Sitrep for Dec. 6-9, 2024 (as of 11 a.m.) UTC+3
Frontline Situation Update
Russian advances on the Vremivka salient near the village of Velyka Novosilka have slowed following a successful Ukrainian counterattack in the village of Novyi Komar.
A similar situation has unfolded in the pocket along the Sukhi Yaly River in the Kurakhove direction. While only a small area remains under Ukrainian control, the Russian Armed Forces have made limited progress in the village of Trudove and south of the village of Uspenivka in recent days. The gap between Russian positions near these settlements has narrowed significantly; however, the pocket remains neither fully encircled nor captured, with no confirmed reports of a Ukrainian withdrawal.
The most notable changes have occurred in the Pokrovsk direction, where the RuAF are advancing toward the town of Pokrovsk along the railroad from Selydove. Russian forces have moved closer to the villages of Shevchenko and Novyi Trud, slightly expanding their salient westward toward Novotroitske. Shevchenko is relatively close to a residential neighborhood on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. It is worth noting that the RuAF are also advancing along the Selydove-Pokrovsk highway toward the village of Dachenske. The pace of advancements in this direction remains inconsistent, making it difficult to predict when fighting might reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk.
Russian forces have strengthened their positions in Toretsk, making slight advances in the southern part of the town. Reports indicate that at least half of the town is currently under Russian control.
Western Assistance
According to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Denmark has delivered a second batch of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. In November, when the first six aircraft arrived, Denmark promised 13 more planes, although it is unclear how big the new batch is. It seems that a new batch of fighter jets will be delivered as soon as a new group of Ukrainian pilots completes their training. This means that if 13 aircraft have been delivered, based on the ratio of two pilots per fighter, another 26 pilots may have completed their training. This number may be slightly smaller if some aircraft were delivered as reserves or for spare parts.
According to President Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the US could have trained even more F-16 pilots if Ukraine had provided more candidates. This odd statement seems to be just an excuse for Biden’s outgoing administration, since it was previously widely discussed that the slow pace of Ukrainian pilot training was due to the air base in Arizona being able to allocate slots for only 12 trainees at a time, with the remaining slots occupied by pilots from other countries.
Sweden and Denmark have signed a contract to purchase CV90 infantry fighting vehicles to replace those they have supplied to Ukraine, with Denmark receiving 115 and Sweden 50 such vehicles. Forty IFVs will be delivered directly to Ukraine. The procurement was announced back in February 2024, but the actual delivery is expected to take place only in 2026.
The United States has announced a new $988 million military aid package for Ukraine. It will include:
- ammunition for HIMARS MLRS;
- unmanned aerial systems;
- equipment, components and spare parts to maintain, repair and overhaul of artillery systems, tanks and armored vehicles.
It is worth noting that this aid package is not allocated under the Presidential Drawdown Authority program but rather through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows to place orders with arms manufacturers. Thus, deliveries are expected to begin within months or even years. However, an important nuance is that the funds for these contracts are drawn from unspent allocations previously approved for military assistance to Ukraine. As far as we understand, after taking office, Trump will likely be unable and unwilling to cancel already concluded contracts. This format of aid provision thus serves as a form of guarantee that Ukraine will receive the assistance.
France has published its 2025 draft finance bill, which includes defense expenditures. Notably, it appears the country is finally planning to resume production of SCALP-EG cruise missiles.
Most modern air defense systems are poorly suited for countering drones, as their munitions are designed to intercept missiles, are complex to manufacture and are significantly more expensive than mass-produced drones. The Estonian company Frankenburg Technologies plans to begin testing its new anti-drone missiles in Ukraine in 2025. Initially, the company aims to produce several dozen missiles per week, with production scaling up to several hundred per week by the third quarter. These missiles are designed to counter relatively large drones, such as the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, the Orlan reconnaissance drone and large multicopters, but they may be less effective against smaller FPV drones.
According to Bloomberg, SpaceX has secured a government contract to expand the supply of Starshield, the military version of Starlink, for Ukraine. The primary difference between Starshield and its civilian counterpart appears to be its encryption system, which complies with US government standards. Its importance for the AFU remains unclear, as there have been no reports of breaches, data interception or successful jamming of Starlink communications. However, it is possible that the military version will be operational in occupied territories of Ukraine and in Russia, where Starlink is currently disabled. This would be highly beneficial for the AFU, especially during operations in the Kursk bridgehead. At present, the AFU has 500 Starshield terminals (at a cost of $40 million), with plans for an additional 2,500 units to be delivered.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The Ukrainian Navy has released video footage of drone strikes, involving UAVs and unmanned surface vessels, targeting gas platforms near Crimea. These platforms reportedly contained surveillance equipment, and this is not the first attack on such installations. The extent of the damage remains unclear.
Interestingly, during this attack, an USV was spotted carrying slots for FPV drones, effectively acting as a mothership drone capable of launching shorter-range drones. Additionally, some footage shows the interface of a Bayraktar UAV, suggesting that these drones are still being used over the Black Sea for reconnaissance and targeting.
On Dec. 6, according to pro-Russian sources, Ukrainian USVs, likely preparing to attack the Crimean Bridge or test its defenses, were destroyed in the Kerch Strait. Russia's Ministry of Defense reported six USVs destroyed, while the pro-Russian Telegram channel Archangel Spetsnaza shared photos of debris and claimed there were five USVs. One piece of debris had markings suggesting that at least this part of the vessel was manufactured in Poland, though this does not necessarily mean the entire vessel was built there.
Russian forces released a video of a missile strike near the Ukrainian Navy's A505 Simferopol reconnaissance ship, located in waters near the city of Odesa. Smoke rising from the ship suggests it may have been struck by fragments from the missile.
Pro-Russian sources also shared footage of an FPV drone attack on a moving train west of Pokrovsk. Previously, Russian forces had not targeted moving trains. Earlier strikes—such as those with Iskander ballistic missiles—had hit stationary trains at stations. Ukrainian forces, however, have conducted drone attacks on trains in the past. The video shows two protective cars placed ahead of the locomotive, designed to shield it from explosive devices on the tracks, as well as additional armor on the locomotive cab.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
As of Dec. 6, 2024, Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], together with BBC News Russian and a team of volunteers, has identified the names of more than 82,000 Russian soldiers killed during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to our formula, the actual number of Russian casualties is around 170,000. Adding at least 20,000 casualties from the territories of the "LPR"/"DPR," occupied before 2022, the total number of killed will be just under 200,000 people. As we have previously reported, we decided to stop publishing assessments of the number of soldiers wounded in action, as these figures were often misunderstood by many readers.
On Dec. 8, Zelenskyy stated that 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since February 2022. We do not consider this number credible, as it is significantly lower than our estimates and the UALosses project’s named list, which includes over 60,000 killed, especially since such lists never account for all losses. It is worth noting that Yurii Butusov, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian publication Censor.net, stated several days ago that, according to Ukraine's General Staff, the AFU have lost 70,000 killed and 35,000 missing in action over the past three years.
A twofold difference in losses seems plausible and can be explained by Russian combat tactics.
On Dec. 9, a car belonging to Sergey Yevsyukov, the head of the Olenivka penal colony in the "DPR," exploded in Donetsk. Yevsyukov was killed and his wife was injured. In Ukraine, a criminal case had been initiated against Yevsyukov in connection with the deaths of prisoners of war among the defenders of the city of Mariupol during an explosion in the early hours of July 29, 2022. However, Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service stated that the deceased was not an employee of the colony.
War in Syria
The Assad family’s 54-year grip on power in Syria ended on Dec. 8, 2024, with the victory of the Syrian Revolution that began in the spring of 2011. Bashar al-Assad and his family have reportedly been granted asylum in Moscow. It should be noted that Russia only rarely grants asylum—by late 2021, only two Syrians had ever received the status.
In recent years, global opinion had increasingly tilted toward legitimizing Assad despite the numerous documented atrocities committed by his regime. These included the use of chemical weapons against civilians, airstrikes on population centers and the torture of political opponents in prisons. Rescue workers are currently attempting to access the lower levels of one such notorious detention facility. The Arab League had begun rebuilding ties with Syria, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄźan appeared poised to negotiate. However, as analyst Charles Lister points out, Assad refused to make any concessions.
Ultimately, the Syrian opposition prevailed, toppling Assad’s rule despite receiving minimal international support. As previously reported, one of the victorious factions is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a radical Islamist group designated as a terrorist organization by the US, Turkey and many European nations. Concerns are mounting that HTS leadership may impose strict Sharia law across Syria and marginalize ethnic and religious minorities. Even so, the fall of Assad’s regime, for now, offers hope for a brighter future for the Syrian people.
The civil war, however, is far from over. Clashes persist between the Kurdish-led People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Additionally, remnants of ISIS, hiding in the Syrian desert, may attempt to exploit the situation to regroup. On Dec. 8, US Central Command announced it had launched airstrikes against 75 ISIS targets.
Our team does not have a unified opinion on the future of Russia's bases in Syria: the naval base in Tartus, used for operations in the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim airbase, which is critical for all Russian operations in the Middle East and North Africa. Most CIT analysts believe that no agreements between the new Syrian authorities and Russia are possible, as Russian forces have bombed civilian populations from these bases for years and are now sheltering Syria's chief war criminal. However, some believe that in the Middle East, anything is possible, and under certain conditions, Russia might negotiate to retain the bases. On Dec. 9, Russian representatives in Latakia told the TASS [Russian state-owned news agency] that "opposition’s armed forces" control the city but have not entered and do not intend to enter Russian military bases. This marks a notable shift in rhetoric: within a single day, “terrorists” were rebranded as "opposition forces." It is worth noting that on Dec. 3, some Russian ships left the Tartus base for exercises, but by Dec. 6, some had returned. At this point, we assume that the fleet is likely to begin withdrawing, as no agreements with the new authorities have been reached yet, and relocating a large base is a time-consuming process. Should an agreement be reached, the equipment would likely return. It is also worth noting that since Turkey has closed the Bosporus Strait to military vessels, Russia cannot move its ships back to the Black Sea. There is speculation that if retaining the naval base in Tartus is not feasible, Russia might attempt to negotiate with another ally in the Middle East—Libya—and establish a base in Tobruk. While the infrastructure there is significantly inferior to Tartus, it remains the best available option for Russia at this time.
On Dec. 7, several military cargo transport aircraft, including an An-124, an An-72 and an Ilyushin Il-76 strategic airlifter, reportedly arrived at the Khmeimim Air Base, presumably to evacuate vehicles. However, Dara Massicot, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted that a full-scale evacuation would require significantly more aircraft than currently observed.
We expect that Western countries will eventually remove the terrorist designation from the HTS group and engage with it. In recent years, despite a $10 million reward offered by the US Department of State for information leading to the capture of the group's leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, he has not gone into hiding. On the contrary, he has traveled freely across Syria and appeared in public places without fear for his safety. The group has actively sought to portray itself as moderate to the international community, claiming to have abandoned its radical ideology.
