Sitrep for April 21-25, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kursk region, virtually no changes have been reported over the past week. Continuing reports of fighting on the outskirts of the village of Gornal cannot be confirmed, as there is still no convincing evidence of such clashes. A video of an airstrike on the Gornal Monastery that surfaced earlier this week was, according to some reports, filmed before the "Easter truce" (it is worth noting that last week we reported on Russian forces approaching the monastery grounds, where Ukrainian troops had previously taken up positions). Although the video’s description claims that a FAB-3000 bomb was used, the footage does not support the use of such a powerful air-dropped bomb. Pro-Russian sources often attribute any somewhat impressive explosion to the use of this type of bomb, regardless of the actual evidence.
The most active section of the frontline in recent days has remained the Toretsk direction (which is now sometimes referred to as the Kostiantynivka direction), where Russian forces captured the village of Kalynove (as reported by Russia’s Ministry of Defense last week) and advanced into the village of Tarasivka, located to the northwest.
Although the MoD has already declared Tarasivka captured, footage showing Russian soldiers in the center of the village does not offer enough evidence to confirm full control. Moreover, in such cases, control over an area may change hands several times in a short period of time.
In the Chasiv Yar direction, the Russian Armed Forces have still not managed to fully seize the town of Chasiv Yar, which is a necessary step before launching a presumed summer offensive toward the town of Kostiantynivka. The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold one district of the town, which is marked as a contested area on DeepState’s map. It is important to keep in mind that a common tactic for Russian forces is to increase pressure on the most vulnerable section of Ukraine’s defenses, only to shift the focus to another direction once the AFU strengthen their positions there. That is why, after several months of unsuccessful attempts to advance in Chasiv Yar, Russian forces might pivot and launch an offensive from the town of Bakhmut toward the city of Sloviansk, as predicted by Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets. In that case, Chasiv Yar could see a prolonged lull.
A similar pattern is visible in the Lyman direction: as Russian progress toward the town of Lyman has stalled (they have not been able to push south of the village of Yampolivka), their focus has shifted to the village of Katerynivka. This kind of operational unpredictability makes long-term forecasting significantly more difficult.
On the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF have already advanced very close to the administrative border of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions. According to the leadership of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group, Russian forces are striving to cross this border by May 9, allegedly to demonstrate notable progress by the holiday. There is regular speculation about the desire of Russian commanders to time any victories with holidays or certain dates; however, these often do not materialize. This may be due to an inability to view the situation on the frontline through the eyes of Russian higher command. It is quite possible that they consider the current systematic advance to be quite successful and feel no need to prove anything.
In previous weeks, we noted a certain intensification of combat on the frontline, but this week, the Russian offensive has again slowed down. We still associate the increase in attacks with the presumed culmination of the negotiation process. The slowdown may also be due to the need to conserve resources—intensifying the offensive required significant expenditure of reserves, including armored vehicles.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the early hours of April 24, Russia launched another massive airstrike on Ukraine, using 145 drones (Shahed-136/Geran-2 loitering munitions, Gerbera UAVs and other decoy drones, aimed at overloading air defense), dozens of cruise and ballistic missiles, including both types of Iskander, Kalibr, Kh-101, Kh-59, and Kh-69, as well as DPRK-supplied KN-23 missiles. A statement from the Ukrainian Air Force indicates that not only F-16s but also Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft were used to repel this strike, marking yet another official mention of their participation in countering Russian air attacks.
The main strike targeted Kyiv. As a result of numerous hits, one of which destroyed a residential building, 12 people were killed and 87 injured. Among the victims were three young people aged 17, 19 and 21. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy's statement, the residential building was hit by North Korean KN-23 missiles.
In the early hours of April 25, Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions attacked Pavlohrad in the Dnipropetrovsk region. One of the drones hit a residential building, causing a fire. As a result, three people were killed and another 15 injured, including three children.
Over the past two months, the intensity of airstrikes on Ukraine has significantly increased. We are confident that the near-daily attacks involving numerous targets cannot be directed solely at military facilities, as claimed by the Russian MoD. Even when legitimate targets are identified, thorough follow-up reconnaissance is not conducted, and it is implausible that the military identifies this many suitable targets on a daily basis. Therefore, a significant portion of the strikes on Ukrainian cities can be classified as indiscriminate use of weapons. In cases where legitimate military targets are confirmed, the collateral damage is disproportionate to the military advantage gained.
It appears that Russian soldiers are attempting—largely unsuccessfully—to use massive strikes on cities, resulting in numerous casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, as a means of pressuring Ukrainian society and influencing the negotiation process.
In addition, given that Russia’s defense industry has steadily ramped up its production of UAVs and missiles over the past three years, it is likely that General Staff officials are pressuring the relevant branches of the military to use all newly produced drones as quickly as possible—even in the absence of well-identified, high-value targets.
Analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies have concluded that Russia produced more than 6,000 Shahed-type loitering munitions (Shahed-136 or Geran-2) in 2024 and intends to further accelerate production throughout 2025. Satellite imagery suggests that a new military-industrial facility for drone production has been established, and that additional assembly lines have been installed at an existing plant. A second production line for Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones appears to have been set up at the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol.
In our previous sitrep, we noted that Russia had turned the Shahed-136 platform into a base for developing various drone modifications tailored to different operational needs.
In the early hours of April 25, Ukrainian UAVs once again targeted the base of the 112th Missile Brigade in Shuya, Ivanovo region—the third such strike in the past two weeks. Russia’s MoD reported the interception of one drone. Following previous strikes, no satellite images of the site showed significant damage, suggesting that ammunition storage facilities may have escaped direct impacts.
Satellite images have now revealed the aftermath of the April 22 explosion at the 51st GRAU arsenal in the Vladimir region. The images indicate that most of the facility has been destroyed.
Peace Talks
On April 17, during a meeting in Paris with Ukrainian and European diplomats, the American delegation proposed a new ceasefire plan, which is reportedly described as the "final offer." (Reuters published the full text of the proposal.) It is worth noting that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington may abandon attempts to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine if it does not see clear signs that a peace agreement is possible. In response to a journalist's question about what concessions Russia had made to move toward peace, Donald Trump stated: "Ending the war, giving up the seizure of the entire country — that’s quite a big concession." In other words, the demand to hand over four regions to Russia is already considered a concession, since it implies that Putin is giving up his demand for the rest of the Ukrainian territories.
The agreement assumes that the US would legally recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine will not recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea. In response, Trump said that such statements "undermine the peace talks" and that no one is asking Zelenskyy to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. The plan also proposes that the remaining territories currently under Russian control would stay under Russian administration, though without formal recognition of annexation. Additionally, Ukraine would forgo NATO membership, while the question of European Union membership would remain open. The draft also includes the lifting of all sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and the strengthening of economic ties between the US and Russia. The security of Ukraine and assistance in post-war reconstruction would be guaranteed by certain unnamed European countries. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant would be transferred to American management and would supply electricity to both Ukraine and Russia (likely referring to the occupied territories). Furthermore, Ukraine would be required to sign an agreement with the US regarding mineral resources.
Trump cannot recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea by executive order, as in 2017 he signed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which imposes specific restrictions on Russia, Iran and North Korea. The law explicitly declares the annexation of Crimea illegal and directly prohibits any recognition of it, as well as the recognition of any other seized Ukrainian territories. It also authorizes Congress to block the lifting of sanctions against Russia, since some of the restrictions that the president previously had the power to revoke are now codified into law and can only be removed by Congress. Trump might attempt to devise "some sort of legal workaround" to bypass Congressional decisions.
If the United States does recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea, it would not be without precedent: in 2019, Trump recognized Israel’s annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights, and in 2020, he recognized Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara in exchange for Morocco normalizing relations with Israel. Nevertheless, part of our team believes that recognizing Crimea would stand out from these examples as it concerns the European continent and the annexation was relatively recent. It would signal that under a Trump presidency, annexing foreign territory does not carry serious consequences.
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said in an interview with CBS that Russia is "ready to reach a deal" with the US on Ukraine, "but some elements still need to be fine-tuned." He also noted that Trump is “probably the only leader on Earth who recognized the need to address the root causes of this situation.”
Trump said, "I think we have a deal with Russia. We have to get a deal with Zelenskyy. I thought it might be easier to deal with Zelenskyy. So far, it's been harder, but that's okay… But I think we have a deal with both.”
According to Bloomberg’s sources, the US will demand that Russia accept Ukraine’s right to develop its own, adequately equipped, army and defense industry as part of a possible peace agreement. The meeting between Steve Witkoff and Putin during which all this was to be discussed took place on April 25.
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has accused Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation and independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Proekt of trying to undermine Trump’s "peace-making efforts." It is likely that the Kremlin has realized that it might miss the opportunity to freeze the war on favorable terms and is trying to demonstrate readiness to freeze the war along the current frontline, leaving minor nuances for later discussions.
One could say the "Coalition of the Willing" has turned into a coalition of the less willing. The Times reported that the United Kingdom no longer wants to send its troops to Ukraine, believing that the presence of European ground forces in Ukraine would be perceived by the Kremlin as unilateral intervention and could lead to a broader war. However, European countries are not abandoning their plans to send instructors to train Ukrainian soldiers, to help protect Ukraine’s airspace with European aircraft, as well as to supply weapons and fund Ukraine’s defense industry.
According to Reuters, Chinese officers are present in the rear of the Russian army, learning from its experience. This is not a unique situation and does not constitute direct involvement in the war: a number of European and American military personnel are also present in the rear of the AFU and are studying the course of combat operations. Chinese state television aired a report filmed during tests conducted by the 81st Army Group of the Central Command, showing how the People’s Liberation Army of China has begun testing fiber-optic-controlled drones.
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