Sitrep for Aug. 1-4, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Sumy direction, there have been no significant changes in recent days. The situation continues to develop near the village of Oleksiivka, where Ukrainian forces are attempting to encircle Russian marines. Previously, similar actions helped them liberate the village of Kindrativka.
In the Lyman direction (on the border with the Luhansk region), fighting is ongoing near the village of Torske. The Russian MoD had already claimed its capture back in mid-May, but this was not confirmed. According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, it is now possible to speak of a partial capture.
Russian forces have now bypassed Torske from the south and are attacking from two directions.
Next, Russian troops are expected to advance on the town of Lyman also from two sides. After that, the road toward the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration will open up for the Russian Armed Forces. It is worth noting that such objectives have been set for Russian troops in this direction for over two years.
In the Siversk direction, Russian forces continue their offensive using armored vehicles. Earlier video footage showed tanks, armored personnel carriers, and MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicles. Minor advances have only been observed near the village of Hryhorivka, west of the village of Bilohorivka in the Luhansk region.
There are no updates regarding the town of Chasiv Yar; the Shevchenko district remains a contested area.
In the Toretsk-Kostiantynivka direction, the Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed the capture of the village of Oleksandro-Kalynove. However, there has been no confirmation yet and only footage of attacks by RuAF small assault groups with a "flag photo op" in a residential area has been published. Even if the village has indeed come under Russian control, this does not significantly affect the situation in the area as the Armed Forces of Ukraine's supply lines south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir were cut off quite some time ago when Yablunivka was captured.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF continue to bypass the town of Pokrovsk from the northwest with the aim of encircling it. The main objective of Russian troops at the moment is to capture the town of Rodynske and advance toward Bilytske and Dobropillia, which are important logistical hubs for Ukrainian forces.
Apparently, attacks on Rodynske from the Razine area have not been successful, so the RuAF are now advancing on it from the north.
Reports indicate that the RuAF has advanced into the village of Sukhetske, which pro-Russian sources claimed to have already captured.
We assess that after the capture of Rodynske, the situation in Pokrovsk will significantly worsen. As stated by General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, the RuAF continue to employ a tactic of "total infiltration" in the town, which, as noted previously, has become possible due to the AFU's acute shortage of infantry.
In the context of the fighting that has begun within the city limits of Pokrovsk, there is ongoing discussion about the potential use of coal mines for defensive purposes. Underground tunnels have been used both defensively, as seen at the Azovstal Steel Factory in the city of Mariupol, and offensively, as in Avdiivka or Sudzha. However, coal mines are generally poorly suited for this role.
First, this is due to their depth as the mines in Pokrovsk run between 500 and 1,000 meters deep, making it impossible to dig new exits at arbitrary locations. Second, their infrastructure is not designed for military use. Entrances and ventilation shafts are limited in number, well known to the enemy, and vulnerable to airstrikes, which is especially dangerous given the rock's high methane content. While the tunnels could hypothetically be used to transport food and water, they cannot be used to deliver munitions to encircled AFU soldiers.
In the Novopavlivka direction in the southern part of the Donetsk region, the RuAF continue attempts to advance toward the administrative border with Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. DeepState map shows narrow salients forming in the direction of this administrative border, specifically toward the village of Zelenyi Hai, the village of Maliivka in Dnipropetrovsk region, and the settlements of Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove (Iskra before 2024) in Donetsk region.
Such narrow salients are typically formed when Russian assault groups push through gaps between Ukrainian positions. As we explained previously, Ukrainian troops may even receive orders not to engage in fighting. Expanding these salients later proves quite difficult, and the ability of assault troops to hold them is further challenged by Ukrainian drone operators as was the case in Zelenyi Hai, where assault troops initially entered the village and claimed control, but were later pushed out by units of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate.
DeepState also reported Russian advances near the villages of Zelene Pole and Novopil.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the city of Kherson, Russian soldiers carried out strikes on a road bridge connecting the Korabel district (located on an island) with the main part of the city. It is worth noting that the islands in the Dnipro River delta are considered a contested area, as Russian and Ukrainian forces regularly land there. The strikes on this bridge were likely intended to hinder AFU operations on the island, such as drone launches or the deployment of jamming equipment. Air-dropped bombs were used on the bridge: first damaging the surface, and then, reportedly, causing one of the spans to collapse. While pro-Russian sources claim the use of FAB-3000 bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK), we doubt this because both days' strikes involved multiple bombs, whereas a Sukhoi Su-34 bomber typically carries only one three-ton bomb, as far as we know. Therefore, we believe FAB-1500 bombs were more likely used. Although some bombs hit residential buildings near the bridge, most strikes were accurate. Previously, the high precision of UMPK-guided bombs was confirmed by French researcher Clément Molin through satellite image analysis of craters at Ukrainian positions.
We do not expect the strike on the Kherson bridge to prompt strikes on other major bridges within range of FAB bombs with UMPK modules, such as the bridge across the Dnipro River near the city of Zaporizhzhia. The farther a bridge is from the frontline, the more alternative logistics and supply routes are available, meaning that the impact of its destruction would be minimal, even in the event of a complete collapse. It only makes sense to destroy bridges located in close proximity to the frontline.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the strikes on the bridge in Kherson indicate preparations for an amphibious operation or an attack on the city, as disrupting Ukrainian logistics in no way improves the supply situation for Russian forces after crossing the Dnipro into the main part of Kherson.
Researchers from the CyberBoroshno project have identified the appearance of shelters on the runway and in other areas of the war-damaged Donetsk Airport (40-60 km [25-37 mi] from the frontline), based on recent satellite imagery. Presumably, these are storage and launch sites for Shahed- and Gerbera-type UAVs, as well as other supporting infrastructure.
Our team compiles monthly sitreps on attacks on civilian infrastructure, with the last two being record-breaking for the entire period of our monitoring:
– in June, at least 282 people were killed and 1,972 injured;
– in July, at least 335 people were killed and 2,228 injured.
On average, 75–85% of civilian deaths occur in Ukrainian-controlled territory. An increase in civilian casualties was also observed last summer, but the scale of escalation in 2025 is significantly higher. Compared to the same period last year, the number of people killed over the two summer months increased by 25%, and the number of people injured increased by nearly 30%.
It is worth noting that last week there was not only a massive strike on Kyiv in the early hours of July 31, but UAV attacks on the Belgorod region also intensified. The sitreps for July 31 and Aug. 1 reported several fatalities and dozens of injuries. Ukrainian command should consider redeploying drone operators who are not fulfilling combat objectives there to the strategically important Pokrovsk direction, where they could counter the aforementioned enemy "infiltration."
Western Assistance
The German MoD has announced that it is going to deliver two Patriot systems to Ukraine over the course of two or three months out of the German army stocks, with the first launchers expected to arrive in the coming days. According to earlier reports, Germany was planning to supply five systems in total. On top of that, Ukraine will be receiving Patriots decommissioned by the Israeli army that are now being upgraded in the US.
According to Reuters, NATO has developed a new mechanism for military aid supplies. Ukraine will prioritize the weapons it needs in $500 million batches and NATO allies will negotiate among themselves who will donate or pay for the items on the list. The process will be coordinated by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Under the new scheme, NATO allies expect to supply Ukraine with $10 billion worth of weapons, although the delivery timeline is still unknown. We expect that the first packages will arrive in September or October at the earliest.
In response to Dmitry Medvedev’s [Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council] aggressive statements, Trump said that when it comes to nuclear weapons, one must be ready—and that the US is fully prepared—and ordered two nuclear submarines to be deployed to "the appropriate regions." Strategic weapons expert Pavel Podvig writes that moving American submarines closer to Russia does not change the level of nuclear threat to the Russian Federation. Thanks to the Soviet-era Perimeter system (also known as Dead Hand), Russia can simply ignore such actions by the US.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
According to Janis Kluge, Deputy Head of Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the financial burden of military recruitment in Russia has been partially shifted from regional budgets to the federal level. In some cases, regional governments reclassified sign-up bonuses for Ministry of Defense contracts originally listed under "Payments to citizens participating in the special military operation" as "Measures related to conducting the special military operation, using funds from regional debt write-offs." A federal program introduced in late 2024 allows regional authorities to write off up to two-thirds of their debt to the national budget, provided the freed-up funds are directed toward housing, local public transport, infrastructure, and supporting local industries. However, in the case of economically weaker regions, the government permitted these funds to be used for expenses tied to the "special military operation."
According to a source of the Lyudi Baikala [People of Baikal] independent media outlet, regional authorities in Russia’s Irkutsk region are preparing to dismiss heads of district administrations in response to persistent shortfalls in volunteer recruitment. The region has struggled to meet its mandated enlistment quotas, as many prospective fighters have opted to sign contracts in regions offering higher sign-up bonuses. With Irkutsk unable to match offers exceeding one million rubles, local officials are reportedly under pressure to deliver results.
Yevgeny Feldman has released a photo album titled This Is Navalny, now available for pre-order, including within the Russian Federation. Copies signed by Yevgeny Feldman are also available for order.
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