Sitrep for Nov. 27-29, 2024 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The Russian Armed Forces have reported further advances in the southern part of the Donetsk region. They are solidifying their positions on the eastern outskirts of the village of Velyka Novosilka and continuing their offensive toward the N-15 highway near the villages of Kostiantynopil and Andriivka. However, there have been no recent changes near the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River. This may be due to the Armed Forces of Ukraine reinforcing the area with additional reserves to stabilize the situation, or it could reflect a decision by the Russian military leadership to intensify their push toward the N-15 highway to operationally, or possibly completely, encircle Ukrainian forces. As a result, the Vremivka salient has become the most active section of the frontline this week.
Russian forces are continuing to consolidate their positions in the town of Kurakhove. After capturing a small area in the town center, Russian units have begun gradually deploying their main forces. The residential neighborhood in Kurakhove is now marked as contested on the DeepState map. Ukrainian sources have highlighted the Russian approach to urban combat, where small groups break deeply into AFU defensive lines, creating narrow areas of penetration. When successful, this tactic can disrupt local defense systems, as Russian forces move house-to-house, potentially advancing into the rear of Ukrainian positions. However, there have also been instances where this tactic failed, such as in the town of Kupiansk, where a similar Russian salient was quickly neutralized.
We acknowledge the possibility that the Ukrainian military leadership may find it beneficial to hold settlements as long as possible, as wedges and flanking breakthroughs are not reflected in official reports. It is worth noting that a timely withdrawal before complete encirclement helps preserve resources and personnel. Such considerations led to the withdrawal of Russian forces from the city of Kherson. Holding a large city, where supplies relied solely on crossings over the Dnipro River was extremely challenging and resource-intensive. Despite the significant political costs, the decision was fully justified from a military standpoint.
Russian forces are also advancing on the northern bank of the Kurakhove Reservoir. A video has been published showing Russian attacks on the AFU defenses near the village of Berestky. The footage shows well-prepared fortifications: trenches, ditches and pillboxes, however, the lack of personnel, apparently, makes holding these positions challenging. A similar video, also showing well-fortified Ukrainian positions, was recently filmed to the northwest of the captured village of Novohrodivka.
Some Ukrainian commanders also told journalists about the lack of infantry. Thus, the CNN television channel published comments by Ukrainian military personnel, in particular the commander of the drone unit of the 15th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, operating in the Pokrovsk direction.
According to him, Russian forces are able to break through Ukrainian defenses because the AFU lack infantry to confront advancing units and have to use drones to strike them. Thus, drones are often used instead of soldiers. Another commander said Selydove, a key town outside of Pokrovsk captured by Russia in October, was defended with only six Ukrainian positions, which he assessed meant about 60 troops were involved in the operation. They were quickly encircled, outnumbered and retreated with significant casualties. Andriy Biletsky, commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade of the AFU, in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda, also noted a serious shortage of personnel, stating that the situation on the frontline at the moment was worse than it had been in the spring of 2022.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF continue their offensive towards the town of Pokrovsk along the railway line leading to it, forming a fairly narrow salient. They will need to create another salient from the side of, for example, from the side of the town of Myrnohrad or the village of Mykolaivka to further encircle and storm Pokrovsk. The eastern flank of such a pincer could, among other things, be aimed at cutting the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway. However, there has been no progress in the direction of Myrnohrad and the frontline in this area has not changed since the beginning of October. Unlike in the Kursk region, there are still no signs of muddy conditions in this direction.
Earlier this week, Russian troops were able to gain a foothold in the village of Darino, south of the village of Lyubimovka, and near the village of Plekhovo in the southeastern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region.
Western Assistance
Donald Trump is planning to create a special envoy for the Russia-Ukraine war position in his administration, with former military officer, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg expected to fill the role. Kellogg is one of the authors of a peace plan that stipulates that Kyiv could lose US military aid unless it agrees to start negotiations with Moscow. At the same time, the US would warn Russia that its refusal to engage in talks would lead to increased American support for Ukraine. The overarching idea of the plan, as presented by Trump’s team, is that Ukraine would have to accept Russian control over occupied territories, without recognizing Russia’s sovereignty over them.
The Wall Street Journal reports, citing American officials and members of Congress, that the Biden administration is struggling to spend billions of dollars of military aid promised to Ukraine. To use all the unspent funds, the US would have to ship more than $110 million worth of weapons a day, or $3 billion a month, which is virtually impossible. The Pentagon has reached its limit in supplying ammunition and weapons without jeopardizing its own defense capabilities. The US plans to send between $500 million to $850 million in aid monthly until Jan. 20, with priority given to ammunition due to its easier delivery. Unlike ammunition, military equipment has to be inspected and, in some cases, repaired before shipment. Trump is expected to leverage the issue of unspent funds to exert pressure on both Ukraine and Russia.
Seven European countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Sweden—have pledged to strengthen their support of Ukraine. This includes expanding the defense industry and investing in the production of ammunition.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov visited South Korea to negotiate arms purchases but was turned down, as the country’s legislation prohibits the export of weapons to warring states.
It should be noted that such a tough stance can have a negative impact on export prospects. For instance, after the Swiss government banned exports to the Polish military equipment supplier UMO, Matthias C. Zoller from the Swiss ASD Group expressed concerns that this could lead to the loss of European customers. For example, Poland owns a significant amount of South Korean-made equipment, and in the event of a Russian attack, it is unclear how the supply of spare parts or replacement equipment for destroyed units would be handled. Under such conditions, countries that fear potential military aggression in the future might lose the incentive to purchase military vehicles from suppliers constrained by similar export bans.
New information has surfaced about defective Ukrainian 120mm mortar shells. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense has ordered the withdrawal of all substandard mortar rounds from the frontline. According to ZN.UA, this involves the recall of at least 100,000 shells. The report states that the manufacturer of the defective shells will be required to replace them at their own expense with fully functional ammunition, which will undergo stricter testing before being sent to the frontline.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova announced that Russia was ready to exchange 630 prisoners of war on a parity basis.
In response to a question about the warhead of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, Putin stated that "appropriate elements" were used as impact components, which "serve as damage agents." He also claimed that Russia had several Oreshnik missiles ready for deployment, and that in a group launch, their combined power would be comparable to that of a nuclear strike. Putin added that the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff are selecting targets in Ukraine for strikes, including "decision-making centers in Kyiv."
Assuming the warhead of the Oreshnik weighs 1.5 tons and, according to Putin, the missile’s speed reaches Mach 10 (3.3 km/s), the impact power of a single Oreshnik missile is nearly 2 tons of TNT equivalent.
For comparison, the power of the nuclear explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was approximately 15-20 kilotons of TNT equivalent, meaning it would require 8,000-10,000 Oreshnik missiles to replicate the scale of the Nagasaki strike.
Given that the Oreshnik warhead consists of independently guided submunitions, each presumably weighing about 300 kg, the destructive effect of a single submunition could be similar to that of a FAB-1000 air-dropped bomb. However, no craters comparable to those caused by a FAB-1000 were observed in photographs of the aftermath of the strike on Dnipro. This suggests that the actual speed of the submunitions on impact with the ground is likely to be much lower than the speed claimed by Putin. If this is the case, a significantly larger number of missiles would be required to achieve an effect comparable to a nuclear strike.
In the early hours of Nov. 25, a cargo plane leased by DHL crashed into a residential building in Vilnius. Concerns arose that the crash may have been caused by sabotage by Russian intelligence services, similar to incidents involving incendiary devices that occurred in July 2024. On Nov. 27, Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūnas stated in the Lithuanian parliament that, based on available information, there were no signs of sabotage in the incident. A visual analysis indicated that the plane was not subjected to any external interference during its landing, and interviews with the surviving crew members revealed no irregularities on board. Vilmantas Vitkauskas, the head of Lithuania's National Crisis Management Center, added that preliminary results of the investigation indicate that the crash was most likely caused by a technical malfunction.
BBC News Russian, together with Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and a team of volunteers, has identified the names of 80,973 Russian soldiers killed during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More than half of them were not connected to the military at the beginning of the war. The rapid increase in losses among volunteer fighters continues, with many killed within two to four weeks of being deployed to the frontline. We attribute this to the lack of proper training and the practice of "meat assaults." In contrast, the proportion of losses among convicts sent to the frontline from penal colonies has decreased. In November 2023, it was 26%, but now it is only 18%.
According to our estimates, the actual number of Russian soldiers killed in the war exceeds 165,000. We have decided to stop publishing assessments of the number of soldiers wounded in action, as this figure has often been misunderstood by many readers. As we have previously explained, it does not reflect the number of individual soldiers, but rather the total number of injury cases. A soldier who was wounded, recovered, returned to the frontline and was injured again would be counted multiple times in the statistics.