Sitrep for May 30-June 2, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Sumy region, Russian forces captured the villages of Volodymyrivka and Kostiantynivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed to have taken the village of Oleksiivka, however only footage of a glide bomb strike on a hangar using a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) was published. Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported partial control over the village. Russian soldiers are now moving toward the villages of Yablunivka and Yunakivka and further south. The buffer zone is estimated to be about 5-7 km. It could be extended up to 10 km into Ukrainian territory due to the proximity of the border and ease of shelling. Further advancement may be difficult, and it is unclear whether the Russian Armed Forces will attempt it.
In the Lyman direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine struck Russian positions in the village of Karpivka in the Donetsk region, but have not secured a foothold there. Fighting continues in the contested area. Last week, Russian advances in the village of Ridkodub, east of Karpivka were reported last week.
In the Pokrovsk direction, DeepState confirmed the capture of the village of Yelyzavetivka, which had already been evident.
In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, Russian forces captured the village of Troitske. With the prior capture of Bohdanivka, only the village of Horikhove now separates them from the Dnipropetrovsk region. Within days or weeks, depending on Ukrainian defense, Russian soldiers may enter the region. However, as previously noted, this would likely lead to fighting over individual settlements rather than a large-scale offensive.
In the South Donetsk direction, or southern part of the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces appear to control the villages of Kostiantynopil, Bahatyr and Odradne. The frontline runs north of Bahatyr and Odradne and west of Kostiantynopil. Fighting is ongoing west of Bahatyr. Some analysts claim that Russian soldiers have begun fighting for the village of Komar, but there are doubts they have reached it from Odradne.
In the main part of the South Donetsk direction, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported the capture of the village of Novopil. The frontline in this area now runs through the villages of Novopil, Zelene Pole, and Novosilka, completing a scenario outlined in early February. Russian forces have nearly reached the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region, as the junction of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions lies just a few kilometers from Zelene Pole.
Sabotage Acts
Late in the evening on May 31, a road bridge near the village of Vygonichi in Russia’s Bryansk region was blown up just as a Miratorg company truck was driving over it and a passenger train was passing underneath. As a result, the bridge structure and the truck collapsed directly onto the locomotive, causing four train cars to derail. Reports indicate that seven people were killed and 104 injured. Bryansk region governor Aleksandr Bogomaz officially confirmed that the bridge had been deliberately blown up. Local residents reported hearing two loud explosions.
In the early hours of June 1, a railway bridge in Russia’s Kursk region was blown up as a freight train was crossing it. The locomotive fell onto an empty road beneath the bridge, injuring the train driver and two of his assistants.
The Russian Investigative Committee initially confirmed the explosions on the bridge in the Bryansk and Kursk regions, but later removed this wording from its official statement. The Moscow Railway had also initially described the incident as "unlawful interference in transport operations," before deleting that statement as well.
On the morning of June 1, damage to a railway line was reported in the Bryansk region, on the section between Unecha and Zhecha stations. According to some reports, this too was the result of an explosion.
Later, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate claimed responsibility for the explosion on a railway line in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region near the village of Yakymivka, not far from the city of Melitopol. The incident reportedly occurred during the night of May 31 as a Russian train carrying fuel tankers and freight cars was passing through. This claim has not yet been independently confirmed.
Previously, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate had already carried out rail bridge bombings inside Russia:
- in the Kursk region in May 2022,
- in the Samara region in March 2024,
- and again in the Samara region in September 2024, near the town of Kinel—a video of that incident was released.
According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed condolences over the deaths and injuries resulting from train derailments in the Bryansk and Kursk regions.
We believe that both of these derailments are almost certainly the result of sabotage carried out by the Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) as part of the same operation as the explosion in the Zaporizhzhia region. Given that the military benefit of such acts of sabotage is disproportionate to the civilian casualties, they constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.
On May 30, in the Desantnaya Bay area of the Primorsky region, where a restricted zone surrounds a former military warehouse, unclear events were reported: explosions, road closures, the arrival of numerous ambulances and fire trucks, and a Kamov Ka-27 helicopter flying over the bay. Subsequently, large objects (apparently passenger vehicles) covered with tarpaulins were transported from the bay area under guard and accompanied by a Federal Security Service (FSB) van. The regional anti-terrorism commission stated that "the threat has been neutralized" and that "there are no damages or casualties." Later, the government of the Primorsky region reported that the explosions were caused by "the ignition of propane-butane gas cylinders in one of the vehicles." Previously, we had not observed such a large-scale response to a gas cylinder explosion in a car.
Spiderweb Operation
On the afternoon of June 1, Ukrainian drones struck several airbases in Russia as part of a large-scale operation by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) codenamed "Spiderweb." It was claimed that the operation had been in development for a year and a half. A warehouse in Chelyabinsk was rented for this purpose, and according to reports, its owner was quickly detained by Russian authorities.
For an extended period, wooden containers with double roofs and solar panels mounted on top were assembled in the warehouse under the guise of construction site trailers or modular housing elements. Beneath the outer roof layer but above the ceiling, each container housed 27 FPV drones. In total, it appears that 10 such containers were prepared—two for each of the five intended targets. Each truck carried two "trailers," and the drivers were instructed to deliver them to specific locations near Russian airbases.
Once the containers were in place, a mechanism apparently activated to eject or otherwise remove the upper roof layer, allowing the drones to take off.
The drones were likely pre-programmed to navigate to their targets even without GPS, using computer vision to orient themselves by terrain. However, the exact method of drone control remains unclear. Given that the only plausible communication channel over such long distances is mobile internet—which is notoriously unreliable—it can be assumed that the drones operated autonomously, following preloaded algorithms. They may have transmitted video streams via mobile networks back to command centers for reporting purposes.
It’s worth noting that only a handful of videos from the drones have been published so far, despite claims that 116 FPV drones were successfully launched. This suggests that the rest may have failed to establish a strong enough connection to transmit data.
In the Amur region, a truck caught fire on a highway for unknown reasons and exploded while the driver was inspecting one of the wooden cabins it was carrying. Regional Governor Vasily Orlov stated that the driver was injured but survived. Meanwhile, in the Irkutsk region, another truck reportedly caught fire following the launch of a UAV.
Drone footage has been released showing Tu-95MS strategic bombers on fire. Additionally, a Russian soldier, reportedly in Olenya, recorded a circle video with a burning airfield in the background. The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel shared this clip along with a separate video that has been geolocated in Olenegorsk. Other footage has also been published showing a fire and explosion at the Belaya airbase in the Irkutsk region, as well as UAVs taking off near Olenegorsk and heading toward the Olenya airbase in the Murmansk region.
The SBU published a photo showing schematics of five Russian airfields. Researchers have identified them as Belaya (Irkutsk region), Olenya (Murmansk region), Ukrainka (Amur region), Dyagilevo (Ryazan region), and Ivanovo (Ivanovo region).
So far, confirmed damage has been reported at the Belaya and Olenya airbases. The attack on Ukrainka appears to have failed—the footage of a burning truck on a highway was filmed in the Amur region. A photo allegedly showing smoke over the Dyagilevo airbase has surfaced but has not yet been geolocated or verified. Ryazan region Governor Pavel Malkov only confirmed the interception of one drone, and a satellite image of the Dyagilevo airbase released on the evening of June 2 shows no visible damage. There is currently no available information about the Ivanovo airbase.
It's worth noting that the distance from Ukrainka airbase in the Amur region to the Ukrainian border is approximately 6,000 km [3,700 mi]. Since the drones in this case were launched from Russian territory, it's now clear that even Russia's most remote airfields are no longer safe from Ukrainian strikes.
Ukraine's SBU claims that during the Spiderweb operation, it struck a third of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers worth a total of $7 billion.
However, analysis of published drone footage shows that five Tu-95MS strategic bombers, two Tu-22M3s and one An-12 military transport aircraft were destroyed or seriously damaged. According to the first satellite images of Belaya airfield in the Irkutsk region, one Tu-22M3 and three Tu-95MS strategic bombers were destroyed there, with another Tu-95MS strategic bomber sustaining damage.
According to the 2025 Military Balance handbook, Russia possessed 58 Tu-95MS strategic bombers, 13 Tu-160 strategic bombers (with 3 more Tu-160Ms undergoing testing) and 56 Tu-22M bombers. It should be noted that Tu-95MS strategic bombers have long been out of production, while Tu-160s are built at a rate of just a few units per decade. Under these circumstances, the loss of approximately 10 aircraft is unpleasant but not critical. The loss of 40 bombers, however, would be a serious blow, even if some of them were already unfit for flight and used as spare parts donors. According to the AFU Air Force, the RuAF typically uses up to 10 Tu-95MS strategic bombers simultaneously in large air attacks employing Kh-101 cruise missiles.
Photos have been published along with a statement from Volodymyr Zelenskyy congratulating General Vasyl Malyuk on the brilliant operation.
Russia's MoD stated that fires broke out in several units of aviation equipment in the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions, while "terrorist attacks" on military airfields in the Ivanovo, Ryazan and Amur regions were repelled.
On May 31, the body of a driver who had died from asphyxiation was found in the cabin of a truck 30 km [19 mi] from Tulun. Preliminary information suggests that this incident is not related to the UAV attacks on airfields.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On May 30, the RuAF launched a strike using S-300 SAM system missiles on the town of Druzhkivka, north of Kostiantynivka, injuring three civilians. This is the first use of S-300 missiles against ground targets in a very long time.
On June 1, a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile was reportedly used to strike a target in Sorokine (Krasnodon), Luhansk region. This is notable as the stockpile of such missiles is nearly depleted, and they have been used very rarely in recent months.
Also on June 1, the RuAF struck the 239th training ground of the AFU in the town of Samar, Dnipropetrovsk region, resulting in 12 deaths and at least 60 injuries. In March 2025, Russian forces had previously targeted this training ground with an Iskander ballistic missile carrying a cluster artillery round. General Mykhailo Drapatyi took responsibility and submitted his resignation as Commander of the Ground Forces.
Western Assistance
An explosion rocked the Krušik plant in Serbia, a facility known for producing rockets and artillery munitions. Local media reported that at least five people were injured in the blast. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) had previously listed the factory among suppliers of artillery rounds to Ukraine.
On May 31, some sources reported that Ukraine was allegedly being granted access to Link 16, the real-time tactical data exchange protocol used by NATO and allied forces. The system enables high-speed, secure and jam-resistant transmission of tactical information between various assets such as aircraft, ships, air defense systems, radars and command posts. For example, it allows an F-35 fighter jet to detect a target and transmit that data to a NASAMS missile battery, which can launch a missile without direct line-of-sight.
To date, Washington has reportedly opposed granting Ukraine access to Link 16, citing concerns that the technology could fall into Russian hands. The capabilities of Link 16 were recently demonstrated during the US-Norwegian Jotun Strike military exercise on the island of Andøya, where a US F-15E Strike Eagle dropped GBU-53/B StormBreaker guided bombs, which were then taken over and redirected to a new target by a Norwegian ground crew.
In reality, Ukraine has signed a licensing agreement for the CRC System Interface—a hardware-software module that links the Control and Reporting Center (CRC), the operational command node for air operations, with other tactical communication and command systems, including Link 16, Link 11, and various national automated command systems. This interface allows for the conversion of data between disparate systems, compatibility across different terminal types and protocols, integration of ground surveillance radars, air defense, AI, and aviation data into a unified operational picture, and serves as a gateway to global networks such as NATO’s Air Command and Control System (AirC2).
On June 4, the next Ramstein format meeting will be held in Brussels. Ahead of it, some countries have already begun announcing military aid packages for Ukraine. Sweden has approved a new military aid package worth 4.8 billion kronor [$500 million]. The package will primarily support European coalitions in artillery, information technology, naval forces, drones and mine-clearing. Additionally, 1.5 billion kronor [$150 million] will be allocated to Ukraine’s defense industry.
As of May 30, 2025, Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and BBC News Russian, together with a team of volunteers, have identified the names of more than 110,000 Russian soldiers killed during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Losses are distributed very unevenly across Russia’s regions—the poorest regions suffer the most. By the number of deaths per 10,000 men, Tyva [Russia's constituent republic] leads with 120 deaths, followed by Buryatia [Russia's constituent republic] with 91, and Russia's constituent Altai Republic with 89. For men from these regions, the likelihood of being killed in the war in Ukraine is 30-40 times higher than for Moscow residents. It is worth noting that the named list of the killed covers 40-60% of the actual losses—for example, in February 2025, the authorities of the Astrakhan region acknowledged the loss of 1,112 residents, which was almost 400 more than was known at that time from obituaries.
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