Sitrep for Jan. 15-17, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the southern Donetsk region, Russian forces have continued to advance along the Vremivka salient and the remaining portion of the salient near the town of Kurakhove. In recent days, they have captured the village of Neskuchne and nearly completed the occupation of the village of Vremivka, leaving only its northern outskirts outside their control, according to maps. As a result, the village of Velyka Novosilka is now in an even more precarious position, approaching complete encirclement. To minimize losses, we believe it would be prudent for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to withdraw from the area in the near future.

Meanwhile, advancing west from the town of Kurakhove, the Russian Armed Forces have reached the outskirts of the village of Dachne. Holding positions in this area appears increasingly untenable for the AFU, with little strategic advantage to justify the associated risks.

A video has surfaced showing a strike on a bridge over the Vovcha River in the village of Kostiantynopil. It seems that the strike did not inflict significant damage to the bridge, and it remains passable. However, this will still complicate the supply of Ukrainian units located east of Kostiantynopil and make their withdrawal from the remaining part of the pocket more difficult.

On the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue to make gradual advances. In recent days, they have captured the village of Pishchane, located northwest of the village of Shevchenko. The Russian advance, combined with the reported cutting off of the road near the village of Kotlyne, has forced the suspension of mining operations for valuable metallurgical coal in the area’s mines. Metinvest, a company founded by Rinat Akhmetov [Ukrainian billionaire and businessman], has officially announced the halt of operations by the Pokrovsk Coal Group. As the frontline situation deteriorates, workers are being evacuated. To address the coal shortage, Ukrainian metallurgical coal will be replaced with American coal, which is approximately one-third more expensive.

The halt in coal production has triggered a crisis in the Ukraine’s metallurgical industry, including steel production, posing a long-term challenge to the stability of the national economy. Steel, which previously ranked as Ukraine’s second-largest export after agriculture, generated $4.4 billion in revenues, with 72% of exports going to the EU. Thus, ongoing fighting near Pokrovsk and the prospect of losing control of the town not only exacerbate logistical difficulties in the country’s east but could also lead to significant losses in export revenues, which are indispensable for supporting military and social programs during wartime.

According to The New York Times, Ukrainians planted explosive devices in coal mines near Pokrovsk and blew up at least one of them, namely, shaft No. 3 near Kotlyne, in December 2024. Restoring a destroyed mine is an extremely labour-intensive, expensive and time-consuming process. Consequently, if Russia occupies this territory, it is unlikely to invest in reviving the mine.

The Pokrovsk mine previously supplied up to 90% of Ukraine’s coal. In 2023, over 3 million tons of coal were extracted, supporting the production of more than 7.5 million tons of steel in 2024. However, with the current situation, coal output is expected to decline significantly.

According to military analyst Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, positions near Kotlyne are defended by the notorious 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU. This brigade, trained in France, has faced significant problems, as reported by journalist Yurii Butusov. These include incompetent leadership, numerous cases of desertion and going AWOL, and the reassignment of some of its units to reinforce other AFU formations.

There have been no significant changes in the frontline on other sections.

In the Kursk region, where the AFU and the RuAF launched their offensives at the beginning of the year, a period of relative calm has been observed this week. Currently, a rather dangerous salient has formed in the northern part of the Kursk bridgehead near the village of Pogrebki. By attacking this position, Russian forces could encircle part of the Ukrainian grouping. To do this, in addition to an assault on the western part of the village of Kruglenkoye, they would need to attack from the east as well—for example, in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye. However, the RuAF has not yet taken such actions.

Reports continue to emerge about a lack of equipment in the Russian army. While old Soviet tanks appeared on the frontline in 2023, in 2024, light vehicles and motorcycles were often deployed for assault operations. Recently, numerous videos and photos have been published showing UAZ Bukhanka vans and motorcycles being used for attacks rather than just for supply, as was previously the case. This has been reported by Ukrainian military personnel as well. According to pro-Russian blogger Wayne Howell, equipment not intended for combat operations has been deployed in assaults to conceal the shortage of armored vehicles from higher command. A video has been recorded on one of the sections of the Siversk direction showing 39 motorcycles abandoned during assaults. It is expected that, to solve this problem, Russia will need to purchase armored vehicles from North Korea in the middle or end of the year if the war is not frozen.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Jan. 13, the Ministry of Defense reported an attempted attack by Ukrainian UAVs on Jan. 11 targeting a compressor station in the Krasnodar region, which supports the operation of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline. All UAVs were reportedly shot down, but falling debris from one of them caused minor damage to the building and equipment at the gas metering station.

On Jan. 15, Russia launched a massive combined air strike on Ukrainian territory. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the following weapons were used in the attack:

• One Iskander-M or KN short-range ballistic missile (not intercepted);
• Seven Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles (not intercepted);
• Four 3M-54 Kalibr missiles launched from the Black Sea (3 shot down), about 50 missiles are used per month;
• 27 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles (23 shot down), with nearly 70 of these missiles used monthly;
• Four Kh-59/Kh-69 air-launched cruise missiles (all shot down);
• 74 Shahed-type loitering munitions/simulator drones of various types (47 downed, 27 lost in location).

The Russian MoD stated that the strike on gas infrastructure, including in the Lviv region, was a response to attacks on Russian territory using Western-made missiles and an attempt to damage the compressor station of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline. Unlike previous statements regarding strikes on energy infrastructure, the ministry did not even attempt to link the targets to Ukraine’s defense industry. Verkhovna Rada deputy Serhiy Nahornyak reported that only the surface equipment of an underground gas storage facility near Stryi in the Lviv region was damaged, while the storage facility itself "continues to operate as normal."

Following the previous massive Russian airstrike on Dec. 25, a Twitter user analyzed long-term data from Ukraine's Air Force and calculated the types and quantities of missiles used. According to his estimates, Russia is currently capable of deploying around 50 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles and slightly fewer than 70 Kh-101 cruise missiles per month. It is worth noting that at the end of 2023, Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to relocate from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, temporarily halting the use of Kalibr missiles. However, within a few months, launches resumed, as the range of these missiles enables deployment not only from the Sea of Azov but also from the Caspian Sea.

At the beginning of autumn, concerns were raised that the extensive damage inflicted by Russia on Ukraine's power generation infrastructure could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe in Ukrainian cities during severe or prolonged frosts. Fortunately, the winter has been relatively mild so far, and the damage has not been as severe as initially feared, preventing prolonged blackouts.

Responding to reports that some Ukrainian Air Force technicians are being reassigned to infantry units, Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered officials to investigate and put an end to the practice. It is reported that a special commission has been created to prevent the transfer of servicemen with critical specialties, as this could significantly impact the combat readiness of Air Force units. It is good that the issue is being addressed (similar issues in the Russian army are being concealed), but we believe it is wrong that presidential intervention is required every time.

A Russian military court convicted air defense officer Igor Pashkov of negligence and sentenced him to two years and ten months in a penal settlement for accidentally shooting down a Russian military helicopter. On Oct. 18, 2023, while on combat duty, Pashkov, serving in a Crimean air defense unit, received a report about an air target. Assuming it was hostile, he decided to destroy it. However, the missile struck a Russian Mil Mi-8 helicopter, which crashed into the Black Sea, killing all three crew members. Such incidents of friendly fire are not uncommon, highlighting the unreliability of the "friend or foe" identification system, a concern that has persisted since the war began. If North Korean air defense systems are deployed on the frontline, the risk of Russian pilots being mistakenly shot down could increase significantly.

The United States has imposed sanctions on several Chinese and Russian companies reportedly involved in supplying at least 80,000 servo motors used in Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK) for FAB air-dropped bombs. Assuming each UMPK module requires two servo motors (one for each wing panel), this quantity is sufficient to produce 40,000 UMPK modules. Estimates suggest that approximately 800 modules are produced weekly.

Sanctions were also imposed for the supply of CNC machines. These machines automate manufacturing processes, enabling high precision and repeatability in operations, including military production.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the war in 2024 cost Ukraine approximately $100 billion, with $40 billion funded by Ukraine itself, $35 billion provided by the US, and $25 billion—by Europe. It is worth noting that Russia’s planned budget for defense and national security in 2025 is $140 billion. Since Ukraine’s procurement of ammunition and equipment is significantly more expensive than Russia’s, achieving a decisive breakthrough in the war will require substantial financial superiority.

The Japanese news outlet NHK reported that in 2025, North Korean troops will participate in Russia’s Victory Day parade. Reportedly, this will involve dozens of military personnel.

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