Who Produces More Weapons—Russia or NATO?
In early July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte made a striking claim: Russia is now producing "three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO is doing in a year," effectively suggesting a twelvefold Russian advantage in ammunition production.
To verify or challenge this assertion, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, in collaboration with the Conflict Intelligence Team, analyzed publicly available data on the production of ammunition and other major categories of weaponry in Russia and NATO member states.
The study focused on six key categories of military hardware: artillery systems, artillery ammunition, tanks, aircraft, long-range strike capabilities (including missiles and drones) and finally air defense systems and interceptor missiles.
Importantly, Russian authorities and defense contractors do not disclose full details of procurement volumes secured during the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As a result, this analysis relies heavily on intelligence assessments from foreign governments, independent military analysts and open-source reporting. In many instances, precise figures on Russian weapons output remain elusive.
To maintain methodological clarity and accuracy, this study excluded data from Turkey, a NATO member with significant domestic arms production. Ankara’s ambivalent posture in the current geopolitical climate—and its potential neutrality in a future conflict involving Russia—has led us to leave it out of the aggregate NATO tally.
Objective Assessments or Exaggeration by the Secretary General? Artillery Rounds
Earlier in 2025, Rutte had already stated that Russia holds a multiple advantage over NATO in ammunition production. For example, in an interview with CBS in April, he said that the Russian defense industry produces four times more ammunition than NATO.
"We have a problem, the United States part of NATO, the Canadian part of NATO, European part of NATO, that we are not producing enough defense industrial products. We are producing in a full year in ammunition what Russia is producing in three months," he said, noting that the size of the Russian economy is only 5% of NATO's combined economy.
At the same time, neither then nor now has the Secretary General clarified whether he is referring exclusively to 152mm artillery rounds—the main Russian caliber—or if his assessment also includes 122mm and other caliber rounds.
According to the UK’s Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI), Russia produced 250,000 152mm rounds in 2022, one million in 2023 and planned to produce 1.325 million in 2024. In practice, however, researchers note that Russia produced slightly more than 1.3 million 152mm rounds. In addition, Russia’s military-industrial complex succeeded in meeting its 2024 target of producing 800,000 122mm rounds. Analysts suggested that production will continue to grow in 2025, particularly in the second half of the year, when Russian factories will be able to produce more explosives thanks to the commissioning of new production facilities.
RUSI’s figures align with estimates from unnamed Western and Ukrainian officials who told Reuters that Russia produced between 2 and 2.3 million artillery rounds in 2024. According to US General Christopher G. Cavoli, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Russia planned to increase its production of artillery rounds to three million at an unspecified time.
Ukrainian military intelligence offered a higher estimate. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, Russia produced a total of 2 million 152mm and 122mm artillery rounds in 2023 and planned to produce 2.7 million rounds in 2024. An unnamed European official offered a similar estimate early last year, citing a monthly production rate of 250,000 rounds, or three million annually.
SkyNews, citing research firm Bain & Company, reported that Russia intended to produce 4.5 million artillery rounds in 2024—an amount they claim is three times greater than NATO countries' total annual production. The analysts did not specify the types of artillery rounds included in this estimate. They stated that their estimate was based on "publicly available information," yet they did not identify specific sources. Moreover, this figure significantly exceeds other assessments of Russia’s 2024 production capacity, leading us to believe that it is either inflated or based on a broader classification of munitions, such as mortar or tank rounds.
Russia also receives ammunition from North Korea. Initially, this included 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds, as well as mines and MLRS rockets. However, when North Korean systems began to be delivered, the range expanded to include 130mm and 170mm rounds, along with rockets for North Korean 240mm and 107mm MLRS. Estimates of the total volume of these supplies vary.
This April, a joint investigation by Reuters and the Open Source Centre revealed that from September 2023 to March 2025, more than 15,000 containers were shipped, potentially containing over 6 million munitions. Recently, the Yonhap News Agency, citing a South Korean intelligence report, stated that the total volume of supplies exceeded 12 million when converted to the main caliber—152mm. In our opinion, this estimate is overstated, and using the 152mm equivalent for all munitions is incorrect. The data from Reuters and the Open Source Centre appear much more reliable and substantiated.
Thus, taking into account the three months since the publication, the total volume of delivered munitions has likely approached 7 million. It is worth noting that we excluded North Korean munitions from our calculations because they do not affect Russia’s production capabilities.
In March 2024, an unnamed European official told CNN that NATO countries have the capacity to produce and send 1.2 million munitions to Ukraine each year.
In the same year, an unnamed senior NATO official stated that member countries collectively planned to produce 2 million main-caliber artillery rounds (excluding 105mm and 120mm rounds) in 2024, and to reach a production volume of 3 million 155mm rounds in 2025.
This roughly corresponds with the European Commission report. According to the report, the production of 155mm rounds in Europe reached one million per year in January 2024, and by the end of 2025, this figure was planned to double. Additionally, the United States was expected to produce an additional million rounds in 2025.
At the beginning of 2024, EU Commissioner Thierry Breton stated that the European Union planned to produce 1.3 million shells by the end of the year. In June of that year, he announced that the EU had doubled its production of 155mm rounds to one million in less than a year. By the end of 2024, he expected 1.7 million rounds to be produced, 400,000 more than his January estimate, and 2.5 million by the end of 2025.
In practice, however, the production capacities of both the EU and the US may fall short of these targets. According to a Slovak defense industry source cited in July 2024, the EU’s actual capacity was about 580,000 rounds per year.
This estimate aligns with projections from the German automotive and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall (currently the largest producer of ammunition in Europe), which stated in early 2024 that Western European companies could produce around 550,000 rounds per year. In addition to Rheinmetall, which could manufacture 350,000 rounds per year at the time, other European ammunition producers include the Norwegian-Finnish company Nammo, France’s Nexter (part of KNDS), the UK’s BAE Systems, Poland’s Mesko, Slovakia’s MSM, and the Czech companies STV Group and CSG.
In 2024, Rheinmetall signed an $8.5 billion contract to supply ammunition to the German army. Starting in 2025, the company plans to produce 700,000 rounds annually, with the potential to increase production to 1.5 million 155mm rounds per year by 2027. Additionally, the Czech company STV Group intends to produce 300,000 155mm rounds and 150,000 rounds of other calibers in 2025 as part of the "Ukrainian initiative." Other European manufacturers are expected to contribute at least 200,000 155mm rounds in 2025 based on 2024 data.
Thus, even by conservative estimates, Europe could produce at least 1.2 million 155mm rounds in 2025. Given substantial investments via the ASAP and EDIP programs, which aim to increase the production of scarce components, such as powders and explosives, as well as final assembly, European production capacity is expected to grow in the coming years.
The United States, for its part, set a target to produce 1.2 million rounds in 2025, or roughly 100,000 rounds per month. However, US manufacturers are currently producing only 40,000 155mm rounds per month, which is less than half of the target. At this rate, they will produce only 480,000 rounds per year, which is well below the earlier plan of producing 75,000-80,000 rounds per month by the end of 2024. The shortfall is due to delays in launching new production lines. If these issues are resolved, output could increase significantly. The target is to produce one million rounds per year by 2026, or approximately 83,000 rounds per month.
Despite delays in the US and challenges faced by European producers, the US and EU could still produce more than 1.7 million 155mm rounds by the end of 2025. If NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s statements are accurate, Russia is expected to produce 6.8 million 152mm rounds by the end of the year, not including other calibers. If we go by his later claim of a twelvefold advantage over NATO, that number rises to an implausible 20.5 million rounds annually.
Even if Europe fails to reach the projected 1.2 million rounds and remains at its 2024 level of 550,000, and the US continues production at its current rate, NATO’s total production of 155mm rounds would still reach about one million. In that case, Russia is supposed to produce either 4 million rounds (or 12 million according to the "fantastical" estimate).
We consider such figures unrealistic for a number of reasons. The limit of increased production through intensification at existing facilities was already reached in 2023-2024, as the data in the RUSI report clearly shows. Production plateaued at around 1.3 million 152mm rounds. Any further growth will require extensive expansion, specifically, building new production facilities.
This process is indeed underway at several sites, including the Kazan Gunpowder Plant and the Biysk Oleum Plant. However, the scale of these efforts is limited and does not support expectations of a dramatic production increase in the short term. Moreover, bringing new facilities online is likely to be accompanied by delays and problems, similar to those experienced at the new GD-OTS plant in Mesquite, Texas, as well as difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel. This will likely further slow growth. However, in the medium to long term, it is possible that overall Russian output could reach 4 million rounds annually if both 152mm and 122mm calibers are counted.
That said, figures like 6.8 million items, let alone 12 or 20 million items, are unachievable without a full conversion of the Russian economy to a wartime footing—a step that has not been taken to date. Moreover, it remains unclear whether there is even a military necessity for such large volumes of ammunition, given the availability of alternative weapons. Reaching these production levels would require significantly increasing the manufacturing of artillery barrels, which would in turn necessitate new machining lines and equipment, some of which is not produced in Russia.
What to Shoot With? Artillery Systems
We also attempted to assess the production of main-caliber howitzers: 152mm for the Russian Armed Forces and 155mm for the NATO countries.
Data on howitzer production in Russia is currently classified. At present, three types of 152mm artillery systems are in serial production: the 2S19 Msta-S tracked self-propelled howitzer, as well as the wheeled 2S44 Giatsint-K and 2S43 Malva.
The 2S43 Malva is a wheeled chassis version of the 2S19 Msta, while the 2S44 Giatsint-K is built around the 2A36 Giatsint-B 152mm towed field gun, which is no longer in production. While the Msta and Giatsint systems have similar characteristics, they fire incompatible shells due to historical design differences.
According to 2020 plans, Russia intended to deploy "more than 35" Msta-S howitzers. In our assessment, Russia currently appears capable of producing only slightly more than 50 Msta-S systems annually. While newly built vehicles have been spotted on the frontline, their numbers do not suggest production rates significantly exceeding losses.
We assume that annual deliveries of Giatsint-K and Malva systems to the Russian army remain limited to a few dozen units at most. Serial production of these models is still in its early stages, they are rarely seen with frontline units, and only a few confirmed losses have been recorded. Nevertheless, given their relatively simple production process, a significant increase in output over the coming years cannot be ruled out.
It is worth noting that our statistics do not include modified, restored or "cannibalized" Russian systems previously held in storage or military units, although the Russian army actively replenishes its artillery stocks in this way.
Between 2022 and mid-2024, the number of towed artillery pieces in Russian military storage facilities decreased from 11,867 to 6,134 (excluding mortars). This reduction primarily concerns large-caliber weapons. Analyst Covert Cabal noted that at that point, approximately 50% of small- and medium-caliber guns remained in storage, but only one-third of large-caliber systems—the 2A36 Giatsint-B 152mm towed field gun and the 2A65 Msta-B towed gun.
Based on this, we estimate that Russia’s annual production of brand-new artillery systems does not exceed 100 units.
NATO countries have a clear advantage in howitzer production. The Franco-German consortium KNDS alone plans to produce 144 CAESAR SPHs by the end of 2025. The company is also launching production of these howitzers in the Czech Republic.
Additionally, Germany plans to deliver six PzH2000 SPHs by year's end, having resumed production in 2024. The country is also manufacturing new RCH-155 howitzers, although the factory has encountered unspecified problems with large-scale production, resulting in repeated delays in deliveries to Ukraine.
Gun production for these self-propelled systems will soon begin in the United Kingdom. However, the UK does not currently produce any howitzers. Production of the AS-90 SPH ceased long ago, and the British army's main howitzer is expected to be the British-German RCH-155 wheeled howitzer. For now, the UK primarily purchases Swedish Archer SPHs, which are produced at an estimated rate of around 12 units per year.
Poland produces at least 24 Krab self-propelled tracked gun-howitzers, while Slovakia plans to produce 40 Zuzana gun-howitzers by the end of 2025.
In the United States, production of barrels for the M777 155mm lightweight towed howitzer and the M109 self-propelled howitzer has increased. M777 barrel output has grown from 11 to 18 barrels per month (216 annually). However, this figure includes barrels for repairs and rebarreling of existing systems, not just new builds. Additional M777 barrel production has also begun at a facility in Sheffield, UK.
As for the M109, data on precise production volumes is unavailable. In 2017, the manufacturer stated that it was capable of producing 60 howitzers annually. In 2024, BAE Systems signed a new five-year, $318 million contract to produce the M109.
Thus, the total annual production of artillery systems in NATO countries—excluding RCH-155 and M777, and assuming M109 output has remained unchanged—is estimated at 362 units, compared to fewer than 100 in Russia, based on rough estimates.
It is not Cut and Dried. Tanks
As with artillery, it is quite difficult to determine the exact number of tanks Russia is producing, since a significant portion of the equipment used in Ukraine consists of restored and modernized Soviet-era models, such as the T-72B3 and T-80BVM. This is likely the basis for estimates, including those by US General Cavoli, that Russia plans to receive around 1,500 tanks in 2025.
It is worth noting that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia’s stocks of relatively modern tanks have been severely depleted: only 20% of the pre-war number of T-72B tanks remain in storage, 10% of T-80B/BVs and 27% of T-80U/UDs.
The only tank currently mass-produced from scratch in Russia is the T-90M. According to our earlier estimates, Russia has significantly increased production of this model since the start of the war and is now manufacturing about 280 T-90Ms annually.
Meanwhile, European countries are producing very few tanks. France has not produced its main battle tank, the Leclerc, in over a decade—likely due to its high cost. The United Kingdom plans to introduce its new Challenger 3 main battle tank in 2027, with all 148 units to be delivered by the end of 2030.
At present, Germany is the only European country engaged in mass production of tanks, manufacturing 50 Leopard 2A8s per year. Germany is also considering purchasing an additional 1,000 Leopard tanks over the next 10 years. Meeting this goal would require doubling current production capacity—excluding already signed and planned export contracts for several hundred additional vehicles (1, 2).
According to 2024 planning documents, the US produces 109 M1A2 Abrams tanks per year. If necessary, as noted in a Congressional report, production could be increased to 420 tanks annually—but such an expansion has not occurred due to a lack of large orders and already substantial existing inventories. Additionally, the US modernizes up to 200 older tanks each year, with a potential to scale up to 350.
In summary, NATO countries are producing at least 159 tanks annually, compared to Russia’s 280. However, production in Europe is expected to expand in the coming years, and US factories are not currently operating at full capacity.
First Things First: The Air Force
According to rough estimates by the Russian portal Technosphere, Russia’s military-industrial complex can produce about 50-60 combat aircraft per year, including fighters and strategic bombers but excluding transport aircraft: 10-12 Sukhoi Su-57 multirole fighters, 15 Sukhoi Su-35S multirole fighters, 12-18 Sukhoi Su-34M fighter-bombers, 10 Sukhoi Su-30SM2 multirole air superiority fighters and 2-4 Tupolev Tu-160M2 strategic bombers.
For comparison, in 2018 the Russian army received 36 combat aircraft. Despite Western sanctions, aircraft production has likely increased over time, especially under wartime economic conditions. Moreover, Technosphere’s data aligns closely with estimates from other sources, including the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, which is closely connected to Russia's defense sector.
However, Technosphere's claim of producing up to four Tupolev Tu-160M2 strategic bombers annually may be overstated. This estimate is based on a late-2024 statement by Russia’s Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov, who announced plans to deliver four Tu-160M2s. Similar promises had previously been made by his predecessor, Sergei Shoigu, regarding 2023.
Russia is indeed modernizing its Soviet-era Tu-160 bombers (Vladimir Putin even took a flight in one) and is also constructing entirely new aircraft. The Kazan Aviation Plant named after S. P. Gorbunov is scheduled to produce 10 Tu-160M2s by the end of 2027. However, there have been no reports of even a single Russian Tu-160 being officially commissioned into service. During Putin’s visit to the Kazan Aviation Plant in February 2024, the second and third aircraft of the new series (with tail numbers "22 red" and "23 red") could still be seen in the assembly halls, even though the second production aircraft was originally planned to be delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces by the end of 2023. Furthermore, the second production aircraft was once again shown in a December 2024 episode of the Voennaya Priyomka (Military Acceptance) program, still inside the Kazan plant.
Similarly, there have been no reports of the four bombers scheduled for delivery in 2025 under Belousov’s plan entering service, although this information may simply not have been disclosed. For example, in early April 2025, photos appeared online of two new Sukhoi Su-57 fighters at Tolmachevo Airport in Novosibirsk, even though no official announcement had been made about their delivery to the Russian Aerospace Forces.
Currently, there are three fighter aircraft in serial production in Europe: the Eurofighter Typhoon, produced by a consortium of European countries, the French-produced Rafale and the Swedish-produced Gripen.
According to a company representative, the Eurofighter manufacturer currently produces 14 jets per year, with plans to increase output to 20 annually. However, in 2024, the plant delivered only six aircraft.
The CEO of Dassault Aviation, which produces the Rafale, stated that the company currently manufactures 36 aircraft annually. Another source reports 21 aircraft produced in 2024.
A representative of SAAB, the manufacturer of Sweden’s Gripen, spoke of the potential to produce up to 24 aircraft per year. In reality, however, production in recent years has been minimal: according to research by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the company produced no aircraft in 2024 and only one in 2023.
Lockheed Martin, an American defense contractor, expects to surpass its own production record for F-35 fighter jets this year, with plans to roll out between 170 and 190 aircraft, which is well above its standard annual target of 156. According to the Kiel Institute, the company produced 110 F-35s in 2024.
In addition to the F-35, the United States produces 36 F-16 fighter jets, 36 F-15EX multirole fighters and 18 F/A-18s multirole fighters for export each year. Production of the F/A-18 is expected to shut down in 2027.
This means NATO countries produce between 227 and 320 fighter jets annually, far outpacing Russia’s estimated output of 47 to 55 aircraft per year, not including Tu-160 strategic bombers.
It is also worth noting that NATO already enjoys a substantial advantage over Russia in the number of fighter aircraft in service. According to the 2025 edition of The Military Balance, Russia fields 931 fighters, including 19 fifth-generation Su-57s.
Meanwhile, the United States alone operates 2,338 fighters, 787 of which are fifth-generation models such as the F-22 and F-35. In addition, the US military maintains an active reserve of 727 fighters, including 61 fifth-generation jets.
European NATO members—excluding Turkey—field a combined total of 1,814 fighter aircraft. France leads with 275, followed by Greece with 230, Germany with 226, Italy with 183 and Spain with 169. Several European countries have also integrated the US-built F-35 into their fleets. Denmark has 10, while Italy and the United Kingdom each have 32. The Netherlands and Norway have fully transitioned to the fifth-generation fighter with 40 and 44 jets, respectively. Altogether, European NATO allies now operate 158 fifth-generation jets.
In total, NATO fields more than four times as many fighter jets as Russia, with 4,152 compared to Russia's 931. The disparity in fifth-generation aircraft is even more pronounced: 885 to 19, representing a nearly 50-to-1 advantage.
Unrivaled Shaheds and Other Long-Range Weapons
Russia manufactures over 5,000 long-range drones per month, according to Ukrainian intelligence data. Half of this production consists of Geran-2 drones, a localized version of the Shahed-136 loitering munition. The other half are Gerbera decoy drones, which are simplified Shahed analogues. They typically lack a warhead or carry a minimal one and are used to conduct reconnaissance or to overwhelm air defenses. The annual production of these one-way attack drones in Russia could reach up to 60,000 units.
NATO countries, in contrast, do not produce low-cost equivalents to the Shahed-136. The United States, for instance, manufactures high-altitude drones like the Reaper and Global Hawk, but these are not kamikaze drones and perform different functions. Furthermore, they cost hundreds and even thousands of times more than a single Shahed drone.
The American Switchblade 300 and 600 kamikaze drones are significantly inferior to the Shaheds in terms of production volume, range and warhead size. So, at least for now, NATO countries effectively lack and are not developing an apparent direct analogue to the Shahed-136.
Russia also produces an estimated 200 to 250 cruise and ballistic missiles monthly, or 2,400 to 3,000 per year, according to assessments by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Main Intelligence Directorate. In particular, the Russian military-industrial complex can manufacture monthly:
- 60 to 70 Iskander-M ballistic missiles;
- 20 to 30 Iskander-K cruise missiles;
- 10 to 15 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles;
- 60 to 70 Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles;
- up to 10 Kh-32 air-launched cruise missiles;
- 25 to 30 Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles;
- a combined total of 20 to 30 P-800 Oniks cruise missiles and 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles.
An investigation by journalists at the Ukrainian publication 24tv.ua, based on documents obtained from a source, suggests a somewhat lower number: Russia’s production plans for the Kh-101 missile in 2025 totaled 633 units, or approximately 53 per month.
Currently, the only European NATO member that may be engaged in the production of long-range missiles is Germany. According to a June report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the country produces 60 Taurus KEPT 350 cruise missiles annually. However, missile technology expert Fabian Hoffmann asserts that no European country is currently manufacturing Taurus missiles.
France and the United Kingdom have agreed to resume production of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles, but officials have not disclosed the scale of output. Hoffmann had previously estimated potential production capabilities at 50 to 100 missiles annually; however, his analysis likely referred to modernizing and maintaining existing arsenals, as it was published before the two countries announced the decision to restart the production line.
The United States, for its part, produces 700 AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles annually and plans to increase output to 1,100 units in 2026. The US also manufactures approximately 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles per year, along with 500 ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (Germany may begin producing American missiles under license in 2026, with a capacity of up to 800 ATACMS missiles annually). Furthermore, the US plans to produce 1,296 next-generation Precision Strike Missiles, or PrSMs, between 2025 and 2029, which averages to about 260 missiles annually.
Russia, therefore, holds a decisive advantage in the production of one-way attack drones. It also manufactures significantly more missiles than NATO (2,400 to 3,000 annually, compared to the alliance’s 1,580).
No Clear Winners: Air Defense Systems
Since the start of the full-scale invasion, there has been no publicly available, objective data on Russia’s production of air defense systems. Therefore, rather than comparing Russia’s capabilities with NATO's, we are highlighting observable trends.
Currently, Russia is mass-producing several air defense systems, including the S-300V4, S-400, Tor, and Buk surface-to-air missile systems, as well as the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system. The S-350 and S-500 systems are rarely deployed and are not considered to be in mass production.
It is difficult to assess the production volumes of most of these systems, except for the S-400, as even before the start of the "special military operation," only scattered reports were available regarding the delivery of various air defense systems to the Russian military.
From 2007 to 2018, the Russian army received 57 S-400 battalions (each consisting of two batteries), including 10 battalions in 2018 alone. Between 2019 and 2021, an additional 16 battalions were delivered. A further 10 battalions were reportedly scheduled for delivery in 2022 (unconfirmed), which would bring the total to 83 battalions, or 166 batteries.
According to The Military Balance, by 2024, the Russian army possessed 124 S-400 battalions, or 248 batteries. This suggests that, between 2022 and 2024, Russia was producing approximately 17 battalions per year—a sharp increase from the previous peak of 10 in 2018. The 2025 report notes a further increase of 18 battalions. If these figures are accurate, Russia has significantly ramped up S-400 production since the start of the "special military operation."
The publication includes data on other systems such as the S-300V and S-300P series, as well the newer S-350. The number of S-350 and S-300V batteries remained unchanged from the previous year. However, the number of S-300PS batteries, which have not been produced since 2011, and S-300PM1/2, modernized versions of the S-300PM produced until 2014, has increased. Some of these systems were likely pulled from storage or redeployed from other regions, making it difficult to track them accurately and rendering estimates for the S-300P series unreliable.
The United States’ primary air defense system is the Patriot. According to company representatives, the manufacturer was capable of producing 12 batteries per year as of 2023. The US currently produces 500 PAC-3 missiles annually, with plans to increase output to 750 by 2027. Additionally, 240 PAC-2 missiles are produced each year, with a target of 420 annually by 2027. Beginning in 2026, Germany’s Rheinmetall is also expected to start producing PAC-3 interceptors, aiming to manufacture up to 300 missiles per year.
Germany manufactures the IRIS-T system with its corresponding missiles. Diehl Defense plans to increase production to eight systems per year in 2025 and 10 in 2026. The company also aims to raise annual output of interceptor missiles to between 800 and 1,000.
The French-Italian SAMP/T air defense system is likely being produced at a relatively slow pace of approximately one battery per year. The manufacturer plans to produce 134 Aster missiles for the system in 2025. Company representatives have previously indicated intentions to ramp up production.
Europe also produces the NASAMS system, a joint Norwegian-American project. Approximately seven to eight batteries can be manufactured annually. NASAMS is compatible with two US-made missile types: the AIM-120 AMRAAM (1,200 produced per year) and the AIM-9X (2,500 per year).
Due to limited data, it is impossible to determine definitively which side produces more air defense systems annually. However, it appears that neither Russia nor NATO feels fully secure in this area.
Russia continues to suffer near-daily attacks by relatively rudimentary Ukrainian UAVs and appears unable to fully secure its airspace, even after redeploying air defense assets from across the country to the western front (1, 2), despite facing an adversary with limited air power.
Meanwhile, NATO members, observing the relentless missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, are urgently seeking ways to defend against similar threats without bankrupting their budgets on multibillion-dollar air defense systems and missiles, which are still produced in limited quantities and cannot meet growing demand.
Conclusion
Contrary to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s dire assessment, the data we examined presents a more nuanced picture of the current arms production balance between Russia and the West. When it comes to artillery ammunition, Russia and NATO appear to be near parity—there is little evidence to support claims of a dramatic Russian advantage. Moreover, both the US and Europe have launched production expansion programs that are already beginning to yield results. While Russia is pursuing similar efforts, the scale of those initiatives does not point to a breakthrough capable of dramatically boosting output.
In terms of artillery systems, NATO countries continue to maintain a threefold production advantage. Still, it is worth remembering that in this sector, the West is largely playing catch-up. The RuAF continue to draw on vast Soviet-era stockpiles of guns and self-propelled howitzers, although many of these are either obsolete or already deployed in Ukraine.
Tank production remains a weak spot for the West, particularly in Europe. Only one tank model is currently being produced at scale across the continent, with an annual output of just 50 units—a figure that not only lags far behind Russia’s, but also falls short of what is needed for a full-scale rearmament effort. In contrast, Russia’s current production rate could allow it to replenish wartime losses within a decade. Europe, by comparison, would manufacture just 500 tanks over the same period unless output is dramatically increased. While American production somewhat offsets this imbalance, only a handful of European states have adopted the US-made Abrams tank.
Air forces remain a domain of clear NATO superiority. The alliance leads both in annual aircraft production and total inventory—particularly when it comes to fifth-generation fighters. While this edge is overwhelmingly driven by the US fleet, even without it, European NATO members still maintain a two-to-one advantage in total fighter numbers and a tenfold lead in fifth-generation aircraft—though these remain produced exclusively in the US.
Russia, however, retains the upper hand in long-range strike capabilities, including missiles and one-way attack UAVs. NATO currently has no direct counterpart to Russia’s Geran-2 loitering munition—a domestically produced version of Iran’s Shahed-136. Russia has ramped up production of these inexpensive systems, now reportedly reaching 5,000 units per month. While NATO’s sophisticated air forces are far more capable of countering these threats than Ukraine, the Geran’s low cost and mass production offer Russia a meaningful edge in a war of attrition. Moscow also enjoys a twofold advantage in missile production—a critical factor that NATO allies must address urgently. As Ukraine’s recent precision strikes have shown, even a relatively small arsenal of high-precision munitions can inflict significant damage. In the event of large-scale usage—something Ukraine is currently incapable of — such weapons could prove decisive.
Air defense is perhaps the area where both sides remain vulnerable. NATO countries face surging costs and limited production capacity for both systems and interceptors — shortages that could persist well into the medium term. Expanding industrial output is necessary, but it remains unclear how quickly such investments will deliver tangible improvements. Russia, which has long prioritized air defense over aircraft, has also found its systems under strain in the current war. Ukraine, despite its limited resources, continues to exploit weaknesses in Russian defenses, raising questions about how Russia’s systems would fare against NATO’s far more advanced capabilities. In this evolving conflict landscape, Russia’s military may soon need to rethink its entire air defense posture.