Sitrep for July 28-August 1, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy direction, Russian offensive operations continue on the eastern flank, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine are counterattacking on the western flank. In recent days, videos have surfaced showing Russian airstrikes and MLRS attacks on AFU positions near the villages of Andriivka and Kindrativka, geolocated north of the previously known frontline. This indicates the success of Ukrainian counterattacks.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed that the town of Chasiv Yar has been fully captured. It is worth noting that this town is located on the eastern flank of the Kostiantynivka direction, and fighting for it has been ongoing for over a year. In a video, Russian soldiers display flags southwest of the main part of the town, including at various locations in the Shevchenko residential area. However, according to the DeepState map, this neighborhood is not even located in the contested zone, and Ukrainian sources reject claims of the town’s full capture. For instance, the 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU called the announcement a "PR stunt" intended to cover up failures and losses, and published footage reportedly showing Russian Airborne Troops carrying out "suicidal missions" to display the flag only to be killed shortly afterward by Ukrainian drones (though we cannot confirm the deaths of all assault troops). According to DeepState, Russian troops enter territory not under their control at night to film these flag videos. Meanwhile, over the past two months, analysts believe that the Russian Armed Forces have only made slight advances toward the Shevchenko neighborhood from the northeast and east. A Ukrainian military analyst known as Shalin relayed statements from the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group and Ukrainian units indicating that the AFU are still present in the town. According to him, although the AFU have almost no remaining positions in Chasiv Yar, the RuAF also do not have full control of the town either.

Opinions within CIT are divided. Some members believe that the videos showing flags in various parts of the neighborhood (as opposed to a single flag photo op at a random spot in a settlement, which is often the case) indicate that Russian soldiers are already moving relatively freely through the area and thus may control it. However, the majority lean toward classifying Shevchenko as a contested zone, given that there are no longer any Ukrainian positions in the town. Actual Ukrainian control would be evidenced by the free movement of AFU soldiers and/or vehicles, not just the dropping of grenades from drones. Most likely, in the near future, the RuAF will manage to gain a foothold in Shevchenko, though it is also possible that the Ukrainian command could issue an urgent counterattack order to reclaim the captured positions by sending in reserve units—similar to what happened in the Sumy region.

It is worth noting that Chasiv Yar has already been effectively destroyed and now consists entirely of ruins. As in previous cases, this is the result of over a year of intense shelling and bombing. Against the backdrop of footage showing the devastation, Russian propaganda claims about the “liberation of Donbas” sound especially absurd.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian infantry—still referred to as saboteurs in Ukrainian sources—continue to infiltrate the town of Pokrovsk and have managed to reach almost the town center. The situation in this area is deteriorating: Russian forces are advancing toward the town of Rodynske, the capture of which would significantly complicate the defense of Pokrovsk, as well as toward the village of Dorozhnie, through which a key railway line runs. Residents of the town of Bilytske, located just 2.5 km [1.55 mi] from Dorozhnie, report hearing the sounds of fighting coming from that direction. Assault groups can cover this distance rather quickly.

Western military analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, who once again visited Ukraine and discussed the results of their field trip in a podcast, noted, in line with assessments by military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady, that in some sectors only six to eight Ukrainian soldiers are holding one kilometer [0.6 mi] of the frontline, rather than half a battalion as per military standards. The analysts also reported that in a typical Ukrainian brigade on the frontline, they get 10 to one tail to tooth ratio [only about 10% of personnel are in combat roles, while the remaining 90% handle logistics, communications and other support functions]. This severe shortage of infantry is a key factor behind the high sparsity of the frontline, which we regularly highlight.

Lee also reported that small Ukrainian infantry units are often ordered not to engage in fighting with passing Russian soldiers to keep these positions as concealed as possible. Instead, they are instructed to relay information about enemy movements to drone operators. On one hand, this tactic helps preserve hidden positions for future engagements and prevents their destruction. On the other hand, it increases the workload on UAV operators, who now must not only perform their regular tasks but also track and eliminate enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, as they are called in Ukrainian sources, that manage to infiltrate 2-5 km [1.24-3.01 mi] behind Ukrainian lines due to infantry shortages.

Kofman also noted that it is incorrect to refer to the ongoing campaign as a summer offensive, since it actually began in the spring and will likely conclude in the fall, when Russian forces are expected to be exhausted and require rotation, leading to a slowdown in their advance.

In 2024, the AFU expanded its UAV units, which helped offset Russia’s material advantage and Ukraine’s manpower shortage. Drones have become the primary cause of daily frontline casualties, inflicting damage up to 15 km [9.32 mi] deep from the frontline. This capability has allowed small Ukrainian defensive units to hold a frontline stretching over 1,200 km [754 mi]. Since then, Russian forces have begun deploying their own offensive "Line of Drones." Rubicon UAV units have appeared in all Russian groups of troops and have become the most discussed threat to the AFU along the frontline. These units focus on severing Ukrainian logistics using fiber-optic drones operating 20-25 km [12.4-15.5 mi] behind the frontline, destroying Ukrainian drone operator positions and intercepting UAVs. Overall, Russian drone forces are now significantly better organized.

According to Kofman, the most serious threats on the frontline currently include the near-complete encirclement of Pokrovsk, the emerging pocket around the town of Kostiantynivka, and ongoing fighting near the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regions around the village of Novopavlivka. Russian forces attempt to stretch Ukrainian reserves by launching attacks along the Dnipro River in the Zaporizhzhia region—specifically toward the village of Plavni and the village of Stepnohirsk. The primary task of Ukrainian infantry remains to prevent Russian assault troops from gaining a foothold, particularly in the basements of ruined buildings.

According to Kofman, the current structure of the frontline consists of positions held by two to three soldiers with large gaps between them, marking a fundamental shift from previous conflicts, especially World War I, to which this war is often compared. Soldiers now consider trenches and other traditional open-top field fortifications unacceptably dangerous, even suicidal. Instead, the frontline is composed of well-fortified and camouflaged firing positions in forests, tree lines, buildings and ruins, where infantry are often ordered not to expose themselves unless absolutely necessary. This confirms our earlier hypothesis expressed in previous sitreps that the frontline is quite porous. According to Kofman, Russian attacks are sometimes conducted by groups of four to six soldiers, though increasingly these are groups of two to three soldiers attempting to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions. They advance in short bursts—approximately 50 meters at a time—survey the area, then dash forward again in an effort to breach the defensive line and gain a foothold.

Their main objective is to penetrate as far as possible beyond the first line of defense and gain a foothold there. Similar tactics are employed in assaults using motorcycles and buggies. Most such attacks fail, but not all, and when successful, they result in small tactical gains for the RuAF. The artillery fire rate, which was a key factor in 2022-2023, is now less significant, as drones are responsible for over 80% of casualties. Nevertheless, artillery still plays a key role in suppressing enemy positions and continues to operate even under poor weather conditions.

Kofman emphasizes that the Russian tactic of attacking with small assault groups does not allow for significant operational breakthroughs. However, due to the nature of such fighting, frontline maps may lag behind real-time developments on the ground. As a result, sudden shifts are possible, such as in the Kursk region, where the Russian army initially advanced very slowly, but then rapidly seized a large area after gaining control of the Ukrainian supply routes.

According to Kofman, the main problems facing the Ukrainian army at the moment stem from a policy of holding every position—even under near-complete encirclement or on unfavorable terrain—a mindset he refers to as “Bakhmut Syndrome.” Rather than retreating or adopting a mobile defense to exhaust the enemy, AFU commanders are often forced to defend unstable lines.

Analysts note that Russia continues to receive large volumes of artillery munitions and systems from North Korea, as well as support from China. In this context, it is worth adding that, according to a report by analysts at the Kyiv School of Economics, more than half of the cargo marked as explosives delivered to Russian stockpiles in 2024 came through the port of Nakhodka—indicating North Korean origin. Regarding China, we still believe this is not official government assistance, but rather the result of permissiveness and insufficient oversight of dual-use component exports.

Kofman sees no signs that the war will be frozen this year. We agree with him—despite early-year assumptions that the war might be frozen by mid-year (a scenario that would have been beneficial for Putin, but as we see, he does not act according to logic).

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of July 31, Russian forces carried out a combined airstrike on Kyiv, with several hits recorded on residential buildings. By the morning of Aug. 1, rescue operations had completed, with 31 fatalities and 159 people injured confirmed.

On July 29, Russian forces struck the AFU training center in the Chernihiv region with Iskander missiles. As a result of the attack, three people were killed and 18 more were wounded.

Following a meeting on training issues, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the training process should be moved underground as much as possible. We believe that transferring many training processes underground (for example, vehicle operation training) is extremely difficult. Instead, it would be more appropriate to relocate all troop training to western Ukraine, closer to the European border. Conducting missile strikes on training facilities in this region would be far more difficult for Russia, as reconnaissance UAVs would need to travel much farther and would face a greater likelihood of being intercepted by air defense systems along the way. Additionally, longer UAV flight times would give troops more time to disperse or seek shelter once air raid sirens are activated.

Western Assistance

Republican Senators Roger Wicker and Jim Risch have introduced the "Peace Act," legislation designed to implement Donald Trump’s proposed plan to supply Ukraine with US weapons paid for by European funds. The bill calls for the creation of a special fund within the US Treasury to receive contributions from allied nations. The US Secretary of Defense would then use those funds to finance contracts replenishing American military stockpiles. Under this arrangement, weapons and munitions for Ukraine would be drawn directly from US Army reserves, while European funds would be used to maintain the combat readiness of American forces. This would enable faster deliveries of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine than if European countries were to place fresh orders with defense manufacturers. The proposed mechanism resembles the previously used Presidential Drawdown Authority, with one key difference: instead of the US budget covering the costs, it would now be financed by European nations.

Politico reports that European countries are preparing to borrow up to €150 billion [$173 billion] from the European Union to fund arms deliveries to Ukraine. Participation in the scheme would give countries access to preferential loans—up to 45 years in duration and with upfront payments capped at 15%—thanks to the EU’s high credit rating. Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Hungary and Lithuania have already officially expressed interest in taking out such loans. Politico also indicates that Czechia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Greece, and France are likely to join the program as well (Politico lists Czechia and Bulgaria in both groups—CIT).

It is worth noting that in 2025, the United States ceased providing military vehicles to Ukraine. Europe has since managed to fill that gap in aid, and next year, it appears that European countries will continue supporting Ukraine using borrowed funds.

Trump announced that he had reduced Putin’s ultimatum to a 10-day deadline and expects a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine to be reached by Aug. 8. At the same time, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States views military conflict with Russia as unacceptable, citing both nations’ nuclear capabilities. His remarks suggest that the current administration, much like the Biden administration before it, is hesitating, possibly out of concern that continued support for Ukraine could provoke Putin and lead to further escalation.

On July 31, Syria’s foreign affairs and defense ministers met with their Russian counterparts in Moscow. According to Syria’s state news agency SANA, the talks signaled a new chapter grounded in mutual respect for sovereignty and shared interests. As CIT’s Ruslan Leviev suggested, anything is possible in the Middle East—and notably, Russia has managed to maintain its bases in Syria under the new government.

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