Sitrep for June 6-9, 2025 (as of 7:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy region, the villages of Kindrativka and Oleksiivka have come under Russian control — a development confirmed by independent sources, including the DeepState project. The neighboring village of Andriivka had previously been reported as captured.

The War Unit Observer research project, which tracks Russian unit movements along the frontline, recorded the redeployment of the 1443rd and 1434th motorized rifle regiments from the Kursk direction (specifically from the area of the town of Sudzha and the village of Guyevo) to the western flank of the Sumy front—near the villages of Kostiantynivka, Kindrativka, Oleksiivka and Andriivka.

Initially, the Russian offensive advanced from the villages of Novenke, Basivka and Zhuravka toward the village of Bilovody. However, the push stalled about 5-7 km [3.1-4,4 mi] from the border, prompting the Russian Armed Forces to expand the frontline by entering the region also from the direction of Kostiantynivka and Volodymyrivka. The previously mentioned motorized rifle regiments with four-digit designations, composed mostly of mobilized soldiers, were redeployed to free up airborne troops and marines for assault operations. These units are typically used in offensive roles (such as in the fighting for the Kursk region), unlike the mobilized soldiers, who are more often assigned to hold and consolidate positions.

By our assessment, the maximum objective Russian forces are likely to achieve in the Sumy region during the current campaign is reaching the line Yastrubyne-Khotin-Pysarivka-Yunakivka. The RuAF do not have the capacity for a deeper advance toward Sumy itself. However, approaching the city to this distance would allow the Russian military to inflict greater damage on the Armed Forces of Ukraine using drones and complicate their logistics.

On the western flank of the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have partially captured the village of Yablunivka, with fighting ongoing for the remaining part. This is a fairly large village stretching from west to east, nearly from the village of Novoolenivka to the Kleban-Byk Reservoir. It is concerning that Russian assault troops have already begun attacking the village of Oleksandro-Kalynove, located near the reservoir.

This poses a serious threat to the AFU, as if Russian forces gain control over both villages south of the reservoir, a dangerous pocket would be formed. The AFU would be able to supply this area only via a narrow isthmus to the east of the reservoir—between it and the town of Toretsk. In such a situation, holding the remainder of the town and this pocket would become nearly impossible, meaning the territory would soon have to be abandoned. This advance is a logical continuation of the long-running offensive campaign, which is expected to lead to battles directly for the town of Kostiantynivka.

The Russian Ministry of Defense and Dmitry Medvedev [Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council] have announced the start of fighting in the Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine, prompting active discussion in the media and on social networks. However, the Ukrainian command has denied these claims. At present, according to the DeepState map, only a few hundred meters remain from the edge of the contested area to the administrative border of the region. Yet, the RuAF must first capture the village of Horikhove to fully reach it and especially to enter the Dnipropetrovsk region.

It is worth noting that the boundaries of the contested area change quite dynamically, and maps often fail to keep up with these changes, making it impossible to determine the exact distance to the administrative border. Nevertheless, Russian soldiers could well cross the border with a small assault group filming their raid with the help of a UAV for reporting. In fact, such a video was published after the sitrep was recorded. In the coming days or weeks, fighting for the region's border villages may begin. For now, however, the Russian MoD and officials are claiming "advances on credit."

In the South Donetsk direction, in recent days, Russian soldiers entered the village of Fedorivka, located south of the village of Komar, and officially announced its capture. Initial reports are also emerging of fighting for Komar, located next to the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk highway. It is worth noting that the frontline in the western part of the region is very close to the administrative border of the Donetsk region. This makes it easy for Russian soldiers to briefly cross the border for another flag photo op.

Among all the FPV drones deployed on the battlefield, a distinct role is played by "anti-air drones," designed to hunt enemy UAVs—primarily reconnaissance drones—flying at altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 meters [5000-1000 ft.]. Once alerted to the presence of a drone in a specific segment of the airspace, the interceptor is launched to locate and shoot it down.

This technology has recently seen a notable evolution. These interceptor drones can now reach targets up to 33 kilometers [20 mi] beyond the frontline—comparable to the range of some short-range air defense systems. The expansion in range allows the AFU to establish a more effective, mobile, and affordable air defense network based on drone interceptors, in contrast to conventional anti-aircraft missile systems.

Russian troops, meanwhile, have devised low-tech methods to counter fiber-optic-controlled drones, which are often forced to fly at very low altitudes through forest lines. In one instance, Russian soldiers reportedly staged an ambush and severed the fiber-optic cable of a drone using scissors.

Strikes and Sabotage

In recent days, Ukrainian forces have successfully carried out several strikes targeting Russian air defense systems and aircraft.

On June 5, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian forces had struck a 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile system in Russia’s Bryansk region. According to Ukrainian officials, one launcher exploded, while at least two others were damaged. The ASTRA Telegram channel reported that eight Russian service members were killed and five wounded in the strike. An obituary has already been published for Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Podozyorov of Russia’s 26th Missile Brigade.

Later that evening, residents in Bryansk reported fires and explosions accompanied by secondary detonations at the local airport. The following day, ASTRA cited sources who claimed that a Russian Mil Mi-8 helicopter was destroyed and a Mil Mi-35 was damaged in the attack.

On June 7, in the Kursk direction, Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-35S fighter jet. The exact method remains unconfirmed, though Ukrainian air defense systems such as the Patriot are the main suspect. An air-to-air strike from an F-16 cannot be ruled out either. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, confirmed the loss of the aircraft and reported that the pilot survived.

The Su-35S plays a crucial role in securing air superiority and protecting Russian bombers. Equipped with advanced radar, it is capable of detecting and engaging enemy aircraft at long ranges. Although these jets continue to be manufactured and the loss of a single aircraft is not critical, the destruction of such modern hardware inevitably affects troop morale.

The Defense Forces of the Southern Ukraine, in their weekly report on combat operations, reported the destruction of a "locomotive with a column of enemy military vehicles," as well as the destruction during the reporting period of 13 tanks and more than 100 units of armored and automotive vehicles on their assigned section of the frontline. The circumstances under which all these vehicles were lost were not specified, but it seems unlikely that a single trainload with such a large number of vehicles was destroyed. Some Telegram channels misinterpreted this report and sparked rumors of an operation dubbed "Spiderweb 2.0": supposedly, a Russian "locomotive with tanks and dozens of armored vehicles" was attacked by drones launched from a nearby moving train carrying hopper cars.

The Security Service of Ukraine [SBU] published a new video of the Spiderweb operation. In our opinion, it confirms that the drones followed pre-programmed flight paths. However, the presence of automation does not exclude the possibility of manual control, depending on the availability of GPS signals and the quality of mobile communication. Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov writes that the UAVs were controlled by operators via LTE modems, but confirms that in the event of electronic warfare [EW] and loss of communication, the drones used a target auto-lock system.

In our previous summary, we mentioned a suspicious incident in Desantnaya Bay in the Primorsky region [Russia’s federal subject]. According to Washington Post sources in Ukrainian intelligence services, on May 30, Ukraine's Main Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defense conducted an operation in Desantnaya Bay targeting the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, which had previously fought in the city of Mariupol, among other places. The attack reportedly involved trucks loaded with bombs and drones, with the latter primarily used as a diversion. Apparently, the strike did not inflict significant damage. Therefore, while the operation may have had psychological value, demonstrating that Ukrainian intelligence can conduct attacks even in remote Russian regions, it cannot be considered a success.

On May 28, Ukrainian drones attacked the Kronstadt plant in Dubna, Moscow region, which produces Orion (Inokhodets) reconnaissance-strike UAVs.

In the early hours of June 8, Ukrainian UAVs again attacked the Azot chemical plant in the Tula region, which supplies chemical raw materials for explosives and gunpowder. A similar strike occurred on March 24.

The oil depot in Engels, Saratov region, which was attacked in the early hours of June 6, continued to burn at least until June 9, with smoke from the fire visible in satellite images.

On the morning of June 9, the VNIIR-Progress plant in the city of Cheboksary came under attack. It produces Kometa satellite CRP antennas used in UAVs, missiles and Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK) for EW protection and more accurate spatial positioning.

At the same time, Russian forces continue striking personnel of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine:

on June 6, a drone struck an ambulance in the Kherson region;
on June 7, a UAV struck a fire station in the Donetsk region;
airstrikes last week resulted in fatalities and injuries among first responders, employees of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

Over the past weekend, the RuAF repeatedly attacked the city of Kharkiv with UMPK-equipped aerial bombs and UAVs, causing civilian casualties and injuries.

Zelenskyy, in an interview with ABC News, stated that the Biden administration had planned to supply Ukraine with 20,000 missiles to counter Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions, but the Trump administration has now decided to redirect them to the Middle East. Reportedly, these are APKWS missiles. They were produced under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, but the Pentagon has now declared they are needed in the Middle East, without providing Congress with detailed explanations.

According to Reuters, the US believes that Russia has not yet responded to the Spiderweb Operation and expects a "large-scale, multi-pronged strike." Military analyst Michael Kofman suggests that such a retaliatory attack could target the SBU headquarters and regional intelligence directorate buildings.

Propaganda Telegram channels report that the Russian MoD is planning to open a number of new military academies. The Russian army is indeed experiencing a severe shortage of junior commanders. However, it remains unclear how they plan to recruit enough personnel amid a demographic downturn and allocate the necessary budgetary funds despite limited resources.

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