Sitrep for June 30-July 7, 2025 (as of 7 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kharkiv region, Russian forces have crossed the Russia-Ukraine border at a new location and captured the border village of Milove. As has been repeatedly noted, this kind of positioning enables raids and even the occupation of settlements in contested areas without the need for significant manpower or resources. According to the Ukrainian monitoring project DeepState, following the advance on Milove, the Russian Armed Forces are likely to attempt an assault on the village of Bolohivka, located west of the village of Stroivka, which was seized in late May (although DeepState only reported its capture on July 4). If the bridgehead near Milove connects with the one along the Oskil River (Stroivka-Topoli), the frontline will extend and require more troops to hold the expanded area.
At the same time, these forces may be more urgently needed in the Sumy direction, which also falls under the responsibility of the same Group of Troops "North" overseeing the entire northern part of the Kharkiv region. Launching a new offensive while attempts to resume the advance in the Sumy region have stalled for around two weeks appears, in our view, to be a case of spreading already limited forces too thin. The Russian MoD has also reported the capture of the border village of Bezsalivka in the Sumy region, located east of the village of Tyotkino in the Kursk region, likely further increasing the number of sectors requiring active engagement by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In the Kupiansk direction, Russia’s MoD continues to report the capture of new territories near the town of Kupiansk—this time claiming control over the village of Sobolivka, located south of the village of Myrne. However, previous statements about the capture of Myrne remain unverified. These "credit-based" territorial claims are raising eyebrows even among pro-Russian bloggers, who express skepticism that the RuAF could have nearly encircled Kupiansk in complete informational silence. One of the few who does not share such doubts is Aleksandr Kots, a pro-Russian Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent. He described the "capture" of the village of Petrovskoyе (which in fact turned out to be the village of Hrekivka) as an expansion of the zone of control—despite the fact that the area had long been occupied by Russian forces.
Another similar statement from the Russian MoD concerns the Kostiantynivka direction, where, near the town of Chasiv Yar, Russian troops allegedly captured the village of Stupochky a month and a half ago and on July 4, they captured the village of Predtechyne, located south of Stupochky. We see no confirmation of this and Ukrainian sources deny the captures. Even within the Russian pro-war community, there is skepticism about such claims.
In the southern part of Donetsk region, in the Novopavlivka direction, according to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, Ukrainian defenses south of the Vovcha River have effectively collapsed. This conclusion is based on the rapid pace of the Russian advance (up to 10-12 sq. km [3.86-4.63 sq. mi] per day) and the swift capture of the area around the confluence of the Mokri Yaly and Vovcha rivers. At the end of June, we noted the gradual withdrawal of the AFU from the pocket between the Solona and Mokri Yaly rivers to more advantageous positions located on higher ground behind the water barrier. Therefore, such rapid Russian progress seems logical to us and does not necessarily indicate a Ukrainian defense collapse.
It is also worth noting that Russia’s current tactics involve relentlessly pressuring Ukraine until its resources are depleted, which would lead to a full-scale collapse of the frontline. To make it more difficult for Russia to carry out this plan, the Ukrainian command must preserve its forces. Withdrawing from unfavorable positions aligns with this strategy—as does abandoning the harmful practice of holding settlements at any cost.
After seizing the villages of Yalta, Zirka and Zaporizhzhia, as well as the contested area to the south, Russian forces crossed the Mokri Yaly River, took the village of Piddubne and reached the village of Tolstoi, which pro-Russian sources have already claimed as captured. In Myrne, the situation is reportedly critical for the AFU, as the RuAF are positioned to the north in Piddubne, to the southeast in the villages of Fedorivka and Vesele and to the east in the village of Perebudova. A partial encirclement and advance from the north and south are possible in this sector, although an advance from the east is complicated by the presence of a water barrier.
The main objective in this direction is to reach the administrative border of the region. To accelerate the AFU’s withdrawal from the remaining part of the southern Donetsk region, Russian forces carried out an airstrike on a road bridge in the village of Iskra. At that location, the highway between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia crosses the Vovcha River, which also marks the administrative boundary in the area.
The Russian MoD has announced the capture of the village of Dachne in the Dnipropetrovsk region, located east of Zaporizhzhia, though no evidence has been provided so far.
On the Zaporizhzhia axis, where reports of attacks near the village of Kamianske (in the western part of the axis) have periodically emerged, there is now evidence of Russian advances in that area, including the capture of the village of Lobkove, located east of Kamianske.
Data from the WarSpotting analytical project confirms our assessment that the RuAF have mostly shifted from the use of armored vehicles to infantry assaults, showing that identified equipment losses have decreased by roughly one-third each month since mid-spring. In other words, losses in June were 30% lower than in May, and May’s losses were 30% lower than April’s. This trend likely indicates a growing shortage of armored vehicles, rather than increased effectiveness or improved tactics.
Footage has emerged showing a Ukrainian RAM-2X UAV—a domestic counterpart to Russia’s Lancet—being downed by a Russian counter-drone interceptor in the Donetsk region, behind Russian lines. This marks the first documented use of the RAM-2X, which shares the same X-shaped frame as the Lancet. Operators of both systems are colloquially referred to as "X-operators."
On July 6, Russian forces reportedly deployed a Gerbera UAV armed with a warhead to strike the town of Druzhkivka, also in the Donetsk region. Previously, stripped-down versions of the Gerbera had been used as decoys to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. The rationale for arming this drone remains unclear, as adding a warhead increases both the complexity and cost of production. The footage does not show any visible damage that would be consistent with a significant detonation. This raises the possibility that what exploded was the drone’s fuel tank rather than a warhead.
Meanwhile, the Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining reported that Russian forces used Shahed-type loitering munitions to attack the Kharkiv region last week. According to the center, the drones dispersed submunitions fitted with delayed-action fuses. These submunitions reportedly detonate one by one over a span of two to six hours, with the final charge exploding as late as 20 hours after deployment. The center said it had not previously encountered this type of munition and questioned its purpose, noting that conventional area-denial munitions typically rely on motion, contact, or proximity to metal to trigger detonation, such as when a vehicle passes nearby.
Western Assistance
The Ukrainian company Armadron announced that it will soon begin delivering new Danish-produced drone bombs with combined penetrating and high-explosive effects. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the launch of joint weapons production in Denmark and an expansion of cooperation with the United States in the field of drones. The mechanism behind the penetrating effect of the new munitions has not yet been disclosed. Unlike bunker-busting bombs equipped with delayed-action fuzes, featuring thick and durable casings, heavy weight—and consequently, high kinetic energy—the penetrating capability of UAV munitions may be achieved using a small shaped charge in the nose of the device.
The General Staff of the AFU published photos of Bradley IFVs in service with the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade, which is fighting in the Pokrovsk direction.
These vehicles likely arrived after the resumption of US military aid under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which had been frozen earlier this year following the dispute between Presidents Trump and Zelenskyy in the Oval Office.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In recent weeks, Ukrainian drones have begun targeting not only production plants of UAVs, such as the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, and the Kupol Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, but also factories producing specific components for drones. On July 4, a factory in Sergiyev Posad, Moscow region which manufactures combat parts for Shaheds was attacked. In the early hours of July 5, the VNIIR-Progress plant in the city of Cheboksary, which produces Kometa satellite CRP antennas used for electronic warfare and more accurate spatial positioning, was targeted again.
Also on July 5, Ukrainian drones struck Borisoglebsk airfield near Voronezh. The Ukrainian General Staff reported hitting storage facilities containing air-dropped bombs equipped with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK), a trainer aircraft, and possibly other aircraft. Analysis by the Frontelligence Insight team, founded by Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami, confirmed strikes on the depot. Satellite images taken before the attack showed 16 aircraft and one helicopter at the airfield, with no signs of fire near the main parking area afterward, though a small auxiliary section had been damaged. Some equipment may have sustained limited damage. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] claims that all operational aircraft were removed before the strike, without commenting on the depot damage statement.
Ukraine has continued to strike Russian army headquarters. On June 30, a strike hit the command post of the 8th Combined Arms Army in Donetsk. According to the Dos'ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, the attack killed 8 service members (including the acting army commander), wounded 9, and left 4 missing in action.
On July 3, strikes again targeted the 8th Combined Arms Army headquarters as well as the command post of the 20th Motor Rifle Division, though casualties remain unknown.
On July 2, a HIMARS MLRS strike on the command post of the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade in the village of Korenevo, Kursk region, killed more than 10 people, including the brigade's former commander, Hero of Russia Major General Mikhail Gudkov, who served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for coastal and ground forces, along with his deputies, battalion commanders and service chiefs. Gudkov was posthumously awarded a second Gold Star medal, which is given to Heroes of Russia. According to the law on the Hero of Russia title, it cannot be received twice, and the award decree correctly states he received a second insignia (not a second title), but in the decree renaming the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade in Gudkov's honor, he is referred to as a two-time Hero of Russia.
Russia's MoD stated that on July 5, during attacks on Kyiv, 2 launchers and 2 AN/MPQ-65 ground surveillance radars of the Patriot air defense system were destroyed. Military correspondent for BBC News Russian Pavel Aksenov checked NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) satellite data and found that fires in the airport area were recorded northwest of the site where the Patriot complex is located (on the territory of production, warehouse and administrative facilities of civil aviation aircraft repair plant No. 410).
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte regularly makes strange statements. Thus, he suggested that should China decide to attack Taiwan, Xi Jinping might ask Moscow to launch an attack on a NATO member in Europe, so as to "keep them busy" with repelling Russian aggression. This statement does not seem to hold water, since in international politics each country is keen to pursue its own interests and would be unwilling to start a war for the benefit of another country.
Also, Rutte has reiterated that in three months Russia produces three times as much ammunition as NATO does in a year. Meanwhile, according to expert estimates, Russia manufactures slightly over two million 152mm rounds and about eight hundred thousand 122mm rounds, while Europe’s output is only two million 155mm rounds.. So, if compared properly, it becomes obvious that though Russia manufactures more ammunition, it is not several times more.
The UK has restored diplomatic relations with Syria. David Lammy, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the UK, visited Damascus on an official visit and met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
To understand Ahmed al-Sharaa’s path to radicalization, we recommend the PBS News documentary The Jihadist.
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