Sitrep for June 2-6, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In recent days, the situation on the frontlines has remained relatively stable, with only limited, localized advances reported.

In Ukraine’s Sumy region, Russian forces captured the village of Andriivka. However, the village lies just 5 to 6 kilometers [3.5 mi] from the Russian border, rendering it ineffective as a defensive buffer zone. It offers no protection from Ukrainian strikes but requires resources to maintain control.

Across the border in Russia’s Kursk region, positional fighting continues near the village of Tyotkino. Ukrainian forces have increasingly deployed glide bombs in this area, notably French AASM Hammers and the American GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs. This uptick is unlikely to be linked to new large-scale deliveries and is likely due to weakened Russian air defenses in the area, which have allowed Ukrainian aircraft greater freedom to strike Russian positions.

On the Toretsk direction, a salient has taken shape between the towns of Toretsk and Kostiantynivka, which appears poised to become the primary target of Russia’s summer campaign. There, Russian forces have begun deploying fixed-wing Molniya attack drones on a wide scale. The drones are visually distinctive, seemingly constructed from makeshift materials and clearly of semi-improvised, volunteer organizations origin. Russian forces have used them to target forest lines and residential buildings.

To clear frontline settlements, Russian troops frequently destroy homes in advance to prevent their use as fortified enemy positions. Direct assaults are nearly impossible; instead, buildings are demolished with precision munitions before infantry moves in.

To fully eliminate shelters, Russian forces are increasingly turning to an improvised munition known as the "Kolobok." While it was first reported in early April, new footage has now surfaced showing it in combat use. The Kolobok is a 3D-printed sphere, varying in size and packed with explosives. A fuse is inserted and lit manually before the device is thrown into a trench, dugout, or partially destroyed building. Its adoption reflects the inadequacy of standard grenades and the unwieldiness of TM-62 anti-tank mines for such operations.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov has highlighted a novel adaptation of the Molniya-2: some are now equipped with FPV drones. The Molniya itself serves as a loitering munition, while the FPV drone detaches near the target, allowing the operator to strike a second objective.

We published a post on our social media platforms (Telegram, Twitter and Teletype) about the unexpected appearance of 107mm caliber rockets in the Russian arsenal. The explosion at the 51st GRAU [Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense] arsenal in Kirzhach, Vladimir region, on April 22, not only resulted in the largest loss of ammunition during the entire war but also revealed the presence of rockets for which the Russian Armed Forces previously had no suitable launchers.

However, this week, a photo emerged that sheds light on their origin, reportedly showing a part of a 107mm towed MLRS system of the Type 63 family in the possession of the RuAF. It can be identified by its carriage elements, electrical cable, and switch assembly, although it is not possible to determine the specific country of manufacture (North Korea, Iran, or China) based on appearance alone.

It should be noted that in June 2024, Alexey Zhuravlyov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, expressed interest in acquiring compact and mobile Type 75 MLRS systems from North Korea.

It is worth noting that 107mm MLRS have a maximum range of just 8.5 km [5.3 mi]—a distance easily covered by nearly any drone, which makes their combat effectiveness in current conditions highly questionable.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Russian strikes on Ukrainian territory continue. In the early hours of June 6, a massive combined attack targeted various regions, including Kyiv, where three people were killed and 27 injured, Ternopil (11 injured), and Lutsk (30 injured and 1 killed).

We will share more details on these and other strikes on our Telegram channel, with the help of volunteers who assist us in gathering information.

Recently, there has been an increase in strikes targeting personnel from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine:

In the early hours of June 6 in Ternopil, six first responders were injured;
That same night in Kyiv, three first responders were killed and 14 injured, including two press officers;
In the early hours of June 5 in Sloviansk, Donetsk region, a driver was wounded in a repeated attack targeting a fire crew that had just arrived on the scene;
On the morning of June 2, a UAV strike on a fire station in the Zaporizhzhia region injured 12 first responders; a second strike was carried out during the evacuation;
During the week from May 26 to June 2, according to Ukrainian Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko, first responders from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine came under attack around ten times.

A tragic incident also occurred: in the early hours of June 5, a Shahed-136 UAV struck a residential building in the town of Pryluky in the Chernihiv region. As a result, the wife, daughter (a police officer), and one-year-old grandson of the local fire department chief were killed. The pro-Russian From Mariupol to the Carpathians Telegram channel, which frequently publishes videos of drone strikes on civilian targets, declared on June 5 that first responders involved in eliminating the aftermath of such strikes would be treated as “priority targets. Guaranteed.” On the same day, several air-dropped bombs were released on the city of Kherson.

The current events partly echo Russia’s military operation in Syria between 2016 and 2019, during which there were numerous recorded strikes on first responders, including members of the volunteer organization known as the White Helmets (Syrian Civil Defense), which operated mainly in opposition-controlled territories. At the time, Russian officials and state media portrayed the group as terrorists or terrorist collaborators.

The Human Rights Watch has released a 93-page report focused on the so-called "Kherson Safari"—a campaign of drone strikes targeting civilians in the city of Kherson and the surrounding region, which we have repeatedly reported. The report's cover features a typical image: a woman on a bicycle attempting to flee from an FPV drone. In recent days, our summaries on strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia have consistently recorded one or more fatalities and around 10 injuries per day in the Kherson region (on June 1, 2, 4 and 5, for example).

Spiderweb Operation

So far, there has been no official reaction from Donald Trump regarding the destruction of Russian aircraft. Sources from some Western publications claim that Trump called the operation audacious, echoed Keith Kellogg's words that it was an escalation and a wrong step, and stated that he is considering suspending aid to Ukraine.

Researchers from GeoConfirmed, Clément Moulin and Emil Kastehelmi analyzed satellite images and a video released by the Security Service of Ukraine [SBU] and published their assessment of the results of the operation:

7 Tu-95MS strategic bombers were destroyed, and 1 more was damaged;
4 Tu-22M3 bombers were destroyed and 2 damaged; possibly several more sustained damage;
1 An-12 transport aircraft was destroyed;
2 Beriev A-50 AEW&C aircraft were also targeted, but judging by their appearance, they were already non-operational and used as parts donors.

In total, 11 bombers were destroyed, and 3 more damaged.

We agree with many analysts and journalists who claim that this attack will be studied in all military academies and used to consider how to defend against similar attacks, which could also be carried out by non-state actors using such simple technologies. Large air defense systems, like the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system, are ineffective against such small drones. Facilities need to be protected by mobile groups equipped with anti-aircraft guns.

We believe that the loss of 11 bombers will not have a significant direct impact on the course of the war, but it is undoubtedly a painful blow to the Russian military, especially considering that Tu-95MS strategic bombers are no longer being produced.

Sabotage Acts and Strikes

On June 5, in the Voronezh region, four railroad ties and a rail were damaged due to the detonation of a railway track. The driver of a passenger train noticed the damage in time and stopped the train, preventing an accident.

On the morning of June 6, in the Belgorod region, a locomotive derailed due to another railway explosion.

No new statements have been issued by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine regarding the bridge explosions in the Bryansk and Kursk regions in the early hours of June 1, but we still believe that the Directorate is involved in these sabotage acts.

Some commentators attempt to justify the explosion of the bridge in the Bryansk region by noting that the passenger train was not deliberately targeted, as approximately 10 minutes before it, a freight train carrying supplies for the Russian army had passed under the bridge. Nevertheless, we believe that the alleged saboteurs failed to take the necessary measures to protect the civilian population in this case.

On June 3, the SBU detonated a support pillar of the Crimean Bridge. Sources from the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reported a "test" strike by an underwater drone. The drone reached the target but failed to destroy the actual support pillar due to an anti-drone flame suppressor. The defense was breached, but the support pillar was not damaged. The drone was loaded with a large explosive charge. Part of the protective device was ejected 40 meters into the air and landed on the bridge. Traffic on the bridge was temporarily halted but soon resumed.

Reports of a fire at Bryansk airport emerged late in the evening of June 5. Footage clearly shows secondary detonations, likely from ammunition.

Additionally, in the early hours of June 6, Ukrainian UAVs struck an oil depot in Engels, Saratov region, with one hitting the upper part of a multi-story building.

On June 4, the RuAF hit an AFU training center in the Poltava region. The exact number of casualties is not reported, but two fatalities have been confirmed. They died in the hospital.

On June 2, the second round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place in Istanbul. Russia submitted its memorandum, and the parties agreed on the exchange of prisoners and the bodies of the deceased.

Western Assistance

Following the Ramstein meeting held on June 4, new military aid packages for Ukraine were announced:

Britain pledged to supply 100,000 drones to Ukraine by the end of the current financial year in April 2026, marking a tenfold increase;
Germany has agreed a new €5 billion aid package, focusing on air defense systems, weapons and ammunition, and joint production of long-range weapons systems in Ukraine;
The Netherlands has announced a new maritime support package for Ukraine, valued at approximately €400 million;
Belgium will provide annual aid to Ukraine amounting to €1 billion until 2029, as well as a mine countermeasures ship;
Norway will allocate $700 million for drones, with a focus on supporting the Ukrainian defense industrial base;
Canada will allocate $45 million for drones, electronic warfare equipment, IT solutions, and an unspecified number of Bison and Coyote armored personnel carriers;
Sweden will contribute €440 million to international programs for the procurement of artillery ammunition, drones and other weapons for Ukraine.

The new military aid will help the AFU contain the Russian offensive, but it is not sufficient to plan any counteroffensive in the fall of 2025 or spring of 2026. In addition, the Ukrainian forces still face unresolved personnel shortages and lack the capacity to form new fully staffed units.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that Russia produces as many artillery rounds in three months as all alliance members do in a year. This claim does not align with our observations. As far as we know, Russia plans to produce over 2 million 152mm artillery rounds and 800,000 122mm rounds per year. Meanwhile, in Europe alone, the planned annual production of 155mm rounds is also 2 million. It is possible that Rutte exaggerated the scale of Russian production to motivate European countries to allocate additional funding for the defense industry.

Yesterday, footage was published allegedly showing a failed launch of the Russian Oreshnik IRBM over Kazakhstan. Researchers from the Alpha Centauri project determined that the video in fact shows the atmospheric re-entry of the second grade of a Chinese rocket launched on May 17, which was placing Earth remote sensing satellites into orbit.

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