Sitrep for April 14-18, 2025 (as of 11:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the number of combat operations along the entire frontline, including the Pokrovsk direction, had been decreasing since late March. Nevertheless, over the past week, there has been a sharp uptick in activity across nearly all sectors. This suggests that the number of engagements does not fully reflect the dynamics of combat operations, nor does weekly comparison of territorial gains provide a complete picture.

In the Kursk region, Russian soldiers have gained a foothold near the almost destroyed Gornal St. Nicholas Belogorsky Monastery, located north of the village of Gornal. Fighting continues for control over the remnants of the Kursk bridgehead. In the Sumy region, Russian attempts to advance from the village of Basivka toward the village of Loknia have thus far been unsuccessful. Some reports indicate that certain units are being redeployed from the Kursk direction to other fronts. This mainly concerns airborne troops, which is why a relative slowdown is indeed observed in this sector of the frontline. However, in our assessment, the Russian command has not yet abandoned plans to establish a buffer zone in the border area of the Sumy region.

In the Kharkiv region, particularly in the Kupiansk direction, the situation has remained relatively calm for the past week and a half. This is partly due to the complete melting of ice on the Oskil River in the area, which has led the Russian Armed Forces to attempt fording armored vehicles across the river. Videos have surfaced showing the aftermath of these attempts, with Russian vehicles—either abandoned or struck by drones—now floating in the river or stranded along its banks. These videos underscore the difficulties of expanding bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oskil and pushing further toward the town of Kupiansk—without armored vehicles, any offensive success is nearly impossible.

In the Lyman direction, near the Zherebets River, Russian forces are advancing northwest from the area of the village of Katerynivka toward the village of Borova, which they are also attacking from the northeast. While the primary objective of the offensive in the Lyman direction is a potential future push toward the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the RuAF are currently trying to break through in sectors where Ukrainian defenses appear weaker. According to Ukraine’s 66th Separate Mechanized Brigade, between 150 and 230 Russian assault troops are fighting daily in this direction, followed by soldiers from other units tasked with securing and defending captured positions. However, we believe it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the RuAF face no constraints on infantry availability—especially given reports from personnel in this brigade indicating that some units have been redeployed from the Kupiansk direction to support offensive capabilities in the Lyman sector.

We maintain that the Russian army continues to experience personnel shortages and that current recruitment rates are insufficient to offset ongoing losses. Nevertheless, in some sectors, Russian command remains capable of forming relatively large strike groups to increase pressure on Ukrainian positions. We believe this escalation may be tied to rising tensions as the conflict approaches a potential negotiating climax: Russia appears intent on seizing more territory to strengthen its position in upcoming talks.

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reports that an offensive toward Kostiantynivka has begun in the Toretsk direction. Active combat operations are now underway along a line from Vozdvyzhenka to the village of Niu-York, particularly in the Niu-York–Kalynove sector. Russia’s Ministry of Defense claimed on April 16 that it had captured Kalynove, but the visual evidence provided does not confirm the village was taken: footage shows only a flag atop a half-destroyed house, and not freely moving soldiers, which would indicate firm control over the village. An NTV report stated that civilians remain in Kalynove. This issue is not unique to Russia’s border areas, where authorities failed to conduct a full evacuation, but also affects Ukrainian settlements where mandatory but non-forcible evacuations were announced. As a result, some civilians simply refused to leave the combat zone.

Russian forces are also trying to advance in Sukha Balka, west of Niu-York, with footage from the village showing Russian soldiers raising flags. Toward Leonidivka—and farther to Shcherbynivka—Russian troops launched an unsuccessful assault with a column of mostly civilian vehicles, primarily UAZ Bukhanka vans. Similar to the situation with personnel, Russian forces in some sectors of the front lack armored vehicles entirely, while others have both tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

At the junction of the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions near Vozdvyzhenka, Russian attacks toward Yelyzavetivka and Myroliubivka have intensified in recent days. Footage shows an assault by a column including up to 100 motorcycles and about 20 armored vehicles, most of which were destroyed by Ukrainian forces.

On the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction, Russian troops are making gains around Kotliarivka. For a long time, Russian forces failed to seize positions in Kostiantynopil, but eventually bypassed it, captured the village of Rozlyv, and reached the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk highway near Bahatyr, severely disrupting Ukrainian supply lines and logistics. This enabled a gradual takeover of the semi-encircled Kostiantynopil.

To further complicate Ukrainian supply efforts in Kostiantynopil, Russian forces, in addition to striking vehicles with drones, are scattering "caltrops"—spikes dropped from drones that puncture tires.

On April 13, in the South Donetsk direction, a Russian armored column, consisting of 14 armored vehicles (including tanks) and motorcycles, attempted to attack westward from the village of Velyka Novosilka toward the villages of Novosilka and Pryvilne. However, the column was reportedly destroyed, presumably by drone strikes.

In March, Russian troops reported capturing the village of Dniproenerhiia on the right bank of the Mokri Yaly River. On April 15, the AFU announced the liberation of the village. As of now, there have been no independent confirmations of this report, while pro-Russian sources claim that the Ukrainian attack was repelled and that the village remains under Russian control. Meanwhile, the RuAF are attempting to advance toward the village of Vesele.

On the Zaporizhzhia axis, Russian troops are trying to advance toward the village of Mala Tokmachka. A video has emerged showing a column of no fewer than 40 armored vehicles. The Ukrainian side has claimed the column’s destruction, although footage shows the vehicles on the outskirts of the village. It is presumed that the RuAF plan to launch an offensive on the town of Orikhiv from two directions: from the village of Mali Shcherbaky and from Mala Tokmachka. While Russian forces may reach and capture Orikhiv in the coming months, a strong Ukrainian defensive line lies beyond the town, leading to expectations that the Russian advance will stall after reaching Orikhiv.

We link the observed intensification of combat operations to ongoing negotiations involving the United States, Russia and Ukraine. The fact that the RuAF command is not prioritizing a single direction but is instead dispersing forces in an attempt to advance along the entire frontline suggests that such efforts are unlikely to yield significant territorial gains.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the past week or two, the number of attacks has increased significantly. Between April 16 and 17, at least 14 civilians were killed and 100 injured. Between April 15 and 16, at least three people were killed and 46 wounded. In the early hours of April 18, the Russian Aerospace Forces struck a densely populated area of the city of Kharkiv. On the morning of April 17, a combined strike using air-dropped bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK) targeted the city of Kherson. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] published UAV footage of the airstrike and claimed that the target was a Territorial Center of Recruitment and Social Support, though comments suggest it was the home base of an AFU unit. It is worth noting that the RuAF do not conduct thorough target reconnaissance and appear to disregard civilian casualties. As a result, even such unsubstantiated claims may be sufficient for Russian soldiers to justify strikes on residential buildings.

In the early hours of April 17, Ukrainian drones struck the base of the 112th Missile Brigade of the RuAF in Shuya, Ivanovo region. The 112th Brigade was responsible for the missile strike on Sumy on April 13. We doubt that the strike hit an ammunition storage facility, as the video footage lacks any sound of secondary detonation or additional explosions. Moreover, firefighters arrived promptly—whereas extinguishing a fire at an artillery storage site would typically be too dangerous.

This base was targeted by drones two nights in a row. During the earlier strike, in the early hours of April 16, local authorities reported that two people were injured. In addition, on April 15, the General Staff of the AFU reported a strike in the Kursk region on the home base of the 448th Missile Brigade of the RuAF, which also played a role in the missile attack on Sumy.

Peace Talks

According to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United States may abandon efforts to achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine within days unless there are clear signs that an agreement is possible. He reiterated Donald Trump’s continued interest in a peace deal, but noted that the President has "many other priorities" globally and he will be prepared "to move on" if there are no signs of progress. Trump himself has stated that he expects Russia to respond to the proposed ceasefire with Ukraine this week.

Meanwhile, according to Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Putin has not issued any new instructions regarding the moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure. Commenting on the possibility of extending or expanding the moratorium, Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s Envoy to the UN, said that a ceasefire in Ukraine is "currently unrealistic."

Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s Minister of Economic Development and Trade, reported that Ukraine and the US have signed a moratorium regarding an agreement on natural resources. Although the document is not a full agreement, it confirms the intention to sign such an agreement in the future. The memorandum does not contain any security guarantees for Ukraine, so it can be assumed that the signing of the agreement will not bring the war to an end.

Ukraine continues to highlight China’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war. Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine has information about arms supplies from China to Russia. According to him, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has general information about the delivery of gunpowder and artillery components, with more details to be revealed next week. We expect that data will be presented indicating that certain Chinese companies are supplying Russia with gunpowder and artillery components. However, this does not provide evidence that the supplies were authorized at the state level.

In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that China has never provided lethal weapons to either side of the conflict and has always strictly controlled the export of dual-use goods. Over the past three years, numerous reports have emerged of individual Chinese companies supplying drones or dual-use components to Russia. However, none of these reports have included evidence that the Chinese government sanctioned such deliveries.

In the coming weeks, we expect a surge of video footage showing columns of armored vehicles. Most of these will not be related to the war in Ukraine—they will be part of Victory Day parade rehearsals.

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