Sitrep for June 23-27, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Despite the stereotypical view that tanks are obsolete and ineffective in modern warfare, there continue to be examples of their successful use. A video has been published showing a Ukrainian tank from the 1st Separate Tank Brigade operating near the village of Yablunivka in the Sumy direction. The tank moves to forward positions and fires directly at Russian positions. Despite being vulnerable to drones, the crew maneuvers, uses a smoke screen for cover and successfully completes the combat mission.

At the end of the week, we agree with the statement by Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi regarding the stabilization of the situation in the Sumy direction. Apart from Ukrainian advances in the village of Andriivka, which we covered previously in the context of counterattacks, there have been no changes in this direction. While it's impossible to predict how long the situation will remain stable, it's highly likely that the Russian offensive will stop at or gradually reach the Khotin–Pysarivka line. We expect an imminent final establishment of a foothold, similar to the situation in the town of Vovchansk in the Kharkiv region. Footholds like these are unable to function as buffer zones.

The AFU counterattacked Russian positions in the area of the village of Ridkodub, the Donetsk region, in the Lyman direction. As reported by the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade of the AFU, during the operation, a platoon of the Russian Armed Forces was completely destroyed, and positions on the western outskirts of the village were occupied. The success of the counterattack is confirmed by the footage published by the brigade, as well as by pro-Russian propagandist Yuri Podolyaka and pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Radov.

A video from the Serebryanske forestry, demonstrating the significant volume of fiber optic lines remaining on trees after prolonged drone use was made public.

In the Toretsk direction, there have been no significant changes to the frontline in recent days. However, the RuAF have recently begun a frequent use of Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions for tactical purposes, specifically for this area. Previously, they were only used against Ukrainian cities further from the frontline, but now they are also striking Ukrainian positions relatively close to it. Russia's Ministry of Defense claimed that the strikes hit the alleged assembly area of the AFU, but without any proof that the partially destroyed buildings in the videos were being used by military personnel. The reason for using these drones near the frontline is unclear, but it may be related to increased production and a large stockpile of drones.

According to available videos, the RuAF have captured the village of Yalta (north of the village of Zaporizhzhia which, like Oleksiivka and Bahatyr, is also most likely under Russian control), in the Novopavlivka direction.

They have likely also seized the village of Shevchenko in the south. DeepState has also reported advances there. However, analysts state that the AFU command may have received inaccurate reports about the retention of villages in the Vuhledar Tactical Group's area of responsibility.

We have regularly noted discrepancies between our understanding of the frontline and the DeepState map. For example, we have repeatedly expressed doubts that Ukrainian forces continued to hold settlements that were in fact completely encircled. According to DeepState, the Vuhledar Tactical Group command was leaving units in isolated, extremely dangerous positions and reporting that the settlements were still being held (instead of ordering a withdrawal to save soldiers' lives). In such cases, videos filmed by encircled soldiers complaining about the command often appear, but we have never seen any.

In particular, DeepState cites the capture of the village of Kostiantynopil, which had not been reported for a long time, and the village of Andriivka. The latter was the contested territory for quite a while, but was officially presented as under the control of the AFU. Consequently, Ukrainian troops sustained losses when they withdrew from the village. Although they captured one prisoner, the question remains whether it was worth holding the village for so long at the cost of casualties.

On June 21, it became known that Lieutenant General Serhii Naiev, the head of the aforementioned tactical group, had been dismissed from his leadership position, and the group itself was disbanded. Its positions have now been taken over by the newly formed 20th Army Corps of the AFU. This structural change in the AFU and the transition to a corps system are intended, at least partially, to resolve command and control problems across various Ukrainian units.

On the Zaporizhzhia axis, combat operations have intensified, with reports indicating Russian attacks toward the village of Mala Tokmachka. Recently, Russian trains in the Tokmak and Molochansk areas have frequently come under drone strikes, suggesting that Russian forces are attempting to push the frontline toward Orikhiv to secure these routes. It should be noted that this would require pushing the AFU back approximately 15 kilometers [9.32 mi], which is quite difficult, as experience with establishing "buffer zones" shows.

On June 25, the AFU attacked a railway convoy on the Tokmak–Molochansk section in the Melitopol district using drones. According to sources from the Astra media outlet, the train was traveling from occupied Volnovakha to Crimea.

It is worth noting that Petro Andriushchenko, advisor to the Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, reported in May 2024 that Russia had launched the first train along a new railway line from the Mariupol port to Volnovakha, and in August 2024 he reported that Russia was using a new railway branch in Mariupol to transport fuel, with tank cars heading toward Rostov-on-Don. It is likely that the railway line is now fully completed and operational along its entire length.

The Financial Times claims that Russian forces have stockpiled about 13,000 missiles of various ranges and can produce around 200 per month. It is worth noting that, according to the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, Russia’s stockpile consists of about 2,000 missiles.

This discrepancy is due to the fact that such estimates typically only include missiles intended for strikes on ground targets (such as Iskander, Kinzhal, KN-23, Kh-101, Kalibr, Kh-32 and P-800 Oniks). However, HUR recently also published an estimate that Russia has 11,000 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for its S-300/400 systems. The Financial Times appears to have combined all of these figures. While SAMs are indeed sometimes used for strikes, such as those on the city of Kharkiv, their primary purpose is air defense, and assuming all of them will be used against ground targets is inaccurate.

New footage has been released showing the Russian army using the Type 75 MLRS, manufactured in North Korea.

The Defense Express media outlet reported on tests of a Ukrainian glide bomb similar to the Russian FAB fitted with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK), currently being developed by the Medoid Design Bureau. A kit has been created for a 500-kilogram bomb with a stated range of 60 kilometers [37 mi]. These bombs could complement the Western glide bombs already in use by the AFU.

Assistance

On June 25, the NATO summit concluded in the Netherlands, which included a meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to the Financial Times, Trump has adopted a tougher stance toward Putin and a softer stance toward Zelenskyy. However, we believe it's premature to draw conclusions about Trump's position changes; he always adapts to the situation and drastically changes his rhetoric depending on the audience.

According to The Guardian's commentator Martin Kettle, the meeting in The Hague seemed more like an "orchestrated grovel at the feet of Donald Trump" than a real security discussion: the summit was truncated into a single morning’s official business, the agenda was adjusted to suit the US President's mood, and European leaders did everything to keep America in the alliance.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte published a message in Trump-style, emphasizing certain words in caps lock. "You will achieve something NO American president in decades could get done. Europe is going to pay in a BIG way, as they should, and it will be your win," Rutter said in his message.

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland plan to mine their borders with Russia and Belarus after their final withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention. Bureaucratic procedures are expected to be completed by summer 2025, after which they will officially notify the UN of their withdrawal, enabling them to produce, stockpile and deploy mines and minefields. In this war, both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines have proven to be effective weapons for deterring enemy attacks, so it is not surprising that many countries are choosing to withdraw from the convention prohibiting their use.

The authorities of a rural council in Bashkortostan [Russia's constituent republic] will begin paying 350,000 rubles [$4,460] to district residents who sign a contract with the MoD. Another rural council in Bashkortostan has introduced a payment of 100,000 rubles [$1,270] for those who "assist in recruiting" new contract soldiers. These payments are not available to officials, municipal employees, military personnel, law enforcement officers, or draft office staff. At the same time, Bashkortostan ranks first in the number of war-related deaths in Ukraine—more than 6,000 natives of the republic have been killed since Feb. 24, 2022.

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