We Identified the Air Defense Position from Which the Missile That Hit a Building in Novaya Adygea Was Launched
Late on the evening of Jan. 20, during a drone attack apparently aimed at the Afipsky oil refinery, an explosion struck the village of Novaya Adygea, several kilometers from Krasnodar. One civilian was killed and 13 others were injured. The head of Russia’s Republic of Adygea, Murat Kumpilov, said that a drone strike had occurred. However, the videos that later emerged (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) made clear that the building had not been hit by a drone, but rather by an air defense missile, judging by the damage, from an S-300 or S-400 system.
Year-End Overview of the War in Ukraine
To summarize the results of the outgoing year 2025, we will sequentially analyze the successes and failures of each side.
Brief Overview of Frontline Changes in November 2025
Throughout the month, thick fog repeatedly settled over various sections of the frontline. In several cases, Russian forces used the fog to carry out assaults. Such “non-flying” weather severely complicates aerial reconnaissance with drones. It limits visibility to 20-30 meters [65-100 ft], reducing the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to detect and strike an advancing enemy in advance. At the same time, the fog helped the AFU rotate and resupply units operating in precarious positions. The fog and the dense fall cloud cover also hinder the analysis of satellite imagery.
When the Fog of War Is Real: How Weather Influences the Battlefield
For much of history, the muddy season—the period between winter and spring or summer and fall when rain turns fields and dirt roads into impassable swamps—was seen as a natural pause in warfare. It offered armies a chance to regroup, bring up reserves and prepare for new offensives once conditions improved. The mud made movement nearly impossible, creating a de facto boundary between campaigns.
Brief Overview of Frontline Changes Over the Past Month
In the Sumy direction, the frontline did not change significantly in October. Russian forces made minor gains near the villages of Volodymyrivka and Varachyne, while intense fighting continues near the village of Yunakivka.
Can the Data on Russian Losses Published by the Hochu Zhit Project Be Trusted? A CIT Analysis
On Oct. 6, the Ukrainian project Hochu Zhit [I Want to Live] published what it said were figures on Russian military losses in the war against Ukraine since the beginning of 2025. If the data is authentic, the document could represent a unique source, offering, for the first time, a full picture of the Russian Armed Forces’ casualties, including the ratio of killed, wounded, missing and captured soldiers across the entire army, rather than within individual units or formations. Until now, researchers have had no comparable source, so it is unsurprising that this article drew significant attention. Our team therefore decided to examine the data and assess whether it can be considered as reliable.
CIT Records Highest Number of Civilians Casualties Since January 2024 for Two Months in a Row
According to counts in our Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia CIT Volunteer Summaries, attacks and shelling on both sides of the frontline in June 2025 killed at least 282 civilians and wounded a minimum of 1,972. These are the highest monthly casualty figures since our monitoring project began in January 2024. The situation worsened even more in July, with fatalities climbing by nearly 19% to 335 and the number of injured civilians increasing by 13% to 2,228.
Who Produces More Weapons—Russia or NATO?
In early July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte made a striking claim: Russia now produces more ammunition in three months than all NATO countries combined produce in an entire year, effectively suggesting a twelvefold Russian advantage in ammunition production.
How Many Т-90M Tanks does Russia Produce? CIT Research
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched in February 2022 as a blitzkrieg-style operation, had by the year’s end devolved into a war of attrition. This shift was openly acknowledged by top political and military leaders on both sides, as well as by numerous military analysts. Indeed, such drawn-out conflicts are most likely when adversaries are relatively evenly matched in both military capability and will to fight.
Emergence of Light MLRS in RuAF Explains Presence of 107mm Rockets at 51st GRAU Arsenal Fire
On April 22, during explosions at the 51st GRAU [Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense] arsenal in Kirzhach, Vladimir region, various types of ammunition were scattered throughout the area. Among them were 107mm rockets that had not previously been in service with the Russian Armed Forces, as the army had no suitable launchers for them.