Sitrep as of Jan. 10, 2025 (10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Vremivka salient, where the village of Velyka Novosilka has been partially encircled since early Dec. 2024, no significant developments have occurred over the past two weeks. Despite the limited number of troops that would be needed to complete the encirclement, Russian forces have not made further advances in the area.
Russian forces have taken full control of the town of Kurakohve, including its power plant, industrial zone and surrounding fortified positions, according to a Jan. 6 briefing by the Russian Ministry of Defense. While Ukrainian authorities have yet to issue an official statement, several Ukrainian sources—including the unofficial Telegram channel of the 46th Air Assault Brigade, the DeepState mapping project (1, 2), and military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets—have acknowledged the loss of the town. Mashovets explained that the fighting in the Sukhi Yaly River valley were rearguard maneuvers designed to allow the main Ukrainian forces to execute a phased withdrawal from Kurakhove. However, units defending the remaining salient along the river now face the risk of being encircled themselves. Following the capture of Kurakhove, Hannivka and nearby villages, the larger salient—previously anchored by the fortified Kurakhove area—has become increasingly vulnerable.
Russian forces continue to advance westward from the village of Zelenivka toward the N-15 highway, aiming to sever the road near the village of Ulakly. Despite this renewed push, the situation in this sector has seen little change over the past two weeks.
While Kurakhove’s capture does not provide Russia with significant military advantages or operational depth, it holds symbolic value, and could create the impression among Ukraine’s Western allies that Russia has seized the initiative on the battlefield.
The most notable developments have occurred in the Pokrovsk direction, where Russia continues its maneuver to encircle the town of Pokrovsk from the south. Although Pokrovsk is connected to central Ukraine via roads and railways, its logistical role diminished late last year due to its proximity to the frontline.
Russian forces are advancing along a broad front west of Pokrovsk, stretching from the village of Pishchane and the village of Shevchenko near Pokrovsk’s outskirts to another village named Shevchenko, located west of the village of Stari Terny near the Vovcha River.
It remains difficult to predict when the Russian Armed Forces might capture Pokrovsk. Fighting in this area, particularly near Shevchenko and Novyi Trud, has been ongoing since the first week of December.
In addition to the aforementioned southwest flank, Russian forces are advancing east of the town of Pokrovsk, near the village of Vozdvyzhenka, toward the highway leading to the town of Kostiantynivka. The highway is now less than 4 km [2.5 mi] away, and the RuAF already have the capability to target it with artillery. They are expected to attempt to physically cut off the highway soon, which would significantly complicate Ukrainian supply lines. The frontline in this area is so extensive that encircling Pokrovsk and the subsequent fighting for the town could become prolonged. While the frontline is about 10 km [6.2 mi] from the Dnipropetrovsk region, there is currently no immediate threat of an offensive toward the cities of Dnipro or Pavlohrad. However, fighting could eventually erupt in settlements closer to this region, such as the village of Novopidhorodne. Meanwhile, the Dnipropetrovsk region is expected to remain under threat from Russian airstrikes, as before.
At the end of 2024, the slowdown of the Russian offensive was widely discussed. At the time, it seemed premature to draw definitive conclusions. However, after more than two weeks, it can now be confirmed that the advance has indeed slowed. The reasons for this remain unclear, but we tend to believe it reflects normal fluctuations in the pace of offensives, as maintaining a consistently high tempo in combat operations is virtually impossible. Currently, we see no signs of exhaustion among Russian army personnel. The slowdown is also unlikely to be related to the holiday season or frost. We believe that weather conditions significantly affect combat operations only during the muddy season, while Ukraine generally does not experience prolonged or severe frosts.
At a recent Ramstein format meeting, Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the operation in the Kursk region as one of Ukraine's greatest victories in the entire war. While opinions may vary regarding its strategic significance, the August 2024 offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region undeniably demonstrated Ukraine's ability not only to defend but also to execute successful offensive operations.
In early January 2025, Ukraine resumed its offensive in the Kursk region, with the AFU breaking through the forward defense lines of the RuAF in the eastern part of the bridgehead. They pushed 3 km [1.9 mi] forward, reaching the hamlet of Berdyn and the village of Novosotnytskyi, temporarily reclaiming contested territory. However, it appears that the AFU was unable to gain a foothold in the area.
Visual evidence suggests that this was a well-prepared attack involving columns of armored vehicles equipped with mine-clearing systems. Nevertheless, Russian forces appear to have anticipated the assault and successfully repelled it.
A debate has emerged among pro-Russian milbloggers about the effectiveness of Ukrainian electronic warfare during this offensive. We believe the "jammers" were indeed effective. At the beginning of the operation, the only available footage came from high-altitude reconnaissance UAVs or fiber-optic drones, while traditional drones—susceptible to electronic warfare—appeared to be inoperable.
Russian forces have launched offensives across multiple sections of the frontline in the Kursk region. In the southeast, they pushed toward the village of Makhnovka, while in the western sector, they advanced toward the villages of Malaya Loknya, Lebedevka and Sverdlikovo, capturing a significant part of the Kursk bridgehead.
North Korean soldiers continue to suffer heavy losses. President Zelenskyy has claimed that North Korea has lost up to 4,000 troops, though this figure cannot be independently verified. However, photos and videos of killed and wounded North Korean soldiers continue to surface. We attribute the successful RuAF advances primarily to Russian units, as North Korean forces, in our assessment, operate with significant inefficiencies and often make critical mistakes.
A video has been published showing a DPRK-made M1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled howitzer, reportedly filmed on the frontline. It is not possible to geolocate the video.
On Dec. 31, the Group 13 unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry attacked Russian Aerospace Forces helicopters using R-73 missiles launched from Magura V5 unmanned surface vessels. As a result, two Mil Mi-8 helicopters were reportedly shot down, and another was damaged.
On Jan. 1, a Mil Mi-28 attack helicopter crashed in the Voronezh region, killing its crew.
According to pro-Russian military blogger Kirill Fyodorov, the loss of two Mi-8s and one Mi-28 resulted in the deaths of eight pilots. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] reported that the end of 2024 was marred by the loss of the best crews, adding that such a large number of qualified specialists had not been lost at one time since 2022. According to some sources, there were 16 crew members aboard the two downed Mi-8 helicopters. While this is not a very significant loss for Russia, given its still considerable inventory of helicopters and crews, the emerging threat posed by such attacks seems very serious to us.
Western Assistance
Two weeks before his inauguration, Donald Trump declared that the hot phase of the war might be over within six months or earlier, while his special envoy for Ukraine and Russia Lieutenant General (ret.) Keith Kellogg promised to do his best to put an end to the fighting within 100 days after Trump's inauguration.
On Dec. 30, 2024, the US announced a new military aid package to Ukraine worth $2.5 billion. Half of the amount is allocated under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and the other half, under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, a mechanism for urgent military support of Ukraine.
Also, on Jan. 9, the Biden Administration announced its final package of PDA security assistance for Ukraine worth $500 million which includes:
- AIM-7, RIM-7 and AIM-9M missiles for air defense and other air-to-ground munitions;
- Support equipment for F-16s;
- Armored bridging systems;
- Secure communications equipment;
- Small arms and ammunition; and
- Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training and transportation.
According to Reuters, Joe Biden is expected to announce a new package of sanctions targeting the Russian economy this week.
French Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets are expected to arrive in Ukraine this month. It is worth noting that the first group of pilots and mechanics has already completed their training. According to Mashovets, these aircraft will be capable of launching Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles and AASM Hammer air-launched cruise missiles, and possibly Armat anti-radiation missiles. This means they could be used not only as flying air defense, like the current F-16 fighter aircraft, but also as strike aircraft to support combat operations along the frontline.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with 54 RCH 155 self-propelled howitzers.
Der Spiegel has reported that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is blocking additional aid to Ukraine worth €3 billion [$3,1 billion]. This likely relates to the budget shortfall reported in August 2024.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On Dec. 30, Ukrainian forces launched Storm Shadow missiles at the town of Lgov in the Kursk region. According to sources cited by the Astra Telegram channel, eight soldiers were killed and 22 others were injured.
On Jan. 2, the village of Ivanovskoye, also in the Kursk region, was attacked. The village is located near Maryino, where on Nov. 20, during an AFU attack on a command post, a North Korean general was wounded. According to Alexander Khinshtein, the Acting Governor of the Kursk region, none of the residents of Ivanovskoye sought medical assistance. Videos from the aftermath show a military Ural truck with the tactical marking of the Group of Troops "North"—a diamond with a cross—along with a UAZ vehicle in protective colors.
The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported receiving information about a meeting of Russian officers on Dec. 25 and struck it by a HIMARS MLRS. Three captains from various units were reportedly killed in the attack. It was later confirmed that Major General Konstantin Smeshko, commander of the Russian Engineer Troops, died on Dec. 26, possibly from injuries sustained in the strike.
In the early hours of Jan. 8, Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in the city of Engels, Saratov region. The fire has been raging for three days, and attempts to extinguish it have so far been unsuccessful.
Later that afternoon, the RuAF dropped two air-dropped bombs on the city of Zaporizhzhia. Presumably, the target was the Motor Sich plant, as we geolocated the strike near its main entrance (though outside the plant's premises). As a result of the strike, 13 people were killed and another 122 were injured.
Situation in Syria
The future of Russian bases in Syria remains uncertain. On Jan. 5, reports emerged indicating that the Russian cargo ship Sparta, which was supposed to transport Russian equipment out of the port of Tartus, has been circling offshore, possibly unable to secure permission from the new Syrian authorities to dock. Additionally, several flights by a Russian Antonov An-124 transport plane from Syria to the Libyan al-Khadim airbase near Benghazi were recorded in late December. It is possible that some Russian equipment is being transferred to this airfield. We lean toward the view that Russia will likely manage to maintain its presence in Syria in some form.
Ahmad al-Sharaa, the new leader of Syria, previously known as al-Julani, stated in an interview with Al Arabiya that he does not intend to sever ties with Russia completely, as it remains an important country and is considered the second most powerful nation in the world. He noted that all of Syria's weapons originate from Russia or the USSR, and Russian experts operate many power plants. For this reason, Syria’s new leadership does not want Russia to leave the country, despite the wishes of some international partners.
Recently, a Syrian delegation visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. Additionally, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot visited Syria. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha also met with Ahmad al-Sharaa. During their talks, Sybiha expressed his willingness to support Syria’s food security and offered to share Ukraine’s experience in collecting evidence, investigating war crimes, and holding war criminals accountable.
The US Department of the Treasury has issued a general license valid until July 7, 2025, allowing certain financial transactions with Syrian government institutions. This includes transactions related to energy resources and transfers through the Central Bank of Syria. This mechanism temporarily relieves Syria’s new authorities from some of the sanctions imposed on the country. Currently, the presence of Russian military bases in Syria is likely to be a subject of negotiation with Western nations.
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