Sitrep for May 2-5, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

On Friday, May 9, there will be no sitrep in the usual format due to Ruslan Leviev’s participation in Yulia Navalnaya’s forum. However, we may publish a brief written update—stay tuned to our social media!

Frontline Situation Update

Since General Valery Gerasimov’s announcement about the full liberation of the Kursk region, no new visual evidence has emerged to confirm that the area has indeed been fully cleared. If the border zone had truly been liberated, Russian propagandists could have traveled there to refute claims of ongoing fighting. Instead, pro-Russian propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova stated that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are still present in the region and expressed doubts that, at the time the video featuring Russian soldiers in the village of Gornal was published, it was actually under Russian control.

In the Sumy region, a frontline has formed along the border zone between the villages of Veselivka and Basivka, remaining stable for several days. Meanwhile, Russian forces have reached the village of Yablunivka, south of the village of Bilovody, and are engaged in fighting there. Earlier, footage of combat operations and reports of the partial capture of Bilovody had surfaced, but no reliable confirmation has emerged so far.

The situation for Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction continues to deteriorate. In recent days, the Russian Armed Forces have made further advances on the western bank of the Zherebets River, northwest of the village of Terny, toward the villages of Novomykhailivka and Nove—thereby consolidating their bridgehead on the western bank. Since Russian troops have already breached Ukrainian fortifications to enter Nove, they may now be able to reach the road leading to the town of Izium, which would complicate resupply efforts for Ukrainian troops in this direction. South of Terny, the RuAF are advancing toward the villages of Zarichne and Torske, through which one of the supply routes for the AFU grouping in the Serebrianske forestry runs.

In the Toretsk direction, Russian forces have made gains on the western flank, near the village of Tarasivka. Advancing along the highway connecting the towns of Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, the RuAF captured the village of Zelene Pole. It is still unclear whether they have gained a foothold in the village of Novoolenivka. The advance along the highway is driven by the presence of a line of Ukrainian fortifications running parallel to it. If the RuAF manage to reach the intersection of this highway with the road connecting the villages of Stepanivka and Yablunivka, a Toretsk salient will be formed, significantly complicating resupply for the AFU in the area.

In the Novopavlivka (Kurakhove) direction, Russian forces continue to advance near the area of the villages of Kotliarivka and Bohdanivka, which is located south of Kotliarivka and west of the village of Zaporizhzhia.

In the winter, reports—including from The Economist and Bild—suggested a decrease in the accuracy of Russian air-dropped bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Module [UMPK] due to the impact of Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. Even then, we had doubts about these reports. Now, confirmation has emerged that the number of air-dropped bombs used continues to rise steadily—as shown by the Ukrainian OSINT project Oko Gora, based on statistics from the AFU General Staff. When a weapon is found to be ineffective, it is usually used less frequently. It is likely that Russian engineers have managed to resolve the EW vulnerability issue, although it is still difficult to assess the full extent of its actual impact.

The Polkovnyk Henshtabu Telegram channel and Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov reported in mid-April that UMPK modules are now being equipped with 12-channel satellite Kometa controlled reception pattern antennas—replacing the older 8-channel ones—to enhance protection against EW. Similar antennas had previously been spotted on Shahed drones.

Western Assistance

According to a report by The New York Times, a Patriot missile battery previously decommissioned from the Israeli military and currently undergoing major repairs in the United States is expected to be delivered to Ukraine this summer. The article also explores the hypothetical possibility of transferring a system from either Germany or Greece (while Reuters reports the potential source could be Greece or the United States, with a decision anticipated before the NATO summit in June). However, no definitive decisions have been made on these transfers or potential compensation packages for contributing countries. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to receive military assistance allocated by the Biden administration, though these deliveries are reportedly scheduled to conclude by the end of summer. The report does not clarify whether this refers to aid across all programs or to one particular funding stream, such as PDA or USAI.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that he expects to receive not only the planned $15 billion in US aid for this year, but also the $15 billion scheduled for 2026. According to him, this could be done within the framework of the minerals agreement, with US assistance counted as a contribution to the investment fund stipulated in the agreement. It is quite possible that the Israeli Patriot will also be included as part of this US contribution.

We do not know what specific $30 billion aid package over two years is being referenced. If we assume this concerns aid through the USAI program in the form of weapons production contracts for Ukraine, then approximately $33 billion in total has been allocated since 2022—making it strange if $30 billion worth of deliveries are still planned for 2025 and 2026.

The US State Department has approved the sale of spare parts and various equipment for F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine worth $310.5 million. In December 2024, Ukraine signed a similar deal worth $266.4 million for the purchase of F-16 fighter aircraft parts. Donald Trump later halted these deliveries following a heated exchange in the Oval Office.

Given the high maintenance costs of F-16s, similar deals will likely continue to be concluded on a regular basis.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy also stated that Ukraine hopes to receive 1.8 million artillery rounds this year through the Czech initiative. The Czech President Petr Pavel mentioned large-caliber ammunition, but we consider it highly unlikely that this primarily refers to 155mm rounds; such statements usually encompass rounds of various calibers, not just the main caliber used by the Ukrainian Army. It is worth noting that by the end of April, Ukraine had reportedly received a shipment of 400,000 large-caliber artillery rounds through the Czech initiative, with plans to supply an additional 125,000 rounds per month until the end of the year.

Peace Talks

President Zelenskyy has effectively rejected Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a three-day ceasefire in honor of the 80th anniversary of Victory Day, instead calling for a prompt 30-day ceasefire. However, it is possible that on May 7, he will announce that during this unconfirmed ceasefire, Ukraine will return fire only in response to Russian attacks.

Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow had unilaterally declared temporary ceasefires for Easter and May 9 in order to test Kyiv’s readiness to seek ways to resolve the conflict between the two countries.

Re: Russia has published an article about US-Russia negotiations. Until February 2025, the negotiation plan proposed by Keith Kellogg was based on pressuring Russia with the threat of large-scale arms transfers to Ukraine. However, following a phone call between Trump and Putin, that version of the plan was rejected. In its current form, negotiated by Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, the deal envisions resolving the war in Ukraine as part of, and a precondition for, a broader US-Russia partnership—the so-called "grand bargain." This "grand bargain" is positioned as part of Washington’s strategy to weaken the Russia-China alliance. According to the plan, the US would showcase the economic benefits Russia could gain if it agreed to halt the war. Putin’s announcement of a unilateral three-day ceasefire—instead of agreeing to Trump’s ceasefire proposal—suggests that the Kremlin was not interested in this approach. There are few opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the US and Russia: the US is not interested in buying Russian natural resources, and improving relations with the US does not guarantee Russia renewed access to European markets.

As of now, Trump has nearly convinced Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire without preconditions and security guarantees. However, Russia remains firm on its unrealistic demands for recognition of all annexed regions and the demilitarization of Ukraine. In recent weeks, Trump has threatened both Moscow and Kyiv with a withdrawal from negotiations if no progress is made. However, these threats are unlikely to be carried out, as walking away would severely undermine Trump’s image as a successful negotiator.

After meeting Trump at the Vatican, Zelenskyy may have concluded that Trump’s relationship with Putin has become more strained, giving Ukraine the option to reject a second ceasefire. Ukraine has already demonstrated its willingness to negotiate and make concessions, while Russia refuses to abandon its maximalist demands.

Re: Russia has also published an analysis based on estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which projects that Russia’s total military expenditures in 2025 will reach nearly 15.5 trillion rubles [$193 billion], or 7.2% of GDP. Current payouts to active soldiers, the wounded and the families of the killed limit investment in the country’s defense capabilities. If the war ends and the Kremlin is able to drastically reduce spending on manpower, it could redirect funds toward building up military potential. However, if Moscow intends to continue large-scale offensive operations for another year, such investments will not be feasible.

On May 1, a natural resources deal was signed between the US and Ukraine. According to sources from Politico and Financial Times, three documents were signed: a framework agreement, the full text of the agreement and a technical annex. Only the first of these has been made public so far.

Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, stated that the agreement guarantees Ukraine new supplies of American weapons—including air defense systems—which will be counted as contributions toward a joint fund. The agreement does not include any commitments regarding past military aid deliveries.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of May 3, the Crimean Bridge was attacked, while Russian air defense systems were active in the vicinity. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that Ukraine launched eight Storm Shadow cruise missiles at the bridge, along with R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles and unmanned surface vessels.

Simultaneously, a large number of UAVs attacked Novorossiysk, where air defense operations were also reported.

To repel the attack, Russia deployed its naval aviation, which entered the engagement zone of the Magura V7 maritime surface drones—the new, extended-range version of Ukraine’s unmanned surface vessels. One of the drones reportedly shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jet using an AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. The crew managed to eject and was rescued by a nearby cargo ship. This marks the first known instance of a manned aircraft being shot down by an unmanned surface vessel. A similar incident occurred on Dec. 31, 2024, near Crimea, when Magura V5 drones reportedly brought down two Russian Mil Mi-8 helicopters and damaged another using R-73 missiles.

The downing of the Su-30 has sparked a debate in Russian pro-war circles. The Fighterbomber Telegram channel, which has ties to the Russian Air and Space Forces, claimed that no country possesses effective guided or homing munitions capable of targeting small and fast UAVs like those that attacked Novorossiysk—thus necessitating the deployment of fighter aircraft. In response, the Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] Telegram channel countered—an assessment we largely share—that various technologies do exist to target hostile USVs, including drones armed with precision-weapons. The discussion was later joined by pro-Kremlin war correspondent Alexander Sladkov.

The emergence of a surface drone capable of destroying a modern fighter jet represents a significant and novel development in the evolution of warfare. It now appears essential to develop new technologies to protect aircraft from such threats. It remains unclear whether Russia’s military leadership recognizes this new risk and is prepared to adjust its tactics accordingly—such as refraining from using fighter jets to intercept Ukrainian aerial attacks on the Crimean Bridge.

Some commentators circulated rumors that the drones were equipped with Eutelsat communication terminals instead of Starlink. However, Georgy Trishkin, a prominent space commentator who runs the Texas Bulletin Telegram channel, dismissed the claim, confirming that Starlink remains operational near Crimea.

In his statement, in addition to the downing of an aircraft by an unmanned surface drone, Zelenskyy mentioned the destruction of a second aircraft during an operation targeting military facilities in Crimea. However, no confirmation has emerged to support this claim—one unit of Ukrainian intelligence published a video showing drones striking various equipment in Crimea, but only Mil Mi-8 helicopters were visible in the footage. Zelenskyy may have been referring to a statement by Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, who claimed that two aircraft were downed by unmanned surface drones. He also stated that the crew of the second aircraft was killed, but further confirmation is still awaited.

British intelligence claims that in the three years of full-scale invasion, Russia has lost 950,000 soldiers killed and wounded. This estimate likely includes repeated WIAs, as soldiers are often wounded multiple times—which is why we have refrained from posting an estimate of the total number of wounded. There have been cases where soldiers with partial loss of fingers or toes were returned to forward positions. Regarding the number of killed, based on data provided by Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and applying our formula, the RuAF have lost about 220,000 personnel killed.

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