Sitrep for Jan. 27-31, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
The suspension of USAID-funded programs, financed by the US budget, has disrupted numerous humanitarian projects, led to mass layoffs within the agency and drawn criticism, including from the United Nations. In Ukraine, among other concerns, projects providing medical and psychological assistance to military personnel, veterans and displaced persons, among others, are now at risk. Moving forward, funding for the most essential humanitarian efforts will fall on Ukraine’s leadership.
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Frontline Situation Update
On Jan. 29, the DeepState project acknowledged the complete capture of the village of Velyka Novosilka by Russian forces. Over the following two days, the frontline in this area remained unchanged.
In the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces are gradually advancing west of the town of Kurakhove, with fighting ongoing on the outskirts of the villages of Dachne and Andriivka, north of the Vovcha River. Despite an increasingly dangerous situation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold the remaining part of this pocket.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian Armed Forces continue their steady advance on the western flank. On the eastern flank, they have formed a narrow salient near the village of Baranivka, northeast of the village of Vozdvyzhenka, pushing toward the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.
There have been no significant changes in the Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupiansk and other directions.
The independent media outlet Agentstvo [Agency], which tracks the pace of Russian advances based on DeepState data, reported that it had now slowed to July levels—before Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk region. This analysis aligns with our observations on the frontline: while fighting continues, the RuAF have recently been unable to achieve significant progress in any direction.
This slowdown may be linked to renewed instances of Russian forces falsely claiming the capture of settlements. On Jan. 20, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of Novoiehorivka, a village in the Luhansk region northeast of Borova, in the Kupiansk direction. Shortly thereafter, a video was released showing Russian soldiers standing with a flag, allegedly filmed within the village. However, the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade of the AFU, which is fighting in this area, later refuted this claim. The brigade's fighters geolocated the video to Kovalivka, a village west of Novoiehorivka that is controlled by the RuAF.
Additionally, the Russian MoD claimed the capture of Nikolayevo-Darino in the southwestern part of the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region near the Russia-Ukraine border. Russian state media aired a report supposedly from this village. However, according to local residents vetted by BBC News Russian, the footage released by VGTRK [state-owned Russian television and radio broadcasting company] was actually filmed in Olgovka, a village captured in November 2024.
The New York Times, citing Ukrainian and Western officials, reports that North Korean soldiers have not been taking part in combat in the Kursk direction over the past two weeks. We believe they have withdrawn to replenish losses and improve combat tactics for upcoming combat operations.
We recently reported on a scandal in Ukraine involving the reassignment of Air Force technicians to infantry roles. Despite President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s statements that such transfers had been halted and that a special commission was being formed to investigate the issue, the practice appears to have continued, according to The Kyiv Independent. Journalist Yurii Butusov has reported in a Facebook post that ten experienced radar operators—specialists in meter and centimeter-wave radar systems—had been forcibly reassigned from an Air Force radar brigade to riflemen in a naval infantry unit. As a result, three operators resigned, while three others went AWOL. Meanwhile, the AFU continue to face an increasing demand for operators of millimeter-wave ground surveillance radars, which are critical for countering UAVs, as well as for technical specialists in UAV and electronic warfare units. Reassigning experienced technicians to these high-demand fields would be far more efficient than transferring them to infantry roles.
Additionally, alongside the suspension of new brigades formations in the AFU, Censor.net reports that a decision has been made to disband the 158th, 159th, 160th and 162nd brigades, reallocating their personnel to existing, battle-hardened units. The 156th Brigade is the sole exception, as reports indicate it has already been fully formed. This decision was influenced in part by the Kursk operation, which significantly extended the frontline, further straining the already high demand for personnel.
Pro-Russian Telegram channels are circulating footage of armored vehicles featuring a new type of multilayered slat armor. We have previously reported on so-called "turtle-tanks"; now, sightings of "shed tanks" have begun to emerge. In the Chasiv Yar direction, an infantry fighting vehicle with makeshift armor was spotted. Its inner drone-defense layer consisted of metal sheets wrapped in logs, followed by another layer of metal. Another video, taken at a Russian military repair facility, showed a T-72B3 tank being stripped of its turret and modified to create an armored personnel carrier. New armor modifications also include "sandwich" armor—metal sheets layered with either logs or bricks. These videos suggest that the RuAF are suffering from a shortage of armored vehicles, while their existing fleet lacks adequate protection against modern threats, particularly drones. The success of Bradley IFVs in the current war is likely due, at least in part, to their use of Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles, which provide enhanced survivability on the battlefield.
Strikes and Sabotage Acts
In the early hours of Jan. 30, a Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition hit a residential apartment building in the city of Sumy. As a result of the strike, nine people were killed and 13 others, including a child, were injured. Two apartment buildings and 23 cars were damaged.
According to Andrii Yermak, Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, the Russian army has begun using Geran-type loitering munitions with larger 90 kg [198 lb] warheads, packed with prefabricated shrapnel in the form of metal balls. We have already reported on UAV modifications with different warheads weights of 50 kg [110 lb] and 90 kg, achieved at the expense of reduced fuel capacity and flight range.
The head of the Bulgarian company that owns the Vezhen bulk carrier, which was arrested by Sweden on suspicion of damaging an undersea cable, admitted that the vessel may have struck the cable. However, he said that the crew had no malicious intent, claiming that the anchor likely fell to the seabed due to strong winds.
The Wall Street Journal, citing sources among European officials, reported that Russia had begun to use warships to escort tankers of their "shadow fleet" in the Baltic Sea. This move will complicate inspections and the potential arrest of ships suspected of sabotage.
During a European Parliament session, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai accused Russia of being behind plans to assassinate Rheinmetall corporation director Armin Papperger, citing his role in providing weapons for Ukraine. According to Appathurai, Russia’s sabotage campaign also included train crashes, arson, attacks on politicians’ property and threats of conspiracies to assassinate industry leaders. Reports of an averted attempt to assassinate Armin Papperger first appeared in the press in July 2024.
On Jan. 30, an explosion occurred at the Rheinmetall plant warehouse in southeastern Spain, injuring six people. Five were hospitalized, with one in critical condition. The fire has since been extinguished, but the cause of the explosion remains unknown.
Western Assistance
In our previous sitrep, we mentioned that last week American C-17 military transports made several flights along the route Ramstein-Nevatim-Rzeszów. At the time, there were speculations that Israel had used these flights to transport Russian-made weapons captured from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Ukraine. However, on Jan. 27, Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine denied this assumption. Meanwhile, Axios, citing three unnamed sources, reported that the flights had actually delivered 90 Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland, from where they are set to be transported to Ukraine.
On Jan. 30, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson announced that Sweden had approved its largest ever military aid package to Ukraine, amounting to 13.5 billion Swedish kronor [$1.23 billion]. Approximately $294 million (~25%) will come from Swedish Army and Navy stockpiles, including 16 Stridsbåt 90 assault boats, 146 trucks, 1,500 TOWs and 200 AT4 RPGs. Contracts worth approximately $534 million (~45%) will be signed with manufacturers for the supply of priority military equipment such as artillery and drones. Around $58 million will be allocated for training Ukrainian military personnel, while $71 million will go toward the repair and maintenance of previously supplied equipment. Additionally, funds will be allocated to the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) for projects such as establishing a defense research institute in Ukraine and organizing mine-clearing training, as well as to the Swedish Defense University for developing training programs on strategic decision-making. Approximately $250 million will be directed to various international funds. Of this, $178 million will be provided under the Danish model, which focuses on financing Ukraine’s defense-industrial base—for example, more than $90 million will be allocated for the production of Ukrainian missiles and drones.
On Jan. 28, a Russian delegation led by Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov visited Damascus. According to SANA, the Russian side confirmed its support for the ongoing positive changes in Syria, and "the dialogue highlighted Russia’s role in rebuilding trust with the Syrian people through concrete measures such as compensation, reconstruction and recovery." Meanwhile, Reuters, citing a source familiar with the negotiations, reported that Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, demanded that Russia extradite former president Bashar al-Assad, who has fled to Moscow. The future of Russian military bases in Syria remains uncertain. While a significant amount of Russian equipment has already been removed, the bases themselves have not yet been closed.
The researcher known by the nickname Status-6 has written about experiencing burnout and plans to gradually scale down his activities.