Shattered Lives: The Civilian Cost of Indiscriminate Fire in 2024
From the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attacks on civilian infrastructure have been the modus operandi of the Russian Armed Forces. Missile strikes on Ukrainian cities and the shelling of the Northern Saltivka district in Kharkiv using multiple-launch rocket systems in the early hours of the war remain seared into memory, as do the Bucha massacre (1, 2, 3, 4), the airstrike on the Mariupol Drama Theater (1, 2) and the destruction of the city as a whole (1, 2), along with a series of other Russian war crimes (1, 2, 3, 4). Yet, as the war nears its third anniversary, we cannot help but note the diminishing attention paid to the bombardment of civilian areas and the toll on noncombatants. This is, of course, understandable: the human psyche cannot endure prolonged exposure to others’ suffering without a defensive response, which manifests as either normalization or detachment.
Nevertheless, documenting and reporting these events must continue despite the length of the war. To this end, in the fall of 2023, we launched the “Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia, CIT Volunteer Summary” series, a project run by our volunteers. Through daily updates, we compile all available information on civilian casualties resulting from the indiscriminate use of force by both sides—including missile and bomb strikes, artillery shelling, UAV attacks and mine explosions. Our data covers both Ukraine (separating government-controlled and Russian-occupied areas) and Russia. Over more than a year, our database has recorded over 6,000 incidents—each an attack that resulted in at least one civilian injury or death. In this dossier, we present key statistical findings for 2024.
Note: When gathering information, we primarily rely on statements from official sources (or occupation authorities in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine). We also collect available photo and video evidence from media reports, Telegram channels and other sources, geolocating strike sites whenever possible. However, we cannot guarantee that our reports capture 100% of incidents, particularly in cases when local authorities do not issue official statements. If there are strong indications that a strike targeted a military facility and the civilian casualties were proportionate to the military advantage gained, we classify it as legitimate use of force and do not include those casualties in our reports. Given the immense scale of destruction and our limited resources, we cannot independently verify every incident in detail. Except in specific cases highlighted in our main reports, we refrain from attributing responsibility for indiscriminate attacks to either side. However, there are instances where one party explicitly claims responsibility. For example, Russia’s Ministry of Defense routinely announces (1, 2, 3, 4) that its missile strikes on Ukraine are "group" or "massive" attacks on "critical energy infrastructure." We classify such strikes as war crimes, as attacks on energy infrastructure—even though it partially powers military facilities and defense industry sites—do not yield a military advantage proportionate to the harm inflicted on civilians, making them indiscriminate uses of force. Reports of such strikes are considered admissions of responsibility.
Key Metrics
Attacks in Ukraine and Russia over the past year have claimed at least 2,600 lives, including 115 children, and left at least 14,155 people injured—among them 842 children—according to a tally by CIT volunteers. In Ukrainian territories under Kyiv’s control, attacks killed 1,915 people, including 81 children, and injured 10,164 others, among them 591 children. In Russian-occupied areas, 452 civilians were killed, including 20 children, while 2,352 people were injured, 156 of whom were children. Inside Russia, attacks resulted in 233 deaths, including 14 children, and 1,639 injuries, with 95 of those involving children.
As we only started compiling volunteer summaries covering strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia in the fall of 2023, a comparison of 2024 data with previous years is impossible. However, a recent UN report noted a 30% increase in civilian casualties in 2024, as well as a significant rise in the number of children among the victims. The first three quarters of 2024 saw more child deaths and injuries than all of 2023. In total, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded at least 12,456 civilian fatalities, including 669 children, and 28,382 injuries, including 1,833 children, from Feb. 24, 2022 through Dec. 31, 2024.
Throughout the year, the intensity of attacks fluctuated, and civilians endured their most harrowing period from May to September, when monthly casualties never fell below 1,600. The toll reached its peak in May, as the RuAF once again attempted to invade the northern Kharkiv region. That month, 278 civilians, including five children, lost their lives, while another 1,385 people, including 67 children, were injured. Civilians suffered the highest number of injuries in September, with 1,699 wounded, including 101 children. With 251 fatalities, including 10 children, it brings the month’s total to 1,950—the highest figure of the year. Starting in October, the monthly death toll steadily declined and fell below the levels of the beginning of the year.
The massive missile strike on Kyiv on the morning of July 8 was the deadliest attack of the year, when a Russian Kh-101 missile struck the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital, obliterating its toxicology and traumatology departments (at the time, we were able to establish from open sources that the missile’s trajectory had not been affected by air defenses). Several additional missiles hit a five-story residential building in the Shevchenkivskyi district and the Isida clinic in the Dniprovskyi district. That day, 34 civilians were killed, including four children, while 121 others sustained injuries of varying severity, among them 10 children. Although some missiles targeted the Artem military plant, which produced military components among other things, the extensive destruction of civilian sites and the high casualty count points to an indiscriminate use of force. Military personnel involved in the attack must be held accountable—either for criminal negligence, if they entered incorrect coordinates or launched missiles with technical malfunctions, or for deliberately targeting civilians, if they directed the missiles at these specific locations.
The highest number of casualties was recorded during the interception of an ATACMS missile in Sevastopol in Russian-annexed Crimea on June 23, when an air defense system intercepted a Ukrainian-launched ATACMS tactical ballistic missile, triggering a cluster submunition detonation that killed four people, including two children, and injured 153 others, 27 of them children. This tragic accident occurred because the warhead, likely aimed at one of the city’s numerous military facilities, detonated directly above a crowded beach on a Sunday. Consequently, no side can bear full responsibility, although a nighttime attack might have reduced collateral damage. However, we cannot determine whether shifting the timing would have compromised any military advantage, as the exact target remains unknown.
Munition Types
We also analyzed the types of munitions used in the attacks recorded in our statistics. As expected, artillery shells proved to be the deadliest. This category includes attacks involving both tube and rocket artillery, as well as strikes using mortars and tank guns. These attacks resulted in 632 fatalities, including 16 children, while wounding 2,332 civilians, 133 of whom were children. Missile strikes led to the deaths of 504 people, including 36 children. However, the number of wounded from missile attacks exceeded that of artillery shelling, reaching 3,180 people, including 236 children.
The highest number of wounded was caused by UAV attacks—3,300 people, including 142 children. This underscores how heavily both sides rely on UAVs in this war, as well as the indiscriminate use of what is, in essence, a high-precision weapon. In particular, FPV drones, actively employed by both sides, allow real-time assessment of the situation and tracking of civilian presence in the strike zone. In theory, this capability should minimize civilian casualties. In reality, however, this is not the case. Footage from strike sites—and sometimes even recordings from the drones themselves—clearly show that military personnel carrying out the attacks often could not have been unaware they were targeting civilians. Yet, this did not prevent them from striking. In many cases, this appears to be a deliberate tactic to terrorize the civilian population. The most striking example, which we will discuss below, is the right-bank of the Kherson region. De-occupied in the fall of 2022, this area has since become the target of systematic, deliberate attacks on civilians by the RuAF.
Air-dropped bomb strikes were responsible for the death of 346 people, including 19 children, while injuring another 2,241 civilians, 167 of them children. Notably, air-dropped bombs are the only category of weaponry where responsibility for civilian casualties can be fully attributed to one side—Russia, which actively employs air-dropped bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPKs). These modules not only extend the range of these munitions significantly (recent estimates suggest up to 70–80 km [43-49 mi] of range) but, in theory, also improve targeting accuracy. However, Russia’s actual use of air-dropped bombs often suggests otherwise. For instance, in 2025, the Russian Aerospace Forces carried out an airstrike on the city of Zaporizhzhia, which, according to the latest reports, resulted in 13 fatalities and 127 injuries. Based on available footage, we determined that the likely target was the Motor Sich plant [a Ukrainian aircraft engine manufacturer], yet the strike hit a district administration building across the street from the plant’s main entrance. Moreover, the attack took place during lunchtime rather than at night, when civilian casualties could have been minimized. Additionally, we have documented numerous airstrikes on civilian infrastructure, with geolocation analysis revealing no potential military targets within a reasonable distance of the attack sites. This rules out accidental targeting errors as an explanation. While technical malfunctions may explain some strikes on civilian areas, the overall data more strongly suggests a deliberate tactic of indiscriminate force application aimed at terrorizing the local population. Since 2024, Ukraine has also employed Western long-range bombs, but we have not recorded any civilian deaths or injuries resulting from their use.
We were unable to determine the type of weaponry used in attacks that resulted in 715 deaths and 3,640 injuries. Additionally, some reports described combined strikes involving multiple weapon types. Since it is impossible to attribute casualties to a specific type of munitions in such cases, these incidents were counted under each reported means of attack. However, such instances represent only 2.5% of all recorded cases and do not significantly affect the overall statistics.
It is also worth noting the difference in the wounded-to-killed ratio in attacks involving different types of munitions. For artillery, this ratio stands at 3.7:1, which aligns with average figures from conflicts in the second half of the 20th century between adversaries of comparable strength, where artillery fire was the primary means of engagement. For all other weapon types, the wounded-to-killed ratio is significantly higher than in artillery attacks but remains relatively consistent across categories. For missile strikes, the ratio is 6.3:1; for air-dropped bombs, 6.5:1; and for UAV attacks, it reaches 6.8:1.
The intensity of various types of weapon use fluctuated throughout the year. As shown in the graph below, air-dropped bombs were rarely used in attacks on civilian infrastructure at the beginning of the year. However, as Russia ramped up the production of UMPK kits, casualties from air raids increased. In May, the number of victims of airstrikes more than doubled. Beyond increased production, another factor was the start of Russia’s operation in the Kharkiv region. Throughout the month, Kharkiv itself was subjected to near-daily bombardments, inevitably resulting in a high number of killed and wounded. During the summer, the intensity of airstrikes remained relatively stable, but in September, airstrikes surged again, surpassing even May’s levels. This may have been Russia’s response to the August offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region, though this remains uncertain. After September, the intensity of air-dropped bomb attacks declined sharply. By December, the number of casualties from airstrikes had returned to early-year levels. This decrease was likely due to the depletion of UMPK stocks—partly a result of Ukrainian strikes on storage sites—as well as worsening winter weather, which limited sorties by Russian Aerospace Forces fighter bombers.
The intensity of missile strikes fluctuated significantly throughout the year. In January alone, nearly 400 people were killed or injured as a result of such attacks. This was primarily due to Russia's winter campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and cities, which peaked during the first two weeks of 2024. After depleting its missile stockpiles, Russia paused its strikes, as reflected in the significantly lower casualty numbers in February. The attacks intensified again in March and April, marking the second wave of Russian missile strikes. In June, a significant number of casualties resulted from the interception of an ATACMS tactical ballistic missile over Sevastopol. July witnessed the deadliest attack of the year—a massive missile strike on Kyiv. From August to October, there was a relative lull, likely due to Russia stockpiling missiles for another winter campaign. This new campaign began in November, as reflected by a sharp rise in casualties. The Russian command likely aimed to collapse Ukraine's energy infrastructure, but the RuAF failed to achieve this goal. In December, despite several massive waves of missile strikes, casualty numbers significantly decreased. This could be attributed to an increased effectiveness of air defense systems or the targeting of energy distribution infrastructure linked to Ukrainian nuclear power plants and gas infrastructure—typically located outside populated areas.
Artillery activity showed no consistent patterns throughout the year. The period from January to March was relatively calm, followed by an escalation in artillery shelling. A significant surge occurred in May, likely linked to Russia's offensive in the Kharkiv region. Throughout the summer, shelling remained intense, possibly reflecting Russian offensives in the South Donetsk direction. In September, the number of casualties increased, likely due to fighting in the Kursk region and intensified combat in the Donetsk region. Afterward, artillery activity declined, with casualty numbers from October to December dropping to April levels, before the summer escalation.
The use of UAVs in strikes against civilians can be divided into two distinct periods: January to June and July to January. In the second half of the year, the number of casualties from UAV strikes doubled. For this analysis, UAVs include heavy kamikaze drones like the Shahed-131/136, light strike FPV drones and various munitions dropped from quadcopter-type drones. The surge in casualties was particularly evident in the Kherson region. In non-occupied areas, civilian casualties from UAV attacks tripled over the summer—from about 25–30 killed or injured per month in the first half of the year to nearly 100 in July and over 150 in August. This trend closely mirrors the overall rise in UAV-related casualties. Further details on the terror campaign in the non-occupied parts of the Kherson region are provided below.
It is worth noting that the AFU also employ UAVs to strike civilian targets. Although the scale of Ukrainian attacks is significantly smaller, this does not justify them or absolve the military personnel and commanders responsible for the attacks. The most affected areas include the Belgorod region, where 56 civilians were killed and 503 injured in 2024, and the occupied territories of the Donetsk region, where drone attacks resulted in 57 civilian deaths and 416 injuries.
Regions
The Donetsk region has suffered the highest civilian casualties, enduring the fiercest fighting throughout 2024. Here, on both sides of the frontline, 816 people were killed, including 30 children, while 3,334 were injured, among them 177 children. Of these, 584 people were killed and 1,880 were injured in Kyiv-controlled areas, while in Russian-occupied territories, the figures stood at 232 and 1,457, respectively. It is worth remembering that Vladimir Putin justified his "special military operation" by claiming to protect the people of Donbas.
The advance of Russian forces in the region is reflected in the casualty numbers from attacks on Donetsk. In January, at the height of the battle for the town of Avdiivka, Donetsk endured regular strikes, resulting in 37 deaths and 91 injuries. However, after Russia captured Avdiivka in February and Donetsk fell beyond the reach of most Ukrainian artillery, casualties dropped sharply—five people were killed that month, and 39 were injured. A contributing factor may have been the acute ammunition shortage faced by the AFU at the time. From February to September, strike-related casualties remained relatively stable before experiencing a sharp decline. In October, reports indicated two deaths and five injuries, while in November and December, only four people were injured in Donetsk, with no fatalities recorded. It is likely that the continued Russian advance placed Donetsk entirely beyond the AFU’s strike range. Meanwhile, in the neighboring city of Horlivka, which remains within artillery and UAV range, casualties between September and December significantly exceeded those in the first half of the year.
The Kharkiv region ranks second after Donetsk in this grim tally, with 397 civilians killed and 2,616 injured. In the occupied territories of the region, only two casualties have been reported, with all other victims being in areas under official Ukrainian control. The onset of the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region is clearly visible in the monthly casualty statistics. During the winter and early spring, attacks killed an average of 25-35 people and wounded 100-200 each month. However, in May, these numbers tripled: 97 civilians were killed and 524 were injured. This sharp increase was directly linked to intensified Russian strikes, including airstrikes, on Kharkiv and other settlements in the region. In June, as the failure of the offensive became evident and combat intensity subsided, civilian casualties also declined. However, figures remained above pre-May levels, with a rise in casualties observed in August and September, followed by a downward trend.
A similar pattern emerged in the Belgorod region, which borders the Kharkiv region. In May, the number of killed and injured rose more than fivefold compared to April. While four people were killed and 42 injured in April, casualties in May surged to 48 killed and 247 injured—a direct consequence of the Kharkiv operation. Aside from a spike in attacks in March, civilian casualties in the region remained relatively low in early 2024. Over the course of the year, the Belgorod region—ranking first among Russian territories in terms of civilian casualties—recorded 176 deaths and 1,339 injuries.
Sumy and Kursk Regions
Two other regions affected by the war were Ukraine’s Sumy region and Russia’s Kursk region—the first Russian region partially occupied by the AFU. This resulted from the August offensive, the impact of which is clearly visible on infographics for the Sumy region. In the preceding months, the region recorded no more than 10 deaths and a few dozen injuries on average. However, in August, these numbers spiked sharply, with 19 people killed and 119 injured. September and November also saw a significant number of civilian casualties, while October witnessed a sharp decline. In December, available data indicates four deaths and four injuries. Over the course of the year, the Sumy region recorded 138 deaths and 618 injuries.
The situation in the Kursk region presents a markedly different picture. Instead of a sharp peak in August, casualties began rising around March. While it is unclear whether the AFU command had already decided to attack the Kursk region and began softening up the enemy at this time, this appears to be the most logical explanation for the rise in casualties during June and July. August saw the highest number of casualties with nine deaths and 44 injuries, followed by a sharp decline. There is no data for September casualties in the Kursk region, likely due to civilians fleeing combat-affected areas. In October and November, possibly as some civilians returned, isolated civilian casualties were recorded. December, however, saw a significant increase. Over the year, the Kursk region recorded 46 deaths and 149 injuries. In the occupied areas of the region, civilian casualty reports only surfaced in January 2025. According to Oleksiy Dmytrashkovskyi, the AFU commandant’s office representative in the occupied Kursk region, since August 2024, Russian "strikes on civilian homes" have killed at least 36 people and injured over 100. These figures are not included in our overall tally.
As shown in the infographics on the Sumy, Kharkiv, Belgorod and Kursk regions, statements by political leaders linking a particular military operation to the need to protect civilians from shelling and create a “buffer zone” are not supported by the facts. The intensification of combat inevitably increases shelling and results in more civilian casualties and injuries. The only effective way to safeguard civilians' lives during wartime is to evacuate them from areas near combat zones.
Kherson
The Kherson region remains one of the most severely affected areas, with 398 deaths and 2,488 injuries recorded in 2024. Kyiv-controlled areas accounted for 297 deaths and 2,145 injuries, while the occupied territories saw 101 deaths and 343 injuries. As noted above, the significant number of casualties in the Kyiv-controlled right bank of the Dnipro River, despite the absence of active combat, is linked to Russia's terror campaign that began in July 2024. This surge in attacks likely followed the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from their foothold near the village of Krynky on the left bank of the Dnipro. Freed-up Russian UAV operators were apparently redirected to strike the right bank, including civilian population. As shown in the infographics below, July saw a threefold increase in UAV attack casualties, rising from five deaths and 27 injuries in June to eight deaths and 88 injuries in July. Since that, UAVs are the primary weapon used for striking civilians in Kherson itself and other riverside settlements within drone range. After June, both the intensity of such attacks and the number of victims continued to rise, and the terror campaign remains ongoing. Both Ukrainian (Kyiv Independent) and Western media outlets (FT, The Guardian, CNN, BBC, Le Monde) have repeatedly reported on the situation in the Kherson region. Due to near-daily attacks, residents of the right bank have been forced to evacuate en masse, while those who remain severely restrict their movements. Fearing strikes, they only leave their homes when absolutely necessary or during bad weather, when drones are unable to operate.
Special attention must be drawn to the cynicism and complete disregard for any norms demonstrated by Russian soldiers carrying out these attacks. With their access to cameras, they can easily distinguish targets, yet this does nothing to deter them from striking clearly civilian vehicles and individuals. On the contrary, their impunity allows them to literally hunt defenseless civilians with deliberate intent. Russian soldiers sometimes wait for hours for victims, then, after striking, finish off the wounded. Furthermore, they use the injured as bait, waiting for first responders to arrive before attacking them and their vehicles—despite clear identifying markings. To make things worse, Russian soldiers actively publish videos of attacks on civilians, accompanying them with cynical comments and threats against right-bank residents, while also using Telegram channels filled with such content as a source of income. The blood money collected in this way is then used to purchase more drones—or to line the soldiers' own pockets. There is no doubt that these strikes constitute deliberate crimes against civilians, and the UAV operators and their commanders are war criminals who deserve the harshest punishment for their months-long terror campaign, which has claimed dozens of lives and left hundreds injured.
Other Regions
In the Zaporizhzhia region, 165 people were killed and 712 were wounded. In the occupied territories of the region, 44 civilians were killed and 144 were injured, while in Kyiv-controlled areas, 121 civilians lost their lives and 568 sustained injuries. It is worth noting that since the fall, likely due to upgrades to UMPK systems that extended their range, the regional capital of Zaporizhzhia has come within range of air-dropped bombs. As a result, in the four months from September to December, 23 civilians in the city were killed and another 203 were wounded in these attacks.
Three regions not directly affected by the war in 2024 also recorded significant civilian casualties. In the Dnipropetrovsk region, 134 people were killed and 1,062 were wounded; in the Odesa region, 104 civilians were killed and 417 were wounded. The Kyiv region (including Kyiv itself) reported 51 civilian deaths and 352 injuries. Excluding Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk region, which lies within the range of Russian artillery, all these casualties resulted from missile and bomb strikes, as well as UAV raids, which primarily targeted the administrative centers of these regions.
Conclusion
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been ongoing for nearly three years. Just as in the early days of the war, civilians and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the frontline remain under attack. While the intensity of such strikes fluctuated throughout 2024, unfortunately, we cannot yet identify a long-term trend toward their decline. Our monitoring shows that escalations in fighting or the emergence of new hotspots inevitably lead to surges in civilian casualties due to the indiscriminate use of force. In some cases, even in relatively calmer areas of the frontline, attacks on civilians appear systematic and deliberate, resulting in high casualty numbers. Both sides have been observed employing indiscriminate force, albeit at different scales. Moreover, we have not seen significant efforts by military command to curb these practices. As a result, we do not expect a sharp decrease in civilian casualties. The volunteer summaries on attacks will continue to be published in 2025.
In conclusion, we would like to express our gratitude to the volunteers who have been meticulously collecting, processing, and preparing information for publication for over a year on such an emotionally difficult topic as the deaths and injuries of civilians, including children. A special thank you to Olga Makarova, who has been responsible for preparing and releasing our daily summaries throughout this time. Without the daily efforts of our volunteers, the publication of this report would not have been possible.
If you would like to access our raw data for your own research, please contact us via the Telegram feedback bot @CIT_bot or by email at info@citeam.org.