Sitrep for July 7-11, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy region, a situation is developing that threatens the encirclement of Russian forces in the village of Kindrativka, where Ukrainian troops are advancing from two directions. Although there is insufficient objective control data—for instance, only a video of a Russian airstrike on Ukrainian positions in the forest lines north of Kindrativka has been published—the possibility of an encirclement of marines from the 40th Brigade was also mentioned by pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Radov.

In addition, independent observers have reported a large number of airstrikes being carried out by the Russian Air Forces in the area.

A similar situation was observed at the end of May in the South Donetsk direction, near the village of Rivnopil, where we initially believed that there was no encirclement and that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had already withdrawn from the dangerous area. However, according to DeepState, Ukrainian troops remained in a position that was surrounded on three sides for one and a half months and eventually left it with virtually no losses, despite the extremely narrow corridor for withdrawal.

Apparently, during this war, it becomes possible to witness seemingly dramatical encirclements on the map which do not lead to complete destruction or capture of the surrounded garrison.

East of Kindrativka, in the Sumy direction, the situation remains unclear. Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported that the AFU are making fairly successful advances along the Varachyne–Novomykolaivka line. However, just days earlier, the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces had advanced from Novomykolaivka toward Varachyne. Then, the day after Mashovets’s post about Ukrainian tactical gains, pro-Russian war correspondent Semyon Pegov (a.k.a. WarGonzo) also reported tactical successes by Russian forces near Varachyne. This suggests that both assessments might be partially accurate—if offensives are taking place from opposite directions and the opposing forces are not directly encountering each other on the ground.

The Russian Armed Forces are also advancing in the village of Yunakivka, taking positions in private houses, from which the AFU are attempting to dislodge them using drones. However, it’s worth noting that Ukrainian advances near the villages of Kindrativka, Andriivka, and possibly Varachyne are of significantly greater military importance than Russia’s progress around Yunakivka. The high strategic priority of the Sumy direction is further highlighted by the fact that, according to some analysts, nearly all of the AFU’s assault regiments are currently engaged there, including the 425th, 225th and 33rd assault regiments, as well as the 48th Separate Assault Battalion.

As for the Kharkiv region, where Russian forces recently captured the border village of Milove, debate continues over the objectives of this advance. Mashovets believes that the Russian plan involves converging attacks toward the village of Velykyi Burluk, not only from Milove, but also from the village of Dvorichna in the Kupiansk direction. As evidence, he points to Russian attempts to advance northwest of Dvorichna. However, Milove is 20 km [12.4 mi] from Velykyi Burluk], and Dvorichna is farther away. In the border zone, Russian forces rarely advance more than 5-7 km [3.1-4.4 mi]. Another theory is that the command of the Group of Troops "North," which operates in the Kursk, Sumy, and Kharkiv directions, aims to stretch the frontline in order to drain Ukrainian resources. Whatever the ultimate goal of the advance into Milove, there have been no confirmed new Russian gains in the area over the past week.

In the Lyman direction, Russian forces have advanced near the village of Borivska Andriivka, south of the village of Lozova. A video was published showing Russian soldiers storming an AFU position. The footage, in our view, indicates signs of a shortage of Ukrainian manpower: Russian assault troops are seen advancing upright across open ground, throwing grenades into a dugout, and killing the Ukrainian soldiers who emerge in the ensuing fight. If a Ukrainian drone operator or machine gunner had been nearby, all of these assault troops could likely have been taken out before reaching the position.

Russian forces have also advanced in the Lyman direction south of the village of Borova, in the area of the village of Zelena Dolyna.

In the southern part of the Donetsk region, where the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets had noted what amounted to a near-collapse of the AFU’s defenses, the village of Tolstoi was confirmed to have been captured by Russian forces. The capture was initially reported by Russia’s Ministry of Defense on July 9. A video has emerged showing tanks from the AFU’s 5th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade conducting a counterattack, supposedly targeting Russian positions inside residential houses in the village. This is yet another example of the continuing relevance of tanks, even amid the widespread use of drones, which are still less effective at destroying enemy fortifications.

Western Assistance

France and Britain have finally resumed production of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles. Ukraine urgently needs these missiles in the current war, and demand will likely remain high going forward.

We previously reported that the Pentagon plans to significantly increase purchases of PAC-3 interceptors for the Patriot air defense system over the next 15 years. Now it has emerged that starting in 2028, the United States plans to sharply ramp up production of PAC-2 GEM-T missiles for the same system. While these missiles cannot intercept ballistic missiles, they could still prove useful to Ukraine.

American military aid deliveries have resumed. Reports indicate the delivery of 155mm artillery rounds and GMLRS munitions for HIMARS launchers, which had apparently been held up in Poland. There is no word yet on deliveries of Patriot air defense missiles.

According to Reuters sources, Donald Trump will allocate a new weapons package to Ukraine for the first time in his second presidential term. The administration plans to send approximately $300 million in aid through the PDA program. While the specific contents have not been finalized, the package may include Patriot air defense missiles and GMLRS munitions. No official information has been released yet, so it makes sense to approach this report cautiously and not celebrate a fundamental shift in Trump's policy prematurely. Nevertheless, most of the team believes that even if this package is not approved, Trump will likely approve a new military aid package in the near future.

Additionally, according to three sources cited by Axios, Trump plans to sell weapons to NATO allies who would then provide them to Ukraine.

Trump stated that he "did not look into" who gave the order to halt arms supplies to Ukraine. The idea may have originated with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, who was concerned about the hypothetical depletion of America’s ammunition stockpiles. He has long believed that the US should be less involved in European affairs. The final decision to suspend the aid was made by Pete Hegseth.

The United Kingdom has signed a long-term agreement to supply Ukraine with more than 5,000 short-range Lightweight Multirole Missiles, a 70mm surface-to-air missile system produced by the defense company Thales. The LMMs are reportedly superior in several technical aspects to the American-made APKWS missiles. Under the terms of the agreement, Thales will deliver launchers, command centers, and missile systems to Ukraine over a 19-year period. The total value of the deal is £2.5 billion ($3.2 billion). In addition, the UK has pledged up to £283 million ($360 million) in bilateral aid to Ukraine through 2026.

Strikes, Shelling and Sabotage

Russian forces are increasingly targeting Dobropillia with fiber-optic-guided drones in recent weeks. Located roughly 20 kilometers [12 mi] from the frontline north of Pokrovsk, the town has come under repeated drone attacks that appear aimed at disrupting Ukrainian logistics infrastructure. However, civilian targets, including vehicles, residential and commercial buildings, and gas stations, are frequently hit. Analysts suggest this may be due to range limitations: as a drone’s battery nears depletion, its operator may redirect it toward the nearest available target to avoid wasting the payload. Russian forces have typically relied on heavy loitering munitions such as the Shahed-136 and Molniya drones to wage psychological warfare against Ukraine’s civilian population. In response, Ukrainian authorities have begun installing mesh netting along roads to shield vehicles from drone strikes.

It has been reported that, in addition to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Mikhail Gudkov, several other senior officers of the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade were killed in the July 2 strike on the brigade’s command post in the village of Korenevo, Kursk region. In particular, the casualties include the brigade’s commander, Colonel Sergey Ilyin—an official obituary has reportedly been issued—the brigade’s chief of staff, Colonel Leonid Bashkardin, and Colonel Nariman Shikhaliyev.

On the one hand, this confirms earlier reports posted by the pro-Russian Telegram channel Severny Kanal [Northern Channel], which claims affiliation with the Group of Troops "North," about the complete destruction of the brigade’s command and the resulting chaos. On the other hand, we are fully convinced that this Telegram channel is in fact part of a Ukrainian psychological operation (PSYOP), and a high-quality one, capable of deceiving many. Such sources may occasionally publish exclusive information, but will also introduce planted rumors when needed. In reality, the Telegram channel affiliated with the Group of Troops "North" is Severny Veter [Northern Wind].

In our previous sitrep, we mentioned the possible use of a Gerbera UAV with a warhead during the attack on the town of Druzhkivka in the Donetsk region. A blogger close to Russian soldiers, Aleksandr "Razvedos" Arutyunov, confirmed that, in addition to various Geran models with warheads of around 50 and 100 kg, there is also a lighter strike drone variant, the Gerbera, with a warhead of around 10 kg. Such a small charge would account for the limited damage observed in Druzhkivka.

In the early hours of July 10, a large-scale aerial attack involving drones and missiles targeted Kyiv, resulting in confirmed strikes on multiple industrial facilities. Satellite images from NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) showed fire hotspots on the territory of the Artem plant, the Kuznya on Rybalsky shipyard, Kyivmetrobud, the Kyiv Central Design Bureau of Valves, the Merydian radio plant, and a garage complex. As of the evening of July 11, there is no data on the extent of the damage.

The number of Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions and Gerbera UAVs simultaneously employed by Russia continues to grow. In the early hours of July 9, a total of 728 UAVs were launched, primarily targeting Lutsk in the Volyn region. By the end of summer, we can expect over a thousand drones to be used in a single attack.

In the wreckage of a downed Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition near Kyiv in the early hours of July 4, a part bearing the markings of the Chinese manufacturer Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Co., Ltd. was found. The production date was less than two months prior, on May 25. This suggests that the drones are not stockpiled long-term, but rather are immediately put into action.

On July 10 in Kyiv, Colonel Ivan Voronich of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was killed. It is reported that Voronich was a founder of a division within the SBU that "now causes a lot of problems for Russians." This likely refers to sabotage and operations within Russia, such as the Spiderweb operation.

Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] reported that in Ivanovo, 55-year-old Mikhail Ryumin from Chelyabinsk has been arrested for an act of terror committed in a group, part "a" of Article 205 of the Criminal Code. Ryumin was a truck driver transporting drones for the Spiderweb operation. He was unaware of the cargo and is considered an incidental witness, but is likely to receive a long sentence as a participant in the crime, as the FSB must show some progress in this high-profile case despite being unable to arrest the actual organizers and perpetrators of the sabotage.

The FSB stated that it had killed a saboteur who, according to its report, was preparing to blow up a railway bridge in the Saratov region. The released footage shows the individual returning fire during the detention, rather than already being killed, as is often the case.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

The Idite Lesom! [Flee through the woods/Get lost you all] Telegram channel and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors, a human rights organization supporting those who refuse to perform military service, report that the Unified Military Register—the register of Russians subject to military service [digital system to identify citizens subject to military service and serve draft notices]—has begun operating in some regions. At the same time, the Draft Register has not yet been launched, and receiving a notification via the Gosuslugi public services portal should not be considered equivalent to being served a draft notice. The Unified Military Register is merely an informational system for maintaining military records, and being listed in it does not impose any legal obligations. Even its full implementation does not pose a serious threat to those liable for military service. The main concern lies in the upcoming launch of the Draft Register.

The MoD and MinTsifry [the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of Russia] have introduced the capability to instantly confirm a serviceman’s participation in the "special military operation" online. This development is likely connected to the launch of the Unified Military Register.

The spring regular conscription campaign ends on July 15, and the fall regular conscription campaign will begin on Oct. 1. By that time, the electronic Draft Register may also be operational.

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