Sitrep for Feb. 24-28, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)Â
Frontline Situation Update
On Feb. 26, in a live broadcast, we explained the data collection methods we used to analyze the movement of Russian army units to Ukraine's borders in 2021 as part of preparations for the full-scale invasion.
In the south of the Donetsk region, the Russian Armed Forces continue their offensive in the area where it borders the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. In recent days, the RuAF have nearly taken control of the village of Burlatske and advanced in the village of Pryvilne.
It is possible that the RuAF will now proceed with the plan previously mentioned by Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets and then advance toward the village of Komyshuvakha, aiming to straighten the frontline. If this plan is carried out and Russian forces reach the border of the Donetsk region, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have an opportunity to attack them on their flank from the direction of the regional border.
In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, Russian forces continue to consolidate their positions in the village of Andriivka and engage in fighting for the village of Kostiantynopil. However, they have not achieved significant success thus far.
In the Pokrovsk direction, Ukrainian forces managed to retake most of the village of Kotlyne. Aside from this, there have been no significant changes.
In the Toretsk direction, the situation remains unchanged. Several videos indirectly confirm fighting for the city is ongoing, despite the Russian MoD's claims. In one video, a Russian soldier runs up to a partially destroyed building, throws in an explosive device (possibly an anti-tank mine), and runs away. The building collapses after the explosion. It is presumed that an AFU position was located there. Another video reportedly shows a Russian strike on a multi-story building, which also may have housed an AFU position. However, we do not rule out the possibility that these recordings could be archival footage. Most likely, these areas are already under RuAF control.
In the Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk and Lyman directions, no changes have been recorded.
In the Kursk region, Russian forces have liberated part of the positions near the village of Pogrebki and continue their offensive attempts near the liberated village of Sverdlikovo. Additionally, on the DeepState project map, the Ukrainian village of Novenke in the Sumy region is now marked as a "contested area," though there have been no objective confirmations of the RuAF entering the village. DeepState analysts might have preemptively expanded the "contested area" following reports of an offensive on Novenke, waiting for more information. At the same time, according to the General Staff of the AFU, several Russian assaults in this section of the border were repelled on Feb. 25. Furthermore, the Russian MoD announced the capture of the hamlet of Nikolsky, which had been previously unsuccessfully stormed by a RuAF column of armored vehicles with Soviet flags, as we reported on Feb. 17. Meanwhile, the Severny Veter [North Wind] Telegram channel, affiliated with the Group of Troops "North," claimed the liberation of the village of Novaya Sorochina, located north of Nikolsky. However, there have been no confirmations of this claim so far.
Following RuAF defensive tactics, the AFU have also begun to stretch nets along supply roads to protect logistics routes from drone attacks, as shown in a video reportedly filmed in the Kursk region.
According to a press release from South Korean intelligence, North Korea has deployed an additional one to three thousand soldiers to the Kursk region in January and February. This number is insufficient to strengthen the grouping and is likely a replenishment of losses for the DPRK contingent. Additionally, according to a source from the Korean newspaper JoongAng, this time, motorized infantry and engineering units, as well as electronic reconnaissance units, were transferred to Russia. We have not yet seen confirmations of this, but this approach would fit the concept of sending a variety of North Korean military units to gain experience in modern warfare.
Summing up the week on the frontline, it is worth noting that while the pause in the Russian offensive continues in the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian military leadership may still view it as the most promising. Achieving results comparable to the capture of the town of Pokrovsk and the advance on Kostiantynivka does not appear feasible in other directions. The map shows that these towns are in a state of semi-encirclement. While capturing such a large area may take a long time, staff generals may find the idea of accelerating this process by reinforcing the troop grouping in this section of the frontline attractive. Losses can now be replenished only by redeploying forces from other directions, such as the South Donetsk direction, which would halt the advance north of the village of Velyka Novosilka. At the same time, there has been no significant influx of volunteer fighters recently, and Russian regions appear to have suspended the "payment race"—with some even beginning to reduce sign-up bonuses.
We continue to observe the deterioration of equipment inventory within the RuAF. A collection of photos has been published showing civilian vehicles being used by Russian forces for both assaults and logistics in areas close to the frontline. We understand that the doors and roof are being removed from the vehicles so that soldiers can jump out and disperse more quickly when a drone approaches.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
As it is the last day of winter, it is worth noting that since this winter, much like the previous one, has been relatively mild, Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have not led to serious consequences for the civilian population.
Mark Krutov, editor of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty news service, analyzed satellite imagery of the aftermath of a strike on an underground bunker—a storage facility for attack UAVs—in Russia’s Oryol region on Dec. 26 (or possibly Jan. 26, when both the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel also reported the destruction of a "Shahed" drone warehouse). Images captured immediately after the attack showed no signs of large-scale destruction, however, most recent ones reveal that the site is being dismantled and repaired, confirming the presence of significant damage caused by the explosion.
The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, claimed that the accuracy of air-dropped bombs equipped with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) has declined due to portable and mobile electronic warfare (EW) stations operating along the entire frontline. We find this assertion dubious: drone footage suggests that communication begins to degrade and fail only within a few hundred meters [hundred yards] of a jamming device. It is hard to imagine that frontline EW systems could affect air-dropped bombs with UMPK, which are released from altitudes of several kilometers [miles] and glide downward towards their target. In the final glide stage, where EW might influence the UMPK, the margin of error is minimal and is unlikely to impact target accuracy. Similarly, we continue to observe ongoing airstrikes on cities in the Donetsk, Kharkiv and Sumy regions. Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov also expressed skepticism about this report.
Upcoming Peace Talks
At a press conference following Donald Trump’s meeting with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, a journalist asked the US president whether he still considered Volodymyr Zelenskyy a dictator. In response, Trump expressed surprise and said he could not believe he had ever said such a thing.
Emmanuel Macron and his team considered their negotiations with Trump a failure, particularly because they were unable to persuade him to provide any security guarantees to Ukraine. Trump stated that since Europe, not America, borders Ukraine, providing guarantees should be the responsibility of European countries.
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that there would be no ceasefire along the frontline, as the Russian constitution considers Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and the Kherson regions to be part of Russia within their administrative borders. He also confirmed (contrary to Trump’s statement) that Russia is categorically opposed to the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin proposed joint US-Russia development of Russian rare earth resources, including in the occupied territories, and also expressed readiness to supply 2 million tons of Russian aluminum per year.
According to Bloomberg, the lead negotiator with the US has become Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and a figure linked to Putin’s family. Dmitriev reportedly convinced Putin that negotiations on Ukraine should be conducted by presenting business opportunities to Donald Trump that would benefit America through cooperation with Russia.
However, despite Putin’s offer to involve American partners in joint rare earth metal extraction projects, on Feb. 27, Trump extended sanctions against Russia for another year.
During a Senate hearing, Stephen Feinberg, the nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense, was unable to provide a clear answer when asked whether Russia had invaded Ukraine.
On Feb. 28, Zelenskyy is set to meet with Trump in Washington. According to Interfax-Ukraine, the Ukrainian president's plane landed at Andrews Air Force Base in the United States. The signing of a framework agreement on rare earth metals is expected. The document's final version includes a clause stating that the United States supports Kyiv's efforts to obtain security guarantees for Ukraine.
The document, titled "Bilateral Agreement Establishing Terms and Conditions for a Reconstruction Investment Fund," outlines that the US and Ukraine will create a dedicated fund, into which the Ukrainian government will contribute 50% of future revenues from mineral extraction. The fund will reinvest its resources within Ukraine. The framework document is structured so that its ratification by the Ukrainian parliament is not required. Additionally, both parties have agreed to develop and sign a more detailed “Fund Agreement,” which will require parliamentary approval. This additional document may provide more specific details on security guarantees.
In our previous sitrep, we mentioned a Wall Street Journal article in which experts speculate that pro-Russian sentiments within the Trump administration could be linked to an attempt to break the Russia-China alliance—similar to how Nixon and Kissinger reshaped US policy toward China in the 1970s, leveraging the existing deep divisions between Beijing and Moscow at the time.
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian stated that US attempts to "drive a wedge" between China and Russia are "completely futile" and that their bilateral relationship will continue to develop regardless of external factors. On Feb. 24, Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping held a phone call. Later on Feb. 28, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council and former Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu arrived in Beijing for a meeting with Xi Jinping and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Western Assistance
Finland is launching a new support program for Ukraine worth €660 million [$685 million]. The program will operate similarly to the USAI [the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative], meaning it will involve signing contracts with Finnish companies to produce weapons for Ukraine. Additionally, this spring, Finland will supply Ukraine with €400 million [$415 million] worth of military aid from all available stockpiles.
Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force, General JĂ©rĂ´me Bellanger, has published photos of the transfer of Mirage 2000 fighter jets from France to Ukraine. According to him, the delivery of the first aircraft was successful, and the pilots and mechanics are well-trained. It is reported that they are armed with Hammer glide bombs and SCALP-EG cruise missiles.
Yulia Navalnaya, Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza have announced an anti-war march in Berlin on March 1, 2025. In their signed "appeal to the democratic and anti-war forces of Russia," they state: "This demonstration must become the strong voice of the real Russia. A voice for life, for peace and for freedom. A voice against war, tyranny, and political murder."
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