Sitrep for Feb. 17-21, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the South Donetsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces have secured positions in the village of Novoocheretuvate, north of the village of Velyka Novosilka, and to the west, they have partially taken control of the village of Novosilka. Thus, over the past week, Russian forces have slightly expanded their zone of control in this area.
In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, the village of Dachne is now confirmed to be captured, according to updated data from the DeepState project. In the previous sitrep, we expressed doubts that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were still present in Dachne, and it remains unclear whether Ukrainian units in the area were encircled. The map now indicates that the RuAF have fully taken control of the remaining pocket west of the town of Kurakhove. Fighting is ongoing for the villages of Kostiantynopil and Ulakly, which are located along the N-15 highway, with a significant portion of the latter already captured. Additionally, according to DeepState, fighting for the village of Andriivka continues, while pro-Russian sources, as well as Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, consider it to now be under Russian control.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the AFU managed to retake new positions this week near the village of Lysivka, east of the village of Dachenske. Earlier, we reported on successful Ukrainian counterattacks on the western flank.
On the eastern flank of the direction, Russian forces advanced east of the village of Baranivka toward the village of Zelene Pole. However, despite this progress, the overall Russian offensive in the Pokrovsk direction continues to stall. As we previously reported, pro-Russian milbloggers attribute the slowdown to the increased concentration of Ukrainian forces, particularly AFU drone units, which have significantly complicated logistics for the RuAF.
In the Chasiv Yar direction, pro-Russian sources have announced the capture of the village of Hryhorivka, north of the town of Chasiv Yar, publishing a video of soldiers with a Russian flag. However, DeepState’s map has marked this village as almost entirely under RuAF control since late December.
In the Kursk region, Russian forces have advanced in the southwestern part of the AFU's bridgehead, completely liberating the village of Sverdlikovo and reaching the border with the Sumy region. According to pro-Russian war correspondent Yury Kotenok, Russian forces have crossed the border and launched an offensive towards the village of Novenke in Sumy region, aiming to reach the N-07, or R-200 highway on Russian territory. This road connects the city of Sumy to the town of Sudzha and serves as a critical supply route. Previously, the RuAF attempted to cut off this route by attacking the Kursk bridgehead from both the west and the east. At present, there is no objective data confirming an offensive towards Novenke. Vladimir Putin stated that units of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade of the RuAF had crossed the state border and entered the territory of the Sumy region.
At the same time, a video of the attempted breakthrough by Russian forces into the Sumy region has been published: it shows two BMD airborne infantry fighting vehicles driving along a road, and after the first one is blown up, the paratroopers abandon the armored vehicles and run back. This behavior of the Russian soldiers is likely due to the fact that after the first BMD was blown up, it became too risky to bypass it and continue moving because of the high likelihood of being blown up by a mine. It is worth noting that this video specifically captures a unit of the Russian Airborne Troops, not marines, which contradicts Putin's statements, and the geolocation confirms that it was filmed not near Sverdlikovo, but at a section of the border near the village of Zhuravka in the Sumy region. Therefore, this video is unrelated to the episode described by Kotenok.
It is worth noting that throughout the war, the area on both sides of the national border essentially forms a contested area, where both sides can relatively freely carry out raids. An example of this is the alleged capture of the village of Ryzhivka by "kadyrovtsy" [nominally National Guard and Police units loyal to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov], also located in the Sumy region.
The Financial Times published an investigation into the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war in the Kursk region. Journalists were able to identify the soldier who posted a video of the execution on his YouTube channel—which was later deleted—and, apparently, participated in the event. He turned out to be 32-year-old Oleg Yakovlev, originally from Kazakhstan, with the call sign "Sara," a soldier of the 30th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and an ex-convict. FT researchers identified him, including through voice analysis of his recordings.
An interview with captured North Korean soldiers appeared in the South Korean newspaper Chosun Daily. One of the most interesting aspects concerns propaganda: according to a POW, North Korea’s Special Operations Forces soldiers were convinced that drone operators in the Ukrainian army were actually South Korean soldiers. Additionally, one of the prisoners stated that after being released from captivity, he intended to go to South Korea to avoid problems upon returning to North Korea, where being captured is considered treason. This appears to be the reason behind the high number of suicides among North Korean soldiers facing the risk of capture. The prisoner also revealed that he had entered Russia as a student and was unaware that he was being sent to the frontline until he arrived in the Kursk region.
It is worth noting that, according to Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], the number of North Koreans entering Russia to study surged in 2024, reaching nearly 8,000 people. If the POW’s words are true, this could indicate that some North Korean troops indeed crossed the border under the pretense of studying. It is believed that the North Korean contingent numbers around 12,000 soldiers, but whether additional forces have been sent to Russia remains unknown.
Typically, news from the Zaporizhzhia axis revolves around the village of Robotyne, where periodic fighting occurs without significant changes to the frontline. However, a recent video showed a Russian convoy of three BMD-4s and three ATVs attempting to attack Ukrainian positions near the village of Piatykhatky located close to the village of Kamianske, west of the town of Orikhiv. The offensive was unsuccessful—the Russian convoy was destroyed by Ukrainian drones and artillery strikes.
Upcoming Peace Talks
On Feb. 19, Donald Trump called Volodymyr Zelenskyy "a Dictator without Elections" claiming that Ukraine itself was to blame for the war with Russia and that it was rude of Zelenskyy to have refused to sign a deal that granted the US access to Ukraine’s mineral resources. In response, Zelenskyy diplomatically suggested that Trump was trapped in “a bubble of disinformation”. This triggered a further wave of comments from American officials. J. D. Vance claimed that an attempt to influence Trump’s opinion by smearing him in the media was a disgusting way of dealing with this administration. Such sharp remarks surprised even Russian officials, including Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev.
At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, then Florida Senator and Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Marco Rubio had called Putin a liar and war criminal, insisting that the US should do its best to support Ukraine and made fun of those who tried to negotiate with Putin. However, three years on and now the US Secretary of State, Rubio has radically changed his rhetoric and, following Trump’s lead, promotes the idea of huge opportunities for partnership with Russia.
Lawyer Igor Slabykh published an affidavit from a USAID employee describing what is happening inside the agency. According to her, DOGE employees gained access to the USAID database containing all contracts and are canceling those that include "wrong" keywords. For example, after investigating contracts related to green energy support, a contract for designing a building for an embassy was canceled because the contractor's name included the company owner's surname, “Green.”
Trump continues to make inaccurate statements about US spending on aid to Ukraine. According to reports from the Inspector General overseeing US expenditures related to Russia's war against Ukraine, a total of nearly $183 billion had been spent on supporting Ukraine by the end of 2024. The largest portion of security-related funding amounts to $45.8 billion, which was allocated to the US Department of Defense to replace weapons and equipment provided to Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority. The second-largest component of security-related funding is $44.9 billion, allocated for increased US military activity in Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative. This program supports the forward deployment of US Armed Forces and the pre-positioning of supplies in Eastern Europe to deter aggression against NATO allies.
It appears that, amid this crisis, France has taken the lead in consolidating European allies and shaping a roadmap for action under the new US administration, while Britain is spearheading concrete steps to ensure Ukraine’s security in the event of a settlement with Russia.
According to sources cited by The Times, British ministers have explored security guarantee options for Ukraine after the war, seeking to avoid the deployment of a large number of troops. One proposal involves using Eurofighter Typhoon jets to patrol Ukrainian airspace. In theory, dozens of combat-ready fighters could repel any Russian aerial attack.
Meanwhile, The Financial Times reports that Britain and France are developing a concept for a European “reassurance force,” leveraging their key military advantage over Russia—airpower. Ground forces would be deployed in Ukraine only in limited numbers. The mission is expected to be led by an existing structure with headquarters in London and near Paris: the Joint Expeditionary Force.
According to The Times defense editor Larisa Brown, the plan envisions a 30,000-strong force “under European command” stationed in “key cities, ports, and critical infrastructure hubs” across Ukraine, but not on the frontline. The border would be monitored using technical assets, including aircraft, UAVs and satellites. To restore commercial air travel, Ukraine’s airspace would be protected by Western forces capable of intercepting and neutralizing incoming threats.
Even in this form, a European contingent would require significant intelligence and logistical support from the United States. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has already stated that Russia considers any presence of NATO troops in Ukraine— even as peacekeeping forces—unacceptable.
If a European contingent were to be deployed in Ukraine and Russia violated a ceasefire agreement by attacking peacekeepers, it would not automatically trigger NATO’s Article 5. NATO’s security guarantees are geographically restricted to the territory of its member states and specific maritime zones outlined in Article 6, which does not include Ukraine.
According to diplomatic sources cited by Reuters, the United States did not support a UN resolution marking the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—a resolution that condemned Russian aggression and reaffirmed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Additionally, the Trump administration is reportedly blocking references to Russian aggression in the upcoming G7 statement marking the invasion’s anniversary.
On the evening of Feb. 18, the presumed debris of intercepted missiles fell in the Central-City District of Makiivka. According to the Joint Center for Control and Coordination of the "DPR," five people were injured, including two children. Based on available video footage, it is unclear whether the missile was actually intercepted as photos do not show any debris. However, in our view, the interception theory is supported by the fact that even pro-Russian sources have endorsed it.
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