Sitrep for March 17-21, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)Â
Frontline Situation Update
Over the past 24 hours, the frontline in the Kursk region has become more active. The Russian Armed Forces have advanced further, reducing the width of the Ukrainian bridgehead to just 4-5 km [2.5-3.1 mi].
A fire has broken out at the Sudzha gas metering station, located near the border crossing of the same name. The cause remains unknown, with possible explanations ranging from an intentional or accidental strike by one of the sides to a deliberate detonation by Ukrainian forces before a full retreat from the Kursk region. This station is part of the gas pipeline infrastructure that was used by Russian soldiers in their widely discussed operation. Given this, it is unclear why there was enough gas at the site to cause such a large fire. One possibility is that the station contained a small gas storage facility to maintain system pressure. It is worth noting that the pipeline has been out of operation since the beginning of the year.
Fighting continues northwest of the remaining bridgehead, where Russian soldiers are attempting to advance toward the village of Basivka in the Sumy region. So far, they have been unable to gain a foothold there.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are advancing southeast of the Kursk bridgehead, near the villages of Demidovka and Grafovka in the Krasnoyaruzhsky district of the Belgorod region. Videos show strikes on Ukrainian armored vehicles, including Bradley IFVs, as well as footage of Ukrainian infantry. Strikes on Ukrainian vehicles have been recorded not only in the Belgorod region but also near the border village of Marine in the Sumy region. A video from that area shows Ukrainian armored vehicles being hit by 9K121 Vikhr air-launched anti-tank missiles, fired from Russian Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) and Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters. This suggests a shortage of short-range air defense systems on the Ukrainian side.
Reports indicate that the 3rd Assault Brigade of the AFU has acquired a new FrankenSAM-style air defense system adapted for launching R-73 air-to-air missiles from a ground-based chassis. It is worth noting that previously, the same missiles were mounted on maritime surface drones, and the Come Back Alive foundation adapted them for use with the 9K33 Osa surface-to-air missile system. Such equipment would be particularly useful in the Sumy region.
In our view, the situation regarding the alleged encirclement of Ukrainian soldiers in the Kursk region has now become clear—there were no signs of it, not only on the map of the pro-AFU project DeepState but also on pro-Russian sources such as Divgen or the Northern Wind Telegram channel, which is associated with Russian forces. According to Reuters, citing sources among US officials, the CIA and other intelligence agencies informed the White House that Ukrainian troops had not been encircled there. However, Donald Trump continues to claim credit for saving these allegedly surrounded soldiers, asserting that he personally asked Putin to intervene.
In the Kupiansk direction, the Russian Armed Forces have established a new bridgehead on the right (western) bank of the Oskil River near the village of Krasne Pershe, north of the village of Novomlynsk in the Kharkiv region. Here, Russian soldiers employed a tactic that has become typical for this sector: small assault groups attempt to cross the river unnoticed, attack nearby Ukrainian positions and gain a foothold. If successful, a reinforcement group is sent across the river to build on the gains. After forming several such small bridgeheads, Russian soldiers then advance toward each other and merge them into a larger bridgehead. This is the same approach they used near Novomlynsk and Dvorichna.
The RuAF may now attempt to connect their newly established bridgehead with their main position in Novomlynsk, as well as with a small bridgehead that emerged in late February near the village of Topoli, close to the Russia-Ukraine border. However, these efforts to expand the bridgeheads and the salient in the Svatove direction do not yet indicate an imminent advance toward the town of Kupiansk.
This week, unexpected activity was observed on the Zaporizhzhia axis, where RuAF airborne and motorized rifle units launched attacks near the villages of Piatykhatky and Mali Shcherbaky, as well as in the direction of Stepove, advancing toward the road leading to the town of Orikhiv. These minor tactical gains are notable primarily because this sector of the frontline had remained largely inactive for nearly a year and a half. During this time, clashes were observed near the village of Kamianske (just west of Piatykhatky); however, no significant advances had been recorded over the past year.
When discussing the prospects of the frontline situation, it is essential to mention Michael Kofman’s analysis following his latest trip to Ukraine. Kofman’s main conclusion is that the frontline is not about to collapse. Despite the AFU being largely pressed out of the Kursk region, the overall situation from Pokrovsk to Kupiansk has improved and Ukraine is not in a desperate situation requiring a rushed ceasefire under unfavorable terms.
Like us, Kofman notes that withdrawal from the Kursk bridgehead was well-organized, and Ukrainian forces did not have to abandon large quantities of equipment. However, some losses were inevitable. In his view, both sides may have suffered roughly equal equipment losses, though a more precise evaluation will require further data.
Across much of the front, there is relative parity in artillery fire and drone strikes, with some asymmetries in specific categories of systems, according to Kofman. A combination of drone strikes, mining and traditional artillery has allowed Ukrainian forces to effectively hold back Russian advances. As a result, the Russian offensive in the Pokrovsk direction has effectively stalled.
A structural deficit of manpower continues to be Ukraine’s leading problem. Mobilization remains insufficient to address these challenges and the sizable AWOL problem. While the amnesty law for those who voluntarily return to military service has had a positive effect, it has not been enough to resolve the problem.
Meanwhile, the situation in the Russian army continues to deteriorate. With armored vehicle stocks depleted, Russian forces are increasingly relying on unarmored and even civilian vehicles, leading to higher losses from attacks, mines and drone strikes. Consequently, casualty rates have risen despite the intensity of combat remaining unchanged. At present, we have no new data on recruitment rates in the RuAF.
Upcoming Peace Talks
On March 18, Trump had a telephone conversation with Putin, during which they agreed to continue negotiations. Reportedly, Putin consented to a 30-day cease-fire against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as announced by Trump on Truth Social.
However, on March 19, Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) reported a Russian attack on the power grid in the Dnipropetrovsk region, in direct violation of the agreement made with Trump.
That same day, Trump also spoke by phone with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Following their conversation, both presidents instructed their teams to address technical issues related to the implementation and expansion of the partial cease-fire. Zelenskyy accepted Trump’s proposal for “an unconditional cease-fire along the frontline” and agreed to halt strikes on energy and civilian infrastructure.
Trump also informed Zelenskyy that the US is prepared to assist Kyiv in managing Ukraine's electric and nuclear power plants. In his opinion, American control over Ukraine’s energy facilities would be the best way to ensure their protection.
Zelenskyy requested Trump to provide additional air defense systems, particularly Patriot systems, to protect the civilian population. Trump expressed willingness to explore the options available in Europe.
In the coming days, the US is going to organize shuttle talks in Saudi Arabia between Russia and Ukraine to determine the terms of the cease-fire. However, we do not expect quick or significant results from these talks.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On March 19, the RuAF struck the town of Kupiansk with air-dropped bombs. Oleh Syniehubov, Governor of the Kharkiv region, reported damage to "critical infrastructure."
In the early hours of March 20, Russian forces launched an attack on the town of Kropyvnytskyi in the Kirovohrad region with more than 20 Shahed-type kamikaze drones. According to Andrii Raykovych, head of the Regional Military Administration, 14 people were injured, including seven children. A video filmed by a drone shows a strike on the railway.
On March 18, a video emerged of a Ukrainian strike using cluster munitions against DPRK-supplied Koksan self-propelled howitzers, reportedly in the Kursk direction. The extent of the damage to the SPHs remains unknown.
On March 20, Ukrainian UAVs, including the Antonov An-196 Lyutyi, struck the Engels Air Base in the Saratov region. Footage captured a powerful explosion, followed by a secondary detonation. The target of the strike was an ammunition storage facility (geolocation: 1, 2, 3, 4).
Global Headlines
As the new American administration remains highly unpredictable and the European Union is seriously considering the threat of a Russian attack in the near term, the EU has decided to reduce its reliance on US weapons supplies. On March 6, at a crisis summit of EU nations, a plan called ReArm Europe was proposed, with a budget of up to €800 billion [$920b]—€150 billion [$160b] of which would be allocated through special pan-European loans. The decision was made to procure weapons and equipment free of licensing restrictions, ensuring third countries cannot limit their supply or use. Priority is to be given to purchasing equipment and weapons in which 65 percent or more of the components are European or sourced from partner nations such as Norway and Ukraine. Should Britain wish to join this initiative, it would need to sign a defense and security pact with the EU. Canada plans to accede to this security pact, offering its industrial capacity—for instance, to produce components for European military aircraft. We believe that for certain categories of armaments lacking European equivalents—such as tactical and operational-tactical missiles like GMLRS and GLSDB, MANPADS missiles like the Stinger, and American air defense systems—a temporary exception will be made, allowing their continued purchase from the United States.
Putin sent a message to Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, affirming Russia’s readiness to deepen practical cooperation with the Syrian leadership and endorsing Syria’s efforts to stabilize the situation in the country as swiftly as possible. As we had anticipated, it appears highly likely that Russia will manage to maintain its presence in Syria.
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