How Many Т-90M Tanks does Russia Produce? CIT Research

Key Findings

• By the time serial production of the T-90M tank began in 2020, the Russian state-owned manufacturer Uralvagonzavod had produced between 120 and 150 original T-90 tanks for the Russian army, along with roughly 280 T-90A models.
• In the post-Soviet period, Uralvagonzavod managed to preserve its production capacities, including its ability to manufacture armored hulls. At the peak of demand in the 2010s, the plant could produce up to 140 tanks annually, while also manufacturing tank assembly kits.
• By the outset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Uralvagonzavod had launched serial production and modernization of the T-90M Proryv [Breakthrough] tank, delivering between 66 and 85 of these tanks to active units. An additional ten were sent to the Kazan Higher Tank Command School. As of late 2021, the company aimed to reach an annual output of around 60 tanks.
• Thus, by February 2022, the Russian army possessed between 65 and 85 T-90M tanks, along with 370 to 380 older T-90 variants.
• Following the start of mobilization, all stored T-90A tanks were withdrawn from reserves and assigned to several units within the Russian Armed Forces. The original T-90s remained in reserve but were subsequently sent back to Uralvagonzavod for modernization.
• According to our estimates, Uralvagonzavod produced 60-70 T-90M tanks in 2022. In 2023, amid efforts to mobilize the defense industry, output may have increased to 140-180 tanks, and by 2024, it may have surpassed 200 units annually, possibly approaching a production rate of 250-300 tanks per year.
• The availability of new armored hulls does not appear to be a limiting factor and has not impeded production. All T-90M tanks currently being produced are newly built.
• Since the war began, at least 540-630 T-90M tanks have been manufactured—this includes both newly built and modernized vehicles. Given that over 130 of them have been destroyed, an estimated 410-500 remain in service—approximately 15 percent of the tanks deployed on the front.
• Uralvagonzavod is actively working to expand its production capacity. The company has issued tenders for the procurement and installation of welding stations and machining stands for tank hulls. This equipment is expected to operate 24/7. These steps suggest a likely further increase in production speed.
• With armored vehicle use—and therefore losses—expected to decline in 2025, current production levels will likely suffice to maintain the RuAF’s tank numbers for at least several more years of combat operations.
• A substantial increase in new tank production would require far greater investments in new assembly lines and a significant expansion in the acquisition of modern machinery. Therefore, tightening sanctions and enforcing export controls remain essential to constraining the growth of Russia’s military-industrial capacity and to reducing the risk of renewed aggression against Ukraine or military confrontation with NATO.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched in February 2022 as a blitzkrieg-style operation, had by the year’s end devolved into a war of attrition. This shift was openly acknowledged by top political and military leaders on both sides, as well as by numerous military analysts. Indeed, such drawn-out conflicts are most likely when adversaries are relatively evenly matched in both military capability and will to fight.

As the term suggests, the decisive factor in wars of attrition is one side’s ability to inflict losses on the other over time at a rate that exceeds the opponent’s capacity to replenish. This makes each side’s military-industrial base—its ability to produce equipment and recruit personnel—a critical and often opaque variable in the war’s equation.

The current conflict is the first large-scale war in history to unfold with such a high degree of "transparency"—not only for its participants but also for external observers. The widespread use of battlefield surveillance tools, particularly UAVs, has enabled OSINT analysts to reliably estimate equipment losses. Similarly, although it requires considerable effort, the proliferation of social media and communication platforms has made it possible to collect and verify human casualty data almost at the individual level. However, the industrial capacity behind both militaries remains largely hidden behind a veil of secrecy.

It is no surprise, then, that Russia’s defense-industrial capacity has attracted the scrutiny of analysts and OSINT communities alike, all seeking to estimate, even roughly, the scale of its military production. Among the most closely watched categories of equipment are tanks—the so-called "kings" of 20th-century battlefields, whose prominence has waned in the new century. Although their tactical use and battlefield roles have evolved during the course of this war, tanks remain a key benchmark in assessing an army’s combat potential.

Both Soviet and, subsequently, Russian military doctrines have placed armored forces at the center of their force structures. The USSR led the world in the production of heavy armored vehicles, leaving behind a vast stockpile of tanks and other armored vehicles. After sustaining heavy losses in the early months of the war, Russia wasted little time in tapping into this inheritance—initiating the recommissioning of mothballed tanks from storage depots as early as spring and summer 2022 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The mobilization that followed in fall 2022 accelerated this process. Two more years of fighting have brought Russia’s usable armored reserves to near exhaustion. According to recent estimates from OSINT analysts Jompy (@Jonpy99), Highmarsed (@HighMarsed), and Covert Cabal (@CovertCabal), of more than 7,300 tanks visually confirmed in storage prior to the invasion, fewer than 3,500 remained by the end of 2024. Many of these tanks are either beyond repair, like the more than 650 T-64s produced in Kharkiv, or so costly to restore that it would be economically unjustifiable. Nevertheless, the RuAF is attempting to restore them. With approximately 1,100-1,200 tanks withdrawn from storage in 2024 alone, it is reasonable to assume that Russia will fully deplete its reserves of tanks suitable for recommissioning by the end of 2025.

However, both the RuAF and the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to have a high demand for tanks, despite ongoing debates about the obsolescence of tanks in modern warfare and their relevance on the battlefield.

In our view, two main factors contributed to this line of thinking. First, the nature of the Russian army’s operations in the early phase of the invasion. Following the plan of the so-called "special military operation," which did not anticipate organized resistance from the Ukrainian army, the RuAF advanced in column formations with little protection. As a result, convoys stretched along major transport routes, unprotected from flank attacks, were ambushed and came under artillery fire. It was during this early stage of the war that a large number of videos appeared showing Russian tanks being destroyed by next-generation anti-tank guided missiles, such as the Javelin or the Ukrainian Stugna. Often, hits led to the detonation of the ammunition, making the videos particularly dramatic and giving the impression that tanks were entirely defenseless against modern ATGMs. However, as the war shifted into a positional phase, the number of such videos dropped sharply, nearly disappearing in recent years.

The second argument for the obsolescence of tanks is the increased use of UAVs. As early as 2022, Ukrainian forces began using quadcopters to drop explosives into the open hatches of abandoned vehicles to prevent their evacuation and repair. By early 2023, FPV drones had become commonplace. These drones were equipped with payloads made from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, such as the PG-7 and PG-7V. They targeted not only damaged tanks, but also fully operational ones—even those protected by improvised cope cages, which are metal structures welded onto the turret. Since each drone carries a camera, both sides can publish hundreds of videos of successful hits on armored vehicles. Naturally, they select the most dramatic ones. However, failed attacks are rarely made public. Together, these videos create the impression of total UAV superiority over tanks and reinforce the belief that the era of tanks is over.

Nevertheless, practical experience shows that such conclusions are premature. Despite their clear vulnerabilities, both sides of the conflict continue to use tanks fairly extensively. Even with significant degradation of its armored vehicle fleet, the RuAF still tries to include one or two tanks in assault columns. This leads to a shift in the composition of assault units, with fewer tanks and more other types of armored vehicles. From a tactical standpoint, two key factors explain the need for tanks in assault formations. First, tanks can be equipped with mine-clearing plows. While attempts have been made to equip other vehicles with these tools, tanks remain the most effective platform due to their technical characteristics. Second, and equally important, tanks can suppress enemy firing positions with their powerful main guns, thus supporting advancing infantry. Although an assault can succeed without tanks, their presence significantly increases the likelihood of success and enhances a unit's tactical capabilities. Similarly, a tank counterattack can help defend or recapture positions. Tanks are also widely used for indirect fire from concealed positions.

At the same time, the threat posed by FPV drones is real and forces armies to limit the use of heavy armor in combat and to seek ways to counter the threat. Two of the most common countermeasures are: 1) equipping tanks with vehicle-mounted electronic warfare systems, and 2) adding extra physical protection with various types of mesh screens, slat armor, rubber-fabric screens and other structural elements designed to prevent shaped-charge payloads from detonating directly on the tank’s hull. The extreme development of these two strategies has given rise to exotic creations like "barn tanks" (1, 2) and tanks fitted with what has been nicknamed "Tsar-EW."

Given all this, the production of new Russian tanks has become one of the most important aspects of Russia’s military-industrial capacity. Currently, it is known with certainty that only one plant in Russia produces tanks from scratch: Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil. Uralvagonzavod manufactures the T-90M Proryv, the latest variant of the T-90 tank, which was first adopted in the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, attempts have been made to estimate the scale of this production.

In an article published by The Economist, experts Michael Gjerstad of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Pavel Luzin of the Center for European Policy Analysis estimated that Uralvagonzavod could produce 28-30 new T-90M tanks in 2024. According to Gjerstad, another 60 tanks could have been upgraded from older T-90 variants. However, not all analysts studying the Russian army agree with this estimate. For instance, Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes that the actual production volume is significantly higher (1, 2).

CIT is closely monitoring expert publications and any other available evidence that could serve as primary material for evaluation. In this article, we aim to present our view of the current state of T-90 production and offer our own estimates of its scale.

Production of Older T-90 Variants

Object 188, which was essentially a continuation of the T-72 tank line, was officially adopted into service under the designation T-90 as Russia’s first post-Soviet tank in October 1992. We will not dwell on the technical features of this model or other details actively debated among tank enthusiasts, and will instead proceed directly to the topic of its production.

During the economically difficult 1990s for Russia, orders for the production of the T-90 became one of the few lifelines that allowed Uralvagonzavod to survive this challenging period. Estimates of the number of tanks produced during that time vary somewhat. According to information published in Izvestia [The News, a Russian pro-Kremlin daily broadsheet newspaper and a news channel] in 2020, about 150 original Vladimir main battle tanks [called in honor of its chief designer Vladimir Potkin] were produced in the early 1990s. A similar estimate is provided by Aleksandr Koshchavtsev in his article "T-90: The Russian MBT" (TankoMaster, issues 4-6, 1998), while Aleksey Khlopotov, in "T-90: Russia’s Main Battle Tank" (Weapons and Equipment: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, no. 5, 2010), gives a figure of 120 units. However, upon closer examination of Khlopotov’s work, it becomes clear that he presents a minimum estimate. Since the exact number of tanks in the final production batch is unknown, the true figure likely lies between 120 and 150 units. Although no detailed year-by-year production data exist, it is evident that the production pace during this period was extremely low and likely did not exceed 30 tanks per year. By the beginning of the new millennium, Uralvagonzavod’s contract with the Ministry of Defense had expired and was not renewed. As a result, production of the original T-90 Model 1992 was discontinued.

However, Uralvagonzavod managed to solve the problem of insufficient domestic orders by developing the export variant of the tank—the T-90S—with India becoming its primary customer. Starting in 2001, the plant became fully occupied with orders for both complete production and the delivery of tank assembly kits (full sets of components and assemblies in disassembled form) for subsequent assembly in India. In December of that same year, the plant shipped the first 40 tanks, followed by another 84 units in 2002. Additionally, beginning in 2003, it is likely that Uralvagonzavod produced the 186 assembly kits stipulated in the contract.

In 2004, the MoD once again placed an order for tanks for the Russian army—this time for the T-90A, a modified variant that reportedly incorporated lessons from the most recent wars at the time. The T-90A was produced by Uralvagonzavod over the following several years. Between 2004 and 2009, Russia manufactured a total of 218-220 T-90A tanks. Production began with 16 units in both 2004 and 2005, increased to 31 units each in 2006 and 2007, then doubled to 62 in both 2008 and 2009 (though some sources report 63 for 2009). It is also known that in 2010, the MoD planned to procure another 63 T-90A tanks, after which further purchases were reportedly halted (1, 2). Although some publications indicate that Uralvagonzavod managed to secure and fulfill one more T-90A production contract in 2011, the company itself states that production ran from 2004 to 2010. Thus, the most likely estimate for the total number of T-90A tanks produced stands at 281-283 units.

At the same time, Uralvagonzavod developed a new export variant of the T-90—the T-90SA—which also proved popular among foreign militaries. While continuing production of tanks for the Russian MoD, the plant signed an agreement in 2006 to supply 185 T-90SA tanks to Algeria. This contract was carried out between 2006 and 2009, with deliveries including 30 tanks in 2006, 102 in 2007 and another 53 in 2008-2009.

At the end of 2007, a new contract was signed with India under which 124 fully assembled tanks were delivered between 2008 and 2010 (24 in 2008, 80 in 2009 and 20 in 2010), along with 223 assembly kits (the delivery of which was completed in 2011). In 2009, reports indicated the signing of an additional agreement for the delivery of another 50 assembly kits, though there is no publicly available information confirming whether this contract was fulfilled. Under a contract with Turkmenistan, 10 tanks were produced between 2010 and 2011 (6 in 2010 and 4 in 2011), while 44 tanks were shipped to Uganda in 2011.

Between 2012 and 2013, Uralvagonzavod manufactured 120 tanks under a second order for Algeria (1, 2, 3, 4). In 2013-2014, the company produced another 100 tanks for Azerbaijan (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). In 2014, a third contract with Algeria was signed, under which Uralvagonzavod was to deliver 200 T-90S tanks. This contract was fully completed between 2015 and the end of 2016. In the same year, 2016, two more contracts were signed. Under the first, with Iraq, 75 tanks were delivered—36 produced in 2017 and another 39 in 2018. Vietnam purchased 64 tanks, which were manufactured in 2018 and delivered in two batches (1, 2).

In 2020, another batch of T-90A tanks was delivered to Algeria, likely under a new, fourth contract. However, no information about the signing of this contract—nor about its volume or delivery timeline—has appeared in open sources. Additionally, the media has occasionally reported rumors about several other countries expressing readiness to sign additional contracts with Uralvagonzavod, but we have found no evidence confirming such agreements or the actual shipment of tanks.

Thus, by 2020—the start of production deliveries of T-90M tanks to the RuAF—Uralvagonzavod had produced between 120 and 150 original T-90 tanks for the Russian army, as well as 281-283 T-90A tanks. The total fleet of tanks in this line can therefore be estimated at 400 to 430.

In addition, the plant also produced export variants of the tank in significant volumes. The chart below shows the plant’s estimated production output during the 2000s and 2010s. It is worth noting that we used the maximum estimates of production figures. It is also important to point out that the distribution of tank assembly kits for India by year is approximate, as precise data is not available. Furthermore, we treat the production of a kit as equivalent to the full production of a tank—although in reality, this is not entirely accurate. For example, during World War II, final assembly accounted for about 25-30% of the total labor involved in tank production. Accurate figures for modern tanks are unknown, but are likely even higher.

Nevertheless, even without accounting for the production of tank assembly kits, the plant was capable of producing up to 140 tanks per year at its peak. Over a 20-year period, it exceeded the 100-tank-per-year mark six times. The fact that assembly kit production was carried out in parallel during peak years indicates that the production of armored hulls, turrets and other basic components was not operating at full capacity. This suggests that the plant had the potential to increase output of fully assembled tanks to as many as 180 units per year. From this, it can be concluded that Uralvagonzavod retained significant production capacity throughout the difficult years of the 1990s and 2000s for the Russian defense industry. However, this did not prevent the accumulation of debt, which ultimately led to the plant being transferred in 2016 to the Rostec state corporation. That said, as shown above, the workshops, foundries, machine tools and assembly lines had been largely preserved by that time. The likelihood that this segment of Uralvagonzavod’s production capabilities suffered major losses following the transfer to Rostec appears low.

Pre-War Fleet of Older T-90 Variants

Before examining the production of T-90M tanks specifically, let us revisit our assessment of the earlier T-90 tank variants. As noted above, Uralvagonzavod manufactured between 120 and 150 original T-90 tanks for the Russian army, along with 281 to 283 T-90A tanks. The total number of these variants can be estimated at 400 to 430 units.

Let us attempt to refine this estimate. As a starting point, we can refer to a statement made in early 2020 by Alexey Krivoruchko, Deputy Russia’s Minister of Defense, indicating that at that time (before T-90M tank deliveries began) the Russian army had only about 400 T-90 tanks of various modifications—a figure that aligns with our lower estimate. The previously mentioned Izvestia article from April 2020 stated that approximately 150 vehicles were produced in the early 1990s (the original T-90) and another 240 or so between 2004 and 2011 (the upgraded T-90A variant), a number that falls below even our lowest estimate.

For a more precise assessment, let us compare these figures with data on the number of tanks actually deployed with military units. According to calculations by the analyst Aleksey Karpychev, who closely tracked Russian army equipment and weaponry, by 2021 the Russian army had approximately 190 T-90A tanks in service.

Of these, 40 were in service with the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, with another 27 tanks in the tank battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division. Beyond these units of the 1st Tank Army in the Western Military District, T-90A tanks were also in service with the Southern Military District: 40 tanks in the then-recently deployed 20th Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Combined Arms Army and another 80 tanks in the 58th Combined Arms Army: 40 tanks in service with the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and another 40 with the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division.

Additionally, 41 T-90A tanks were stationed at the 7th Military Base of the RuAF in Gudauta, Abkhazia [autonomous republic in northwestern Georgia that formally declared independence in 1999], while another 40 or so T-90 and T-90A tanks ended up in Syria (some were part of the Russian expeditionary force, others were transferred to Bashar al-Assad's regime and various local formations, with at least several units lost as far back as the 2010s, and no fewer than 6 vehicles captured by Syrian opposition forces during the offensive that led to the fall of Assad's regime).

Furthermore, according to OSINT analysts who track military equipment through satellite imagery of storage facilities, at least 112 additional T-90 tanks were stored in the open before the invasion began—all at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base near the town of Buy in the Kostroma region. Thanks to publicly available photographs from this facility, we can identify these tanks as T-90 Vladimir main battle tanks.

Therefore, we arrive at an estimate of 230 T-90A tanks in the RuAF, at least 112 T-90 tanks at the storage base and another 40 T-90 and T-90A vehicles (the exact ratio is unknown) in Syria. This almost perfectly aligns with the minimum estimates we cited earlier. However, it seems highly unlikely that all existing tanks came into view. Presumably, some additional number of both T-90 and T-90A tanks could have been kept in enclosed storage hangars or otherwise escaped observation. For instance, during the invasion it came to light that Russia possessed export T-90S tanks, which only became known when they were withdrawn from storage for dispatch to the frontline—no information about this had surfaced previously. Therefore, in our view, the most realistic estimate appears to be 130-140 T-90 tanks and 281-283 T-90A tanks (about 40 of which were in Syria). This is the figure we will rely on going forward.

Pre-War T-90M Production

Deliveries of the latest T-90M tanks began even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The MoD signed the first contract with Uralvagonzavod in August 2017. It stipulated the modernization of 20 existing T-90 tanks to the T-90M standard and the production of 10 newly built T-90M tanks between 2018 and 2019. Thus, in the initial production phase, the ratio of newly built to upgraded tanks was 1:2 (not 1:3, as stated in Gjerstad’s article). A year later, in August 2018, a second contract was signed for deliveries in 2019. According to unofficial data from the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), which is closely linked to the Russian defense industry, this contract also covered a battalion set of 30 tanks, described as "newly built." While this suggests they were produced from scratch, there is no documentary confirmation. A third contract followed in August 2019, covering the overhaul and modernization of T-90A tanks to the T-90M standard. Again, according to unofficial CAST data, this contract involved the modernization of approximately 100 tanks, possibly not T-90A but older T-90 models from the 1990s (likely sourced from the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base). The delivery timeline for this contract was not disclosed. Meanwhile, Izvestia reported in April 2020 that the first tanks to be modernized to the T-90M standard would be the previously mentioned vehicles from the 7th Military Base in Abkhazia. Finally, in summer 2021, a fourth contract was signed for both new production and modernization of T-90 tanks to the T-90M level. However, no information was released regarding delivery deadlines, quantities or the ratio between new and upgraded tanks. Overall, in the pre-war period, four contracts were signed covering the delivery of at least 160 T-90M tanks. According to unofficial data, 40 of these were newly built and 120 upgraded. The lack of detail on the fourth contract does not significantly affect this estimate, as it was signed only a few months before the invasion and likely not fulfilled in time.

As for deliveries under the signed contracts, they, as is often the case in the Russian army, experienced delays. Tanks covered by the first 2017 contract, which was due for completion in 2018-2019, were only delivered in 2020: in April, the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division received 20 tanks, and in November, 10 T-90M tanks were sent to the Kazan Higher Tank Command School. Five months later, in March 2021, Uralvagonzavod announced the delivery of a new batch of T-90M tanks, apparently as part of the second (2018) contract. The 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade received eight tanks. Later that summer, the aforementioned General Krivoruchko stated that in 2021, the army would receive 65 production T-90M tanks. According to Uralvagonzavod Director Vladimir Roshchupkin, 26 units had already been shipped by then. Thus, by mid-2021, Uralvagonzavod had essentially completed the 2018 contract. It is also worth noting that, according to Roshchupkin, "both absolutely new vehicles and T-90A tanks upgraded to the T-90M standard" were supplied. This contradicts CAST's earlier claim that the 2018 contract was for "newly built tanks." Therefore, it can be possibly assumed that the second contract may have included 10 new tanks and 20 upgraded from existing stocks. We also note that initially, only T-90A tanks, not the older 1992 T-90s, were being upgraded. Uralvagonzavod reported a new shipment after the start of the full-scale invasion, in May 2022. Video evidence shows at least 10 tanks shipped at that time, likely under the 2019 contract.

In summary, despite the obvious initial problems with organizing serial production of T-90M tanks, Uralvagonzavod eventually resolved these issues and began regular deliveries, albeit several years later than originally planned. It is worth noting that production rates increased during 2020-2021: over eight months from April to November 2020, 10 tanks were produced; over the next five months (by March 2021), the factory produced eight tanks; and after another six months (by August 2021), 18 vehicles were delivered. The factory aimed to reach an annual production rate of 65 tanks, including both newly built and upgraded vehicles.

Given the accelerated rate, it can be assumed that the factory could have produced at least several dozen additional tanks by the end of the year that were not publicly reported. If we assume that Uralvagonzavod successfully fulfilled its 2021 plan, up to 39 more T-90M tanks may have been supplied. Thus, by the time of the invasion, the RuAF could have had 66 to 85 T-90M tanks in service, plus another 10 at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School. Of these, at least 40 were upgraded T-90A tanks.

Therefore, by early 2022, the Russian army had 65-85 T-90M tanks and 410-420 older variants. However, from the latter category, at least 40 tanks that were upgraded to the T-90M standard must be subtracted. Consequently, the total number of older variants should have been 370-380 units, and the total number of T-90 tanks of all modifications was approximately 435-465.

It is worth noting that, according to The Military Balance 2022, the Russian army had 350 T-90A tanks, 67 T-90M tanks and about 200 T-90 tanks of various versions in storage, totaling 612 tanks of this type. As we have shown above, this estimate appears to be overstated by at least 150 vehicles.

Use of T-90A Tanks During the War

At the outset of the full-scale war, T-90A tanks were in service with several Russian army units participating in the invasion. From the very first days of the war, they began appearing in loss reports. According to the Oryx project, the first T-90A was destroyed no later than Feb. 27, 2022, and on that same day, another tank—belonging to the 20th Motorized Rifle Division—was captured. To date, at least 43 T-90A/AK tanks have been confirmed lost. At the same time, units equipped with other tank models also suffered heavy losses, particularly in the early months of the war and during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region. By March 15, 2022, according to intercepted staff documents, the 1st Tank Army had already lost a total of 131 tanks. A significant portion of its equipment was also abandoned during the retreat from the Kharkiv region (1, 2, 3). Other RuAF units also suffered substantial losses.

As a result, by the time mobilization was declared, there was a serious equipment shortage on the frontline. Additionally, armored vehicles had to be provided to at least some of the new units being formed as part of the mobilization effort. As expected, Russia turned to mass withdrawal of tanks from storage, including T-90A tanks.

Reportedly, mobilized soldiers assigned to the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army received T-90A tanks. The MoD actively published videos showing T-90A tanks in 1st Tank Army service (1, 2, 3, 4), allowing us to determine that at least some of these T-90As had previously belonged to the 7th Military Base in Abkhazia. It is worth noting that these tanks were supposed to be upgraded to the T-90M standard under a 2020 contract, but this apparently never happened. T-90As also appeared in various other units that had not previously been equipped with them—including the 21st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, reorganized into the 27th Motorized Rifle Division in 2024, of the 2nd Combined Arms Army and possibly other units of the Central Military District (1, 2), as well as the 5th Separate Tank Brigade (1, 2) of the 36th Combined Arms Army (part of the Eastern Military District). It is likely that these transfers completely depleted both the T-90A stock at the 7th Military Base and the tanks held in closed storage, which were not visible in satellite imagery. This resupply almost certainly exhausted the Russian army’s remaining inventory of T-90A tanks—especially given that a portion of them had already been upgraded to the T-90M variant in previous years.

It is worth noting that there have been no verified cases of the original 1992 T-90 tanks appearing on the frontline. The number of these tanks in storage did not decrease drastically—as of mid-2023, only 13 had been withdrawn, leaving 89 in reserve. It is likely that these 13 tanks were sent to Uralvagonzavod for modernization to T-90M standard, replacing the T-90A vehicles that had previously filled that role but were no longer available. The withdrawal of T-90 tanks from storage continued: by October 2023, their number had dropped to 50, and by mid-2024, all T-90 tanks had been removed from the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base.

Around the same time, in September 2023, satellite images of Uralvagonzavod revealed approximately 60 turrets from T-90 and T-90A tanks—likely from vehicles that had been upgraded to the T-90M variant. These turrets were not visible in earlier imagery from June 2022. Presumably, due to expanded production, the plant moved these turrets to an open storage area to free up space in its workshops. It is worth noting that at least 40 tanks—most likely T-90As—had been modernized before the full-scale invasion began. Thus, it can be cautiously assumed that an additional 20 tanks had been upgraded by September 2023, at least some of them likely from the original 1992 T-90 batch.

T-90M Tank Production during Wartime

In his article, Gjerstad attempts to estimate the production volume of T-90M tanks based on Uralvagonzavod reports on shipments to its customers. By May 2024, he had counted 13 batches reported publicly by the factory. Assuming a standard batch size of 11 to 15 tanks, the facility manufactured between 143 and 195 tanks since the invasion began, bringing the total output since production started in 2020 to a range of 231 to 267 tanks. Gjerstad posits that the annual delivery rate increased from 40 units in February 2022 to between 60 and 70 during 2023, with the potential to exceed 90 in 2024.

Assuming the ratio of newly built tanks to upgraded T-90Ms remains constant, Gjerstad estimates that Russia will produce 23 to 28 brand-new tanks in 2024. Pavel Luzin offers a similar assessment in an article for The Economist, stating that Russia produces 30 new T-90M tanks annually. In his article, Gjerstad claims that production primarily relies on the deep modernization of older T-90A tanks.

Based on the earlier presented data, we find this assessment to be incorrect. We believe that the T-90M's production rate is significantly higher, that the ratio of newly built tanks to modernized vehicles is lower, and that the availability of older tanks does not determine the factory’s production capabilities.

First, it is not valid to rely solely on public announcements to assess tank deliveries in a country at war. Officials have consistently attempted to portray the Russian military-industrial complex as stronger than it really is for propaganda purposes. However, they have had to awkwardly balance these narratives with the demands of OPSEC (operational security). For example, the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, another producer of armored vehicles for the RuAF, reported shipments of BMP-3 and BMD-4M infantry fighting vehicles almost every month throughout most of 2024. However, the company stopped publicizing deliveries in the fall, though the shipments continued, as confirmed by reports in national media. The plant even removed previous posts about its deliveries from its Telegram channel.

Occasionally, videos surface showing trainloads of military equipment whose dispatch was not publicly announced, such as the deliveries of T-72B3M, T-80BVM (1, 2) and T-90M (1, 2) tanks produced by Rostec. In addition to the footage available from open sources, we also have several others in our possession, albeit without permission to publish them.

Second, the size of delivery batches may have changed during the war. Trainloads with T-90M tanks, such as those seen in recent videos, often contain more than 10 or 15 vehicles. Occasionally, video recordings show trains transporting 20 or even 30 tanks at a time. Therefore, publicly announced delivery figures should be viewed with extreme caution and used only as a lower estimate, as actual production numbers could significantly exceed official reports.

Third, Russian loss data also suggest a higher production level, with the OSINT projects Oryx and WarSpotting reporting 110 to 137 visually confirmed losses of T-90M tanks, a figure that includes destroyed, damaged and captured vehicles.

The rate of T-90M tank losses has steadily increased, with a significant rise in the number of these tanks among Russia's visually confirmed losses between Q2 2022 and Q2 2023. According to WarSpotting data, Russia lost 9, 40 and 64 of these tanks in 2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively. Assuming all losses were recorded, with a total production of 270-280 units and visually confirmed losses of 115-120, the RuAF should currently have approximately 150-165 of these tanks. Alternatively, assuming visually confirmed losses account for 75% of the actual losses, a coefficient we used in 2022, the RuAF should currently have 110-130 tanks. This number seems inconsistent with the widespread presence of T-90M tanks in the Russian army as observed in open sources. Monthly tallies also indicate that T-90s have consistently accounted for 6-7% of total Russian tank losses over time. This is a notable increase from the approximately 2% share in the initial months of the invasion, when only T-90A models were used. While the proportion of losses does not directly reflect the overall number of tanks and is influenced by various factors, it can be used to estimate deployment of vehicles over time.

Now, let us address an important question raised by Gjerstad and Luzin: what is the ratio of older T-90 models upgraded to the T-90M standard versus newly manufactured tanks? As previously mentioned, the initial contracts maintained a 2:1 ratio, except for the 2019 procurement order, which provided only for the modernization of 100 T-90(A) tanks and did not include new production. If one accepts the analysts' assumption that this proportion continued, then by June 2024, when they estimate Russia produced 231-267 new tanks, Uralvagonzavod would have had to modernize 154-178 older vehicles from an available stock of 400-420. After subtracting the more than 40 T-90A tanks that were lost in the war and clearly did not receive upgrades, the available pool shrinks to 360-380 tanks, meaning that Russia has already modernized nearly half of its tanks, and potentially more at higher production rates. Furthermore, evidence suggests Russia withdrew from storage at least 112 T-90 tanks of the original 1992 model since the beginning of the invasion. They presumably went to Uralvagonzavod for upgrades as they never appeared on the frontline. In that case, however, one should have observed either the withdrawal of T-90A tanks from the active service for factory modernization or a significant drop in production rates during 2024. Neither occurred in reality. Russia's MoD published several videos in fall 2024 featuring this tank model (1, 2), and observers continued to document T-90A tanks on the frontline into spring 2025 (1, 2).

The T-90A model continues to represent a stable share of Russia's visually confirmed losses, according to the WarSpotting data. After Russian forces lost 29 of the tanks in the peak year of 2022, the number fell to just five in 2023. In 2024, however, the number of destroyed T-90A tanks increased slightly to eight. Throughout three years of war, the only periods where observers recorded no losses of this specific model were the Q4 2023 and Q3 2024. Following a substantial drop in losses from the 2022 peak to early 2023, the T-90A's share of all destroyed T-90 variants has remained low but stable. This indicates that the tank is still in active service with the army.

Moreover, photos have surfaced showing Uralvagonzavod repairing a T-90A tank. If the factory faced a hull shortage, it would have evidently modernized the tank instead of carrying out a resource-intensive repair. This suggests that the tanks being upgraded to the T-90M standard are not just those in need of routine factory maintenance, but are likely vehicles that have sustained such significant damage that their modernization is more economically justifiable than factory repairs.

Additionally, an original T-90 tank appeared on camera during Russia’s Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov's visit to a training range in the Leningrad Military District in the summer of 2024, where future participants in the invasion of Ukraine are undergoing training. While this is only anecdotal evidence, it is reasonable to assume that, due to a severe shortage of hulls, this tank was also sent to the factory for upgrades.

Therefore, in our view, the production of new armored hulls for the T-90M tanks is not a significant bottleneck, and production rates have exceeded analysts’ estimates. As we demonstrated earlier, according to pre-war plans, Uralvagonzavod intended to reach a production level of 65 tanks per year as early as 2021. Even if the target was not fully achieved by the end of that year, the plant was expected to meet it by 2022. Further production expansion likely began no earlier than late fall 2022, when, following the announcement of mobilization in Russia, authorities began implementing a full-scale war of attrition strategy. In October 2022, for example, a contract was signed with 103rd Armor Repair Plant for the modernization of 800 T-62 tanks over three years—volumes unprecedented in the modern Russian military-industrial complex. We believe that Uralvagonzavod has started implementing production expansion plans.

What might these volumes be? It is worth noting that in the 2000s and 2010s, the plant was capable of producing up to 140 tanks per year at its peak, alongside the production of assembly kits. During that period, the factory operated under peacetime conditions, without transitioning to a 24-hour, 3-shift schedule with round-the-clock operations and extensive overtime—which it has now adopted. Implementing a 24-hour production cycle, considering the productivity reserve of hulls, likely makes it possible to outperform these figures.

Thus, in our opinion, T-90M tank production at Uralvagonzavod in 2022 amounted to 60-70 units. In 2023, production volumes further increased, driven by additional hiring and a transition to a 3-shift, 24-hour production schedule. It is likely that during this period, production could have increased to 140-180 tanks per year, and by 2024, it could have exceeded 250—possibly even 300—tanks per year. A recent Wall Street Journal article cited Western intelligence sources estimating current production at about 300 tanks annually. Based on information from reliable analytical sources available to us, production in 2024 was around 280 T-90M tanks per year.

A total of at least 540-630 tanks have been produced since the start of the war, including both new and upgraded vehicles. Thus, considering the loss of over 130 T-90M tanks, there are currently 410-500 units of this type in service, which constitutes about 15% of the entire RuAF’s tank fleet. According to the above data, the share of T-90M losses at 6-7% is significantly lower than our estimate of their total number in service. We view this discrepancy as a result of more cautious employment of T-90M tanks in combat. These tanks are less frequently used in assault operations and are more often employed in indirect fire from concealed positions, where the likelihood of destruction is significantly lower. Another factor could be the armor distribution system, under which Russian airborne troops and naval infantry units, actively engaged in assault operations, are more often equipped with other types of tanks.

Growth and Limitations

Certainly, with such significant production scaling, two key problems inevitably arise: staffing and component supply (primarily high-tech electronics). Indeed, over the three years of the war, the labor market situation in Russia has deteriorated, with a rapid increase in labor shortages. From a macroeconomic perspective, the shortage of labor is a serious constraint on the growth of the Russian economy overall, as well as the military-industrial complex in particular, although it may not be as noticeable at key factories. Currently, Uralvagonzavod has posted vacancies for 68 different positions, including engineering and direct production roles such as lathe operator, miller, driller and CNC machine operator. However, given that the total number of Uralvagonzavod employees is estimated at over 20,000 people, even 600 unfilled vacancies account for only 3%. Of course, some positions are critical in production chains, but with the importance of state defense orders for the plant’s future and its management, such vacancies are likely to be filled as a priority, and employees can be transferred to priority areas if necessary. At the same time, significant expansion of production associated with launching new lines and opening new workshops may be a more challenging task than simply increasing staff within already operating production lines.

As for component shortages, the Russian tank-building industry does indeed face difficulties with high-tech components. In particular, some T-72B3M and T-80BVM tanks produced after the start of the invasion saw the replacement of the Sosna-U tank gunner's sight with the simpler 1PN96MT thermal sight. In addition, according to Gjerstad's data published in The Washington Post, from late 2023, laser sensors on gun barrels disappeared from produced T-90M tanks. Certainly, all this indicates limitations within the Russian military-industrial complex. However, the replacement of sights did not affect T-90M tanks; they continued to be produced with the Sosna-U sights. Moreover, the situation normalized during 2023 for other tank models. Furthermore, a simpler sighting system, as well as the absence of a laser sensor on the barrel, critically does not reduce the effectiveness of tanks under current war conditions. As their combat use has shown, tank battles where technological superiority in target detection and firing accuracy can play a decisive role are very rare exceptions rather than the rule. Tanks are primarily used in two ways: for employing indirect fire corrected by UAVs and for assault actions and shelling of enemy positions (with direct firing at short, often super short, distances). In both cases, the presence of the most advanced electronics does not significantly affect the tank's effectiveness. Currently, the tank's resilience under FPV drone strikes is the most crucial factor. That is why the tankers' main efforts are focused on installing electronic warfare and additional protection like improvised cope cages. In this configuration, even the most advanced optoelectronic system will function noticeably less effectively due to limited visibility. Thus, although the situation with some high-tech components may deteriorate in the future, it is more likely that these units will be replaced with simpler ones—sacrificing quality for quantity, which seems a logical choice in conditions of a war of attrition.

Nevertheless, a production level of 240-280 vehicles per year is insufficient to offset losses. According to various estimates (1, 2), visually confirmed losses amounted to 1,300-1,600 tanks in 2022, 770-1,000 in 2023 and 1,050-1,100 in 2024. Of these, 3,100-3,200 were irretrievably lost. The actual number of losses is likely higher, as not all destroyed military vehicles have been documented in photos or videos. Additionally, some damaged vehicles are beyond repair and are used for spare parts. Until now, to address the equipment shortage, the RuAF have resorted to recommissioning tank reserves from Soviet-era storage bases. However, as previously noted, these reserves are running out. That said, the remaining tanks at storage bases and armored vehicle plant sites will be sufficient to continue restoring at least some tank types for several years. At the same time, due to the poor condition of these reserves, the pace of restoration may significantly slow down.

It is evident that the Russian military leadership is aware of this issue. A likely solution is the further expansion of tank production from scratch. Back in 2023, Uralvagonzavod announced its intention to resume the production of T-80 tank hulls at Omsktransmash [Omsk transport machine factory, major tank producer], which is part of the Uralvagonzavod corporation. However, to date, we have found no evidence confirming that production has begun.

The Nizhny Tagil-based Uralvagonzavod also intends to expand its own tank hull production. Specifically, we identified a tender issued by the plant in April 2024 with a total value of over 158 million rubles [$2 million] for structural reinforcement work on the metal frameworks of the cold stamping shop, thermal shop No. 3 and mechanical assembly shop No. 6, under the project titled "Reconstruction and technical re-equipment of armored hull production shops." The work, which includes reinforcing lantern supports in the shops, is scheduled for completion by November 2025. Another tender, issued in April 2023, was worth over 277 million rubles [$3.5 million] and involved the supply and commissioning of a universal station for hull welding. According to the documentation, the work was to be completed by July 2024. Notably, the contract stipulates that the equipment must operate 24/7. Finally, a third tender we identified, worth over 91 million rubles [$1.15 million], was issued in March 2023. Under its terms, the contractor was required to supply and commission a stand for the mechanical processing of hulls by March 2024. Similar to the previous case, the equipment was designed for 24/7 operation. It is worth noting that most procurement data from military-industrial plants have not been publicly available since 2022 for security reasons. Therefore, it is likely that Uralvagonzavod is engaged in other procurement activities aimed at expanding production. Based on the identified tenders, we anticipate an increase in production volumes in 2024.

Undoubtedly, even these transformations will not enable the production of new tanks at a level corresponding to Russian losses in 2022-2024, when the RuAF were losing about 1,000 tanks per year. However, from the second half of 2024 and especially in 2025, there has been a significant change in the scale and frequency of armored vehicle use. Using motorcycles and civilian passenger vehicles instead of tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles on the frontline, while leading to increased personnel losses, has significantly reduced armored vehicle losses. According to their tally, OSINT analysts estimate that about 200 tanks were lost in the first five months of this year. Extrapolating this figure to the entire year gives an estimate of 480 tanks annually—half as much as the number lost in 2024. Thus, the reduction in losses, combined with the current production pace and the ongoing modernization of older tanks, will allow the RuAF to maintain the current level of armored vehicle supply for at least several more years. Moreover, if the loss trend for this year remains unchanged, the size of the Russian tank fleet may even increase by several hundred units per year, despite ongoing combat operations.

Given all the observations above, it makes sense to study the production of armored vehicles in the context of a potential confrontation with NATO countries, a scenario Western intelligence agencies have been warning about over the past several months. In their reports, the timeframe for the RuAF to get ready for a potential conflict varies depending on its type. According to a Danish Defense Intelligence Service report, the RuAF could initiate a localized war in a country bordering Russia within six months of the end of combat operations in Ukraine. Assuming the United States does not participate, Russia will be ready for a regional war in the Baltic region involving several NATO countries within two years, and prepared for a large-scale war in Europe within five years. The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) assesses that Russia will establish the conditions necessary for a large-scale conventional war by the end of this decade. The State Security Department of Lithuania (VSD) believes Russia could engage in limited military action against one or more NATO countries in the medium term.

From the perspective of restoring combat capability and based on our estimated production rates, assuming hypothetically that combat operations end on Dec. 31 this year, Russia could produce nearly 1,000 new tanks within three years, 1,500 within five years, and 3,000 within ten years. However, this estimate does not account for potential increases in output, such as the possible resumption of T-80 tank production in Omsk. Since Russia has largely offset its losses during the current war by modernizing tanks withdrawn from storage, postwar production could focus on equipping the significantly expanded RuAF. During the 2022 mobilization and the formation of new units from 2023 to 2025, both outdated, withdrawn from storage, and modern tanks were supplied. Examples for the former would be T-62 and T-54/55, and for the latter T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M. However, delivery volumes, factoring in losses, were insufficient to equip units according to RuAF standards. For example, some newly formed motor rifle regiments had only a tank company instead of a full tank battalion, and newly formed motor rifle divisions sometimes had a separate tank battalion instead of a full tank regiment. In the coming years, efforts will likely focus on addressing these shortfalls, meaning that Russia will not be able to build significant tank stockpiles before the decade’s end.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of stockpiles for large-scale conflicts. If the initial "blitzkrieg" plan fails, the conflict will likely turn into a war of attrition that requires a steady replenishment of armored vehicles from reserves. Without such reserves, Russia would be in an extremely vulnerable position. Even a localized or regional conflict risks escalating into a full-scale war with all its consequences.

At present, the military-industrial complex appears to have reached its peak saturation with financial resources and personnel. Further growth would require significantly higher investments in establishing new production lines, which in turn would need large-scale purchases of modern equipment. Meanwhile, existing machinery, now in its third year of nonstop, around-the-clock operation, will also increasingly require replacement. In this context, enforcing stricter sanctions is key to limiting Russia’s defense potential growth.

Such a policy would prevent a significant increase in production and thus hinder the creation of substantial stockpiles of armored vehicles at storage bases, that would be necessary in the event of a potential conflict with NATO. Consequently, limiting Russia’s military production must become a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence strategy in Europe.

The components needed for scaling up production, unlike microelectronics, are often individual items, and monitoring their end users is a far more manageable task. However, political will is essential to enforce such controls, including imposing secondary sanctions against dishonest or negligent vendors with poor due diligence.

We wish to thank the military analyst who reviewed this paper for his valuable remarks and fruitful discussion.

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