Sitrep for Jan. 22-24, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Fighting continues in the Vremivka salient for the village of Velyka Novosilka, with its southeastern part already under Russian control and the remainder still contested. On the morning of Jan. 24, a video emerged showing a Russian flag geolocated in the center of Velyka Novosilka. Pro-Russian Telegram channels claim that forces from Ukraine's 110th Brigade have been encircled. These sources also report the presence of alleged foreign mercenaries in the village, attempts to establish a crossing over the Mokri Yaly River and strikes targeting it. However, it is possible that the majority of Ukrainian forces have already withdrawn from the area. In any case, it seems likely that the Vremivka salient will fall under Russian control in the coming days.
In the remaining part of the salient west of the town of Kurakhove, Russian forces continue their attempts to advance toward the villages of Andriivka and Kostiantynopil in an effort to encircle Ukrainian troops still positioned in the Sukhi Yaly River valley and near the village of Dachne. Throughout this week, the AFU have been engaged in rear-guard fighting near the villages of Zelenivka and Shevchenko. Despite earlier assumptions that the AFU could fully withdraw from the salient during this period, Russian forces have yet to capture the entire area and have only advanced into Dachne. As noted in our previous sitrep, Shevchenko is situated on higher ground, as are Russian positions near Zelenivka. This elevated terrain gives the RuAF a tactical advantage for better reconnaissance and more effective use of drones and artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces, according to Ukrainian journalist Yurii Butusov. Butusov has also expressed confusion over why Ukrainian forces, forced to counterattack from lower ground, and thus at a disadvantage, have not yet withdrawn from this dangerous zone. It is worth noting that, upon assuming office, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, emphasized that preserving soldiers' lives would be a top priority.
In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continue their steady advance on the western flank. Meanwhile, on the eastern flank, where the RuAF have approached the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway, an interchange connecting the road to the village of Vozdvyzhenka has been destroyed. Since the interchange has completely collapsed, it was most likely a controlled demolition by retreating Ukrainian forces rather than the result of a Russian strike. Typically, structures like a bridge or an interchange tend to collapse unevenly when hit by air-dropped bombs.
The researcher Intelschizo, who analyzed radar satellite images of the town of Avdiivka and the village of Ocheretyne from May 2024 to January 2025, concluded that Russian forces managed to establish railway logistics between these settlements. Trainloads of fuel, ammunition and military equipment can now be transported from the rear to locations closer to the frontline.
In the Kharkiv region, Kupiansk direction, Russian forces advanced on the right (western) bank of the Oskil River. While Russia's Ministry of Defense has reported the capture of the village of Zapadne, DeepState has yet to confirm this claim. According to their maps, the village is currently semi-encircled. Based on the topography of the area, Zapadne, unlike Kupiansk and the village of Dvorichna, is located on elevated terrain, which offers a military advantage to the AFU. It would be more beneficial for Russian forces to advance westward across these heights toward the village of Monachynivka and then southeast to Kupiansk, rather than advancing from the east through the lowlands in the Oskil River valley, which divides Kupiansk into two. However, this maneuver toward Kupiansk could take a considerable amount of time to materialize.
In the same area, soldiers from the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade of the AFU reportedly filmed a video of an initially unsuccessful assault on Russian positions. During the attack, Ukrainian forces used a military ruse: dressed in Multicam camouflage resembling Russian uniforms and without insignias, they approached a dugout and claimed to be Ukrainian troops, demanding the surrender of those inside. Mistaking the Ukrainians for fellow Russians, the soldiers emerged from cover unarmed and were taken prisoner. Reports indicate that this is not the first instance of such a tactic being employed. This type of tactic is not considered a war crime and is permitted under international humanitarian law, along with deceptive maneuvers, spreading disinformation and similar actions. However, the situation could be classified as perfidy if Ukrainian forces had used Russian identification marks.
At the same time, the number of Russian war crimes continues to grow. New evidence has emerged showing the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war and the shooting of a wounded AFU serviceman by the RuAF, filmed by the Russian soldiers themselves.
Fighting involving North Korean soldiers continues in the Kursk direction. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces recently published a new video of a North Korean offensive on Ukrainian positions in the western part of the Kursk bridgehead. Despite these offensive actions, pro-Russian forces have failed to make any significant progress. North Korean soldiers continue to make the same mistakes they made in early December, moving through fields and tree lines in large groups that are easily spotted by Ukrainian drones and come under fire.
A photograph has been published showing a trainload carrying North Korean M1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled howitzers and, presumably, 240mm M1991 MLRS.
On Jan. 20, Stanislav Buniatov reported the intensive use of Koksan SPHs in the Lyman direction. A Ukrainian soldier with the call sign Alex, who runs the Officer+ Telegram channel, confirmed this report, noting that the scale of their use was larger than that of gliding bombs. We have no reason to doubt the accuracy of these reports. As expected, these SPHs are not being used in the Kursk region, but rather in areas of the front where their long-range capability is more crucial.
Pro-Russian Telegram channels have circulated doctored images suggesting that North Korea allegedly supplied 122mm MLRS disguised as civilian trucks. A video showing a white truck with a covered cargo bed, above which MLRS launch tubes are visible, was widely shared. While this type of launcher was showcased during a 2023 military parade in Pyongyang, the authenticity of the video is highly questionable. It appears likely that the footage was digitally manipulated using a still frame from the parade broadcast.
The voiceover in the video claims that the system was filmed near the city of Kursk. However, if the video was indeed shot in the Kursk region and not on forward positions, the launch tubes would have most likely been kept in their lowered position. The CyberBoroshno project noted that the lighting and camera angle in the footage match scenes from the Pyongyang parade, suggesting the image is a photomontage.
We doubt that this system was actually delivered to Russia. The 122mm caliber has limited range and would only be effective near the frontline, where a white truck would stand out conspicuously. Additionally, the apparent lack of all-wheel drive makes the truck impractical for frontline use. It is also worth noting that disguising military equipment as civilian vehicles violates the laws and customs of war and would constitute a war crime.
In a previous sitrep, we mentioned that Syria’s new leadership had terminated an agreement with a Russian company to expand the port of Tartus. Researcher Qalaat Al Mudiq has confirmed that the cancellation only applies to the commercial section of the port and is likely linked to Russia’s decision to halt grain shipments to Syria in December. The agreement does not address the Russian maritime base, and its future remains a topic of ongoing negotiations.
Western Assistance
On his social network TruthSocial, Donald Trump promised to impose high tariffs on Russian goods and introduce new sanctions if Vladimir Putin does not make peace with Ukraine soon. However, it is worth noting that Russia exports relatively few goods to the United States, meaning such measures would have limited impact on its economy. In his statement, Trump did not mention increasing arms supplies to Ukraine. When asked by journalists whether he would continue supplying weapons to Ukraine or if the supplies might cease, Trump replied that he is negotiating with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, plans to speak with Putin and will see how the situation develops. Trump also criticized Europe for what he considers insufficient support for Ukraine, emphasizing that the European Union should contribute much more than it currently does.
At the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Zelenskyy addressed journalists’ questions about the necessity of deploying troops from allied countries on Ukrainian territory. Should Ukraine need to reduce the size of its Armed Forces, a large contingent of foreign troops would be required to deter Russia. When a journalist mentioned the figure of 200,000, Zelenskyy commented that this would be the minimum in such a scenario. According to The Financial Times, Ukrainian officials involved in discussions about potential negotiations consider the presence of 40,000–50,000 European peacekeepers to be a more realistic option. Analyst Michael Kofman has noted, however, that maintaining such a contingent would require approximately 120,000 troops, taking into account the need for rotation.
The issue of deploying peacekeepers will be discussed at an informal meeting between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Keir Starmer and the Secretary General of NATO Mark Rutte on Feb. 3. Some European officials believe that sending a contingent could be possible within the framework of a special coalition led by the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, with participation from the Baltic and Nordic countries. NATO’s role would be intentionally minimized to reduce the risk of escalation with Russia. It remains unclear what specific authority the peacekeepers will have. It is evident that European forces will align with Ukraine but will not fight in forward positions. Instead, they are likely to serve as stabilization or deterrence forces rather than entirely neutral peacekeeping forces, whose mandate is typically limited to monitoring the exchange of artillery fire between warring parties. The peacekeepers may be tasked with securing strategic sites or patrolling the border with Belarus, allowing Ukrainian forces to be redeployed to the frontlines.
One example of such a deterrence force model is South Korea, where US military bases are stationed while South Korean forces are positioned along the demarcation line. Another comparable example is NATO’s KFOR mission in Kosovo, which operates as a peace-support operation.
On Jan. 23, the US Senate held a procedural vote on Pete Hegseth's nomination for Defense Secretary. The vote passed narrowly, with 51 senators in favor and 49 against. The final confirmation vote is scheduled for Jan. 24. The reluctance of many senators to even consider Hegseth's nomination sharply contrasts with the unanimous approval of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and the relatively smooth confirmation of John Ratcliffe as CIA Director, which passed with a vote of 74 to 25. With Republicans holding a 53–47 majority in the Senate, Hegseth cannot afford more than three Republican defections if Democrats unite against him. Notably, two Republican senators, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Susan Collins of Maine, have expressed doubts about Hegseth's qualifications for the position.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and BBC News Russian, together with a team of volunteers, have reported 90,000 Russian soldiers killed as of Jan. 24. Of all the casualties, 23%—nearly one in four—are volunteer fighters who signed contracts with the MoD after the war began. 17% of all known deaths are convicts who were deployed to fight on the frontline from penal colonies, and 12% are mobilized soldiers. It is worth noting that the list of identified losses includes approximately half of the actual casualties, meaning that the total Russian losses likely amount to about 200,000 killed.
The competition between Russian regions over the size of sign-up bonuses for contracts with the MoD continues. These bonuses have long exceeded civilian salaries. In the summer of 2024, the payments amounted to hundreds of thousands of rubles, and as of now, even payments of 2 million rubles [$20,100] are no longer extraordinary, with bonuses in some regions exceeding 3 million rubles [$30,150].
A convicted murderer from Yuryevka in the Omsk region has been sent to fight in the war with Ukraine. In January 2022, the then-17-year-old teenager murdered the family of his 14-year-old girlfriend: a 35-year-old woman, her 38-year-old partner and a 10-year-old girl with disabilities. In March 2023, he was sentenced to six years and seven months in a penal colony. However, he left the colony to join the war. The widespread deployment of individuals convicted of serious crimes is a significant factor in declining morale and deteriorating discipline within the RuAF.
We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.