuhledar direction began as early as November 2022, with heavy and costly assaults on the village of Pavlivka under the command of General Rustam Muradov. These operations inflicted severe losses on Russia’s 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade.
Sometime after the capture of the town of Avdiivka in February 2024, Russian forces launched a large-scale offensive to the west. Thereafter, the Ocheretyne salient, which was quickly formed in April, included the villages of Hrodivka and Novohrodivka by the end of August, and by mid-December, Russian forces reached the village of Shevchenko on the outskirts of the town of Pokrovsk.
In the last months of this year, the RuAF threw significant forces into the Kurakhove direction. As a result, by now they have managed to take Ukrainian forces in the fortified area of Kurakhove and its suburbs almost into complete encirclement. At the same time, most of the town itself has already come under Russian control.
Although these advances are significant, on the scale of the entire frontline they are still not enough to bring Putin closer to the main political goal of this war—a change of power in Ukraine. Additionally, these results were achieved by conducting almost continuous offensive operations throughout the year with heavy losses.
In the eastern part of the Donetsk region, in the Chasiv Yar direction (former Bakhmut direction), Russian forces have been trying to capture the corresponding town since the spring. Despite the existing advances, they have not achieved any significant successes so far. It is worth noting that although there were rumors about an order to take Chasiv Yar by May 9, 2024, the RuAF have managed to capture only half of the town by the end of the year.
In the Luhansk region, the frontline has remained virtually unchanged throughout the year. With Russian forces fighting for the village of Bilohorivka in the Siversk direction for a long time. Repeated reports about the capture of the village in the absence of any real success led to the resignation of the commander of the Group of Troops "South," Colonel General Gennady Anashkin.
Russian advances in the Kharkiv region this year have so far yielded no significant military gains. In the Kupiansk direction, the RuAF managed in the second half of the year to reach the Oskil River near the villages of Kruhliakivka and Kolisnykivka, forming salients north and south of the town of Kupiansk. Additionally, they forded the river north of the town near the urban-type settlement of Dvorichna. However, the Russian forces have not been able to significantly expand their bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil, and it is premature to say they will reach Kupiansk anytime soon.
The result of Russia’s offensive in northern Kharkiv region in May 2024 was the formation of two bridgeheads: one in the town of Vovchansk and another near the village of Lyptsi. In our view, holding these bridgeheads makes sense only in reports to the command of the Group of Troops "North." Practically speaking, they offer no benefits but require resources and lead to losses.
One of the most significant developments on the frontline this year was Ukraine’s offensive in the Kursk region, which began on Aug. 6. Under the pretense of preparing for a Russian offensive in the Sumy region, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to concentrate enough forces at the Russia–Ukraine border to break through and rapidly capture part of the territory, including the town of Sudzha, gaining a foothold. Ukrainian forces secured their position so well that the RuAF were able to reduce its size by only about 40% during their counteroffensive. By year-end, Russian forces had still not reclaimed the territory, even with the involvement of North Korean soldiers in the Kursk direction since December.
For Ukraine, the Kursk foothold is more important politically than in terms of the area of control. Its primary role is to maintain a bargaining chip ahead of potential negotiations to freeze the war.
In recent days, the RuAF have continued to slowly expand their salient toward the town of Pokrovsk. The Kurakhove fortified area remains nearly encircled: while Russian forces seemingly could quickly have reached the village of Kostiantynopil along the N-15 highway, for some reason, they have not yet done so.
We expect the large salient around Kurakhove to be captured in January or February. Additionally, the battle for Pokrovsk is likely to begin in 2025; the town previously served as an important logistical hub for the AFU. Other objectives for Russian forces include the cities of Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk. The capture of Pokrovsk would not cause the collapse of the frontline, but it would create additional challenges for the AFU. However, we also do not rule out the possibility that Pokrovsk may remain uncaptured until negotiations, possibly initiated by Trump.
If Ukrainian forces successfully repel the Russian offensive in the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF may shift their focus to another area, such as the Kupiansk direction. As we previously noted, Russian command tends to intensify attacks where the AFU's defense appears the weakest.
The Ukrainian project Militarny reported the possible capture of a wounded North Korean soldier in the Kursk region by Ukrainian special forces. The published photo shows a man of Asian descent, and it is also reported that a BTR-82 armored personnel carrier was captured. Later, the capture of the North Korean serviceman was confirmed by South Korean intelligence. It was later revealed that he died from the injuries he sustained.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In 2024, Russia continued its strategy of combined strikes on Ukraine’s energy system and civilian population. Another strike on energy facilities occurred on Dec. 25, which was acknowledged by the Russian Ministry of Defense, which stated that these facilities support the operation of the military-industrial complex. Strikes on the energy grid are considered war crimes since it is a civilian target. Meanwhile, military-industrial complex facilities are generally better equipped with backup power systems than civilian areas.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the following weapons were used in this strike:
- 2 North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles;
- 10 S-300 or S-400 modified SAM missiles;
- 12 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles launched from the Black Sea;
- 50 Kh-101 or Kh-55 cruise missiles launched by Tu-95MS strategic bombers;
- 4 Kh-59 or Kh-69 cruise missiles;
- 106 Shahed drones.
North Korean KN-23 missiles (analogous to Russia’s 9K720 Iskander missiles) fly along a quasi-ballistic trajectory and can maneuver in flight. They have the potential to cause significant damage, as they are difficult to intercept with air defense systems, though they are used relatively rarely, likely due to their limited numbers. However, the situation may change, as it was recently reported that the North Korean factory producing them is expanding.
Similarly, we assume that 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles are not used very often due to their limited production.
Acting Governor of the Kursk region Alexander Khinshtein stated that on Dec. 25, an attack on the town of Lgov resulted in four fatalities and five injuries. One apartment building, two private houses, a beauty salon, at least 12 vehicles and a gas pipeline were damaged. The strategic command of the AFU claimed that the strike targeted the "location of the command post of the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade of the RuAF," allegedly located in an abandoned building near a sugar factory. There is currently no independent confirmation of this information. Ukrainian accounts published a photo of Russian soldiers allegedly killed in the strike, but obituaries confirming this information for specific individuals have not yet been seen. The sister of the deputy commander of the 810 NIB of the RuAF initially reported his death but later clarified that he is alive, though injured.
The Misha in Donbas Telegram channel reported that the Ukrainian military employed social engineering tactics. Under the pretext of delivering humanitarian aid, they invited Russian soldiers to a meeting, using data gathered from the internet, including the full names of the commander, individuals involved in correspondence, their friends and people who had previously supplied aid. However, when several vehicles and personnel arrived at the agreed location to load the aid, they were struck by a HIMARS MLRS. No obituaries or photos of the bodies of those killed have been seen yet, but a video of the damaged vehicles has been published.
Passenger Plane Crash in Aktau
On the morning of Dec. 25, Ukrainian UAVs based on the lightweight Aeroprakt A-22 aircraft once again attacked regions of the North Caucasus. (A similar raid had previously occurred on Dec. 15.) One of the UAVs was shot down over Vladikavkaz. The debris caused a fire in a shopping mall, resulting in the death of a cleaner and injuries to 13 people. Residents of Grozny shared videos of the UAV, footage of its destruction, and photos of the used rocket booster from a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system. Chechen Security Council Secretary Khamzat Kadyrov confirmed the UAV attack on the region, stating that all UAVs had been intercepted.
At the same time, an Embraer 190 passenger Ń„ operated by Azerbaijan Airlines was flying from Baku to Grozny over the North Caucasus. Available data suggests the aircraft was mistaken for a UAV and struck by a Pantsir-S1 missile over the Naursky district of Chechnya. The crew initially assumed the aircraft had collided with a flock of birds and attempted to land first in Grozny and then in Makhachkala. Eventually the plane was redirected to Kazakhstan, where it crashed at Aktau Airport.
According to some sources, Russian airports denied the pilot permission to land due to the ongoing air raid and the activation of the so-called Carpet plan closed sky regime. However, in critical situations, a flight commander is authorized to land regardless of airport closures, and air traffic controllers cannot override such a decision. It is possible the crew underestimated the extent of the damage, and the aircraft’s controls failed progressively during the flight over the sea.
The plane was carrying 62 passengers and 5 crew members. Of these, 29 survived and were hospitalized. Videos from the crash site reveal characteristic marks on the fuselage consistent with prefabricated shrapnel from an anti-aircraft missile. Footage of the crash and Flightradar24 data show the plane alternately diving and climbing, indicating problems with the elevator and other control mechanisms. Recordings from inside the aircraft before the crash show holes in the fuselage and a damaged life jacket.
Reports from Euronews and Reuters, citing Kazakh government sources, state that preliminary investigations suggest a Russian missile shot the plane down. This is not the first such occurrence. In 2014, a Russian air defense system shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine’s Donetsk region, mistaking it for a Ukrainian military transport plane. In 2020, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps mistakenly downed a Ukrainian plane over Tehran with a Tor SAM system, believing it to be an American cruise missile.
Western Assistance
According to sources cited by The Washington Post, US President Joseph Biden is considering imposing new sanctions on Russia's energy sector. The primary target of these measures would be the shadow fleet of international vessels transporting Russian oil to Western countries, as well as some Russian oil exporters that have so far avoided sanctions. In addition, one of the options under consideration is the revocation of licenses that allow banks to process transactions related to the Russian energy sector. It is reported that the US administration previously feared that such sanctions could lead to a sharp rise in global oil prices, which, in turn, could lead to a significant increase in domestic fuel prices and negatively affect public opinion ahead of the elections. However, the rate of inflation has come down significantly from previous years and the elections are now over, changing the political calculus. Peter Harrell, Senior Director for International Economics and Competitiveness on the National Security Council under President Biden, claims that the goal of the new comprehensive sanctions package should be to reduce Russian export revenues by double digits within 6-12 months. However, he acknowledges that Russia will continue to profit from energy exports. According to the ratings agency S&P Global, the Kremlin earned approximately $100 billion from energy sales in 2023.
France has completed a six-month training course for Ukrainian pilots and mechanics on Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets.
On Dec. 25, the Estlink 2 undersea power cable between Finland and Estonia was damaged. In the early hours of Dec. 26, Finnish police detained the tanker Eagle S, which had departed from the Russian port of Ust-Luga, and initiated an investigation. OSINT researcher writing under the pseudonym Auonsson noted that the tanker reduced its speed by 25% just minutes before crossing the cable’s location, after which it came to an almost complete stop over the cable's site. Less than 10 minutes later, the vessel resumed its voyage at full speed. It is suspected, as in previous similar sabotage incidents, that the vessel dropped its anchor on the seabed and then, allegedly "forgetting" to raise it, resumed its movement, severing the cable.
Journalists from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed satellite images of the area around the Crimean Bridge dated Nov. 8, Dec. 16, and Dec. 24. They discovered that makeshift Russian barriers, assembled from old barges to protect the bridge from Ukrainian drones, had been severely damaged and partially sunk during the Dec. 15 storm.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Starting Jan. 1, authorities in the Samara region will pay 3.6 million rubles [$36,100] to individuals signing contracts with the MoD, marking the highest regional sign-up bonus to date. This payment will be available from Jan. 1 to Feb. 1, 2025, with a possible extension. Combined with the federal component, the total sign-up bonus in the region will amount to 4 million rubles [$40,100]. Additionally, authorities will pay volunteer fighters 50,000 rubles [$500] monthly for nine months. The Samara region last increased its regional payments in October, raising them from 1.2 million to 1.6 million rubles [from $12,000 to $16,000].
Shamil Abdulaev, a member of the Public Monitoring Commission in Russia’s constituent Republic of Dagestan, reported that six female detainees from Makhachkala’s Pre-Trial Detention Center No. 1 were sent to fight in Ukraine. While women have been recruited for the war in the past, it remains uncommon. To date, it is reliably known that only one woman in Russia who signed a contract with the MoD while in a penal colony has been killed.
Social anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova spent two years analyzing denunciations, letters to journalists, interviews and other texts authored by a serial informant under the pseudonym Anna Korobkova to uncover the mechanisms of modern informing in Russia. In collaboration with linguist Daniil Skorinkin, Arkhipova used stylometric analysis of the "Korobkova" text corpus alongside OSINT methods. These efforts allowed the researchers to identify the individual behind the pseudonym as historian Ivan Abaturov from Yekaterinburg.
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