Sitrep for May 5-13, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m.)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kursk region, on May 5, the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked the border area near the village of Tyotkino, in the Glushkovsky district, around the hamlet of Otruba, which is separated from the rest of the region by the Seym River, as well as from the direction of the village of Novyi Put. In recent days, Ukrainian soldiers breached lines of concrete pyramids and entered Russian territory with armored vehicles and quad bikes, supported by UAVs. However, they have been unable to gain a foothold, and fighting continues. The purpose of this attack remains unknown. While it could be interpreted as a diversionary maneuver, given the absence of rapid Russian Armed Forces advances on any section of the frontline, such incursions appear to be an unjustified use of resources. Establishing a new bridgehead seems pointless.
The Severny Veter [North Wind] Telegram channel, affiliated with the Group of Troops "North," published footage of drone strikes on Ukrainian vehicles reportedly in this direction in the Sumy region. Pro-Russian blogger Roman Alyokhin reported a difficult situation in Tyotkino itself.
Video of a Ukrainian strike on a bridge over the Seym River in the village of Zvannoye has been published—it was previously hit at the start of the Kursk operation—as well as a strike on a Buk-M3 SAM system, geolocated in the Kursk region.
In the border zone near the village of Gornal, the situation remains unchanged, fighting continues there.
At the Victory Day parade, North Korean generals were seen shaking hands with Vladimir Putin. However, unlike military contingents from other Russian-friendly countries, there was no formation from the DPRK in the parade. Among those identified was Kim Yong Bok, commander of North Korean forces in Russia. Other officers were also identified by researchers.
The Korean Central News Agency has released a statement from Kim Jong-un in which his order to "wipe out the neo-Nazi occupiers from Ukraine and liberate the Kursk area" is mentioned. The statement also hints at a possible order "on using the armed forces of the DPRK in repelling the enemy’s invasion" if "the henchmen of the United States and the West, with their tacky, defective munitions, attempt another assault on the Russian Federation, our fraternal country." We interpret these words as a signal that North Korean military personnel, unlike the military equipment transferred to the RuAF, are likely to be returning or have already returned home. There have been no reports of their involvement in combat for several months.
In the Lyman direction, Russian troops have advanced towards the villages of Ridkodub and Kolodiazi, where strategic heights are located. The captured village of Nove is situated on the hills near Ridkodub. Following this, further advancement will be easier until reaching the next ridge of hills near the village of Karpivka—the last before the village of Lozove on the Oskil River. If the RuAF advance on Lozove, they could cut off supplies to the Ukrainian grouping in the village of Borova.
They may also push south or north along the heights. Another potential scenario is an offensive by the RuAF from Ridkodub and Kolodiazi southward towards the Siverskyi Donets River, along which a defensive line could be established. This advancement could pose a threat to the supply lines of the AFU in the Serebryanske forestry.
In the Toretsk direction, there have also been some changes along the frontline — in recent weeks, its western flank has been the most active area. There, the RuAF have reached the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka highway in the villages of Novoolenivka (and additionally secured positions in the village of Oleksandropil), Nova Poltavka, and Vodiane Druhe. They are also advancing toward the highway slightly farther east, near the village of Romanivka.
In addition to the developments described above, Russian forces have achieved some gains in the northern part of the town of Toretsk, where the AFU had previously conducted counterattacks. The RuAF have also reinforced their positions slightly south of Toretsk. The situation in this direction is becoming increasingly difficult for the AFU, as Russian forces are redeploying additional units of the 8th Combined Arms Army and the 68th Army Corps of the RuAF to this section of the frontline. These units had previously been operating in the Kurakhove direction.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF are advancing on the western flank. Judging by a ground-level video—not taken from a drone—showing a flag, they have managed to capture the village of Kotliarivka. The Russian MoD has also announced the capture. This means that only a few kilometers remain to the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region. While we still believe there is no significant risk of a deeper advance into the region at this time, the border settlements may soon be captured. It is worth noting that one of the Russian army's main objectives is to reach the administrative border of the Donetsk region.
In the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces are fighting in the village of Bahatyr and advancing toward the village of Oleksiivka. This demonstrates their continued consolidation along the highway connecting Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. The likely objective of Russia's summer offensive will be Kostiantynivka, as well as the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area. However, a methodical offensive cannot be expected, as conditions may shift dramatically depending on the reaction speed of the AFU command, reserve availability and the ability of fresh forces to establish effective defensive positions. If the advance on Kostiantynivka is significantly slowed, the priority direction may change – as always, Russian tactics will likely focus on identifying vulnerable sections of Ukrainian defense. It is worth noting that earlier active operations in the Kupiansk direction have quieted for similar reasons.
The three-day ceasefire unilaterally declared by Russia resembled the "Easter ceasefire" with slowed combat operations across various frontline sectors, evacuation teams operating in some areas, while fighting persisted elsewhere. Aircraft were deployed along the frontline, but no long-range missile or drone strikes against Ukrainian cities were recorded.
Peace Talks
With the backing of European leaders, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has proposed a 30-day ceasefire to Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer arrived in Kyiv, where Macron, during a meeting with Zelenskyy, called Donald Trump to brief him on the talks. It was claimed that Trump agreed to support the European position.
Later, Keith Kellogg, the US special representative for Ukraine, reaffirmed Washington’s stance that it would increase pressure on Russia if Putin refused the 30-day ceasefire. Putin declined the truce proposal but offered to resume direct negotiations in Istanbul.
Trump wrote on Truth Social that Ukraine should immediately agree to the Istanbul talks. Zelenskyy responded by announcing that he would personally travel to Istanbul on May 15 and was ready to meet with Putin. The Kremlin has yet to respond, and there is skepticism that Putin will travel to Turkey.
Meanwhile, Trump made another post, declaring that a “BIG week” is coming and floated the possibility of attending a Putin–Zelenskyy meeting in Istanbul. Should Putin refuse to show up, Trump suggested, it would signal the Kremlin’s unwillingness to freeze the war.
The Agentstvo media outlet, citing Reuters, reported that Iran will soon transfer launchers for its Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. It is worth noting that, according to US and European officials, Tehran supplied Moscow with these missiles in September 2024 but, for unclear reasons, did not provide the launchers. At the moment, we are unable to confirm this information based on open-source data.
A similar situation occurred last fall, when rumors emerged about North Korea transferring MLRS to the Russian army. However, these systems only appeared on the frontlines several months later. The Fath-360 missiles have a range of 120 km (75 miles), and their deployment would allow the Russian army to conserve longer-range and more expensive missiles—such as the 9K720 Iskander or KN-23—by avoiding their use on frontline targets.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Our team analyzing attacks on civilian infrastructure has prepared a comprehensive report detailing civilian casualties for April 2025. Over the past month, we recorded the highest number of victims since our monitoring began in January 2024—2,021 civilians. At least 273 people were killed, and another 1,748 sustained injuries of varying severity. A slightly higher death toll was recorded only once, in May 2024—278 deaths. We have never previously observed such a high number of injured; the closest figure was in September 2024, when 1,699 people were injured.
It is important to emphasize that indiscriminate use of force has resulted in significantly higher civilian casualties in the non-occupied territories of Ukraine compared to the occupied territories or Russia. This is largely due to the high number of Russian airstrikes and the use of various ballistic and cruise missiles.
We would appreciate any help in sharing this report and raising awareness about the civilian victims among the international community.
The Economist published a piece focused on Russia’s military capabilities. According to estimates by Western analysts, the Russian defense industry is capable of producing more than 1,400 Iskander 9K720 mobile short-range ballistic missile systems and around 500 Kh-101 cruise missiles per year. According to Ukrainian media outlet 24 Kanal, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has ordered 633 Kh-101 missiles for 2025. This represents a significant increase in production compared to pre-war levels, and therefore, the number of missile strikes on Ukraine is expected to increase in the coming months.
The Economist article also compiled opinions from analysts, diplomats, and defense ministers from various European countries regarding the possibility of a Russian attack on Europe. Some believe that if the war in Ukraine is halted, Russia could rebuild its military to the level needed to launch a large-scale war against a NATO country within two years; others estimate five or even 8–10 years. However, to launch a regional conflict, Russia would only need about six months to recover. At the same time, analysts point out that if the war in Ukraine is halted, an attack on a European country would be risky for Russia not only due to the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 and potential US involvement in the war, but also because such an attack would require pulling significant forces from the occupied territories in Ukraine. This would give Ukraine an opportunity to counterattack and reclaim those territories, as in that case, no one would accuse it of violating the ceasefire.
Former British military attaché John Foreman claims that the recently established 44th Army Corps in the Leningrad Military District, intended to counter Finland, is a window dressing, and that the actual strength of its units is significantly lower than planned.
We agree that if the war in Ukraine is frozen, it would take Russia several years to restore its military forces, equipment and ammunition stockpiles before it could attack any European country.
Poland has officially accused Russian intelligence services of setting fire to one of Warsaw’s largest shopping centers, Marywilska 44, in May 2024, which had previously been reported unofficially. As a retaliatory measure for the sabotage, Poland is closing the Russian consulate in Kraków.
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