Sitrep for Dec. 20-23, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
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Frontline Situation Update
Russian forces have reportedly completely encircled the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the village of Makarivka, south of Velyka Novosilka, according to the Dec. 22 DeepState map. While there is no video evidence confirming the presence of Russian soldiers within the village itself, footage geolocated to the eastern outskirts of the settlement suggests that some Ukrainian forces may still be holding out. Unfortunately, DeepState has reduced the frequency of its map updates in recent days, with some evidence suggesting it may be due to pressure coming from the AFU’s commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, conditions in the Vremivka salient continue to deteriorate, with Russian forces now claiming full control of the village of Novy Komar in its northernmost part.
In the occupied village of Blahodatne, located across the Mokri Yaly River from Makarivka, another execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war has been reported. A video shows five Ukrainian soldiers emerging from cover and being forced to lie on the ground. Three are led to a nearby road and executed, while the remaining two are killed shortly afterward. Dmytro Lubinets, Ukraine’s Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, has called on the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate the incident and bring those responsible to justice before an international tribunal. It appears as though some Ukrainian soldiers were either unable to retreat in time or lacked orders to withdraw from Blahodatne, leading to their capture.
Footage has emerged showing the destruction of a road bridge over the Mokri Yaly River between Velyka Novosilka and the village of Vremivka. The Pro-Russian Voin DV Telegram channel shared additional videos of air-dropped bombs targeting the bridge, as well as another crossing over the same river. The destruction of these bridges will complicate resupply and evacuation efforts for Ukrainian forces in the area.
The fate of the AFU units that, until recently, were positioned in the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River—now fully captured—remains unclear. DeepState analysts have stated that some servicemen were unable to retreat in time. However, the Khortytsia operational-strategic group has officially reported that the AFU units withdrew from the pocket to the Kurakhove–Kostiantynopolske line in a timely manner. At present, this information cannot be independently verified.
As previously mentioned, a new large bulge is forming in the Kurakhove direction. Advancing along the Sukhi Yaly River, the RuAF has almost reached the N-15 highway. If they capture the village of Kostiantynopil, located on the same riverbank as the already occupied village of Zelenivka, they could physically sever the highway. Such a move would encircle the entire Kurakhove’s fortified area, cutting it off from supplies. However, even now, Russian forces can still fire on targets using the road. The difficult situation for the AFU in this direction may deteriorate further in the near future.
Reports on the extent of residential areas captured in the town of Kurakhove vary; however, the Kurakhivka TPP has not yet been captured.
In the Kursk region, there have been minimal changes in recent days. It is worth noting that in the northwestern part of the bridgehead, pro-Russian forces have captured the area near the village of Kruglenkoe, west of the village of Malaya Loknya. In the southeastern part, they have made slight advances south of the town of Sudzha.
New evidence has emerged of North Korean military personnel participating in combat. According to South Korean intelligence in October, the Russian side allegedly planned to disguise them as their own troops using forged documents. The Special Operations Forces of the AFU has published images of military IDs reportedly found on the bodies of killed North Korean soldiers. Unlike standard documents issued to Russian soldiers, these IDs lack photographs, contain what appear to be fake names of Tuva residents, and provide minimal information. Notably, the first records of weapon issuance are dated 2024, despite the claimed years of service in the RuAF. In the signature field, Korean names are written in Hangul. Meanwhile, according to Russian soldiers, it is common for troops to be sent into combat without carrying military IDs. Although we admit the theoretical possibility that these documents or their photos could have been forged or doctored by the Ukrainian side, we consider this scenario highly unlikely.
Our editor specializing in mobilization summaries has published a video featuring a trainload of DPRK-made Koksan M1989 170mm self-propelled howitzers, previously reported by us, along with launch systems that are difficult to identify, presumably M1991 240mm MLRS. The train was reportedly filmed in the Tyumen region. The X (formerly Twitter) user KPAWeapons reposted the video without citing the source, identifying the MLRS as DPRK-made Pukguksong-2 medium-range ballistic missiles. However, these missiles are significantly larger than SPHs, and we are absolutely confident that they do not appear in the video. Unfortunately, some analysts, including the Ukrainian Militarnyi media outlet and Andriy Tarasenko, have reposted this incorrect identification.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the morning of Dec. 20, Russian forces launched a massive combined attack on Kyiv, killing one person and injuring 13 others. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Iskander-M/KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles were used in the attack.
Later that day, the AFU launched an attack on the town of Rylsk in the Kursk region, killing five people and injuring 12 others. Damage was reported to three apartment buildings, several private residential buildings, three educational institutions, including Rylsk Civil Aviation Technical College, corporate offices, a community center, the Civil Registry Office and about 15 cars. Mark Krutov, editor of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty news service, found out from a serial number in one of the photographs that a US-made rocket was used.
It is worth noting that the RBC [Russian media group] edited a quote from a local resident in its report about the incident. The original version stated, “These were pinpoint strikes on crowds of people—on a cultural center, on a school where soldiers were, on a bus station,” but later removed the reference to soldiers. Although the Russian authorities tried to hide the fact that the attack apparently targeted military personnel, as far as we can tell, the collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure is disproportionate to any possible military advantage.
On Dec. 21, several Ukrainian Lyutyi drones collided with high-rise residential buildings in Kazan, causing no fatalities or injuries. We disagree with the conclusions of journalists from the Agentstvo [Agency] independent media outlet, who argue that the impact of two drones on the Lazurnye Nebesa [Azure Skies] residential complex, built in 2013, virtually rules out the possibility of an accident. The UAVs’ flight path should, on the one hand, pass as close to the ground as possible to evade air defense systems and, on the other hand, fly above buildings to avoid collisions. We believe that when programming the flight route, the freestanding building—although built 11 years ago—was not accounted for, leading two drones flying the same route to hit the same spot. Programming separate routes for each drone might have been more effective but is likely too labor-intensive. The suggestion that the strike specifically targeted the apartment of Timur Shagivaleev, the general director of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, located in a neighboring building, seems highly unconvincing. Video footage of a drone striking the spire of the Manhattan residential complex in Kazan also suggests that high-rise buildings were not the intended targets but rather accidental obstacles along the way. According to the Astra Telegram channel, the potential targets of the attacks could have been a gunpowder factory, a helicopter plant, military unit No. 58661 or the aircraft plant airfield.
On Dec. 21, a series of fireworks-related incidents occurred in crowded places across Russia. In Moscow, this happened three times, while in Saint Petersburg, an explosion occurred in a bank branch. According to Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], between Dec. 13 and 22, Russians carried out 34 arsons attributed to actions of phone scammers. This is the second largest wave of such incidents since the beginning of the war. During this wave, arsonists primarily targeted banks and police vehicles. Several incidents also took place at post offices and multifunctional public service centers (MFCs) located in shopping malls. Notably, this was the first time that MFCs and post offices were targeted. Since the beginning of the war, Mediazona has recorded 156 arson attacks coordinated by scammers. The previous wave, from July 29 to Aug. 3, 2023, included 37 such incidents, while another spike occurred in November 2023, when 19 attacks targeted draft offices and other facilities. Based on the scale of these incidents, we suggest they may have been orchestrated by either a state structure or a quasi-state actor operating in Ukraine’s interests. However, we consider the overall impact of such attacks on the course of the war to be negligible.
Western Assistance
On the frontline, the AFU was observed using the X-MADIS eXpeditionary Mobile Air Defense Integrated System produced by CACI. This portable full-spectrum counter-small unmanned aircraft system (C-sUAS) detects, locates, tracks, identifies and defeats single or multiple small drone threats. It allows the AFU to direct fire against Russian reconnaissance drones using their FPV drones. X-MADIS combines radar, a portable electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) optic and an electronic warfare system that acts quickly and decisively against drone-related dangers and threats. Originally developed for the US Department of Defense, this system is also supplied to certain allies. Given that Russian forces have been successfully intercepting Ukrainian drones using FPV drones, it can be inferred that they possess similar technologies.
Poland has transferred two Mil Mi-8 helicopters and one Bell 412HP helicopter to Ukraine.