Sitrep for June 16-20, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

The Conflict Intelligence Team has published an in-depth report, months in the making, on the scale of Russia’s production of the T-90M main battle tank. As previously noted, the Russian Armed Forces have increasingly shifted toward infantry-led assaults, relying largely on unarmored vehicles. This shift has enabled Moscow to sustain its war effort despite a critical shortage of armored vehicles. According to CIT’s assessment, Russia is currently producing between 250 and 300 T-90M tanks annually. While that figure is insufficient to support large-scale armored offensives involving tank columns, it appears adequate to maintain the current pace of combat operations focused on infantry.

Frontline Situation Update

The Ukrainska Pravda media outlet has published a new report on the situation in the Kursk-Sumy direction, based on interviews with Ukrainian military personnel. The main takeaway regarding the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s incursions into the village of Tyotkino in Russia’s Kursk region and the border area of the Belgorod region is that these operations failed to produce any significant military results. Given the acute shortage of manpower, military equipment and resources, the AFU should focus on shortening the frontline, rather than stretching it further. According to the report, after withdrawing from the Kursk region, AFU command should not have launched new operations on enemy territory. Instead, the freed-up units ought to have been redeployed to reinforce defenses in other critical sectors—such as the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions. Nevertheless, command has continued to act otherwise, leading to a steadily expanding frontline and mounting vulnerabilities.

At the same time—an idea that can be inferred indirectly from the article—public perception plays a considerable role: Ukraine’s leadership often appears reluctant to officially acknowledge retreats. This could be seen as, in a sense, a downside of the importance of social media (the so-called Facebookocracy)—the ability to communicate issues directly to command means that some commanders may fear making difficult and unpopular decisions to abandon territory, even when the situation becomes dangerous. However, we think that it is crucial not to be afraid of retreating to more advantageous positions. Although this currently often carries negative connotations—and is sometimes used as a euphemism for a chaotic flight—a deliberate withdrawal can be a necessary and sound military decision. Holding out in small villages until the last moment tends to lead only to their total destruction. Withdrawal becomes inevitable anyway, but at a higher cost. A battered unit that has suffered heavy losses is unlikely to retain the strength to hold new defensive lines and may end up retreating even further. A timely withdrawal to better-prepared positions, by contrast, helps preserve both personnel and equipment.

The Ukrainska Pravda article also mentions that Russia is allegedly testing drones with fiber-optic control and a range of 50 km [31 mi]. In theory, such drones are viable, but from a military perspective, their effectiveness would be limited. The cable spool would be significantly heavier, which—given a fixed payload—would limit the weight of the warhead, preventing it from inflicting serious damage. Even more importantly, saturating an area 50 km deep from the frontline would require producing a significantly larger number of drones. Because of these limitations, we believe that fiber-optic drones with such range will most likely serve as specialized weapons: due to the bulky spool and a sufficiently powerful warhead, they will be used to strike high-value targets such as ground surveillance radars, ammunition storage facilities or fuel depots. Their use for disrupting logistics is unlikely.

In the Sumy region, according to the Russian MoD, the RuAF have captured the village of Novomykolaivka, located south of the village of Vodolahy, which, according to DeepState, was occupied on June 4. Despite the lack of evidence, the capture of Novomykolaivka seems to be a logical continuation of Russian military operations: by June 10, the RuAF had reached the villages of Yablunivka and Yunakivka and had previously captured the villages of Andriivka and Oleksiivka. This left Novomykolaivka semi-encircled and contested, making its capture a matter of time. Russian forces are also continuing their advance in Yunakivka. Journalists from Ukrainska Pravda emphasized in the aforementioned article that DeepState’s map noticeably lags behind actual changes to the frontline in this direction.

In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, where Russian troops recently established an "enclave" in Kindrashivka, video footage of Russian soldiers on motorcycles in the village suggests that the RuAF managed to link it with the main part of the occupied territory and establish supply lines. The Russian MoD had already claimed its capture on May 30, while on May 23, the village of Radkivka was recorded as "taken on paper." On June 20, the MoD once again made unsubstantiated claims of capturing a village near Kupiansk, similar to the earlier claim regarding Radkivka. This time, the village in question is Myrne, also known as Moskovka. Despite these statements, there is no evidence confirming that Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Kupiansk.

In the Kostiantynivka (Toretsk) direction, Russian forces continue to advance near the villages of Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove, with new footage confirming clashes in the latter.

The situation in this sector illustrates the strategic necessity of not hesitating to withdraw to more advantageous positions, as Oleksandro-Kalynove is expected to fall soon. As we previously noted, this would create supply difficulties for the Ukrainian group south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir, and attempting to hold this area further would only result in a futile expenditure of resources and personnel.

Although recent Russian assaults have generally been conducted with minimal use of armored vehicles, occasional attacks in mechanized columns have been recorded. For example, videos have appeared showing such advances near the village of Novoolenivka. Notably, one video shows vehicles approaching an anti-tank ditch seemingly unaware of its presence—despite such fortifications being visible on satellite imagery—while another vehicle actually falls into the ditch. Additionally, equipment can be seen getting stuck on a line of concrete pyramids.

Overall, Russian forces continue to develop their offensive on the salient between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka.

Back in mid-May, the first video showing "flag photo ops" in the village of Malynivka in the Pokrovsk direction appeared, with similar footage from the western outskirts
of the village published by the end of May. It remains unclear why the Russian MoD announced the capture of Malynivka (using its former name, Ulianovka) only
on June 16.

On the Novopavlivka axis, Russia’s MoD claimed its forces had captured the village of Novomykolaivka, near the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region, though no visual confirmation of the claim has yet emerged.

Footage has surfaced showing a BM-21 Grad MLRS engulfed in smoke after being struck. Ukraine’s 20th Separate Regiment of Unmanned Systems "K-2" reported that in intercepted communications, Russian troops warned each other to take cover and don gas masks, claiming the destroyed Grad launcher was "loaded with chemicals." However, the thick brown smoke seen in the video could plausibly be explained by the release of nitrogen dioxide (NO₂), a toxic gas with a sharp, choking odor that can be produced by the detonation of ballistic propellant inside artillery rounds.

Meanwhile, Japan’s public broadcaster NHK has reported that North Korea is considering sending as many as 25,000 workers to a Russian drone factory in exchange for training in UAV operation. Analysts have expressed skepticism, questioning whether piloting Shahed-type loitering munitions is complex enough to justify such a large labor exchange.

In a separate development, Russian authorities announced that Kim Jong-un has pledged to send 1,000 combat engineers and 5,000 laborers to assist in reconstruction efforts in the Kursk region.

On June 19, a new prisoner-of-war exchange between Russia and Ukraine took place. It is worth noting that earlier Volodymyr Zelenskyy had stated that Ukraine would decide whether to participate in negotiations with Russia only after the exchange was completed.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

We have repeatedly reported on Russian UAV strikes against civilians in the Kherson region. On June 17, multiple drone attacks by the RuAF injured 27 civilians and killed one person. Notably, not only Russian drone operators but also the so-called "governor of the Kherson region," Volodymyr Saldo, are speaking openly about strikes targeting all types of vehicles.

In the early hours of June 17, a massive airstrike involving cluster munitions caused the collapse of an entrance section of a nine-story residential building in Kyiv. A total of 28 people were killed and another 142 injured.

In the early hours of June 20, the RuAF attacked the city of Odesa using Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions. As a result, a four-story building caught fire. One person was killed and 14 others were injured, including three firefighters who had arrived at the scene.

Meanwhile, in many Russian regions, mobile internet is increasingly being shut down to counter Ukrainian UAVs. A photo has emerged reportedly showing taxi drivers near Pulkovo Airport in Saint Petersburg trying to find a Wi-Fi signal in order to connect to the ride dispatch system.

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