dispatches
Today

Sitrep for June 27-30, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In recent days, there have been virtually no changes to the frontline, although fighting continues in various directions.

In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, Ukrainian drone operators discovered a mined railway bridge northeast of the town of Kupiansk (across the Hnylytsia River) and blew it up, destroying or significantly damaging it. Although the bridge is no longer used for its original railway purpose due to its proximity to the frontline, it can still be used by infantry and assault troops on motorcycles. While some sources claim the bridge was mined by the Russian Armed Forces, it is also possible that it was mined by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in preparation for a final retreat from the area, in order to hinder the resupply of the Russian group attacking Kupiansk. Notably, the DeepState map marks this area as under AFU control, while the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] Telegram channel claims it has been under RuAF control since the fall of 2024, with Russian troops having gained a foothold in the outskirts of Kupiansk.

Mining key logistical infrastructure ahead of a potential withdrawal is standard military practice. However, the development of unmanned aerial systems has introduced new risks: enemy drones can now detect explosives and strike such objects, thwarting these plans.

In this context, it is worth noting that after the start of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian military command was criticized for not mining and destroying the bridges connecting Crimea with the Kherson region—bridges that the RuAF used for their offensive. Russian forces were able to cross the Antonivskyi Bridge over the Dnipro River and capture the city of Kherson. Its timely destruction might have slowed or hindered the rapid advance of the Russian army.

In the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces have reported the capture of the village of Novoukrainka, located northwest of the village of Bahatyr on the border between the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Although fighting for the village had been ongoing for some time and a video showing Russian soldiers in the area had already surfaced, the Russian Ministry of Defense did not officially announce its capture until June 29.

It is worth noting that on this section of the frontline, we consider the villages of Zelenyi Kut, Oleksiivka and Odradne to be under RuAF control. Additionally, footage has emerged of fighting in Zirka, a village located west of the village of Zaporizhzhia (DeepState reported the capture of Odradne and Zaporizhzhia only on June 27). Judging by the situation, the AFU appear to be gradually withdrawing from the pocket shielded by water barriers to higher ground beyond the river. This repositioning will soon allow the RuAF to launch attacks on the border area of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko stated that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a decree withdrawing Ukraine from the Ottawa Treaty, or the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. While Russia has never been a party to the treaty and has freely deployed minefields, the AFU were formally prohibited from using, storing, or producing such mines. Now, the legal framework will align with the realities on the ground. It is worth noting that the Baltic states are currently withdrawing from the Ottawa Treaty to establish minefields along their borders with Russia. Russia initially refused to join the treaty, citing national security concerns and specifically the length of its land borders.

The use of anti-personnel mines is also regulated by Protocol II to the 1980 Geneva Convention, which requires the monitoring of minefields to prevent civilian harm and the creation of accurate maps of their locations. When mines are deployed in areas accessible to civilians, they must be equipped with self-destruct or deactivation mechanisms and be detectable by modern equipment. In the current war, however, there are virtually no fully secured areas where civilians are denied access.

Under these circumstances, the most critical provision of Protocol II is the requirement to create accurate minefield maps—without them, mine-clearing operations could take decades.

A video has surfaced showing the first documented destruction of a North Korean M1991 multiple launch rocket system. A Ukrainian drone struck the launcher near the village of Prechystivka in the Donetsk region, west of Vuhledar. The footage shows one of the rockets piercing the crew cab following the drone strike, with two crew members seen falling out of the vehicle. After a cut, the video shows the launcher exploding, confirming its total destruction.

A previous report from May 7 had claimed the destruction of an M1991 system in the Kursk region, but it was later clarified that the vehicle involved was actually a Uragan-1 MLRS.

Western Assistance

An M1A1 Abrams tank, painted in camouflage typical of the Australian army, was spotted at the Polish port of Gdynia. In October 2024, Australia pledged to donate 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks—set to be decommissioned as the Australian military transitioned to the newer M1A2 variant—to Ukraine. In May, the US reportedly granted the long-awaited approval for the re-export of these older tanks to Ukraine.

Details from the Pentagon’s proposed fiscal year 2026 budget reveal plans to significantly scale up purchases of PAC-3 interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system. Over the next 15 years, the US plans to increase its total PAC-3 purchases from 3,376 to 13,773 units. According to public filings and statements from Lockheed Martin, PAC-3 annual production was approximately 500 missiles per year in 2022, increased to 550 in 2023, and was projected to reach around 650 annually by 2024-2025. Meeting the demand for more than 13,000 missiles will require scaling production to roughly 900 missiles per year.

Two weeks ago, we reported that 20,000 Hydra rockets with APKWS kits produced under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) were redirected by the Trump administration to US Armed Forces in the Middle East due to an emergency situation. It is known that General Dynamics produces approximately 330,000 Hydra 70 unguided rockets per year. In contrast, BAE Systems produces around 25,000 APKWS laser-guidance kits per year. If new kits were now ordered for Ukraine, their production would likely consume nearly the entire annual capacity. Currently, the AFU deploy APKWS-equipped rockets from ground platforms, whereas the US Air Force launches them from aircraft.

In the early hours of June 29, the Russian Aerospace Forces launched over 500 munitions against Ukraine. Among the assets used to repel the attack were F-16 fighter aircraft, one of which was lost. The pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Maksym Ustymenko, shot down seven aerial targets but died while engaging the final one, failing to eject in time.

Reports have recently emerged that Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions have begun flying at altitudes of up to 3 km [1,86 mi]. This makes them virtually invulnerable to mobile air defense crews equipped with machine guns and anti-aircraft guns, and nearly unreachable by APKWS-guided rockets, which have an effective ceiling of 1.5 to 2 km [0.93 to 1.24 mi]. Therefore, the role of fighter aircraft, including F-16s, is increasing.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces announced an attack on the Marinovka Air Base in Russia’s Volgograd region in the early hours of June 27. They claim that two Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers were destroyed and two others were damaged. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Aerospace Force] reported losses amounting to billions of rubles, though it did not specify how many aircraft were affected. Satellite images show signs of fires, but the extent of the damage remains unclear.

In the early hours of June 28, the SBU attacked the Kirovske Air Base in Crimea. Reports indicate that three helicopters—a Mil Mi-8, a Mil Mi-26 and a Mil Mi-28—were destroyed, along with a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system. While this information has yet to be independently verified, NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) satellite imagery shows fire activity at the airfield.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that in 2024, Ukraine developed a plan for systematic long-range "deep-into-Russia" attacks. The plan includes ramping up the number of such operations and producing tens of thousands of long-range drones to carry out precision strikes deep inside Russia.

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