Sitrep for July 21-28, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Sumy region, attacks on Russian positions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue. Reports of the liberation of the village of Kindrativka, in our view, do not reflect recent changes to the frontline, but rather indicate that pro-Russian sources have acknowledged the loss of the village. The AFU liberated Kindrativka more than a week ago, as well as the neighboring village of Andriivka at the end of June, and are now advancing toward the village of Oleksiivka. According to pro-Russian sources, Russia’s Special Operations Forces have been redeployed to this area. This, along with the presence of most of the AFU’s assault regiments, underscores the high priority of the Sumy direction.
The Operational Tactical Group Kharkiv published a video, filmed in the Kharkiv region, showing a tank and two BTR-4 APCs firing at forest lines. Another tank, according to the post, supported the attack with fire from a concealed firing position. At the time of publishing this sitrep, the exact geolocation of the video had not yet been determined. Although some of the armored vehicles hit mines while the tank was also attacked by a drone, they did not sustain significant damage, thanks in part to the anti-drone mesh and the use of a smoke screen. This episode once again demonstrates that tanks can still be effective on the frontline.
According to the DeepState project, Russian forces have been observed advancing toward the village of Myrne (referred to in Russian sources by its old name, Moskovka) in the Kupiansk direction. This movement indicates an attempt to outflank the town of Kupiansk from the west. Additionally, videos have emerged showing Russian troops in the village of Radkivka, near Kupiansk, confirming their ability to make brief incursions in small groups.
In the Siversk direction, on the border between the Donetsk and Luhansk regions—an area where news has been scarce in recent months—a video was recorded showing a large column of Russian armored vehicles attacking. The column consisted of six tanks, three armored personnel carriers, six MT-LB multipurpose armored vehicles, one BREM ARV, two buggies and 41 motorcycles. The video was geolocated south of the village of Serebrianka. This is an extremely rare instance of an armored vehicle attack in recent times. Apparently, it took place after equipment had been accumulated. Over the past one and a half months, attacks using unarmored vehicles had been observed almost exclusively. Clearly, once the stock of armored vehicles is depleted again, assaults on motorcycles will resume. Similarly, Russia shifts primarily to drone raids when missile supplies run out.
Additionally, footage has been published showing Russian UAV operators attacking a Ukrainian tank in the same direction.
At present, the frontline is so thinned out that full-scale encirclements in the traditional sense are unlikely to occur again. Instead, the opposing forces are more likely to "slip" through each other’s positions. For example, regarding the attack in the Siversk direction, a researcher under the nickname Playfra writes that the RuAF simply drove past Ukrainian positions, then got lost and came under fire from the AFU.
Pro-Russian Telegram channels reported that the village of Oleksandro-Kalynove had been captured in the Toretsk (Kostiantynivka) direction. However, in our view, the published footage does not differ from previously shown fighting videos and does not confirm full Russian control over the village. Regardless of whether Oleksandro-Kalynove is fully occupied, the neighboring village of Yablunivka has already been taken, which cuts off the western approach to the Kleban-Byk Reservoir for Ukrainian forces. The only remaining route for movement, rotation, supply and evacuation of wounded soldiers is now from the eastern side. But since, as elsewhere, the frontline here is sparse, even if the situation on the map appears to show Ukrainian forces fully encircled, it is unlikely we will see close-combat footage involving large numbers of Ukrainian troops, mass surrenders or large-scale breakout attempts.
A video has been published showing Russian soldiers present in the village of Novoekonomichne in the Donetsk region, in the Pokrovsk direction. According to our information, the village may only be partially controlled by Russian forces.
The Ukrainian side reports the presence of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the town of Pokrovsk. However, we believe that these are not actual special forces units, but rather small assault groups that, due to the extreme sparsity of the frontline, have slipped past Ukrainian positions unnoticed and established themselves in suburban areas, effectively operating behind Ukrainian lines. This does not mean they control any part of Pokrovsk, nor that full-scale urban combat has begun there.
Russian troops attempted to build on their gains in this frontline and, having found a weak spot in the defense, launched an attack with a column of armored vehicles near the village of Shevchenko. Reports indicate that one vehicle hit a mine immediately after crossing the line of contact, and a second vehicle was destroyed by a drone.
Just west of the village of Horikhove in the Donetsk region, Russian soldiers have reached the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region—footage has been published showing Ukrainian artillery strikes on their positions. It is worth noting that Russian assault troops first began entering the Dnipropetrovsk region near Horikhove in early June. Despite statements at the time by the Russian Ministry of Defense and Dmitry Medvedev [Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council] about the beginning of fighting in the region, in reality, after a month and a half, Russian forces have only just recently reached the regional border.
A video has been published showing Russian marines raising the St. Andrew’s flag in the village of Maliivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region. We view this not as evidence of full control over the entire village, but rather as confirmation of a periodic Russian presence.
The Russian MoD has claimed the capture of the village of Zelenyi Hai. Several videos showing flags displayed in different parts of the village strongly indicate that it is indeed under Russian control.
Additionally, the RuAF are advancing toward the villages of Andriivka-Klevtsove (former Iskra) and Piddubne.
The Financial Times has published an interview with Austrian analyst Franz-Stefan Gady, who regularly visits Ukraine and closely studies the situation on the frontline. Notably, he challenges the accuracy of the term "summer offensive" when referring to current Russian operations. Gady states that since March, the Russian army has been steadily increasing its tempo, deploying more manpower and equipment and is literally grinding through Ukrainian defenses. However, the key issue of Russian forces lies not in drone vulnerability, but in their inability to "attack in large formations in a fairly well co-ordinated manner." The RuAF "push and they find a gap in the front line, they enter a trench, but because they can only do so in fairly small numbers, the Ukrainians usually are able to block the gap." We agree with this assessment: the tempo of the war has remained nearly unchanged for many months, and we see no evidence of a significant "offensive" in progress.
Gady also highlights serious personnel shortages on the Ukrainian side. In some positions, just eight soldiers are defending a 900-meter stretch of the frontline. Even with artillery and drone support, this is critically insufficient—it is no surprise that assault groups and even armored columns can pass through such positions unimpeded. Under normal conditions, a 1-kilometer [0.6 mi] section of the frontline should be held by around 250 troops (roughly 2 km [1.2 mi] per battalion).
Western Assistance
It has been reported that the long-awaited first batch of 49 decommissioned M1A1 Abrams tanks, promised by Australia last year, has finally arrived in Ukraine.
In addition, deliveries of Patria 6x6 armored personnel carriers from Latvia have been confirmed.
Last week, the US State Department approved four defense contracts totaling $652 million, covering maintenance and spare parts for a range of military systems. These include support for air defense systems, Hawk Phase III missile systems, Bradley IFVs and M109 SPHs.
At the end of last week, Ukraine received a Patriot air defense system. While some commentators suggested this was one of the systems pledged by Germany, analyst Colby Badhwar believes it is more likely a decommissioned Israeli system that was upgraded in the United States.
The Washington Post also published a report detailing how European countries are financing US military aid to Ukraine. According to the article, the weapons will be purchased using national budgets of European countries and coordinated through NATO. Some Telegram channels misinterpreted the article, claiming that Germany had transferred three additional Patriot systems to Ukraine. In reality, the reference was to systems previously delivered.
Roughly two months ago, we reported on Germany’s funding of long-range Ukrainian weapons production, specifically the development of strike drones known as Liutyi and Bars. They are being deployed on the frontline with increasing frequency. On July 26, the Signal plant in Stavropol, which manufactures radar and electronic warfare systems, came under attack. Video footage from the scene shows buildings being hit, though the extent of the damage remains unclear.
A photograph has also surfaced showing a previously unseen UAV, which may be a Bars drone-missile system.
Strikes on Russian railway infrastructure have continued as well. In the early hours of July 27, a traction substation in the village of Oktyabrskoye, Volgograd region, was targeted. Footage from the aftermath shows visible structural damage. According to Ukrainian milblogger Tatarigami, the facility housed signaling equipment critical to train operations along that segment of the railway. Several trains were delayed as a result, though rail service was restored later that day.
Meanwhile, the US-German company Auterion has secured a $50 million contract from the Pentagon to supply 33,000 kits designed to turn basic drones into AI-enabled systems. Reports suggest these drones are resistant to jamming and capable of tracking moving targets at a range of up to one kilometer [0.6 mi]. Whether these claims reflect real-world performance—and whether the contract includes simpler variants—remains unclear.
On July 27, Vladimir Putin marked Russia’s Navy Day in Saint Petersburg. This year’s main naval parade in the city had been canceled following a large-scale Ukrainian drone assault on the region. Separately, on July 24, Andrey Kostin, chairman of the United Shipbuilding Corporation's Board of Directors, declared that it was no longer "worth repairing" Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, signaling that the vessel would be decommissioned.
Three weeks ago, we suggested that Russia might deploy more than a thousand drones in a single wave before the end of summer. In recent days, drone activity appears to have dipped. While a record 728 drones were launched at Ukraine on the night of July 9, only a little over 200 were used on July 26, and just around 80 on July 27. This could indicate that Russian forces are stockpiling drones in preparation for an even larger strike.
In late May 2025, during a prisoner exchange, 21-year-old resident of Chuvashia [Russia’s constituent republic] Aleksey Gerasimov was returned to Russia after attempting to join the Sibir Battalion within the AFU. As reported by the Vyorstka media outlet, upon his return, Russian authorities charged Gerasimov with terrorism and placed him in a pre-trial detention center. Gerasimov crossed the Russia-Ukraine border in early 2024, intending to fight on the Ukrainian side. However, he never saw the frontline. For seven months, he waited for his contract to be approved. Eventually, the battalion’s command handed him over to a migrant detention center, allegedly for "illegal border crossing." Fellow soldiers, however, claim that tensions with commanders over the prolonged contract process may have led to his detention. Gerasimov was ultimately returned to Russia—possibly due to bureaucratic confusion within the Ukrainian migration services. Another theory suggests he volunteered to be included in the prisoner swap.
In a separate case, on July 25, the Leninsky District Court in Perm ordered the pre-trial detention of activist Leonid Melekhin, who had been wanted by Russian authorities on charges of "justifying terrorism." Melekhin was previously deported from the United States. In August 2024, he attempted to enter the US from Mexico but was detained in an immigration facility and ultimately lost his legal battle to remain in the country.
We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.