Sitrep for April 11-14, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kursk region, the frontline has remained virtually unchanged in recent days, according to our observations. Recent updates on the DeepState map reflect Russian advances that occurred over the past two weeks. The Russian Armed Forces are now fighting near the outskirts of the village of Gornal—video footage, reportedly, shows commanders using drones to coordinate Russian assault groups, and images show Russian strikes on a monastery near the village. The bridgehead near the hamlet of Oleshnya also appears unchanged—an assessment echoed by pro-Russian sources. However, footage showing Ukrainian strikes on Russian troops approaching the area suggests that fighting for control is ongoing.
No new Russian advances have been recorded in the border areas of the Sumy region either. In this sector, Russian troops are reportedly using Inokhodets (also known as Orion) UAVs to target Ukrainian military vehicles. A domestic counterpart to the Bayraktar drone, the Inokhodets is capable of carrying a heavier payload. Despite being in serial production for some time, it has been used relatively infrequently. Footage of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles in the area likely shows the use of precision-guided air-dropped bombs. These UAVs appear to be operating either from positions near the Russia-Ukraine border or from within Russian airspace.
It has come to light that the Ukrainian Air Force has lost another F-16 fighter jet. Pilot Pavlo Ivanov was reportedly killed when the aircraft was shot down by Russian air defense systems. This is not the first such incident: in late summer 2024, another F-16 was lost during an attempt to repel a large-scale airstrike. That mission claimed the life of pilot Oleksii Mes, though details surrounding the incident remain unclear. Initially, we assumed that the Western-supplied fighter jets would be used primarily to defend Ukrainian airspace, intercepting Russian missiles and UAVs while avoiding proximity to combat zones. However, in February of this year, F-16s were spotted over the Sumy region providing air cover for Ukrainian multirole MiG-29 fighters conducting bombing missions near the frontline.
By our estimates, Ukraine has received about 30 F-16 aircraft, therefore the loss of two jets is unlikely to have a significant impact on the overall situation.
Bild journalist Julian Röpcke has claimed that Russia is allegedly preparing a new offensive, initially aimed at the town of Kupiansk and, in the longer term, the city of Kharkiv. However, there are currently no signs that fighting for Kupiansk will begin anytime soon—we assess that such actions are unlikely to take place for at least several more months. Over the past few days, the frontline in the Kupiansk direction has remained stable: small Russian bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oskil River still exist, but we currently see no opportunities for them to expand or to launch an offensive on Kupiansk. While Kharkiv remains within the range of regular Russian strikes, a ground offensive on the city is highly unlikely in the coming years.
In the Lyman direction, the RuAF have slightly expanded their control near the village of Yampolivka, advancing in the southern part of the salient near the villages of Novoliubivka and Katerynivka.
In the Toretsk-Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF continue to advance in the area between the villages of Vozdvyzhenka and Panteleimonivka, moving toward the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka highway. Over the past few days, they have at least partially—according to some pro-Russian sources, completely—captured the village of Kalynove and advanced into the village of Valentynivka.
On the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction, positions near the village of Kotlyne have been changing hands during the course of combat. While last time we reported on successful AFU counterattacks, now the RuAF have once again retaken some of those positions. In the southern part of the direction, Russian advances continue toward the villages of Kotliarivka and Preobrazhenka.
The shortage of armored vehicles in the RuAF continues to worsen on the frontline. A recent video shows the 12th Azov Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine repelling an attack by a Russian convoy composed of UAZ Bukhanka vans, Niva cars and other civilian vehicles.
Another video has emerged showing the destruction of a DPRK-supplied Koksan M1989 170mm self-propelled howitzer, allegedly in the Kursk direction—though the geolocation remains unconfirmed. Unlike a previous strike on a similar system with cluster munitions, this time the SPH was clearly destroyed by drone strikes. Judging by the presence of a nearby vehicle resembling an armored repair and recovery vehicle, it is likely that the howitzer had lost mobility and was awaiting evacuation.
Russian propagandists have released a video featuring a woman from the village of Lebedevka in the Kursk region, which had been under occupation. In the video, she claims that AFU soldiers are fascists who killed civilians. However, in an earlier interview recorded by Ukrainian journalists, she praised Ukrainian soldiers for helping her and her family in every possible way, eventually evacuating them through Belarus to Russian-controlled territory in the Kursk region. This case highlights how eyewitness testimonies should be approached with caution—and how easily such narratives can be reshaped.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the morning of April 13, Russia launched a missile strike on the city of Sumy. According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the strike was carried out using Iskander-M or KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles. The first missile hit the Congress Center of Sumy State University, while the second struck the university’s second building, where the assembly hall was located.
The mayor of the town of Konotop, Artem Semenikhin, and Member of Parliament Marianna Bezuhla reported that at the time of the strike, a ceremony was taking place in the Congress Center to honor servicemen from the 117th Territorial Defense Brigade, marking the anniversary of the unit's formation. It was later revealed that the strike resulted in the deaths of Colonel Yurii Yula, the deputy commander of the 26th Artillery Brigade of the AFU, and serviceman Volodymyr Zherebtsov.
As the geolocation of the main destruction closely matches the corresponding markers on Google Maps, it can be assumed that Russian forces used this service to guide the missiles to their target. Upon learning that a military meeting would be held at the Congress Center, they may have discovered that the university's assembly hall was located nearby and assumed that the event could also be taking place there—leading to the decision to strike both buildings.
Footage from the Congress Center shows that most of the damage occurred inside the building—specifically, collapsed ceilings. The assembly hall across the street from the Congress Center has a severely damaged corner: a hole is visible near the top, with shrapnel marks on the walls, likely from prefabricated fragments. Based on the nature of the destruction, an explosive fragmentation warhead with a contact fuse was used, not a penetrating one capable of piercing building walls and hitting targets inside. It is worth noting that in an airburst, like that of the April 4 strike on Kryvyi Rih, the damage pattern was different: the building itself was barely affected. Thus, in the strike on the assembly hall, the missile detonated outside upon hitting the wall. As a result, missile fragments struck a large number of civilians in a trolleybus and at a nearby stop. At the time of writing this sitrep, Sumy region prosecutors reported 35 people killed and 117 injured. Even if a military target was present, such massive collateral damage is unacceptable, and this strike should be classified as a war crime. We view the attacks on both buildings as evidence of negligence by Russian military intelligence, which failed to pinpoint the meeting’s location. The use of explosive fragmentation warheads, rather than penetrating ones, may stem from the fact that only the former were available for this strike.
We believe it would be useful to hold officials organizing military events in populated areas where civilians are present to greater account. This could reduce collateral damage when Russian intelligence obtains information about gatherings in advance.
The Russian Ministry of Defense reported the strike on Sumy only a day later, in the afternoon of April 14, claiming that two Iskander-M ballistic missiles had hit the command staff of the Siversk task force during a meeting and, as usual, announced the killing of 60 AFU soldiers.
Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets suggested that the true aim of the strike was to terrorize the civilian population. According to him, the Kremlin is trying to increase pressure on both Ukraine's population and its armed forces to weaken their will to resist. To maximize fear among civilians, Russia uses long-range, high-yield weapons in densely built-up urban areas, accepting high civilian casualties. While this logic is plausible, we still consider the more likely scenario to be a strike on a military meeting without prior reconnaissance and with disregard for collateral damage. For mass attacks and civilian terror, the RuAF, in our assessment, relies on cheap UAVs such as the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions—despite three years of war demonstrating that such actions do not produce the desired effect nor compel Ukrainians to surrender.
In response to journalists asking for comment on the strike on Sumy, US President Donald Trump said it was terrible, that "they made a mistake," and that he thinks the entire war is a horrible event. He did not specify who made what mistake.
Germany’s future Chancellor Friedrich Merz condemned the missile strike on Sumy, calling it a war crime. He emphasized that Ukraine must be given the means to "seize the initiative" and force Putin to make concessions. He confirmed that he is prepared to authorize the delivery of Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missiles, if this is coordinated with European partners. It is worth noting, however, that this would first require the formation of a new government and a formal approval of the delivery of the missiles.
It is worth noting that, according to Russian officials, the 30-day ceasefire agreement on energy began on March 18 and will expire at the end of the current week. Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that "the moratorium was essentially not observed by the Ukrainian side," and therefore, it is necessary to analyze the past 30 days and exchange information with the American side, after which Putin will make a decision. Throughout this month, both sides have accused each other of violating the agreement; it has not affected the course of the war, and we do not expect for it to be extended.
Reuters reported that in the new version of the agreement on mineral resources, the US demanded that Ukraine transfer control over a pipeline of the Russian company Gazprom—previously used for gas transit to Europe—to the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In this case, the US would be able to decide whether to resume the supply of Russian gas to Europe.
According to CNN TĂĽrk, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on Black Sea security issues are scheduled to take place on April 15-16 at the Naval Forces Command base in Ankara. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha denies that this meeting will take place. It is worth noting that on March 24, separate negotiations between representatives of Ukraine and Russia with US officials were held in Riyadh. Following the talks, a White House press release stated that the US and Russia had agreed on safe navigation in the Black Sea, while a Kremlin press release said that the agreement would only take effect after sanctions against Rosselkhozbank and the agricultural sector are lifted.
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