dispatches
April 7

Sitrep for April 4-7, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The pace of combat operations continues to slow down. The changes observed along the frontline are now so minor that in previous months we might not have even mentioned them in our summaries.

In the Kursk region, Russian Armed Forces released photos and videos showing Russian flags raised over a church and the district administration building in the village of Guyevo—it appears that a significant portion of the village is now under Russian control, with the rest remaining contested. On a nearby section of the frontline, there are unconfirmed reports that fighting has begun for the village of Oleshnya.

No changes have been observed in the Belgorod and Sumy regions. Russia’s Ministry of Defense unexpectedly announced the "liberation" of the village of Basivka in the Sumy region—a notable statement given that Russia does not claim the Sumy region as its territory, and the term "liberation" is typically used in reference to Ukrainian regions that Putin has declared part of the Russian Federation. There is currently no confirmation of Basivka being captured, and Ukraine’s border guard service denies it as well.

In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces managed to make slight gains in the village of Zapadne and straighten the frontline near the village of Kamianka. Any offensive operations in this area are complicated by the need to supply bridgeheads across the Oskil River — currently, it is nearly impossible to move armored vehicles across, and seizing territory using infantry alone is highly inefficient.

In the Lyman direction, the RuAF also made slight advances near the village of Novoliubivka in the Luhansk region. It is worth noting that the current offensive focus has somewhat shifted to this section of the frontline, as it appears the territory captured here may later be used as a springboard for an assault on the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, additional forces from the Group of Troops “West” are currently being redeployed to the Kupiansk and Lyman directions—in particular, units from the 27th Motor Rifle Brigade. It is likely that pressure along this part of the frontline will intensify in the near future.

In the Pokrovsk direction, where, according to Ukrainian military sources, the Russian command has redeployed additional forces, there has been a relative uptick in combat operations. Russian forces managed to capture part of the territory near the village of Lysivka.

According to the War Spotting project, Russian troops lost 57 tanks in February and 56 in March.

At the current rate, the Russian army is projected to lose around 700 tanks within the year. Our assessment from last year indicates that Russia can produce and restore 1,000 to 1,100 tanks annually, meaning there is still a possibility to replenish losses. However, most of the tanks being restored are taken from storage, which have limited resources.

If we look at the weekly loss chart of Russian military equipment, we can observe that the rate of losses has halved over the past six months. This is not due to Russian soldiers learning to defend more effectively against Ukrainian strikes, but rather because they have increasingly less armored vehicles at their disposal.

To partially compensate for the shortage of armored vehicles, Russian soldiers are attempting to adapt civilian vehicles for their needs. Pro-Russian Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent Aleksandr Kots reported on Russian engineers-volunteers from Rosatom State Atomiс Energy Corporation who are converting LADA Niva off-road vehicles into buggies for the frontline. These vehicles are unarmored and provide no protection for the driver and passengers. Additionally, the Niva's off-road capability in marshy terrain leaves much to be desired, although it is better than that of standard passenger cars.

Pro-Russian Telegram channels have published a video featuring a homemade explosive device designed to breach enemy fortifications. It consists of an explosive-filled sphere with an improvised fuse—the round shape allows it to roll more easily when thrown into a bunker. Typically, bulkier anti-tank mines such as the TM-62 are used for such purposes. Anti-personnel mines have a significantly smaller charge and are incapable of destroying fortifications; they are effective only against personnel.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On April 5, Ukrainian forces launched drone strikes on Saransk. The target was the Optic Fiber Systems plant—the only enterprise in Russia producing optical fiber cables. The plant's products are currently in high demand for drone manufacturing. Footage has been released showing a Ukrainian UAV approaching the plant and a fire in one of the buildings. It has been reported that the damage was minor and did not affect production.

Also on April 5, drones struck an explosives plant in the Samara region—footage of a fire has been released.

In both cases, in the absence of satellite images, it is currently difficult to assess the extent of the damage.

On April 4, Russia launched a missile strike on the city of Kryvyi Rih, apparently using a Iskander ballistic missile with a warhead containing prefabricated shrapnel. Footage of the strike shows a single airburst, rather than multiple explosions resembling machine gun fire, which would be typical of a cluster munition warhead. Traces of the prefabricated fragments are visible around the impact site. The MoD stated that the target of the "precision strike with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead" was the RoseMarine restaurant (formerly Magellan), where a meeting between Ukrainian officers and Western instructors was allegedly taking place. In reality, it was a beauty conference. It is not possible to cause significant structural damage to a building using a missile with an airburst and prefabricated shrapnel. However, it can cause serious injuries to people in open areas. The missile hit several dozen meters from the restaurant—a CCTV camera captured the moment of impact. It is possible that the story about the meeting in the restaurant was fabricated to justify the strike on a civilian city. However, Iskander missiles are typically used for strikes on targets important to the RuAF.

As a result of this strike and a subsequent UAV attack, 20 people were killed, including 9 children, as a playground was located close to where the missile exploded; more than 90 people were injured.

Later that evening, Kryvyi Rih was also hit by drones, resulting in the death of another woman, the twentieth victim that day.

On April 6, Russian forces launched a combined strike on Kyiv, resulting in one death. To justify this, the Russian Ministry of Defense again claimed that the target was the "central artillery base of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" as well as military-industrial enterprises involved in UAV production. Since any facility can theoretically be used for assembling drones, the MoD may post factum declare anything as UAV production sites. It is worth specifically noting that the Russian army is poorly organized in terms of target reconnaissance.

International News

On April 2, Trump imposed tariffs on most countries around the world, allegedly to address the United States’ trade deficit (as of April 7, global financial markets continue to react negatively to these measures), though Russia was not included in this list.
Kevin Hassett, Director of the National Economic Council, stated on ABC News that the US did not impose tariffs on Russia to avoid damaging the negotiations aimed at ending the war.
However, Israel’s efforts to avoid 17% US tariffs by cancelling Israel’s own tariffs on a few product categories did not succeed.

Politico published an article detailing how the trade war unleashed by Trump is harming US national security. It makes American weapons—which rely on components manufactured in other countries—far more expensive and threatens supply chains. Additionally, the imposition of tariffs jeopardizes US partnerships with other nations, such as the joint submarine-building program with Britain and Australia known as AUKUS, which aims to bolster security in the Indo-Pacific region, including by deterring China.

The Washington Post published a piece quoting a US Department of Defense document outlining an interim national defense strategy. According to the document, the Pentagon views China as the primary threat, while seeking to delegate Russia’s containment to Europe. It is worth noting that, during Pete Hegseth’s confirmation hearings for US Defense Secretary, he declared that one of his top priorities in the role would be countering the “communist Chinese threat” in the Indo-Pacific region. We doubt that imposing such steep tariffs will foster US partnerships with Southeast Asian countries; rather, it may push them toward closer ties with the People’s Republic of China. For instance, trade ministers from South Korea, Japan, and China have agreed to expedite negotiations on a free trade deal among their nations.

The Sunday Times released an extensive report on the maritime and underwater rivalry between Russia and Britain. It describes how unidentified Russian sensors, tracking the movements of Vanguard submarines—the sole carriers of Britain’s nuclear deterrence force (the country abandoned the land- and air-based components of its nuclear triad during the Cold War due to cost)—were detected along the coast and at sea near Britain. This is not the first time Russia’s maritime activities have posed a direct threat to British security; in 2020, Russian underwater drones were spotted near undersea cables vital to the UK. Britain’s Ministry of Defense is convinced the drones were attempting to tap the cables for information, though there was no evidence of successful interference. As a result, in 2023, the UK purchased a vessel from Norway to monitor underwater infrastructure and track threats at great depths. Russia possesses a significant number of nuclear submarines capable of operating covertly and conducting reconnaissance missions at substantial depths. Beyond shadowing Vanguard submarines, Russia has the ability to disable undersea gas pipelines, sever electrical and internet cables, and disrupt communications, heating, and power supplies across the British Isles.

Russia is believed to be a leader in underwater reconnaissance and sabotage activities, as the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research operates within the Russian Ministry of Defense. This directorate commands ships and submarines equipped with extensive technical capabilities. The United States does not have a similar structure under military command; however, vessels, submarines, and underwater drones with comparable technical specifications can be assigned to scientific institutions, making their military purpose less obvious. Naval OSINT analyst H.I. Sutton has repeatedly noted that the degradation of the Russian army does not imply a decline of its navy.

The authors of the article argue that Russia is waging a so-called Grey Zone Warfare against Western countries—without open combat operations, but through the use of sabotage tactics, such as cutting internet cables in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, the United Kingdom must invest in the construction of multi-purpose reconnaissance vessels, as well as work on protecting underwater infrastructure and ensuring nuclear security.

The article also mentions that some of the superyachts owned by Russian oligarchs may be used for covert intelligence operations, as they are capable of deploying underwater drones.

Reuters has published an investigation into packages allegedly sent by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) containing explosives hidden among sex toys and cosmetics.

Journalist Katie Livingstone, who writes for Newsweek and Foreign Policy, reported—citing her sources—that in December 2024, Marianna Budanova, the wife of Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, traveled to the US for follow-up treatment after being poisoned in 2023.

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