Sitrep for March 28-31, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kursk region, contrary to the information depicted on DeepState’s map, which does not fully reflect the shrinking area of the Ukrainian bridgehead, the Russian Armed Forces have not only seized the Sudzha International Automobile Border Crossing Point and advanced toward the hamlet of Oleshnya, but have also partially occupied the village of Guyevo, as confirmed by video footage. Thus, at present, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it seems, only control small patches of land near Oleshnya and between the villages of Gornal to Guyevo.
In the Sumy region, fighting continues for the village of Veselivka, which Russia’s Ministry of Defense has already claimed to have captured—Russian soldiers are seen raising a flag atop a water tower in a video geolocated to Veselivka. It is worth noting that, as of now, fighting persists in the border area of the region, which constitutes a contested area.
In the Belgorod region, the AFU continue their raiding operations—there are still no signs of firm control over the border territory, and it is premature to speak of the establishment of a bridgehead. As was the case last week, fighting is ongoing in the Krasnoyaruzhsky district near the villages of Popovka, Demidovka and Grafovka. According to various pro-Russian sources, fighting is underway in Popovka and Demidovka, where the AFU have likely managed to gain a foothold, and, per some reports, even partially seize territory.
According to the Associated Press, citing Ukrainian sources, Russia is reportedly preparing for a new offensive in the spring and summer, spanning nearly the entire frontline, including the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also mentioned this possibility in an interview with French newspaper Le Figaro. While the current fighting in border areas could already be classified as an offensive, these statements suggest the potential for a broader and more intensive campaign. However, doubts remain about whether the RuAF currently have the manpower and resources to sustain such large-scale operations. Roman Kostenko, the secretary of the Verkhovna Rada's Committee on National Security, has also expressed skepticism. Instead of a large-scale breakthrough, he expects Russia to focus on localized advances.
In the Kupiansk direction in the Kharkiv region, there have been no significant changes. The RuAF continue efforts to expand their bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oskil River. However, as they need to transport new forces across the river and moving armored vehicles without bridges is difficult, Russian forces are compelled to advance on Ukrainian positions using infantry assault groups to expand their bridgeheads. Given Russia’s personnel shortages, they are unable to conduct these operations as aggressively as they would like.
In the Lyman direction, Russian forces have formed a salient toward the villages of Katerynivka and Nove—representing a noticeable, albeit tactical, advance. We assess that the broader strategic goal of the Russian command in this direction is a future offensive against the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. We believe that, in Putin's and his generals' view, the RuAF will be able to capture the town of Pokrovsk relatively quickly and then launch an offensive on the town of Kostiantynivka from Pokrovsk, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. With these towns under Russian control, the only remaining obstacle to full control over the Donetsk region would be the capture of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. As in many previous offensives, an offensive on this major agglomeration could be launched from two directions: from Kostiantynivka and from the Lyman direction. The newly formed salient may therefore serve as a staging ground for an offensive on Sloviansk from the north. It is quite possible that the Russian command plans to carry out this entire multi-stage operation by the end of the year.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the pace of combat increased in the second half of March compared to earlier in the month, according to the AFU General Staff. It exceeded half the intensity recorded in January 2025, despite significantly lower levels at the beginning of March. However, no significant changes have been observed in this sector of the frontline. The RuAF recaptured some positions near the villages of Pishchane and Uspenivka, made slight advances in the southern part of the sector and, apparently, captured the village of Zaporizhzhia.
The independent media outlet Agentstvo [Agency] has confirmed the deaths of 20 more people in the Sudzhansky district of the Kursk region. Combined with the previously published list from the 7x7-Gorizontalnaya Rossiya [Horizontal Russia] news outlet, the total number of identified civilian casualties in the Kursk region now exceeds 50. The causes of death for some victims have been determined, including hypothermia, cardiac arrest and accidental exposure to an attack or strike by either side. This confirms that not all civilian deaths in the combat zone can be attributed to deliberate actions by Ukrainian forces.
Peace Talks
Ukraine has predictably rejected the new US draft agreement on fossil and mineral resources. In response, according to Reuters, Donald Trump threatened Volodymyr Zelenskyy with "big problems."
According to an NBC News anchor, Trump stated in an interview that he was "pissed off" when Putin questioned the credibility of Zelenskyy's leadership on March 27, proposing the establishment of a temporary administration in Ukraine under UN supervision. Trump said that if a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine is not reached due to Russia’s actions, a 25% "secondary tariff" would be imposed on Russian oil exports. We believe that such a measure would be ineffective, as all previous economic sanctions have failed to compel Putin to end the war. Furthermore, the existing ceasefire agreements related to the energy sector and the Black Sea have had no real impact on the course of the war.
Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and one of Russia's negotiators in talks with the US, stated that Russia and the US have begun negotiations on rare earth metals. This may be an attempt by Russia to demonstrate its willingness to negotiate.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
On April 1, Russia will launch its largest regular conscription campaign in 13 years, with 160,000 men expected to be conscripted. It is worth noting that, according to statistics from the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of Russia, no real prison sentences are issued for evading regular conscription. Therefore, we strongly urge everyone to avoid conscription by any possible means—a fine or, in rare cases, a suspended sentence is far better than the risk of being killed or permanently disabled in the war. Conscripts are often forced to sign contracts to participate in the war and are subjected to brutal—sometimes fatal—beatings. In some cases, commanders forge conscripts’ signatures on contracts. Those sent to Russia’s border regions face constant danger; just last week, it became known that on Dec. 6, 2024, 20-year-old conscript Andrey Bolotin from the Perm region [Russia’s federal subject], was killed in the Belgorod region. For assistance in avoiding conscription, we recommend turning to trusted resources such as Idite Lesom! [Flee through the woods/Get lost you all], Kovcheg [Ark] and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors, a human rights organization supporting those who refuse to perform military service.
As of March 28, 2025, Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], together with BBC News Russian and a team of volunteers, has identified the names of more than 100,000 Russian soldiers killed during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the actual death toll is significantly higher—and even if the war were to end tomorrow, the number would continue to grow. The current list accounts for only about half of those killed, while researchers have gathered more than 10,000 additional obituaries still awaiting verification and analysis.
Mediazona has announced an urgent fundraising campaign. Unfortunately, the outlet has not yet reached its target of 5,000 subscriptions, forcing management to cut salaries and reduce staff. Starting March 31, Editor-in-Chief Sergey Smirnov and editor Dmitry Treshchanin will continue working without pay. We urge you to support the project by signing up for regular donations.
We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.