Sitrep for Dec. 23-25, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On the Vremivka salient, the village of Makarivka has completely come under Russian control. According to the DeepState project, Ukrainian units that were encircled in the area managed to break out.

In addition to Makarivka, the villages of Blahodatne and Storozheve, located south of the village of Velyka Novosilka, have also come under Russian control.

No significant changes have been observed in the Kurakhove direction over the past few days: the Russian Armed Forces have not yet advanced toward the village of Kostiantynopil to cut the N-15 highway and close the encirclement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Kurakhove salient.

The most significant Russian advances in recent days have been noted in the Pokrovsk direction, where the RuAF have expanded the western part of the salient near the town of Pokrovsk, strengthening their flanks and straightening the frontline.

There are still no changes in the Kursk direction, despite the participation of North Korean troops in combat.

The lack of significant advances on several fronts could indicate a slowdown in the overall Russian offensive. However, before analyzing the reasons for this, it is important to confirm that this is not a localized slowdown caused by natural factors or a stabilization of the situation due to the reinforcement of Ukrainian forces in these areas. An offensive cannot maintain a constant pace for a long period of time.

It is worth noting that Russian tactics in recent months have focused on identifying weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses. When Ukrainian reinforcements are deployed in these areas, the Russian advance initially slows down without reducing the intensity of the fighting. In many cases, the Russian command then shifts its attention to other weaknesses in the AFU's defenses as they are identified. We believe that it will take another week or two before we can definitively speak of a slowdown in the overall Russian offensive. Only after that time should one begin to analyze whether this is due to a lack of personnel, a slowdown in recruitment, a worsening shortage of equipment, or other factors.

It is also worth noting that if the RuAF manages to encircle the Kurakhove fortified area in the near future, this could significantly affect the statistics of Russia's territorial gains.

A video of the interrogation of Russian soldiers, captured in the Kursk region, has been published. During the interrogation, they stated that the equipment, training and supplies, including food, of North Korean soldiers were better than that of Russian soldiers. North Korean soldiers receive more modern AK-12 assault rifles and other weapons, including machine guns and grenade launchers, while Russian soldiers are issued outdated AK-74 assault rifles and bayonets. Tactics also differ: North Korean soldiers are sent for a frontal assault, while Russian troops are sent to mop up AFU positions if the assault troops manage to capture them and then secure those positions. Joint combat operations are not carried out, which is partly explained by the language barrier. Verbal codewords such as "KAMAZ-UAZ" and "Drone-Katyusha" are used for safe passage near North Korean positions.

The New York Times, citing US military sources, reported that the idea of deploying troops to the Kursk region came from North Korea itself, but Russia quickly agreed. It is worth noting that we and other experts had previously suggested similar motivations.

In his address, Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned that, according to preliminary data, the losses of the North Korean military in the Kursk region, including killed and wounded, have exceeded 3,000 people. It is impossible to independently verify this information, as the available tools in the Russian and Ukrainian information spaces, such as obituaries, grave counts, data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), etc., are not applicable to North Korea, and counting bodies on drone videos does not allow for an accurate estimate of casualties, as it is unclear how many of the killed are actually captured on video. The Telegraph published an article stating that North Korea plans to send even more military personnel to Russia. It is still unclear whether this will involve a rotation or reinforcement.

A scandal has erupted in Ukraine over alleged pressure from the command of the AFU, or possibly Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi himself, on the DeepState project. The apparent reason is the publication of "inconvenient" information by the project's analysts regarding dangerous situations for the AFU on the frontline and command errors. According to Maryana Bezuhla, there are plans to either bring the project under full control or shut it down, with team members reportedly facing potential mobilization and deployment to infantry units.

The project has received support from various public figures, including Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian activist and YouTuber, journalist Yurii Butusov, AFU soldier Stanislav "Osman" Bunyatov from the 24th Separate Assault Battalion, and the Officer+ and CyberBoroshno Telegram channels. Def Mon, a Twitter-based OSINT and military analyst, and John Helin from the Blackbird Group are among the project's international supporters. DeepState maps are utilized by Ukrainian and independent analysts, as well as pro-Russian military bloggers.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense reported a "mysterious fire" at a warehouse in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, where Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions are produced. The fire destroyed engines and parts for drones, including 65 strike drone fuselages, engines, navigation systems, and thermal imaging cameras intended to produce 400 Shahed-136 drones. The reported damage amounts to $16 million. The fire may have been caused by sabotage, although no official reports of such an act have been made. It may also have been caused by the Ukrainian UAV attack on Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan on Dec. 21. So far, no visual evidence of the fire has surfaced.

Russia sent five cargo ships to the Mediterranean Sea, reportedly to help evacuate Russian bases from Syria, according to some researchers. On Dec. 23, one of these ships, the cargo ship Ursa Major (officially en route to Vladivostok with cranes and hatches for an icebreaker under construction), suffered an explosion and sank off the coast of Spain. It was reported that 14 sailors were rescued, while two are missing. Maritime forums suggest the explosion occurred in the engine room, killing the motorist and mechanic. Later, the ship's owner, Oboronlogistika, a shipping company that carries cargo for Russia's Ministry of Defense, said that three explosions led to the sinking.

Western Assistance

The Ukrainian Armor defense company will receive licenses from the Czech defense holding Czechoslovak Group to produce tank and artillery shells. These will include:

Standard 155mm M107 projectiles;
155mm L15 high-explosive shells;
155mm HE ER-BT/BB MKM/VMK long-range artillery rounds;
105mm M1 HE shells;
120mm tank shells of an unspecified type.

Domestic production will enhance the reliability of ammunition supplies for the Ukrainian army, avoiding bureaucratic delays and financing issues that often complicate the delivery of foreign-made shells.

Germany has updated the list of military aid it has delivered to Ukraine over the past five weeks:

an IRIS-T SLM defense system with medium-range surface-to-air missiles;
an IRIS-T SLS defense system with short-range surface-to-air missiles;
2 Patriot launchers;
2 TRML-4D air surveillance radars;
15 Leopard 1A5 tanks (joint project with Denmark);
ammunition for Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 tanks;
30 MRAP vehicles;
12 Kinetic Defence Vehicles;
7 Caracal air assault vehicles;
a Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled gun;
52,000 155mm artillery rounds;
2 Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns;
65,000 35mm rounds;
20,000 40mm rounds;
12 Zetros trucks and 8 Zetros tankers;
a border protection vehicle;
15,000 120mm mortar ammunition;
120 GMG grenade launchers;
200 MG4 machine guns;
420 MK 556 assault rifles;
80 HLR 338 precision rifles;
100 CR 308 rifles;
AIM-9L/I-1 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles;
4.3 million rounds of small arms ammunition.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

In late April 2024, 18-year-old Aleksandr Vinshu signed a contract with the MoD and went to war, citing a lack of job opportunities in his home village as the reason for his decision. While seeing him off, district head Konstantin Dizendorf assured Vinshu's family that he would speak with the military command to ensure Aleksandr would not be sent directly to the frontline. However, according to obituaries, Vinshu spent several months in training but was ultimately deployed to the frontline, where he was killed on Nov. 28.

In the Krasnodar region, a verdict was issued for Aleksandr Steshuk, who, in September 2021, entered his neighbors' yard and killed an elderly couple by stabbing them to death. Steshuk then stole their belongings, 140,000 rubles [$1,400] and set a fire to cover up the crime. Following the jury's guilty verdict, a judge from the Krasnodar Regional Court sentenced Steshuk to 18 years in a maximum security penal colony, along with an additional one-year restriction of freedom. However, as he expressed his willingness to go to war and signed a contract with the MoD, he was released from serving his sentence and handed over to a military representative.

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