Sitrep for June 9-13, 2025 (as of 8:00 a.m. UTC+3)
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Frontline Situation Update
In the Sumy region, Russian paratroopers are dismantling Shmel infantry flamethrowers to repurpose their thermobaric warheads for use in Molniya fixed-wing UAVs. These are then used to strike various buildings where Ukrainian troops might be sheltering. This tactic reflects a broader trend in the current campaign—prioritizing the destruction of buildings and dugouts over storming them, which would require significantly more resources. Thermobaric charges are more effective for this purpose than high-explosive ones.
In the Kursk direction, clashes are ongoing in the border areas of Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces are attacking Russian positions near the villages of Tyotkino and Novy Put (east of Tyotkino).
A new count of visually confirmed equipment losses in the Kursk direction has been published by independent researcher Naalsio. This direction includes the Sumy region, where the Russian Armed Forces are currently carrying out offensive operations. Between May 19 and June 9, Ukraine suffered significantly heavier losses than the Russian side—29 pieces of equipment versus 13—continuing the trend observed during the Kursk bridgehead phase.
In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces have joined two previously separate bridgeheads on the right bank of the Oskil River near the village of Dvorichna, establishing control over it. Dvorichna holds strategic value for the RuAF as a road from Russia runs through the village and crosses the Oskil River there. Although the bridge was destroyed long ago, it is now quite possible to restore it or at least construct a temporary crossing, as the surrounding area has come fully under Russian control.
North of the town of Kupiansk, in the village of Kindrashivka, Russian forces recently established an "enclave," and although fighting continues there, the issue of supplying Russian soldiers remains acute.
In the Izium district, a Russian drone struck a mine-clearing vehicle of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) killing a sapper-mechanic and injuring the two others. Since all of the victims were civilian SESU employees, this attack constitutes another war crime.
On the western flank of the Toretsk direction, Russian troops are gradually advancing towards the villages of Yablunivka (including from the village of Oleksandropil) and Oleksandro-Kalynovo, where fighting has reportedly already begun. Currently, neither village has been fully captured; however, once full control is established, Ukrainian forces' supply and retention of Toretsk and the territory south of the Kleban-Byk reservoir will be seriously threatened.
The French open-source researcher specializing in satellite imagery, Clément Molin, has highlighted a dramatic uptick in Russian glide bomb strikes in eastern Ukraine. According to Molin, an unusually high concentration of strikes using FAB-series bombs equipped with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) has been recorded between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka.
Since May 25, in this narrow sector alone, Russian aircraft have dropped more than 1,000 guided bombs, Molin said. Satellite images show a consistent pattern of precision strikes, often hitting forest lines—narrow strips of trees where Ukrainian troops shelter from near-constant drone surveillance and attacks. The accuracy of these strikes raises questions about earlier Ukrainian claims that electronic warfare systems were disrupting the bombs’ guidance modules. That assessment, Molin suggests, now appears outdated or overstated.
The strikes have been concentrated along fortified areas. To the west of Kostiantynivka, where defensive infrastructure is weaker, Russian forces appear to rely more on UAVs than glide bombs—likely because the positions there are less fortified and can be targeted with lighter, cheaper munitions.
This is not the first time such focused bombing has been observed. Similar strike densities were recorded in Robotyne during the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, in Russia’s Kursk region in 2024, and more recently in the Sumy region. Analysts note that the concentration and frequency of bomb craters visible in satellite images offer indirect insights into Russia’s current military priorities on the battlefield.
Ukraine, too, has deployed glide bombs, albeit in smaller numbers. These include US-supplied GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) and French AASM HAMMER munitions. The AFU have primarily used them against Russian positions in the Kursk direction and, in isolated cases, in Zaporizhzhia direction, where they have struck sites believed to be used by Russian drone operators. Nevertheless, the overall advantage in aerial munitions—both in volume and reach—remains firmly with the Russian Air Force.
As of Friday, June 13, there is no clear evidence that full-scale fighting has begun in the Dnipropetrovsk region. The closest confirmed Russian positions are located just north and south of the village of Horikhove. Although Russia’s Ministry of Defense has claimed to have captured the village and advanced to the regional boundary, independent sources have yet to verify those claims.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian Telegram channels report that Russian assault groups are attempting to push into Dnipropetrovsk but have not yet managed to secure a foothold.
Russia’s MoD claimed to have taken the village of Oleksiivka in the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction. Russian troops published videos showing flags raised in the village and at positions near Novoukrainka, a settlement we believe lies approximately five kilometers [3 mi] beyond the current frontline in what would be considered Ukrainian-held rear territory.
According to sources cited by The Economist, captured Russian officers told the Ukrainian authorities that the Russian army's current summer offensive had been presented to them as a "final push" in Ukraine. We assume that the Russian Armed Forces command often makes similar statements to their subordinates, and such statements should not be taken at face value. Russia is capable of sustaining the war at its current pace for at least another year.
Another round of POW and body exchanges has taken place.
As part of the latest exchange, Ukraine recovered the bodies of 1,212 fallen soldiers, while Russia received 27 bodies. This stark difference is due to the RuAF continuing to systematically advance along most fronts, meaning the battlefield—and thus most of the fallen—ends up in their rear areas. This trend is clearly visible in the exchange statistics graph over the past two years.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s General Staff once again published updated statistics on RuAF losses—this week, according to their estimates, total losses surpassed one million personnel.
As noted by BBC News Russian correspondent Olga Ivshina, who monitors Russian losses through obituary counts, Ukraine’s General Staff always includes not only KIAs, but also POWs, MIAs, those discharged due to disability, and all wounded, including those with light or moderate injuries who later return to duty, in these overall figures. It is known that even soldiers with partial limb amputations may be sent back to the front line.
According to the latest data obtained by Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and BBC News Russian together with volunteers, the number of confirmed deaths of Russian soldiers, verified by obituaries, has exceeded 113,000. Using our formula, if we approximately calculate the ratio of wounded to killed soldiers (3:1 or 4:1) and account for losses of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) prior to their full integration into the RuAF, the upper estimate would be around one million people. Thus, we consider the data from the General Staff of the AFU to be slightly overestimated, but not by several times. It is worth noting that the problem with this methodology is the double-counting of soldiers who were wounded multiple times.
Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet], based on data from national budget expenditures, estimated that nearly 90,000 people signed contracts with the MoD during the first quarter of 2025. This is significantly lower than the 50,000–60,000 people per month claimed by Putin, but it is sufficient to cover current losses in the war and possibly to gradually staff the new units being formed in the Leningrad Military District.
In a previous summary, we reported on the deployment of 107mm Multiple Launch Rocket Systems [MLRS] in service with the RuAF. A video has emerged of a North Korean Type 75 MLRS being fired, but the date and location of the footage are unknown.
Additionally, photos have been published of what are claimed to be 107mm North Korean high-explosive fragmentation and cluster munitions in the possession of the Russian army.
Western Assistance
Speaking at the fourth Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit in Odesa President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that Russia had plans to capture the city and then move towards the Ukrainian borders with Moldova and Romania. Statements like that seem to be an intentional exaggeration aiming to motivate the allies to provide more active support to Ukraine, for in order to advance on Odesa the Russian army would first have to cross the Dnipro River and capture the cities of Kherson and Mykolaiv, something it already failed to achieve in 2023 when its combat readiness was much higher.
Bruno Kahl, head of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, said that his agency had clear intelligence indications that Russian officials believed the collective defense obligations enshrined in the NATO treaty no longer had practical force and were envisaging confrontations that fell short of a full military engagement that would test whether the US would honour its mutual aid obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to Kahl, there is no need to send armies and tanks for this—just sending "little green men," to Estonia, for example, to protect a supposedly oppressed Russian minority would suffice. We consider this threat to be exaggerated. While Russia is conducting and will continue to conduct sabotage operations on European soil, we do not believe that a direct invasion is likely in the coming years.
In the previous sitrep, we mentioned that the Trump administration had allegedly begun cutting military aid to Ukraine. For the 2025 fiscal year, the Pentagon's budget includes $300 million in aid for Ukraine, but these funds are not being spent. It was decided that the money will be rolled over to the 2026 fiscal year, but the Pentagon will not request additional funds from Congress. During a congressional hearing, when asked whether the administration would request additional funding for Ukraine’s defense, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that the military budget aid is being reduced because Trump wants to achieve peace, and that a deal to stop the murder would not only help Ukraine and Russia but also protect US interests. He also said that deliveries from the last four Presidential Drawdown Authority [PDA] packages signed by Biden are still ongoing, while all previous packages have been fully executed. Additionally, the Pentagon plans to halve the F-35 procurement budget, reducing it from 48 to 24 aircraft.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, at a joint press conference with Zelenskyy, stated that Germany is not considering supplying Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missiles to Ukraine. As previously discussed, the Chancellor cannot make such a decision unilaterally without the Bundestag’s approval. They also announced that the delivery plan for IRIS-T air defense systems is scheduled over the next three years. Moreover, Germany intends to allocate an additional €1.9 billion to Ukraine soon, on top of the €7 billion pledged in recent months.
