Sitrep for March 10-14, 2025 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)Â
Frontline Situation Update
Almost the entire frontline remains quiet, with the only exception still being the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region. In recent days, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have withdrawn from most of the town of Sudzha.
As of March 11, Russian soldiers had taken in the eastern part of the town, and by March 12, they were already seen in the center. DeepState reported that the town was not fully abandoned—its northern and western parts were still considered a contested area. Geolocated footage of fighting near the village of Zaoleshenka suggests it was likely rear-guard fighting or an unexpected clash between Russian soldiers and retreating Ukrainian forces, as there were no recorded mortar attacks or regular UAV strikes.
On March 13, Russia’s Ministry of Defense officially declared Sudzha "liberated," which is essentially the case now. Only a few villages near the state border remain under Ukrainian control. Their recapture may take a few more days or possibly a week. Holding this roughly 10 km deep territory is nearly impossible for the AFU, as it is within range of almost all types of weaponry; otherwise, it would lead to unnecessary losses.
As the Kursk bridgehead nears its end, increasing attention is being drawn to the fighting in the Sumy region. Footage has emerged showing Russian soldiers on ATVs attempting a chaotic breakthrough near the village of Basivka, south of the village of Novenke, but they were spotted and destroyed by Ukrainian drone operators. For now, it is too early to speak of any Russian Armed Forces advances in the Sumy region, though attacks in the border area remain possible.
The pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant], summarizing the Kursk bridgehead operation, once again claimed that the AFU’s best-case scenario was to capture or at least reach the Kursk nuclear power plant. As we previously noted, such a scenario seemed unrealistic from the start, and, in our view, such statements were merely part of an information operation. The advances along the roads toward the town of Kurchatov, cited by Voyenny Osvedomitel as evidence, were nothing more than an expansion of the contested area by Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups. For the AFU to push so deep into Russian territory, they would have needed a much broader bridgehead to secure the flanks of the salient. Ukraine simply did not have the necessary forces for this. If a narrow salient had formed, the RuAF would have quickly cut it off.
The liquidation of the Kursk bridgehead was a sequential result of many months of RuAF strikes on the flanks, which enabled them to get closer to the main AFU’s supply route and bring it within weapons range. The Ukrainian forces were unable to sufficiently fortify their flanks to prevent this. Thus, while the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region was swift, it was not sudden; the situation had been developing over a long period. The Finnish analytical project Black Bird Group also noted that it was the inability to repel Russian attempts to cut off supply lines that made the exit of the Ukrainian grouping a matter of time, rather than the cessation of military aid from the US, including the suspension of intelligence sharing.
The Russian offensive on the flanks posed a threat of complete encirclement for the AFU in the Kursk region, but this scenario was avoided. After establishing control over the supply routes, the RuAF attacked the northern part of the bridgehead near the villages of Malaya Loknya and Martynovka, while the Russian Aerospace Forces began striking bridges, complicating the movement of Ukrainian armored vehicles. As a result, Ukrainian troops sometimes had to abandon their military equipment and retreat on foot. Abandoned military vehicles, including Abrams tanks, a Bradley IFV, an M113 APC, a Biber bridge layer, HMMWVs, and a destroyed 22S2 Bohdana 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzer were observed.
According to Black Bird Group, the RuAF will continue to put pressure on the Sumy region, preventing Ukraine from redeploying its forces to other sections of the frontline. However, this would also mean that Russian troops themselves would be unable to reposition for renewed offensives in other directions. Analysts consider the outcome of the Kursk operation to be negative, as its objectives were not achieved, nor were the resources invested justified. We generally agree with this assessment— in our view, the only significant result of this operation was the boost in morale among Ukrainian soldiers and society as a whole. Unfortunately, due to Trump’s actions, the bridgehead could not be leveraged as a bargaining tool in negotiations.
It is still too early to summarize the Kursk operation in terms of equipment losses, as only preliminary data is available, and a full assessment by independent researcher Naalsio may not be released for some time. As of March 10, his estimates suggest that throughout the existence of the bridgehead, the AFU lost 632 military vehicles, including 66 tanks, 222 armored fighting vehicles, 244 infantry mobility vehicles, 27 self-propelled howitzers, 5 howitzers, 7 air defense vehicles, 20 engineering vehicles, and 16 other transport units. Meanwhile, the RuAF lost 712 military vehicles, including 74 tanks, 412 AFVs, 69 IMVs, 9 SPHs, 5 howitzers, and 6 air defense vehicles.
The fortification construction that began in the Kursk region after the AFU incursion is unrelated to any Ukrainian plans to advance on major cities in the region. Instead, it represents standard wartime precautionary measures or an attempt by local authorities to prepare for a potential unexpected AFU breakthrough. It is worth noting that the Russian Ministry of Defense has only ever reported the successful repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion and heavy losses for the enemy. Similarly, the construction of fortifications in the Ukrainian rear (such as in the Kyiv region) should not be interpreted as evidence that authorities expect a new deep offensive into the country. Rather, it is simply a precautionary measure for a nation at war. However, it is crucial to consider which directions should be prioritized for strengthening defenses.
There is still no clarity regarding the Russian operation to move troops to the outskirts of Sudzha via the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod gas pipeline. The AFU has not released any new visual confirmation of the destruction of Russian saboteurs, while various sources are reporting conflicting numbers of soldiers who moved through the pipeline—estimates range from 100 to 800. If Russian forces did manage to reach Ukrainian positions, this could have been an additional destabilizing factor, potentially forcing local Ukrainian commanders to order a retreat—a development that has been reported in Ukrainian Telegram channels.
It remains unclear what will happen to North Korean soldiers after the final elimination of the bridgehead—it is possible that they will be redirected to the Donetsk region.
Vladimir Putin visited a command post in the Kursk region, stating that the RuAF had captured over 400 AFU soldiers and that Ukrainian casualties in the border region allegedly reached 67,000. As is common in such cases, these casualty figures are significantly exaggerated—a tactic frequently used by both sides. Putin has ordered the defeat of the AFU grouping in the Kursk region and the complete liberation of the territory, as well as proposed creating a security buffer zone along the Russian border—although it is unclear what exactly he meant by this.
Reports have emerged about the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war in the village of Kazachya Loknya. A Telegram channel affiliated with the Akhmat unit published a photo of four Ukrainian soldiers with their hands tied behind their backs. The following day, a video surfaced showing their bodies—along with a fifth individual—clearly indicating that they had been executed. Their hands remained tied behind their backs, and bullet wounds were visible in their heads.
Putin stated that Russia is not prepared to allow isolated AFU servicemen in the Kursk region to leave after they allegedly committed crimes against local residents. He also announced that captured Ukrainian soldiers would be treated as terrorists. We believe that such statements further encourage Russian soldiers to execute POWs.
Speaking about crimes against local residents, Putin was referring to the discovery of civilian bodies in the village of Russkoye Porechnoye. We have analyzed this case in detail, and based on available data, it is impossible to determine what exactly happened to the deceased. Reports have also emerged that bodies of civilians were found in a church in the village of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, which had remained in a "contested" zone the entire time. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation has initiated a case for an act of terror, claiming that the villagers were killed by Ukrainian servicemen.
Upcoming Peace Talks
In Saudi Arabia, meetings were held between representatives of Ukraine and the US, as well as between representatives of Russia and the US. According to participants, the Ukrainian side initially proposed a partial ceasefire. The US responded with the idea of a full cessation of combat operations for 30 days with the possibility of an extension. After consultations with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian side agreed to this option, which helped strengthen its standing with the US administration.
According to a Reuters source, Russia reiterated its demands during the negotiations, some of which are deliberately unfeasible. These include the international recognition of the annexation of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and the Kherson regions, Russia’s right to block foreign aid to Ukraine in the event of a new war, as well as a "rollback" of NATO expansion to the east, requiring Finland and Sweden to leave the alliance.
On March 13, Putin's adviser for foreign policy issues Yuri Ushakov stated that Russia is interested in a long-term resolution of the conflict with Ukraine rather than a temporary ceasefire. He called the proposal for a truce with Ukraine "a temporary respite for Ukrainian troops" and said that Russia does not need it. Later, he clarified that he was expressing his personal opinion.
Putin, in turn, said that Russia is, in principle, open to the proposal to halt combat operations, but added that there were issues that required discussion, demanding an end to both arms supplies to Ukraine and the mobilization and training of Ukrainian troops.
The Trump administration did not extend the authorization for payments for energy supplies involving Russian banks under sanctions. This means that no one, including EU countries, will be able to purchase Russian oil without the risk of facing US secondary sanctions. These temporary sanctions relief had been introduced by the Biden administration and was extended every few months, but the new administration decided to stop doing so. According to a Fox News source, this tightening of sanctions is a "negotiating tactic" aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war.
Western Assistance
According to CNN sources in the US administration, US military aid deliveries to Ukraine have resumed. Poland's Deputy Defense Minister Paweł Zalewski also stated that shipments through Poland’s logistics hub have been restored.
The Ukrainian project Militarnyi reported that Maxar has reinstated Ukraine’s access to satellite imagery, which had previously been revoked. Meanwhile, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard confirmed the resumption of intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
The Associated Press, citing a US official and a Ukrainian lawmaker, reported that Ukraine had depleted all its ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles as early as late January. It is claimed that fewer than 40 units were supplied in total, while earlier estimates suggested around 200.
Reuters has reported that the United States is prepared to resume deliveries of Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB), which are already stockpiled in Europe. Their first recorded use was in February 2024.
In April, William LaPlante, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment under President Biden, acknowledged that GLSDB munitions had become ineffective due to Russian electronic warfare countermeasures, leading the AFU to abandon their use. In May 2024, the manufacturer Boeing announced that upgrading the GLSDB munitions would take several months. In recent weeks, Boeing, Saab, and the US Department of Defense conducted 19 tests of the upgraded version, after which the modified munition was deemed ready for use.
It is worth noting that in March 2024, Russia began producing and deploying its own equivalent of the GLSDB—the Universal Inter-Branch Gliding Munition (UMPB) D-30SN. The UMPB, with a 30 cm [12 in] diameter, is reportedly capable of being launched from the air and from Tornado-S MLRS. Video recordings and photographs indicate that the UMPB can be distinguished from air-dropped bombs fitted with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) by its shape—UMPB munitions more closely resemble a pencil than a cigar, and their wings are positioned in the center rather than closer to the nose of the bomb.
At the end of February, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] claimed that due to EW systems operating along the entire frontline, the effectiveness of air-dropped bombs fitted with UMPK modules had declined. However, we have yet to observe a reduction in their use. Moreover, in recent weeks, video footage from the Kursk region has shown UMPK-equipped air-dropped bombs striking bridges and individual buildings with notable precision.
Meanwhile, Sweden has announced an order of 18 Archer self-propelled howitzers and five Arthur counter-battery radar systems for Ukraine. The total value of the military aid package is approximately 3 billion Swedish kronor [$300 million].
In Finland, a court has sentenced Voislav Torden (Jan Petrovsky), the founder of the openly neo-Nazi Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group Rusich, to life imprisonment for war crimes committed in Ukraine in 2014.
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