Sitrep for May 26–30, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

According to a statement by the Ministry of Defense, the Russian Armed Forces captured the border village of Kostiantynivka in the Sumy region. Since it is located right on the border between Russia and Ukraine, its capture and even consolidation there does not present significant difficulty. In this way, by gradually extending the frontline, Russian forces are effectively demonstrating the execution of Putin’s order to create a buffer zone in the Sumy region. In addition, the RuAF is advancing toward the villages of Volodymyrivka, Yunakivka and Yablunivka (not to be confused with Yablunivka in Donetsk region in the Kostiantynivka direction).

This week, there was ongoing discussion about the Russian military in this area, and it is worth noting the statement by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who said that the Russian army had amassed a 50,000-strong force on the border with the Sumy region. According to him, it was the right decision for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to leave one direction in the Kursk region (near the town of Sudzha) and approach from another (likely referring to the village of Tyotkino). We are not prepared to definitively conclude that the idea of a new incursion into the Kursk region came from Zelenskyy himself—it may have been promoted by Commander-in-Chief of the AFU Oleksandr Syrskyi or another member of Ukraine’s military leadership.

We still view diversionary maneuvers as questionable when facing an active enemy offensive. While attempting to slow the advance in the Sumy region seems logical, the priority in such situations should be strengthening defensive positions, after which any remaining resources can be used for diversionary maneuvers, like in Tyotkino. As of now, we see no signs that the actions near Tyotkino have affected the pace of Russian advances in the Sumy direction.

Amid President Zelenskyy's statements about the Russian buildup near Sumy, the Ukrainian Kharkiv operational-tactical group officially denied Western media reports about a similarly sized Russian grouping being redeployed to the Kharkiv region border to prepare for an assault on the city of Kharkiv (which is not currently being considered at all). On one hand, this doesn’t contradict Zelenskyy’s words, as he referred to the Kursk region, while the denied reports are about Belgorod region. On the other hand, the key word is "redeployment." There is no indication that these forces were pulled from other fronts. On the contrary, this group mostly consists of units that previously worked to eliminate the Kursk bridgehead, with their strength, according to Ukrainian data, being about 50,000-60,000 personnel.

The presence of Russian marines and airborne troops in the border area of the Sumy region, remaining there after the cleanup of the Kursk bridgehead, was confirmed by Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets. He noted that this sector involved units from the 155th and 40th Naval Infantry Brigades, as well as the 76th Air Assault and 106th Airborne Divisions of the RuAF. This information is indirectly supported by open-source reports. On social media and messaging platforms, relatives of Russian soldiers regularly post about missing personnel. Among them are troops from the 234th Air Assault Regiment and the 76th Air Assault Division, with contact reportedly lost in early May near the village of Basivka.

In April, following the near-complete expulsion of the AFU from the Kursk region, the transfer of Russian drone operators from there to the Donetsk region began.

At the same time, the redeployment of Ukrainian units was recorded. In particular, part of the 82nd Separate Air Assault Brigade of the AFU, which had previously operated in the Kursk bridgehead, was redeployed to the Pokrovsk-Toretsk direction, as officially announced on the brigade's Telegram channel. According to independent analysts, they are fighting in the area of the villages of Novoolenivka and Popiv Yar.

This week, the use of F-16 fighter aircraft by the AFU in the Kursk direction was noted, deploying GBU-39 SDB glide bombs. The application of F-16s in this role came as somewhat of a surprise, as they were initially utilized as "flying air defense" deep within Ukrainian territory and only began appearing near the frontline in the Sumy region in late winter 2025, accompanying Mikoyan MiG-29 fighter aircraft that launched guided aerial bombs.

Air forces remain a crucial element of firepower, as airstrikes can level enemy fortifications, thereby facilitating the advance of ground forces. For the RuAF, this is achieved through the use of a significant number of FAB bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK). It is possible that the AFU has begun using their F-16s closer to the frontline due to the recent arrival of new aircraft or due to an acute need to increase firepower.

In the Kharkiv region, according to Russia’s Ministry of Defense, the RuAF have captured the village of Stroivka near the border with Russia. It was originally located in a contested area, and its capture was technically an easy task. A video has been released showing the village being attacked with multiple rocket launchers (likely BM-21 Grad MLRS), after which troops moved in to storm it. From here, Russian forces will presumably push forward from Stroivka toward the bridgehead near the village of Topoli on the right bank of the Oskil River to expand it. This also has no connection to any hypothetical offensive on the city of Kharkiv.

In the Lyman direction, Russian units have reached the western edge of the village of Ridkodub. Footage has been published showing a Russian flag displayed in the western part of the village, indicating control over that area and possibly the full capture of Ridkodub.

On the western flank of the Toretsk direction, which has been the most critical in recent weeks, Russian forces continue working to straighten the frontline. It is worth noting that in recent days, Russian units have been observed in the village of Zoria and the village of Romanivka. The capture of Romanivka on May 30 was confirmed by DeepState. There is little doubt that the current frontline runs through these settlements, while the villages of Stara Mykolaivka and Hnativka are located in territory controlled by the RuAF. In our view, talk of operational encirclement is not warranted. Russia’s MoD announced the capture of Stara Mykolaivka on May 27 (judging by video footage, Ukrainian forces may have already withdrawn by the time Russian troops entered), and the capture of Hnativka on May 29.

The main problem Ukrainian forces face in the town of Kostiantynivka is that while there are plenty of trenches, dugouts, and other fortifications to the east of the town, the area to the west is open fields. When Russian forces were still far away, it's likely that the fortifications were built expecting an attack only from the east. Now, constructing any new defenses under constant drone fire has become impossible. It can be assumed that the Russian command has also taken notice of this and decided to advance from Novoolenivka toward the villages of Yablunivka and Stepanivka, and from the village of Nova Poltavka toward the village of Popiv Yar. Reports of fighting over the latter are already beginning to surface.

In the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces have reportedly advanced near the villages of Kotlyarivka, Troitske and Bohdanivka (it is worth noting that a video confirming the capture of Bohdanivka was previously published). At this point, the only settlement separating Russian forces from the border of the Dnipropetrovsk region in this direction is the village of Horikhove.

In the South Donetsk direction, Russian forces have reached the border between two regions after capturing the village of Zelene Pole. This is confirmed by footage showing Russian soldiers in the northern part of the village. Similar to the situation in the Toretsk direction, there is strong reason to doubt that Ukrainian forces are still present in the area north of the village of Rivnopil, despite it being marked as under AFU control. If they were, they would be nearly encircled.

Of all active sectors of the front, the Toretsk direction has recently seen the most movement, while shifts in the frontline have also been observed in Ukraine’s Sumy region. Meanwhile, frontlines in the Lyman and Kupiansk directions remain largely static.

Western Assistance

On May 26, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the United States had lifted range restrictions on the weapons supplied to Ukraine. However, a German government spokesperson later clarified that no new agreements had been reached.

Germany has signed a funding agreement to support the production of long-range Ukrainian weaponry, with initial deliveries expected later this year. According to Die Welt, the deal covers the production of several systems: the AN-196 Liutyi strike drone with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers [1,240 miles], the Bars missile drone with a range of up to 800 kilometers [500 mi], and the VB140 Flamingo interceptor, which has a range of up to 50 kilometers [30 mi]. The total value of the contract is approximately 400 million euros [$450 million].

US President Donald Trump continues to promise, on a biweekly basis, that he will decide the course of action on the war in Ukraine within two weeks. This time, he stated he would determine within that time frame whether President Vladimir Putin is deceiving him, and if so, the United States would "act differently."

Reuters has reported that Putin is seeking a written commitment from Western countries that NATO would not expand eastward. This is not the first time Russian sources have suggested to the agency that Putin is willing to freeze the war under certain conditions. However, such reports have repeatedly failed to materialize into actual policy shifts. Suspicion is growing that these are planted rumors aimed at manipulating the negotiation process—each time Trump suggests Putin is not interested in peace, a Reuters story emerges portraying Russian demands as flexible and open to discussion.

This week, long-range strikes by Ukrainian drones continued against various targets on Russian territory, but none appeared to have had a significant impact. There have been no reports of factory shutdowns or even halted production lines as a result.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that on May 29, Russia launched Dan-M drones—originally jet-powered target drones used in air defense training—from Crimea. Russia modified and equipped these drones with warheads. Given these aircraft's limited flight range of about 300 km [186 mi] and the fact that adding a warhead likely reduces that range further, it is more plausible that they are being used to overload Ukrainian air defenses than to carry out effective strikes.

That same day, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] published footage allegedly showing the use of these drones. However, the video appears to be from a training exercise, and some of the accompanying photos are quite old—one helicopter is marked "VVS" (Air Force), not "VKS" (Aerospace Forces). It is worth noting that Russia’s Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces were merged into the Aerospace Forces (VKS) in 2015.

The Ministry of Defense’s Zvezda TV channel published footage, reportedly from the Pokrovsk direction, showing tank crews from the Group of Troops "Center" mounting rebar spikes on top of cope cages for added protection against drones, resulting in so-called "hedgehog tanks."

It raises questions about how such modifications affect the effectiveness of electronic warfare systems and whether they hinder the crew’s ability to quickly exit the vehicle.

Earlier this week, servicemen from the 5th Motor Rifle Brigade of the RuAF and their relatives released a series of appeals criticizing their commanders. According to them, wounded soldiers are held in a basement, denied medical care, and sent into combat—even those who rely on crutches or canes. Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov dismissed the video featuring the wounded soldiers as fake, claiming it was staged to discredit the Russian army. As proof, he shared footage of four of the servicemen—now in hospital garb—claiming on camera that they were forced to take part in the staged video under threat of being sent into combat. However, the servicemen later told the Astra Telegram channel that the original video was real and that no one was coerced into filming it.

Pro-Russian blogger Wayne Howell recounts another incident involving the 5th Brigade: allegedly, at some point, its tank crews were left without equipment and were sent into an assault, where they were killed. Later, a new batch of equipment arrived, but there was no one left to operate it. A similar story about a graduate of a flight school being reassigned to regular infantry about a month ago was reported by the pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, associated with the Russian Air and Space Force.

Lawmakers in the Vologda regional parliament have backed a bill introducing employment quotas for war participants: starting Sept. 1, 1% of jobs must be reserved for them. The measure applies to companies with a staff of 100 or more; the region has about 450 such companies. Similar initiatives have already been implemented in the Samara and Moscow regions, discussed in Russia’s constituent Republic of Dagestan, and are being introduced in the Primorsky region.

However, in the Moscow region, only 300 service members applied for jobs under the quota over the course of a year, after which the law was softened: now, companies with more than 200 employees are only required to hire one person returning from the war.

For the past several months, there has been no noticeable increase in the amounts of regional one-time sign-up bonuses for contracts with the Ministry of Defense. We attribute this to the negotiations initiated by Trump and the expectation of a potential halt to the war—governors have little incentive to raise the bonuses and create additional budgetary strain if the war may soon end.

However, we are now again seeing an increase in regional one-time bonuses in several regions: the Magadan region, the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region–Yugra, and the Altai region.

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