Sitrep for June 20-23, 2025 (as of 7 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy direction, fighting continues, with key developments reported by both sides focusing on the village of Andriivka. DeepState has already declared it fully liberated, while pro-Russian sources reported possibly successful counterattacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A video, geolocated on the southern outskirts of Andriivka, indicates at least a partial liberation of the village. Apparently, the situation on this section of the frontline has stabilized—this was officially stated by Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, in a report to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

A recent video from this area shows the bodies of killed Russian soldiers on a rural road. Other soldiers lie face-down next to them with their hands raised above their heads.

When the video was first published, some claimed these were merely dead assault troops, while others viewed it as evidence of the extrajudicial execution of prisoners of war. A later video emerged showing the process of surrender to a Ukrainian drone. Such scenarios are becoming increasingly common: soldiers caught without cover cannot escape drones, and often choose to surrender. Sometimes, a UAV will escort them to Ukrainian positions. Other times, another drone will arrive and drop notes with instructions.

Last week, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) took place. It was remembered not only for images showing the Taliban flag displayed alongside the flags of other participating countries, but also for a number of meaningless statements. Putin said that he does not rule out the capture of Sumy, but that such a task is not currently assigned to the RuAF.

We still believe that Russian forces will not attempt to advance all the way to the regional center, but will instead establish a foothold along the Khotin–Pysarivka–Nova Sich line, securing the northern border of the large forested area and striking Sumy with drones and artillery.

No confirmations have yet appeared regarding the capture of the villages Moskovka(renamed Myrne in January 2024) and Radkivka in Kharkiv region. Even some pro-Russian war correspondents doubt these claims by the Russian MoD. It is worth noting that both villages lie on the outskirts of Kupiansk.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, small advances by Russian troops have been reported near the village of Yablunivka. Expanding this salient westward, the RuAF captured the village of Shevchenko Pershe.

In the Novopavlivka direction, Russian troops continue their advance from the village of Komar, with reports of the capture of the settlement Perebudova and the village of Zaporizhzhia to its north. Video footage has surfaced showing Russian soldiers displaying a flag and moving freely in these areas. Based on this, we consider that these settlements may indeed have been captured.

A video has been published showing a frontal clash involving Russian assault troops on motorcycles traveling along a dirt road somewhere near the forward positions. As a result, one rider fell and apparently broke his leg. As we have repeatedly noted, travelling across rough terrain on motorcycles can be quite dangerous, as most military personnel lack sufficient riding skills. Such incidents likely occur regularly within Russian forces. It is worth recalling the well-known fatal case from last year when General Klimenko reportedly died while riding a motorcycle under the influence of alcohol.

On June 22, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of a village named Petrovskoye in the Kharkiv region. Interestingly, prior to Ukraine’s 2016 decommunization reforms, there were nine settlements named Petrovskoye [Russian version of the village’s name] in the Kharkiv region. However, none appear to be located near the current frontline, making it highly unlikely that the MoD was referring to the long-ago captured Petrivske located east of the village of Dvorichna and mentioned by pro-Russian war correspondent Aleksandr Kots. It is more likely that the MoD was referring to the village of Hrekivka (formerly Petrovskoye until 2016) in the Luhansk region. Hrekivka lies near the border with the Kharkiv region, just north of the villages of Novomykhailivka and Katerynivka in the Donetsk region, in the Lyman direction.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Some time ago, the official situation reports from Ukraine’s Air Force introduced a new and ambiguous phrase: "lost/supressed missiles." Previously, this terminology was used exclusively in reference to Russian drones, particularly the Gerbera type, which lack warheads. Analysts used the count of these lost/supressed UAVs to estimate how many decoy drones were launched to divert Ukrainian air defenses, under the assumption that Ukraine could distinguish Gerbers from fully armed Geran (Shahed) drones. However, the same term is now being applied to a broad range of missiles including 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles, 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles, Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles, and even Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles. We strongly doubt that Russia has begun manufacturing missile-shaped decoys that visually replicate all of these weapon types. What the Ukrainian MoD truly means by "lost/supressed" in this context remains unclear to us.

Ukraine has received its first Shark light aircraft, manufactured by a Czech-Slovak company. The plane is equipped with antennas for detecting and tracking UAVs, as well as electronic warfare systems designed to jam positioning signals, video feeds, and drone control links. At an altitude of 1.8 km [1.12 mi], the aircraft can suppress UAVs within a radius of up to 4.5 km [2.8 mi]. With a cruising speed of 270 km/h [168 mph], it can remain airborne for up to 12 hours. Several more of these aircraft are expected to be delivered.

In the early hours of June 21, the RuAF carried out a large-scale air attack, including a strike on an oil refinery in the city of Kremenchuk, Poltava region. Satellite data from NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) showed that a large fire broke out at the refinery that day, but the extent of the damage remains unknown. According to the same data, the fire was extinguished the following day.

The police of the Poltava region reported finding unexploded spherical submunitions, approximately 10 cm [4 in] in diameter, on the ground after the strike. The submunitions originated from the cluster munition warhead of a Russian missile. The police warned that handling the submunitions is extremely dangerous.

On June 22, the RuAF launched a missile strike on an AFU training ground near the village of Davydiv Brid in the Kherson region (about 55 km [34 mi] from the frontline). According to the Ukrainian Ground Forces, three servicemen were killed and another 14 were wounded.

On June 21, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine struck a Russian train carrying tank cars, likely filled with fuel and lubricants, near Molochansk in the Zaporizhzhia region. This is not the first train to be hit in the area as drones enable the AFU to effectively keep the limited railway logistics in the occupied territories within weapon range, far from the frontline.

Western Assistance

The Re: Russia project has published an article on foreign aid to Ukraine. Setting aside the issue of shortages in air defense systems, surface-to-air missiles and infantry fighting vehicles, and focusing solely on financial support, Europe was able to fully compensate for the "lost" US assistance in the first quarter of 2025 by providing financial support. From January to April, total aid amounted to €27.4 billion—only slightly below the average for all four-month periods since May 2022 (€28.3 billion). Notably, Europe accounted for 98% of this amount, whereas its share had averaged 53% over the previous three years.

EU institutions played a key role in the first four months of 2025, providing €12.2 billion aid—just over 45% of the total. It remains unclear whether Europe will be able to continue replacing the missing US aid. According to Politico sources, options are being discussed to use frozen Russian assets more effectively—for example, by investing them in less conservative financial instruments and using the returns to finance a new loan to Ukraine. This year, profits from the frozen Russian assets will cover a $50 billion loan to Ukraine.

According to calculations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in the first half of 2025, Ukraine will receive approximately $1 billion worth of weapons from the United States monthly (according to the Ukraine Support Tracker, this is roughly half the average amount Ukraine received from the US in previous years). Weapons supplies will continue at similar volumes—from $700 million to over $1 billion per month—for several more years. These deliveries are covered by the PDA and USAI, both of which were signed by Biden. According to the Defense Production Act, Trump has the option to redirect the supplies to the benefit of the US Armed Forces, citing an emergency (as recently happened with APKWS missiles produced for Ukraine but sent to the Middle East). However, the funds allocated for USAI do not automatically "expire" simply because a specific batch of weapons was withdrawn and redirected. By law, the Pentagon is obligated to either:

• re-order these missiles from the manufacturer later; or
• provide an equivalent replacement within available capabilities; or
• report to Congress on the impossibility of fulfilling the obligation and reallocating the budget.

Reuters reports that NATO countries have agreed on a draft statement for the upcoming summit in The Hague. It sets a target for member states to allocate 5% of their GDP to defense and security-related expenditures. According to the plan proposed by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, countries would reach the 5% target by increasing their core defense spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP, along with an additional 1.5% for related expenses such as adapting roads and bridges for military vehicles and enhancing cybersecurity. Initially, Rutte suggested reaching the new goal by 2032, but according to diplomats, the final text sets the deadline for 2035. A review of the target is scheduled for 2029.

However, at the same time, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has stated that Spain has a very high level of public debt and it cannot afford to spend more than 2.1% of its GDP on security. So, he asked Rutte to consider a "more flexible formula" for defense spending. In Italy, striking union members also voiced their opposition to the government’s participation in the European rearmament plan.

Donald Trump, meanwhile, declared that all NATO countries should allocate 5% of their GDP to defense, excluding the United States, which, in his view, had previously covered almost 100% of all expenses.

US Strike on Nuclear Facilities in Iran

We do not comment on the Israel-Iran conflict, as we lack sufficient resources to fully understand the topic and develop expertise that meets our standards. However, as open-source researchers, we note that the available satellite images showing the aftermath of the US strike on the nuclear facility in Fordow do not allow for an assessment of the extent of damage to the underground uranium enrichment halls. Some assumptions might become possible after the publication of radar satellite imagery that reveals terrain deformation. In this context, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, stated that the underground facility in Fordow was directly affected by the strikes, but "at this time, no one, including the IAEA, is in a position to have fully assessed the underground damage at Fordow."

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