Sitrep for Jan. 31–Feb. 3, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
With the capture of the Vremivka salient, we will now consider the remaining free southern part of the Donetsk region as a separate direction—stretching from the village of Zelenivka to the village of Rivnopil, located near the border with the Zaporizhzhia region. According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, the Russian Armed Forces are expected to launch offensive actions toward the Donetsk–Zaporizhzhia highway, west of the village of Kostiantynopil, near the villages of Bahatyr and Komar. To avoid the formation of a salient vulnerable to attacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the west, Russian forces will likely attempt to straighten the frontline from Zelenivka to Rivnopil. If this happens, the villages of Novopil, Zelene Pole and Novosilka in the Donetsk region and Novodarivka in the Zaporizhzhia region could soon come under threat.
West of the occupied town of Kurakhove, fighting continues for the village of Dachne, which remains contested and is currently only controlled in part by Russian forces. The eastern part is already under Russian control. The width of this salient—from Russian positions in the village of Shevchenko to positions west of Zelenivka—is only about 5 km [3.1 mi], a distance easily covered by drones, making it extremely dangerous for Ukrainian forces to remain there. North of the N-15 highway, Russian forces continue to consolidate their positions on the outskirts of the village of Andriivka. The DeepState map now marks the road used by Russian forces to advance on Andriivka from the village of Petropavlivka as Russian-controlled.
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian assault operations continue along the entire western flank, as they have in recent weeks. On the eastern flank, Russian forces are advancing toward the village of Baranivka. The developing salient near the village of Vozdvyzhenka is significant because, although it currently represents the eastern flank of the encirclement maneuver around Pokrovsk, it could become the western flank of the Kostiantynivka direction if an offensive begins toward the Kostiantynivka agglomeration. It is worth noting that the expected advance on Kostiantynivka is likely to come from the towns of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar.
The most significant shift along the frontline in recent days has been observed in the Kupiansk direction in the Kharkiv region, where Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead on the right (western) bank of the Oskil River. According to DeepState, the RuAF captured the village of Novomlynsk several weeks ago—a position the AFU had managed to clear in early December of last year. The analysts have clarified that the delay in posting this information was due to hopes for an imminent AFU counterattack, which ultimately did not materialize. Military observer Mashovets fears these advances are indicative of a developing crisis in the Kupiansk direction. It is our assessment that Russian forces will now focus on capturing the village of Dvorichna and pushing Ukrainian troops further west, rather than advancing toward the village of Zapadne. DeepState reports that a significant portion of Dvorichna is already under Russian control, while Zapadne remains semi-encircled. However, the Russian MoD has already prematurely claimed the capture of both settlements. The purpose of this maneuver is to secure supply lines for the bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskil River via a route leading to Kupiansk from the town of Valuyki in the Belgorod region. The route follows the left bank of the Oskil, controlled by the RuAF, and crosses the river at Dvorichna. While the existing bridge has likely been destroyed, pushing the AFU farther from the village would allow Russian forces to establish a new crossing. Securing supply lines for the bridgehead is crucial for further advances toward Kupiansk along both banks of the river.
Meanwhile, soldiers from the AFU’s 3rd Assault Brigade have published footage of the interrogation of a Russian prisoner of war, who described how a staged "flag photo op" was orchestrated in the village of Novoiehorivka in the Luhansk region, in the Kupiansk direction. The Russian MoD had falsely declared the village captured. According to the POW, three assault groups—a total of 15 men—were sent to storm the settlement. Only three survived the attack, while the rest were either wounded or killed. The prisoner stated that commanders had ordered soldiers to raise a Russian flag inside the village so that a drone could capture the moment on video.
In the Kursk region, no changes on the frontline have been reported in recent days.
Russian propagandists have published footage of the interrogation of a Ukrainian soldier, who was accused of the murder and rape of civilians whose bodies were found in the basements of the village of Russkoye Porechnoye in the Kursk region. AFU soldier Yevhen Fabrisenko stated that he had raped women "with particular cruelty." This phrasing, which directly mirrors language from the Russian Criminal Code, suggests that he was forced to read a text composed by Russian law enforcement officers, which included legal elements to support the prosecution's case.
According to the General Staff of the AFU, on Jan. 31, the command post of the Group of Troops "Kursk," located in the city of Rylsk, Kursk region, was struck. While we are unable to independently verify this, the information appears plausible. East of Rylsk lies the village of Maryino, where, on Nov. 20, the command post of the Group of Troops "North" was hit by Storm Shadow missiles. The strike resulted in the injury of a North Korean general and the death of Russian officers.
Recently, many videos have emerged showing the reappearance of the muddy season: military vehicles getting stuck in the mud on the roads and even people struggling to move through the terrain. We believe that this could be why Russian soldiers were spotted using tractors to transport troops from forward positions. However, we have not yet seen evidence of tractors being used in assaults.
Researcher Richard Vereker noted that in January 2025, Russian forces lost only 45 tanks, none of which were T-90s. In his view, this suggests that Russia is no longer producing T-90M tanks from scratch but is only upgrading older T-90A models, whose stock has now been depleted. However, we believe that such bold claims should not be made based on statistics from a single month, as there could be other explanations for the absence of T-90 losses in January. For example, units equipped with these tanks may not have been deployed to forward positions that month but instead stationed in reserve or in less active sectors.
Western Assistance
Eduard Hulicius, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, announced that, as part of the Czech initiative for ammunition procurement, a total of 520,000 155mm artillery rounds were delivered to Ukraine in 2024, with an additional 300,000 to be supplied in 2025. He added that the initial plan was to provide 800,000 rounds in 2024, but it turned out to be impossible to secure sufficient funds and buy the entire amount due to fierce competition in international markets, including from Russia. The latter point is puzzling, as Russia does not use 155mm rounds.
In an interview with Reuters, Keith Kellogg, the US President's Special Envoy for resolving the conflict in Ukraine, stated that the American Administration would like Ukraine to hold both presidential and parliamentary elections this year, especially if a ceasefire with Russia is achieved. In making this statement, Kellogg referred to the practice of holding elections even in wartime in most democracies. This is true; for example, the US held elections during all the wars it was involved in, including in 1944. However, it is wrong to compare the American experience with the current situation in Ukraine, where about a quarter of the country’s territory is occupied and nearly half the population is living outside the country. For instance, during both world wars, the United Kingdom extended Parliament's powers and postponed elections until after the war.
Reuters also quotes an unnamed retired Western official who stated that lifting martial law and announcing elections could destabilize the country, as mobilized soldiers might leave the military and those eligible for conscription could "flee abroad." Besides, it might undermine the position of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, turning him into a "lame duck" in the lead-up to the elections. According to Reuters’ source, by pushing Ukraine toward elections, Trump is responding to signals from Russia, which would like to see Zelenskyy removed. We acknowledge that Kellogg's comments could be interpreted as an attempt to exert pressure on Ukraine.
Strikes and Sabotage Acts
On Feb. 1, Russian forces launched a Kh-22 cruise missile strike on a five-story residential building in the city of Poltava. As a result, one of the building’s entrances was completely destroyed, killing 14 people, including three children, and injuring 20 others, four of whom were children. We geolocated the impact site and found no nearby military facilities that could have been potential targets.
That same day, a missile, also identified as a Kh-22, was captured on dashcam footage in the Lipetsk region, where it crashed into a field, likely due to a malfunction.
On the evening of Feb. 1, the Ukrainian Air Force reported a strike—presumably involving air-dropped bombs or guided missiles—on a care home in the town of Sudzha. It was claimed that at the time of the strike, 95 elderly and bedridden residents of the Kursk region were inside the building. The attack resulted in four deaths and four serious injuries. Notably, Russian forces had already struck this building on Jan. 12, killing one person and causing only minor damage. Reports also stated that during the clearing of debris, Ukrainian first responders were attacked by Russian drones.
Based on available footage of the aftermath, it is currently impossible to reliably determine which side carried out the strike or what weapon was used on Feb. 1. Destruction of this scale could have been caused by either a Russian air-dropped bomb equipped with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) or multiple HIMARS MLRS rockets. However, a repeat strike on the same site seems less like an accidental impact from a misfired munition and more like a deliberate attack.
Russia’s Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalkova reported that Ukrainian forces have been evacuating civilians remaining in the Kursk region via the Sumy region and Belarus. It can be assumed that military vehicles were used to transport bedridden individuals to the care home as part of evacuation preparations, which Russian spotters may have interpreted as military activity. We have seen many instances where Russian forces did not conduct proper target reconnaissance or verify intelligence before carrying out strikes.
The Ukrainian Air Force has published footage from a Virazh-Planshet automated process-control system, which reportedly shows a Russian Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft launching a FAB UMPK glide bomb. We are unable to verify this footage. Based on the words of Oleksiy Dmytrashkovskyi, a representative of the AFU commandant’s office in the occupied Kursk region, at the end of a video recorded in the first hours after the strike, the AFU have the ability to track glide bombs in flight.
The Russian side claims that the attack on Sudzha was carried out by Ukrainian forces using HIMARS MLRS. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Severny Veter [North Wind] published a video showing the launch of rockets, reportedly from the village of Mala Rybytsia in the Sumy region. However, the date of filming cannot be confirmed, and the footage has not been geolocated.
On Feb. 1, in the city of Rivne, as a result of an explosion near a territorial center of recruitment and social support, one person was killed and six others were injured. On Feb. 2, an explosion near a territorial center in the town of Pavlohrad injured another man. These explosions could have been organized by Russian intelligence, potentially involving local residents who were deceived by phone scammers.
On Feb. 1, in the Poltava region, a man wearing a balaclava shot and killed an employee of a territorial center of recruitment and social support, who was accompanying mobilized soldiers, and fled with one of them. The suspects were detained a few hours later.
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