Sitrep for March 24-28, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kursk region, Russian paratroopers have reached the Sudzha International Automobile Border Crossing Point. A recently published video shows them waving the Russian flag from the rooftop of a building.

It is worth noting that the Sudzha gas metering station, where a fire was reported recently, is located near this checkpoint. Although the Ukrainian project DeepState has not yet updated its map of the remaining part of the bridgehead, the pro-Russian Divgen project shows most of the northwestern part of the bridgehead as already under Russian control, including the village of Gogolevka. According to their data, the Armed Forces of Ukraine still hold a small portion of the bridgehead near the village of Oleshnya and its southeastern part near the village of Guyevo. Videos showing fighting near Oleshnya have also emerged.

Independent researcher Naalsio has published preliminary data on military vehicle losses in the Kursk direction, which also includes Ukrainian losses in the Sumy region. Final tallies for the Kursk operation have yet to be completed. As of March 24, AFU losses amounted to 790 vehicles, while losses for the Russian Armed Forces stood at 740. However, the loss of some vehicle types, such as tanks, is significantly more detrimental for Ukraine, as it lacks domestic production capabilities.

In the Belgorod region, the territory from the border to the villages of Popovka and Demidovka in the Krasnoyaruzhsky district is marked as contested by the DeepState project, with fighting for the villages ongoing.

In the Sumy region, combat operations continue west of the Kursk bridgehead in the vicinity of the villages of Basivka and Veselivka. Although not officially confirmed, the village of Novenke appears to be under Russian control. As previously stated, both sides can relatively easily advance a few kilometers from the border due to the difficulty of maintaining full control over the border zone.

In the Lyman direction in the Luhansk region, over the past week Russian forces have advanced near the villages of Novoliubivka, Katerynivka and Yampolivka. The RuAF appears to be attempting a semi-encirclement of the latter. This is the only direction showing noticeable Russian progress.

On the Zaporizhzhia axis, fighting continues near the villages of Piatykhatky, Lobkove, Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky. The Russian Ministry of Defense has already announced the capture of Mali Shcherbaky. In recent days, the RuAF has only slightly expanded its control zone in this area.

On the Donetsk axis, a Ukrainian UAV struck a North Korean Koksan self-propelled howitzer, with the exact location yet to be geolocated. Unlike footage reportedly showing these systems in the Kursk direction, there is significantly less doubt that this was indeed an SPH from North Korea. It is worth noting that the use of these systems was previously reported in the Lyman direction.

The administration of the Krasnoyaruzhsky district in the Belgorod region has reported that around 450 people have refused to evacuate from the border area of the district. The primary reason, as we believe, is fear for their property, which may have intensified following reports of looting in the village of Repyakhovka.

As reported by Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], a soldier from the 21st Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU, Volodymyr Yurov, has been found guilty of terrorism (under paragraphs "a" and "b" of part 2 of Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) and sentenced to 15 years in prison: the first three years in jail and the remaining years in a maximum security penal colony. Among other things, the charges mention shooting to kill against Russian servicemen, which is part of standard combat operations and is covered by combatant immunity rather than being classified as a war crime under international law. However, Russian authorities, as Putin stated during his visit to the command post in the Kursk region, classify such actions as acts of terror. As clarified by the Pepel [Ashes] Kursk Telegram channel, 26 Ukrainian servicemen have already been convicted of "committing acts of terror" in the Kursk region.

It is worth noting that a counter-terrorism operation regime has been declared in the region instead of martial law. Previously, Ukrainian soldiers from the Azov Brigade were unlawfully tried in Mariupol and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

Peace Talks

The Moscow Times spoke anonymously with a current Russian official who stated that Russia may attempt to seize part of the Dnipropetrovsk or Sumy region in order to offer a trade for the cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

First and foremost, it should be noted that such a hypothetical exchange would inevitably be unequal: a territory with several villages is far less strategically significant than two major cities with pre-war populations of approximately 300,000 and 700,000, respectively. Moreover, the annexation of these cities would, in theory, allow Russia—after rearming and launching a new invasion in a few years—to advance on Mykolaiv and Odesa, cutting off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and creating a "corridor" to Transnistria. It is very unlikely Ukraine would agree to such ridiculous demands.

In Riyadh, separate negotiations took place between representatives of Ukraine and Russia with the United States, resulting in an agreement on a ceasefire in the Black Sea. Specifically, they agreed on ensuring the safety of navigation (apparently, the Russian Navy must remain in the eastern part of the sea). At the same time, the Russian side demanded that commercial vessels not be used for military purposes, such as arms shipments. In return, Russia will receive assistance from the US in regaining access to the global market for agricultural exports and fertilizers, reducing maritime insurance costs, and expanding access to ports and payment systems for such transactions. The White House press release described this rather vaguely, whereas the Kremlin’s statement indicated that the agreement would take effect only after sanctions on Rosselkhozbank and the agricultural sector were lifted. It is worth noting that only the European Union can lift European sanctions—negotiating this item with Putin without the involvement of EU representatives was pointless since the US cannot implement such a promise.

Under these conditions, Ukraine gains no real benefits. The Russian fleet is already unable to move freely in the Black Sea due to attacks by unmanned surface vessels, and this agreement does nothing to prevent 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missile launches. Russia’s compliance with the agreement and cessation of attacks on Odesa’s port infrastructure would have far less impact on Ukraine than the partial lifting of sanctions, which would strengthen Russia’s budget. Meanwhile, the European Union has refused to lift sanctions on Russia until the full withdrawal of troops from Ukrainian territory and instead intends to increase sanctions pressure.

According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine agreed with the US that the ceasefire on energy infrastructure would begin after the White House issued a corresponding statement—this occurred on March 25. However, Washington’s statement mentioned that US authorities had agreed with the warring parties to "develop measures for implementing" a 30-day suspension of strikes on energy facilities. Russia, on the other hand, claims that the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure has been in effect since March 18. These discrepancies create an opportunity for both sides to accuse each other of failing to comply with the agreement.

The Kremlin has published the list of facilities covered by the 30-day moratorium on strikes, which has been in effect since March 18. The moratorium applies to:

oil refining facilities;
oil and gas pipelines and depot terminals, including pumping stations;
electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, including power plants, substations, transformers, and distribution units;
nuclear power plants;
hydroelectric dam structures.

In our assessment, Ukrainian strikes on oil refining facilities have not had a significant impact on the war.

It appears that the agreement also includes a ban on strikes against the Crimean Bridge using unmanned surface vessels. In this context, it is worth noting that while there have been suggestions that Russia has stopped using the bridge for military purposes, this is still not the case. A trainload carrying North Korean Koksan SPHs and at least one vehicle, presumably a transport-loading machine for North Korean MLRSs, was spotted in Dzhankoi. This trainload could have arrived in Dzhankoi only via one route—across the Crimean Bridge. However, due to tightened enforcement of the ban on filming military facilities, it is impossible to assess how frequently the bridge is used for military transport.

The Associated Press citing the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported, that in addition to the 3,000 additional troops sent to Russia in January and February, North Korea has also transferred a "significant quantity" of short-range ballistic missiles, 170mm Koksan self-propelled howitzers, and approximately 220 240mm caliber MLRSs. So far, we have not observed the latter in combat.

The Frontelligence Insight team, founded by Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have published a comprehensive report on Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russian territory from September 2024 to February 2025. Using satellite imagery, they attempted to assess the extent of damage to each target and estimated the total inflicted losses at a minimum of $658 million. However, in the context of Russia's military expenditures, this is relatively minor—less than a single day’s worth of spending. It should also be noted that about 30% of the strikes during this period caused damage that could not be accurately assessed. Among the key incidents, they highlighted strikes on Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenals in Toropets, Tver region, where between 30,000 and 160,000 tons of ammunition were destroyed. They also pointed out improvements in target intelligence: for instance, from August to December 2024, Russia was constructing an underground storage facility for Shahed-136/Geran-2 loitering munitions in the Oryol region, which was subsequently struck by the AFU in late December.

At the same time, compared to 2022, Russia has improved its defensive preparations against such strikes—many sites now feature protective embankments, mounds of earth built around storage facilities to prevent the detonation of nearby structures.

On March 27, it was reported that the US Agency for Global Media had retracted its decision to cut funding for RFE/RL, though such a move could still happen in the future.

A senior Ukrainian official told the Financial Times that, under a new agreement, Kyiv would immediately halt "deep strikes" on Russian military targets, including those in the Black Sea, and on energy infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the Re: Russia project has published an article analyzing whether Europe could "compensate" for a potential loss of US assistance and independently strengthen the AFU. Compared to the early stages of the war, Europe has significantly expanded its defense industry capacity and reassessed its approach to the conflict in Ukraine. Today, containing Putin in Ukraine is increasingly seen as part of a broader existential challenge to European security as a whole.

Experts consider it a realistic scenario that Europe could bear the full cost of financing foreign aid to Ukraine. Europe's total spending (EU and the United Kingdom) would have to increase, but in total it would amount to the equivalent of 0.21% of the region's total GDP. If the principle of proportional burden-sharing were applied, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Baltic states would not need to increase their spending—they already spend more than 0.2% of GDP. The main burden would fall on the region's largest economies: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain, whose relative spending currently lags behind the European average.

However, such a hypothetical offset creates room for dispute. Currently, spending on nuclear weapons represents a significant share of the French military budget—about 15%. France may try to count this expenditure as a contribution to overall security by extending its nuclear umbrella over all of Europe. Since nuclear weapons are so expensive to maintain and service, Ukraine cannot afford them at this time, even if someone were to provide them for free. In this vein, Korea expert Andrey Lankov has published a video explaining how a country as poor as North Korea managed to develop nuclear weapons by sacrificing many other expenditures, particularly social spending.

French President Emmanuel Macron has announced a new package of military aid for Ukraine worth €2 billion [$2.17 billion]. It includes:

Mistral MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems);
MILAN anti-tank missile systems;
MICA air-to-air missiles;
VAB armored personnel carriers;
AMX-10RC armored vehicles, and
ammunition.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has announced that he has agreed with Macron that France will continue to supply Mirage aircraft to Ukraine.

The Financial Times reports that the US has sent Ukraine a new version of the mineral resources agreement where the White House demands that the deal include not only Ukrainian oil, gas, rare earth minerals, but also the country’s energy assets with the exception of nuclear power plants. On top of that, the proposal covers infrastructure relating to the extraction of natural resources, such as roads and railways, pipelines, ports and factories. All revenues are expected to be promptly converted into hard currency and transferred abroad. In case of any delays or disputes Ukraine shall be liable to pay compensation. The US expects to be the first to receive royalties from the fund, to maintain priority rights on any infrastructure projects and enjoy the right to veto the sale of resources to a third party. In return, as before, the proposal does not contain any security guarantees to Ukraine.

Bloomberg has specified that, under the new agreement, the Ukrainian government would be required to allocate 50 percent of its revenues from all new natural resource and infrastructure projects to a fund, while the United States would be entitled to all profits plus 4 percent of annual revenue until its "investments"—understood as the Biden administration’s grant aid—are repaid. Additionally, according to the draft, the US government would have the right to purchase Ukrainian metals, minerals, oil, and gas ahead of other parties on commercial terms, regardless of whether the fund finances the said project. The deal, which has no time limit, also prohibits Kyiv from selling critical minerals to countries deemed "strategic competitors" of the US. Some experts argue that such an agreement would be incompatible with Ukraine’s European integration aims and, moreover, is deliberately worded to prevent the country from joining the European Union.

Reuters reported that Europe’s efforts to establish security mechanisms for Ukraine are shifting away from troop deployments toward other alternatives, as they face political and logistical constraints, as well as the prospect of opposition to their plans from both Russia and the United States. Without US support in air defense, deploying European peacekeepers on Ukrainian territory would be impossible.

At a summit of the "Coalition of the Willing," the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine was discussed, with France and Britain set to take a leading role in the process. The other countries declined to publicly declare their potential involvement.

Demobilization

Putin stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense is studying the issue of rotating "the troops first sent" to the frontline. According to him, the issue of rotation is pressing, and the authorities have not forgotten about it, but "many mobilized soldiers have already become professional military personnel," so decisions on troop rotation will be based on the realities on the ground. The reference to professional military personnel implies that they have transitioned from mobilized soldiers to contract soldiers, who will be the last to be discharged into the reserves. It is worth noting that the discussion is not about demobilization but rotation—pulling units back from forward positions to the near rear for rest and replenishment.

Some pro-Russian Telegram channels report that the Main Personnel Directorate of the Russian MoD is already developing a plan for the partial demobilization of servicemen, linking the timeline to the end of the "special military operation." The proposed sequence of discharges includes:

Demobilization of mobilized soldiers.
Discharge based on previous maximum service age limits (it is worth noting that these limits were raised in 2023).
Discharge of other non-renewed contracts, subject to review by an attestation commission, with priority given to those who have not reached 10 years of military service and lack preferential grounds for continued service.

It should be clarified that the existence of such a plan does not mean that a decision on imminent demobilization has already been made—MoD officials are required to develop such options as a contingency. Journalist and blogger Ivan Filippov has compiled reactions from pro-military Telegram channels to the discussions on rotation and demobilization.

On March 24, rumors emerged alleging the death of Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin [Commander of the Central Military District]. We have not seen any credible confirmation of this, similarly, it is worth noting that over the three years of the war, more than one Russian general has already been mistakenly reported dead.

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