Sitrep for Sept. 24-28, 2026 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
There have been no significant changes along the frontline in recent days.
In the Lyman direction, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine are conducting Operation Vivaldi, on the morning of Sept. 28, the AFU’s 3rd Army Corps reported the liberation of the villages of Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka, as well as the restoration of control in the area of the villages of Karpivka and Novomykhailivka. On Sept. 27, the 3rd Army Corps of the AFU showed the use of ground robots equipped with grenade launchers against Russian Armed Forces positions—effectively allowing positions to be cleared remotely.
The corps’s Telegram channel had previously reported that they can now deploy such robots 10 km into the enemy’s rear using heavy UAVs. Such surprise attacks may look like an infiltration by an assault group rather than the use of ground robots. At the same time, they are not yet capable of fully replacing infantry: their mobility is noticeably worse, especially in wooded areas, among ruins, and around other obstacles. Part of this problem is addressed by accompanying the ground robot with a reconnaissance UAV, which helps the operator navigate the terrain. The 225th Separate Assault Regiment also described similar operations to clear positions, but using drones. The advantage of ground robotic systems over FPV drones is that they do not produce the characteristic sound of an FPV drone, making them harder to detect in advance.
Russian forces are also developing their own robotic systems: the 14th Separate Special Purpose Brigade showed upgraded Kurier robots equipped with thermal imaging sights and twin PKT machine guns. They are intended to be used against UAVs as mobile air-defense systems (possibly near the frontline, where mobile fire teams typically do not go). The advantage of using robots as a replacement for mobile fire teams is that a single operator can remotely control several systems deployed at different positions and switch to the appropriate system depending on the direction from which a UAV is approaching. This is particularly relevant amid a shortage of personnel to protect facilities from UAV attacks. With a sufficient number of robots, a single operator could monitor several sectors.
Ukrainian presidential adviser on radio technologies Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov published a video showing an unusual deployment of an ambush drone: a Ukrainian FPV drone had hooked itself onto power lines alongside a road and was waiting for a target. Ambush drones are normally positioned on the roadside or in concealed positions. Deploying one on power lines gives the operator a wider field of view, but also makes the UAV itself much more visible to the adversary.
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned that China had provided Russia with technologies enabling the production of UAVs that can fly into house windows or building entrances in contested areas and rear areas close to the frontline, wait for enemy soldiers to appear, and then detonate. We have not encountered such ambush tactics so far—only conventional booby-trapping of buildings. However, such tactics are entirely possible. It is unclear to us what specific technologies Zelenskyy was referring to, since all the components required to implement this concept have existed for quite some time. It would only be necessary to program the drone to detonate upon detecting people, which can be done using thermal signatures, sound, movement, or other sensors.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
French researcher Clément Molin published another update to his statistics on Ukrainian strikes against Russian trucks. According to his data, after a rapid increase in the spring and early summer, the rate of such attacks has stabilized in recent months, indicating that the campaign has reached a saturation point. Since June–July, Ukrainian forces have been unable to further increase the number of strikes or inflict devastating damage on Russian logistics. As we have noted, establishing fire control over a particular road deep in enemy territory requires a substantially larger number of UAVs and, consequently, drone operators, making this task unattainable in the near term for either Russia or Ukraine. Although the middle-strike campaign has undoubtedly had some impact, we cannot characterize its effect on supplies to the RuAF on the frontline as critical.
Russian strikes on Kyiv intensified sharply in September. So far this month, Molin has counted 155 Russian strikes on the city, compared with 113 in August and 111 in July. In March, by contrast, he counted only 21 strikes. As The Guardian notes, after a relative summer respite, the Ukrainian capital is once again coming under intense attack.
In Kyiv and the Kyiv region, Russian forces are striking not only military targets but also civilian ones, including gas stations, data centers, internet providers, and mobile carriers. The Russian Ministry of Defense itself reports such strikes, claiming that the targets are linked to the AFU. Damage to telecommunications infrastructure disrupted Ukrainian television broadcasts and other services. On the evening of Sept. 27, Russian forces struck the Stolichny market in Sofiivska Borshchahivka, a village in Bucha district, setting it on fire. The strike killed two people, injured three more, and destroyed market pavilions.
By the end of September, Kyiv and the Kyiv region could, for the first time, rank first in our count of civilians killed and injured, surpassing the frontline Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions.
Military facilities are also sometimes targeted: On Sept. 24, Russian drones attacked the Pegasus Arms assembly workshop in Kyiv. After a previous strike, the company relocated production, but the new site was also hit, and the company temporarily suspended UAV assembly. Relocating such workshops is relatively easy because they do not require large-scale specialized infrastructure.
Russian forces also continue to try both to cut off the western part of the Odesa region from the rest of Ukraine—by destroying crossings over the Dniester Estuary—and to impede overland and seaborne exports. For example, on Sept. 26, the RuAF again attacked the road bridge in the village of Mayaky and, on Sept. 27, struck the port of Kiliya.
In response to strikes on border checkpoints, there has been discussion of relocating them to neighboring countries—otherwise, crossing the border at some of those checkpoints may become impossible. Russian forces, however, are unlikely to actively attack checkpoints in Romania and Moldova (even as another cruise missile struck the Yahodyn border checkpoint in the Volyn region on the evening of Sept. 28).
Ukrainian forces, in turn, are striking Russian defense industry facilities and related production sites. On Sept. 25, UAVs attacked the Iskra plant in Ulyanovsk, which produces microelectronics. The official website of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate states that the plant’s products are used, among other things, in Kh-59 cruise missiles and Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems.
On the same day, the AFU reported strikes on facilities in the Tula region and Voronezh that produce rubber used, among other things, to manufacture solid rocket fuel.
On Sept. 26, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported an attack on the Azov Optical and Mechanical Plant in the Rostov region. The facility produces radar and infrared seekers for guided missiles, thermal imaging devices, and electronics for precision artillery. The strike involved Neptune, Ruta, Palianytsia, and Bars missiles. Satellite imagery shows damage to roofs and some of the facility’s buildings, but it is not yet possible to determine whether production equipment or other critical components were damaged or whether the strike halted operations at the plant.
Donald Trump said that he had asked Volodymyr Zelenskyy to reduce strikes on Russian oil refineries, claiming that the strikes affect the global fuel market. According to Trump, the Ukrainian president responded, "We probably will." However, there are no signs that the campaign has been suspended: on Sept. 25, Ukrainian forces attacked the Perm oil refinery, while on Sept. 26, they struck the Ilsky oil refinery in the Krasnodar region. Fuel prices, however, are affected much more strongly by developments in the Middle East.
By the end of the fiscal year on Sept. 30, the Pentagon needs to allocate another $93 million out of the $400 million appropriated by Congress for assistance to Ukraine under the USAI program. The other $307 million has already been allocated through contracts: deliveries of spare parts, armored vehicles, and other weaponry began in September and will continue through 2029. Such extended timelines are tied to the USAI mechanism itself, which provides for ordering newly manufactured equipment from defense contractors rather than transferring arms from Pentagon stockpiles. Missiles for Patriot air-defense systems are not included in these packages.
More information has emerged regarding the consequences of strikes on Ukrainian metallurgical enterprises. According to Oleksandr Vodoviz, head of the Metinvest Group CEO’s office, five blast furnaces at the group's enterprises and another two at ArcelorMittal's facilities in the city of Kryvyi Rih were destroyed.
As a result, for one week in September, Ukraine produced no steel for the first time in 100 years. The main problem is that blast furnaces are very expensive: the cost of just starting one up is estimated at $50 million, while building a new one to replace a destroyed one will cost $500 million. Investing such sums in facilities that could be hit by another Russian missile is not feasible, since strikes on Ukrainian industry have become systematic and are aimed at inflicting maximum damage on the economy.
Russian strikes on transportation infrastructure and ports create additional problems by making it difficult to export finished products. Furthermore, since the beginning of 2026, exporting Ukrainian steel to the EU has become more expensive due to a new carbon tariff on imports from countries with less stringent environmental standards. An exception for Ukraine could spark protests from European producers who would find themselves at a disadvantage. As a result, export revenues and jobs in Ukraine are shrinking, and a further deterioration of the economic situation could increase the flow of refugees. To avoid this, Europe needs to step up its support for Ukraine.
Russian Sabotage Operations
German investigators link the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation] to an attempted arson in Munich in the early hours of Sept. 3. The perpetrators threw containers filled with an incendiary mixture onto a construction site near the offices of defense companies Helsing and Rohde & Schwarz. Two Bulgarian nationals detained at the scene—a 28-year-old woman and a 38-year-old man—are suspected of belonging to a GRU agent network operating from Slovakia. Helsing supplies drones to Ukraine, while Rohde & Schwarz cooperates with the Ukrainian companies INFOZAHYST and the previously mentioned Pegasus Arms on the development of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems for UAVs.
According to German intelligence services, acts of sabotage in Europe are being organized by a new GRU Special Activities Service. It combined Military Unit 29155, linked to the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal, with the Senezh Special Operations Forces Training Center, and also took over some functions of the FSB [Federal Security Service]. Colonel Denis Smolyaninov has been named as the service's likely head.
On Sept. 27, a "major incident" was declared in the village of Welford near RAF Fairford in southwest England, where US bombers are stationed. Local residents were evacuated, and several men were detained on suspicion of violating the Explosives Act. Army bomb disposal teams examined several vehicles, police established a cordon, and numerous emergency services were deployed to the scene. Details of the incident remain unknown, so it would be premature to link it to the GRU Special Activities Service.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
We still see no direct signs of preparations for a new wave of mobilization similar to that of autumn 2022. However, by the end of the year, coercive and quasi-criminal recruitment of contract soldiers may intensify: regions falling behind their targets are likely to resort increasingly to roundups, threats, and other unlawful methods. For example, Grigory Bityukov, prosecutor of Nizhny Tagil's Leninsky District, proposed abolishing payments to intermediaries for recruiting contract soldiers. According to him, the "bring-a-friend" system has spawned criminal groups that may involve police officers, draft office staff, and members of draft boards. However, the city administration refused to abolish the payments, calling them one of the main recruitment tools.
Pressure will probably peak in October–December, when regions will need to meet their annual targets, and temporarily ease at the beginning of next year. Tenders and mobilization readiness exercises, by themselves, also do not prove that a decision on a new wave has been made; rather, regional authorities appear to be preparing for different scenarios as a precaution.
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