Sitrep for March 7-10, 2025 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)Â
Frontline Situation Update
The key events of recent days have been unfolding in the Kursk region. It is worth noting that in the middle of last week, Russian forces managed to break through from the village of Kurilovka and get close to the N-07 (R-200) highway from another direction. This road is used to supply the Ukrainian grouping in the town of Sudzha. As a result, Russian drone operators gained the ability to strike Ukrainian vehicles not only from the west but also from the east, significantly complicating the position of Ukrainian forces in the region.
Following this, Russian forces launched assault operations in the northern part of the bridgehead, advancing near the villages of Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Martynovka. Additionally, the Russian Armed Forces took control of the villages of Viktorovka, Nikolayevka, Staraya Sorochina and Kositsa. Given the rapid pace of developments, it is possible that by the time of publication, Russian forces will have expanded their control further.
The Russian Aerospace Forces are supporting the ground offensive. North of Sudzha, two bridges over the Loknya River in the villages of Knyazhy Pervy and Knyazhy Vtoroy were destroyed. The latter bridge connects the village with Kazachya Loknya and has been widely reported as the bridge in Kazachya Loknya. This strike is notable for the use of the FAB-3000 air-dropped bomb equipped with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK). Two more bridges were destroyed in the eastern part of Sudzha. For some reason, a column of Ukrainian vehicles approached one of the destroyed bridges—possibly because the soldiers had not received updated information about its destruction. A Russian drone then detonated a pre-mined section of the bridge behind the column, leaving the Ukrainian vehicles cut off by the destroyed crossings. The trapped vehicles were subsequently targeted by Russian artillery and drones.
There have been numerous reports of a Russian operation to move troops behind enemy lines using the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod gas pipeline, which has been inactive since Jan. 1. These reports have been confirmed by videos featuring Russian soldiers. Additionally, Ukrainian paratroopers released a video showing that they had spotted the Russian troops emerging from the pipeline and struck them with cluster munitions. While it was claimed that all the soldiers were killed, the available footage does not confirm this. It is possible that the soldiers managed to scatter and take cover before the strike. Such statements—suggesting that if an enemy is spotted in a tree line and then struck, they are presumed dead—are characteristic of both sides. However, even if some RuAF soldiers managed to escape, we believe they had no significant impact on Russia’s offensive.
Unlike in the town of Avdiivka, where Russian soldiers used a pipeline to infiltrate the AFU’s rear near Tsarska Okhota and gain a foothold on the outskirts of a residential area, this pipeline traversing maneuver did not yield results comparable to breaking through to the Sudzha supply route, launching airstrikes on bridges, or conducting assaults in the northern part of the bridgehead. This serves as a clear example of the superiority of combined-arms warfare—coordinated operations involving different branches of the military.
Although some attribute Russia’s recent gains in the Kursk region to the pause in US military aid, including intelligence sharing, the breakthrough in the southern part of the bridgehead occurred several days before that. Nevertheless, US actions could accelerate the AFU’s withdrawal from the Kursk region. And while developments over the past week may seem unexpected, it is worth remembering that preparations for clearing the bridgehead began as early as January. Ukrainian soldiers themselves have mentioned this in interviews with Ukrainska Pravda.
We believe the Kursk bridgehead will cease to exist in the coming weeks—if not sooner. At this point, holding it serves no strategic purpose.
One of the original goals of the Kursk operation was to divert Russian forces from the most contested battlefronts in the Donetsk region. However, in the end, only a few units were redeployed from the Kharkiv region and other secondary sectors of the frontline. One of the objectives was to use the captured territory in Russia in future negotiations in exchange for Ukrainian territory seized by the RuAF. Such an intention was officially acknowledged by Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the end of February. However, this "trade" now seems unlikely due to the actions of Donald Trump, who is not leveraging Ukraine's advantages to pressure Russia. As a result, the negotiations are expected to drag on, and it has become impossible to maintain a bridgehead until their conclusion. Although it failed to achieve its objectives, the Kursk operation boosted the morale of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and demonstrated to the Western allies that the Ukrainian army is capable of conducting not only defensive but also offensive operations. Nonetheless, we still believe that if the AFU had accumulated reserves and launched an offensive about a month later, the results could have been more significant. Specifically, the AFU would not have had to redeploy reserves to the Kursk region from other directions. Time has also shown that initially there were no opportunities for further advance towards larger towns such as Lgov, Kurchatov, and the city of Kursk.
In other directions, there have been virtually no changes. In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, the Russian MoD claims to have captured the village of Kostiantynopil. Several videos have emerged showing Russian soldiers raising flags in this settlement. Although the Ukrainian DeepState project claims that they entered Kostiantynopil for filming purposes only,, the freedom of movement may indicate that the village is indeed under their control.
In recent days, there has been discussion about an alleged decision by Maxar to disable access to its services for Ukraine. It is worth noting that this company provides high-quality satellite imagery. In fact, Ukrainian users' access to the US program for sharing non-classified geospatial data with allies was revoked by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This has been officially confirmed by Maxar. The program allowed the US to order satellite imagery of specific areas from Maxar and grant allies access to view the imagery at no additional cost. However, commercial access—where customers can independently select the location and timing of satellite imagery—remains available to Ukraine.
At the same time, we do not believe that the RuAF have gained access to Maxar imagery. In 2021, a German company partnered with Maxar offered to provide access to satellite images in exchange for exclusive rights to publish our investigations first. However, after Maxar’s management learned that our company’s leadership held Russian citizenship, the deal was canceled, as Maxar’s policy prohibits selling imagery to Russia.
The Financial Times reported that four satellite operators are in negotiations with European governments and institutions about potentially providing backup connectivity for Ukraine. Spaceflight popularizer Georgiy Trishkin, who runs the Telegram channel Texas Bulletin, explained why Starlink cannot be fully replaced for Ukraine at this time: in short, there are no European companies currently to manufacture terminals in sufficient quantities.
There are conflicting statements regarding intelligence sharing with Ukraine. According to CNN sources within the US administration, the US continues to provide Ukraine with intelligence necessary for defense. At the same time, a source in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government told the American weekly Time that Ukraine has lost the ability to track the takeoffs of Russian bombers and other military aircraft from airfields inside Russia. As a result, Ukraine now has less time to warn civilians and military personnel about the risk of potential missile or bombing strikes.
The loss of satellite intelligence can be partially compensated by European intelligence services, the purchase of Maxar imagery, data from the satellite acquired by the Serhiy Prytula Foundation, and reconnaissance information gathered by drones. However, the US has significantly greater capabilities in human and signals intelligence than any other country, making full compensation impossible. It remains unclear to what extent the Trump administration is pressuring European allies to prevent them from sharing US intelligence with Ukraine.
Upcoming Peace Talks
According to NBC News sources within the US administration, Donald Trump has told his aides that the mineral deal signed by Ukraine will not be enough to resume aid and intelligence sharing. Trump wants a deal to be signed that gives the US a stake in Ukraine's mineral resources. However, he also wants to see a shift in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s stance on peace negotiations, including a willingness to make concessions, such as ceding territories to Russia. Additionally, he believes Zelenskyy should take steps toward holding elections in Ukraine and possibly consider stepping down as head of state.
Sources from The Telegraph have reported that Trump is considering relocating the 35,000-strong US military contingent from Germany to Hungary. However, we believe such a move is unlikely, as Germany serves as a crucial logistical hub for the US, hosting the major Ramstein Air Base, the Landstuhl military hospital, and the Grafenwöhr training ground. Hungary, on the other hand, lacks the necessary infrastructure, and building it from scratch would require significant investment. If Trump does reduce the US military presence in Germany, Hungary would likely only receive a symbolic contingent.
Reuters, citing sources in the US administration, reported that the US delegation plans to use the meeting in Saudi Arabia on March 11 to determine whether Ukraine is ready to make significant concessions to Russia to end the war. Zelenskyy does not plan to participate in these negotiations, although on March 10, he will meet with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman. The Ukrainian delegation will be led by the Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office Andrii Yermak. From the US side, the negotiations will include US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff.
Bloomberg sources in Moscow reported that Russia is willing to discuss a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, provided that progress is made towards a final peace settlement. Moscow will also insist on defining the conditions of a possible peacekeeping mission, including the composition of participating countries.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the early hours of March 8, the RuAF launched a combined strike on the town of Dobropillia in the Donetsk region, using Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Tornado-S systems, and Shahed-131/136 drones. Published videos capture the characteristic sounds of cluster munitions exploding. According to the latest data released by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 11 people were killed, and another 50 people were injured, including 7 children. The attack damaged 8 apartment buildings, an administrative building and 30 vehicles. During firefighting efforts in the damaged buildings, a secondary strike, reportedly carried out by Shahed-131/136 UAVs, targeted emergency services personnel. As a result, an employee of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine was killed, and a fire truck was damaged. The BBC Verify team confirmed the fact of the secondary strike. The strike on residential areas with indiscriminate weapons (particularly cluster munitions) and the secondary strike on first responders are unequivocally war crimes. In the last month, the number of Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian territory has increased, possibly due to rumors of potential negotiations, with both sides attempting to strengthen their positions as much as possible ahead of potential negotiations.
On March 6, Lithuania ceased to be a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was the first country to announce its withdrawal from the Convention, citing the threat from Russia as the reason.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Poland would take steps to withdraw from international treaties banning the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. Additionally, the Polish government is working on a large-scale program that would introduce mandatory military training for all men as part of efforts to build a 500,000-strong army. Currently, Poland’s armed forces number 200,000 troops, making it the third-largest in NATO after the United States and Turkey, and the largest among EU countries in the alliance.
Undoubtedly, cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines pose a significant threat to civilians. However, after three years of full-scale war, they have proven effective in defending against military aggression.
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