Sitrep for April 7-11, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Fighting continues in the Sumy region for the village of Basivka. A recent video shows Russian soldiers arriving on ATVs, dismounting, and attempting to gain a foothold in the village. They move in short bursts between destroyed houses, searching for cover while under attack from Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets stated that up to four North Korean brigades are taking part in fighting on this front. In terms of numbers, this roughly corresponds to two Ukrainian motorized rifle brigades. According to him, the North Koreans are either being deployed to reinforce Russian units—primarily as forward assault units—or are conducting independent assault operations on sectors of the frontline assigned to them.
At the same time, since February, we have not seen any footage confirming the participation of DPRK soldiers in the fighting. However, considering how poorly they have performed in combat (contrary to the expectations of some media outlets), it is possible that the lack of significant successes and the inability to fully clear the Kursk bridgehead could be directly linked to the involvement of the North Koreans.
According to Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian airborne troops are advancing in the Sumy region. Their objective is to push along the Loknia River toward the villages of Loknia and Yunakivka in order to cut the Sumy–Sudzha road, which could facilitate the creation of a buffer zone in the border area of the Sumy region. Additionally, the Russian Armed Forces have likely fully secured the village of Guyevo in the eastern part of the bridgehead. In the previous sitrep, we reported that Guyevo was nearly captured, as shown on the DeepState map of April 9.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy's statement about a planned Russian offensive in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions could, on the one hand, create false expectations of a potential attack on the city of Sumy. However, offensive operations are already underway in the Sumy region as confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, in an interview with the LB.ua media outlet. We agree with this assessment and believe that these actions by the RuAF do not indicate an imminent threat to the city of Sumy, but rather reflect an intention to establish a buffer zone on Ukrainian territory.
Mashovets believes that the Russian grouping in this direction, estimated to be up to 60,000 strong, is capable of occupying a border strip with a depth of 10 km [6 mi] and a width of up to 30 km [18 mi].
For firm control over this area, the RuAF need to occupy tactical heights in the vicinity of the villages of Bilovody, Yablunivka, and Yunakivka, as well as the eastern part of the forest massif to the northeast of Sumy.
In the best-case scenario, they may reach the Psel River and establish defenses along it. However, we consider these assessments to be rather optimistic for Russia, and in reality, the buffer zone may turn out to be significantly smaller. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the RuAF have enough strength not only to occupy this territory but also to hold it for a sufficient period of time; it may turn out that in the future, forces from this direction will have to be redeployed to a more sensitive section of the frontline, for example, the Donetsk region.
In the Toretsk direction, an unusual video was filmed showing two Russian armored personnel carriers that managed to penetrate relatively deeply into the control zone of the AFU to the northeast of Toretsk, but were destroyed by Ukrainian strikes. The possibility of such a breakthrough demonstrates how dynamically the line of control in the town and around it can change: military forces from both sides can penetrate quite deeply into enemy-controlled territory, creating contested areas, as shown on the DeepState map, or as in the aforementioned video, the advancement of these APCs were reflected on the map by the pro-Russian project Divgen.
Active fighting in the Toretsk direction has been ongoing throughout the week. Southwest of Toretsk, the RuAF managed to capture the village of Oleksandropil (at the beginning of the month, they had partially occupied the village of Panteleimonivka, located north of it) and advanced in the area of the village of Kalynove (possibly capturing it as well). As we were explaining in a previous sitrep, all of this is part of a plan for a further offensive towards the town of Kostiantynivka.
In the Pokrovsk direction, fighting continues with mixed results. On the western flank of the front, the AFU managed to recapture some positions near the village of Kotlyne, while the RuAF made slight advances near the village of Uspenivka, south of Kotlyne. There are also minor Russian advances in the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that two Chinese citizens fighting on the Russian side were captured in the Donetsk region. According to him, at least 155 citizens of the People's Republic of China are participating in the war on Russia's side. This is not surprising—the Russian army includes citizens from many countries. Since China is the main strategic adversary for the new US administration, Ukraine is likely using this statement to emphasize China's involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China has not sent its military personnel to participate in this war and urged its citizens to stay away from the conflict zone, specifically refraining from participating in military operations on either side.
Western Assistance
The Ramstein format meeting will take place on April 11. Since the United States does not plan to attend this time, the conference is chaired by the defense ministers of the United Kingdom and Germany. It was later announced that Pete Hegseth would be joining the conference online. We expect one of the main issues to be the provision of air defense systems to Ukraine, as no new military aid packages from the United States are expected, meaning there will be no deliveries of anti-aircraft missiles for the Patriot systems. An alternative capable of intercepting 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles is the SAMP/T air defense system, and discussions may revolve around its potential supply. This is especially relevant against the backdrop of ongoing missile attacks on Ukraine, such as the one on the city of Kryvyi Rih on April 4 and Dnipro on April 10. In Dnipro, a missile hit a warehouse of household goods and personal hygiene products, resulting in the death of an employee.
In the run-up to the meeting, the UK and Norway announced a new ÂŁ450 million military aid package [$585 million]. The UK is to provide about two thirds of the amount, with Norway providing the rest. The money will be spent on manufacturing hundreds of thousands of drones, anti-tank mines and radars, as well as on the maintenance and repairs of the equipment the UK has already supplied to Ukraine.
Bridget Brink, the US Ambassador to Ukraine, has announced the arrival of a new batch of Canadian Roshel armored vehicles in Ukraine, the purchase of which was funded by the Biden administration.
It has also emerged that Ambassador Brink has submitted her letter of resignation. Her first letter was submitted back in January, after Trump’s election, but it was rejected by the State Department. Last week her tweet concerning the strike on the city of Kryvyi Rih which failed to mention the fact that the missile had been launched by Russia caused an uproar. According to some sources, after Trump’s election the American embassy has been deliberately avoiding direct accusations of Russia in its posts. It seems that similar instructions have been circulated to the diplomatic corps by the new American administration.
The Czech Republic has completed the transfer of its last usable T-72M1 tanks to Ukraine. The final tanks of this type were sent to Ukraine in late March - early April 2025. The batch, consisting of approximately 20 units, had previously been in service with the 73rd Tank Battalion of the Czech Army, which, following the transfer, was left without any heavy armored vehicles and is now awaiting deliveries of Leopard 2 tanks.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine is ready to purchase weapons—primarily air defense systems—from the US for a total of $30 to $50 billion and is prepared to pay either directly or as a contribution to a joint fund, the establishment of which is envisaged under the resource agreement.
Photos of preparations for Victory Day parade rehearsals have started to appear in various Russian cities. In the city of Yekaterinburg, a large number of new military vehicles have been spotted: T-72B3M, T-80BVM, T-90M and BMP-3. At the same time, numerous images from the frontline show very old GAZ-69 vehicles, produced between 1952 and 1973, including at forward positions near the village of Bilohorivka. This may be due to the fact that these vehicles are available in greater numbers than the Lada Niva SUV, while being just as capable off-road.
Late on the evening of April 9, a video emerged showing a helicopter flying over Naro-Fominsk in the Moscow region under fire from small arms, specifically point defense anti-air assets. We do not know why the people guarding the site decided the helicopter was hostile. Ukrainian drones of this type have not been spotted over Russian territory, and it is hard to imagine a Ukrainian military helicopter reaching the Moscow region. Aleksey "Voevoda," a pro-Russian blogger and Russian Aerospace Forces helicopter pilot, initially praised those shooting at "hooligans" and "criminals" in his first post about the incident, but later wrote that it was a helicopter belonging to one of Russia’s security agencies and passed along a "fiery hello" from the crew to the shooters.
On April 8, a Russian air-dropped bomb fell on a road near the village of Novaya Glinka in the Belgorod region. While it did not explode, fragments of the shattered pavement struck a passing car, injuring its driver. In footage from the scene, filmed by a soldier or a first responder, someone explicitly says, "…[it was] a FAB," a claim corroborated by eyewitnesses. Indirect evidence that Russia bears responsibility for this situation lies in the fact that Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov simply reported an injured person in his post about the incident, whereas in other cases he always specifies that injuries resulted from an AFU drone attack, shelling or missile strike. Nevertheless, the Investigative Committee announced its intent to investigate this event as a "crime by the AFU against civilians."
Another example of the Investigative Committee’s peculiar approach to evidence is its claim of murders of civilians by AFU soldiers in the village of Makhnovka in the Kursk region. So far, in none of the cases of civilian deaths in Kursk have we seen evidence of executions or other war crimes committed by Ukrainian troops.
In late March 2025, pro-war rapper Akim Apachev arrived in Sudzha and spray-painted the walls of houses with graffiti containing obscenities, which, in turn, outraged local residents. A Kursk court found Apachev guilty of disorderly conduct and imposed a fine of 70,000 rubles [$830]. According to his lawyer, Apachev will not appeal the court's decision and "regrets choosing the wrong linguistic formulation."
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